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Abstract
What is the significance of the deployment of madness in the  early Christian ascetic 
experience of holiness? The first Byzantine holy fools – themselves critics of monastic orders 
– represent the consistent and logical conclusion of the theology and practice of the early 
Christian ascetics, and in particular that of the followers of Anthony and Pachomius.  The 
flight to the desert of the first Christian anchorites and coenobites was an attempt to transform 
the experience and theology of holiness in church and society by transgressing the rules and 
thoughts  of  the  city  in  a  practical  outworking  of  negative  theology.  The  transgressive 
behaviour  of  the  holy fools  renewed that  transformation  by accepting  neither  secular  nor 
religious truth and life. Where desert fathers and mothers had transformed the production of 
norms by their obedience and ascetic transcendence of human life, holy fools undermined the 
religious production of norms through their masterless obedience, defeat of vainglory,  and 
foreignness to self. The transformation of the production of ethical knowledge amongst early 
Christian ascetics – through control of passions, representations, and silence – was followed 
through by the holy fools’  apophatic  babble and rejection of  religious  loci of  knowledge 
production  in  liturgy,  confession,  religious  community  and  ecclesial  authority.  As  a 
continuation of ascetic methods of reforming the self’s relation to society by brutal  truth-
telling and truth-hearing,  the holy fools used self-ostracising insult and laughter  to follow 
divine truth into the periphery without legislating universal modesty and submission to group 
truths.  As  such,  the  holy  fools  exemplify  the  practices  most  idealised  in  early  Christian 
asceticism – humility, suspicion of fixed orders and truths, apophatic critique of doctrine and 
legislation – with renewed innovation and commitment to city life. They applied the strategic 
moves and principles of negative theology to the Christian theology and practice of holiness 
through aspiring to desert freedom, the practice of ignorance, and the unserious self.
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Introduction
 The holy fool  is  no stranger  to the modern  world.  The name is  used to describe 
beatniks, truth-telling weirdos, and modern ascetics. It doesn’t matter what you are reacting 
to, so long as you challenge established truths in innovative ways, you are a holy fool.
This study is based on the assumption that it does matter what you are reacting to. The 
starting point determines the range of answers available. Speaking of the holy fools of late 
antiquity in the same breath as modern European gurus and even early modern Russian holy 
fools implies abandoning a specific  starting point.  It makes transformation an unchanging 
absolute rather than a negotiation of particular differences on the basis of shared practices and 
thoughts.
I will here be considering the holy fools of late antiquity and the early Middle Ages in 
the Eastern reaches of the Holy Roman Empire. Their situation is striking not just because 
these figures are the earliest source for the ‘holy fool’, but also because of their starting point. 
The first  Byzantine  fools  react  against  early  Christian  asceticism.  They emerge  from the 
monastic movements of Egypt, Palestine and Syria.
It is the nature of early Christian asceticism that makes what follows more than a list 
of ways in which holy fools differ from their predecessors. At the time of our holy fools, 
Eastern monks and nuns had developed a sophisticated technology of personal and social 
transformation  that  baptised  the  philosophy  of  late  antiquity  in  developing  the  church’s 
theology,  ethos,  and  interpretation  of  Scripture.  Their  holiness  was  characterised  by 
discipline, disconnection, and self-mastery. It is in these terms that the holy fools attempt to 
transform the Christian experience of the holy.
Another  assumption:  the  Christian  experience  of  the  holy is  historically  mediated. 
There is nothing necessary,  nothing timeless about it. We experience the holy – rightly or 
wrongly – in context. Perhaps it will be called a Hegelian starting point, but it is also founded 
on the dogma of the infinity and inexhaustibility of God, who always exceeds and transcends 
our current thoughts.
It is because of the theological practice of the early Christian ascetics that holy fools – 
who  mark  their  departure  precisely  from the  norms,  knowledge,  and  saintly  selfhood  of 
monasticism – are called holy rather than simply foolish. It does not simply take a trailblazing 
holy  man  to  transform the  experience  of  holiness.  It  takes  a  transformed  reception  too. 
“Continuity is but the phenomenon of a discontinuity.”1
I will therefore attempt to draw up the common features and conversions enacted in 
the emergence of the holy fools amongst early Christian ascetics. Shared theologies made it 
possible for contemporaries to identify them as holy; conversions are what catch our attention 
and theirs, constituting a critique that elicits transformation. We could say that the one makes 
them holy, whilst the other makes them foolish.
The task is therefore restricted to the earliest Christian holy fools. Parallels in other 
religions, places, and times are no doubt interesting, and may even help us to understand the 
material in hand. These are not, however, the domain of this study. Two reasons motivate the 
choice:  firstly,  in  order  to  posit  a  genuine  parallel,  a  thoroughgoing  understanding  is 
necessary of each phenomenon, so that the parallel itself adds no new knowledge concerning 
either of them, but mere illustrations of particular features. Secondly, even though the theme 
of this work is ostensibly a set of historical religious figures, my underlying interest is an 
understanding of the experience and theology of holiness, as it is negotiated in Theology’s 
classical era, in the wake of one of the most far-reaching transformations Christianity has 
undergone, namely the birth of monasticism.
Even  this  restriction  is  not  enough,  though.  There  have  been  a  number  of 
interpretations of Christian foolishness that have included everything from Biblical material, 
through Byzantine holy fools, to modern religious radicals.2 These works attempt to draw up a 
Christian theology of holy madness. Whilst useful studies in themselves, demonstrating the 
range of phenomena we are inclined to call foolish and holy, there tends to be very little to 
unite the phenomena described. Christians are called mad all the time, but that doesn’t make 
them holy. On the other hand, counter-cultural holy men and women have emerged, noticed 
and unnoticed,  in most historical  eras, without their  having anything in common with the 
Byzantine holy fools.
Similarly,  madness in itself has been praised as holy in different contexts in church 
history,  without  any  obvious  reference  to  each  other  or  significant  common  features. 
Byzantine hagiographers praised holy fools for pretending to be mad in order to hide their 
holiness;3 Erasmus praises madness because of its refusal of Renaissance theological  self-
righteousness;4 modern  charismatic  Christians  praise  madness  because  it  overcomes 
1 Foucault, 1972 [1961]: 144, my translation.
2Typical examples are the post-modern Phan, 2001 and the historical Saward, 1980.
3Dagron, 1990.
4 in Erasmus, 1989[1510].
inhibitions  for  the sake of  worship.5 Therefore,  this  study will  concentrate  on the unique 
theology of one of these groups – namely the early Christian Byzantine holy fools – in order 
to examine that way of thinking in all its specificity.  The common features of a Christian 
theology of madness will have to wait for another day.
Even at this degree of specificity, however, we will have to make some distinctions. 
The delimiting of this field has caused enormous problems in the secondary literature, and 
any preliminary  definition  of  holy  fools  is  bound  to  rule  out  or  include  figures  that  are 
relevant.  So  I  shall  impose  an  arbitrary  distinction,  and  remain  alert  to  its  contingency 
throughout. I propose to include in this study all hagiography that includes the appellation 
‘salos’,6 which came to be used for holy fools by the Eastern church. Chronologically, I will 
be considering all holy fools up until and including the time of Symeon the holy fool. After 
Symeon, there was very little foolish hagiography until St Andrew Salos, three hundred years 
after Leontius’ silly scribblings.7
This definition has the disadvantage of including certain desert fathers who clearly do 
not adopt the lifestyle of a holy fool.8 Since these instances do not describe a holy man or 
woman pretending to be mad for any long time, we can however discount them from our 
description of holy foolery. We are looking primarily at people who adopt this way of life as a 
vocation rather than as a last resort on one occasion. The other disadvantage is that it excludes 
the story of Antiochus, recorded by Johannes Climacus,9 who pretended to be a fool (e)chxwn) 
for  thirteen  years  as  an act  of  penance.  Since  this  instance  is  set  in  the context  of  early 
Christian asceticism (as the natural step from obedience and enduring insults), this exclusion 
is no disaster.
Perhaps a more controversial decision is to exclude St Andrew Salos10 from this study. 
The parallels between Symeon Salos and Andrew Salos are so striking that any work on holy 
fools that included the one without the other appears incomplete. There are, however, good 
reasons for positing a break at this point.
5 according to, for example, Cox, 1995.
6 the standard Greek term for fools for Christ’s sake: salo/j.
7 The date of the life of Andrew Salos has been the subject of a long debate between C. Mango and L. Rydèn. 
See the discussion in Rydèn’s introduction and commentary to Nikephoros, vit. and.
8 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Moses 8 =  Apoph. Patr. (Lat): VIII.10 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): VIII.13 and  Apoph.  
Patr. (alph): Ammonas 9 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XV.12 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XV.13.
9 Climacus, scal.: Step 4. A possible reference to Antiochus may be behind Symeon’s comments in Symeon the 
New Theologian 1980: VI.8.
10 Text, translation and commentary can be found in Ryden’s edition. cf. Nikephoros, vit. and.
Firstly, and most importantly, Andrew does not arise from a monastic community or 
lifestyle. He receives a divine calling whilst living as a slave in Constantinople. All the fools 
in our period either live amongst religious or have been religious themselves.
Secondly, Andrew – though himself originally from Scythia – does not move to the 
place where he works as a holy fool: he lives in Constantinople both before and after his call 
to be a fool. In contrast, the early holy fools are anonymous and unknown in the place where 
they begin their calling. Symeon, for example, moves from Edessa to Emesa, via a long stay 
in the desert.
Thirdly, Andrew does not resemble a monk, but a prophet. Whilst we can and will 
interpret the early holy fools as adopting a particular mode of asceticism, Andrew Salos is to 
be interpreted against the background of other frameworks. He foretells events in the city, and 
a large part of his life is taken up with an elaborate apocalypse.
Fourthly, Andrew takes foolish disciples. He is emulated. The earliest holy fools only 
reveal their way of life reluctantly and by divine command, and when they do, they do not 
recommend it to anyone else.
These features force me to agree with Grosdidier de Matons,11 who in his seminal 
work on holy foolery and Andrew Salos in  particular  argued that  the hagiography of the 
Mediaeval Byzantine fools is of an entirely different genre and character to its forerunners. Its 
mode of edification is at odds with that of the hagiography of early holy fools. We could say 
that whilst writings concerning Andrew Salos draw the reader into its description, asking her 
to become a holy fool, and thus describable by the hagiographer, the early fools retain the 
reader-text relation. The aim in writing about the early fools is that the reader may know that 
there are holy fools. It is not that the reader may become one.
To the extent that later interpretations of holy fools similarly disregard their relation to 
asceticism, they are similarly irrelevant to this study. It is perhaps surprising to note, however, 
that the link to monasticism is more resilient in interpretations than in practice.  Symeon the 
new theologian, for example, associates pretending to be mad (saloj) not with supernatural 
speech,  but  with a  monastic  economy of  vainglory and control  of  the  passions,  albeit  in 
condemning  the  practice.12 Similarly,  Dostoevsky’s  holy  fools  are  often  (but  not  always) 
11 de Matons, 1970, e.g. on p328: ‘starting out with the most original kind of saint hagiography has to offer, 
[Andrew Salos’ hagiographer] ends up by giving holiness its most banal, conventional, and even most false 
image.’ (my translation)
12 Symeon the New Theologian, 1980: XXVIII.12. Ivanov notes further fool-like activity in hagiography about 
Symeon the New Theologian, which falls outside the confines of this work, for the above-mentioned reasons. 
Ivanov 2006 [1994]: 174-182.
compared with and set in the context of monasticism: the exegetical problems involved in 
identifying  authentic  holy  fools  notwithstanding,  de  facto fools  (who  were  generally 
identifiable and known figures in Dostoevsky’s Russia) appear in the context of monasteries, 
with and over against  the conventional  religious.13 When later  interpetations  refer to holy 
foolishness as a way of relating to Christian asceticism, then, they will also be relevant to the 
study of the earliest holy fools.
What do these restrictions leave us with? If we are to only regard those stories written 
before Leontius of Neapolis that use the word ‘salos’ to refer to those that embrace the life of 
feigning madness for Christ’s sake, a coherent group of texts emerges:
 Isidora of Tabennesiotes, who was abused by her entire monastery for her madness 
until her holiness is revealed by an angel to Piteroum (cf. below, on page 24);14
 Abba Mark the fool  who moved to  Alexandria  to play the fool at  the baths of 
Hippo, and who was discovered by Abba Daniel of Scetis;15
 the anonymous monk living in the community around abba Silvanus in Palestine 
who laughed and fooled around in public, but in private counted his good and bad 
thoughts  by  making  piles  of  pebbles,  only  allowing  himself  to  eat  if  the  good 
outweighed the bad;16
 Symeon the holy fool, whose long  vita  by Leontius of Neapolis17 represents ‘the 
pinnacle of the  literary development of the ideas of holy foolery’18 describing a 
flight from the world through the common life, the desert, and the madness of the 
city, where Symeon mocks, steals, and shits his way through the last days of his life 
in a fest of holy foolishness, always hiding, always provocative.
13 Father Therapon is a monastic authority and holy fool in Dostoevsky, 1994[1880]: IV.1; Semyon Yakovlevich 
the  holy fool  –  though  treated  as  a  prophet  –  is  attended  by monks,  and  connected  to  a  local  monastery:  
Dostoevsky, 2000[1872]: II.5.ii
14 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XVIII.19 Palladius, h. Laus.: XXIV.
15 cf. now the excellent critical collection by Britt Dahlman of the Daniel texts: v. dan. scet. The story of Mark 
the holy fool appears in chapter 2.
16 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): VIII.32
17 Leontius, v. Sym., based at least partly on the short chapter on ‘Symeon the monk’ in Evagrius Scholasticus, 
h.e.: IV.34.
18 Ivanov, 2006[1994]: 130, italics original.
So the holy fools material itself justifies an examination of the texts that appear at this 
time (from the fourth to the seventh century) and location (Egypt and Syria) of transitions: 
from antiquity  to  the Middle  Ages;  from pagan Rome to the  Holy Roman  Empire;  from 
philosophy to doctrine; between the Eastern empire and the orient; between the diaphysite 
orthodox  world  and  the  multiplying  orthodoxies  around  monophysitism;  between  the 
Christian  East  and  the  Muslim East.  It  is  in  this  context  that  the  holy  fools  appear  and 
establish a place for themselves in religious consciousness.
There are generally three academic tasks attempted regarding the holy fools material: 
describing a previously unknown set of texts,19 which has now been largely achieved in the 
online edition of Kreuger’s commentary and translation of Leontius’ Life of Symeon20 and the 
magisterial translations of the sayings of the desert fathers and mothers by Benedicta Ward;21 
identifying  an  historical  and  notional  context  in  which  to  understand  them,  for  example 
amongst the desert fathers and mothers,22 cynic philosophers,23 the religious phenomena of 
crazy-wise gurus;24 and elucidating the significance of the holy fools in the grammar of a 
particular practice or doctrine, assuming the details of a context and logic in order to make the 
meanings of the texts emerge in that discussion.25 Now that we have established the set of 
data, what contexts will we be setting them in, and how will the texts be approached?
A good analysis will have to argue both for a context and for an understanding of that 
context. The reading suggested here will be against the background of Christian asceticism as 
one  step  in  the  developing  conception  of  the  philosophical  life.  The  holy  fools  will  be 
portrayed  as  an  internal  critique  of  Christian  monasticism  understood  as  philosophical 
practice.
The approach will therefore owe a great deal to Michel Foucault’s interrogations of 
philosophical  practice  in  its  relation  to  truth-telling. Foucault’s  historical  writings  danced 
around the Christian asceticism of late antiquity without ever directly addressing it in any 
systematic  study.26 His concerns regarding the literature are fairly clear,  however,  and his 
19 Examples of this approach include Rydén, 1981 Frøyshov, 2003 Ware, 2000 Syrkin, 1982.
20 http://www.escholarship.org/editions/view?docId=ft6k4007sx&brand=ucpress, the online version of Krueger, 
1996.
21 Ward, 1975 Ward, 2003.
22 Gorainoff, 1983: ch. 1 Ivanov, 2006[1994]: chs. 1 and 2.
23 Krueger, 1996.
24 Boutenoff, 2003 Feuerstein, 1991, who is followed by Phan, 2001.
25 Dagron, 1990 Certeau, 1979.
26 Key texts are: Foucault 1979, 1996 [1984], 2000 [1981], 2000c [1982], 2000a [1983], 2000b [1983], 2000 
[1985], 2005 [2001]: lectures on 24th February,  3rd March and 10th March, (2007a) [1980], 2007b [1980], and 
especially 2007 [2004]: lectures from the 1st February to the 8th March, and 2009: lectures from 29th February and 
28th March.
approach to it was demonstrated both in his short analyses and in his work on the philosophy 
of  late  antiquity.27 The  method  adopted  here  is  perhaps  best  demonstrated  in  the  two 
trajectories of Platonic thought outlined in Foucault’s final lecture series.
Socrates’ psychagogical practice lies at the heart of much of Foucault’s later thought, 
stretched as it  was between analyses  of Platonism on the one hand and Kant’s  article  on 
Enlightenment  on  the  other.28 An  important  point  made  in  the  analyses  of  the  Socratic 
dialogues is that the great philosopher is not simply repeating the Delphic command to know 
yourself, but that he wanders the streets of Athens encouraging young and old rather to take 
care of themselves (the “care of the self”: e)pimeleia e(autou). This care generated two major 
implications for platonic thought,  two forms of telling the truth about the self in order to 
mould the aesthetics of existence. Foucault therefore outlines two modes of giving an account 
of oneself.
Firstly, the philosopher can give an account of himself through an understanding and 
elaboration of the being of the soul. Socratic truth-telling gives way to metaphysics. Foucault 
associates  this  trajectory  with  the  Alcibiades,  but  its  trajectory  is  clear  in  neoplatonism. 
Alcibiades was important as a dialogue because it came first in the later pedagogical lists.29 
The truth-telling philosopher works on his way of life by placing himself in an ontological 
order, and by appealing to a different world, the realm of the soul.
Secondly, the philosopher may give an account of himself through a description of and 
work on his life (bioj), the interrogation of forms of life. One’s self is questioned according 
to  the  measure  of  virtue,  but  more  enduringly  according  to  truth.  What  kind  of  life  is 
necessary in order for me to be able to speak the truth? Foucault roots this trajectory in the 
dialogue  Laches,  although its  heirs are the practical  philosophers of late  antiquity,  and in 
particular the Cynics, late Stoics, and early Christian ascetics.
Whilst these two traditions are no doubt related – indeed Foucault’s histories speak 
primarily of the roots of the ascetic tradition in Alcibiades rather than in Laches until the 1984 
lectures – their relation is flexible and varied. There is no specific metaphysic of the soul and 
the other world that applies to one specific way of life. They are reconfigured again and again 
in the history of the soul.
27 In particular, see Foucault 1992a [1984], 1996 [1984], 2000c [1982], 2000 [1983], 2005 [2001], 2009, and 
Pearson 2001.
28 The transition from the one to the other can be seen in a variety of texts from the 1980s: Foucault 1983, 2007 
[1990], 2008: lectures from the 5th and 12th January.
29 Foucault mentions Olympiodorus and Proclus in Foucault 2005 [2001]: 170. See his longer analyses in the 
first two lectures, and comparisons scattered throughout these lectures.
The following analyses of holy fools and early Christian asceticism will be primarily 
guided by the concerns of the latter trajectory. Where theories of the soul and the other world 
are treated, it will be for the sake of the understanding of the truth-telling that concerns and is 
produced by the true way of life.
A number of consequences follow from this focus. Firstly, the traditional division of 
Patristics  into  the  more  theoretical  texts  of  Augustine,  the  Cappadocian  fathers,  etc  over 
against the hagiographical texts of church histories, stories and sayings of monks, and so on 
will  not  hold.  The  theory  and  practice  of  the  self  are  constantly  playing  off  each  other. 
Metaphysical theories of the other world and the eternal soul have practical implications for 
ascetic heroes, and particular practices of death and hope will sometimes require a particular 
metaphysic, and sometimes allow metaphysical flexibility. Neither can be studied in isolation.
Secondly,  Christian asceticism can not be read as a mere continuation of either the 
platonic tradition or the cynic ascetic tradition. In the monastic Christianity of late antiquity, 
the  possibility  of  truth-telling  required  a  particular  ascetic  practice,  and  ascetic  practice 
produced and assumed a set of truth games. Whilst Cynic philosophers more or less ignored 
metaphysics,  and  neoplatonists  eschewed  the  radical  life  transformations  of  cynics  and 
monks,  Christian philosophers united the life of withdrawal with the life of the soul. The 
desert is where you save your soul.30
Thirdly, theology contains a vital reference to practice in two directions. On the one 
hand,  truth-telling  is  grounded  in  practice.  Only  particular  games  of  truth  and  habits  of 
mastery over one’s thought will allow the emergence of truth about the other life of God and 
the soul. On the other hand, life is assessed not only against the standards of truth, but against 
those of the divine life. In short, truth produces and is produced by holiness.
Illustrations of this principle can be found in the analysis of dispassion (below, section 
2.1.2:  Death:  escaping  from  ethics).  The  notion  of  the  dispassion  of  God  has  troubled 
theologians  for  some  time.  Grounding  it  in  the  practice  of  dispassion  will  add  to  our 
understanding  of  how  ancient  theologians  thought  through  the  attribute,  for  example 
demonstrating that it  is by no means incommensurate with love, that it  is concerned with 
social  convention,  manipulation,  and  knowledge.  On the other  hand,  the  practice  itself  is 
driven to a great extent because of the theology of divine impassibility.
A  further  illustration  concerns  the  account  given  below  of  negative  theology,  or 
apophaticism (section  I.2.1  below).  Whilst  the  theme will  first  be confronted  in  practical 
30 Foucault 2009: 228.
terms – the rejection of the city, particular forms of life, and conventional shapes of holiness 
as  non-divine  –  ascetic  practice  is  both  driven  by  and  a  mode  of  producing  intellectual 
apophaticism. For this reason, we will first confront it in the section on ways of transforming 
norms and then later in the description of the transformation of knowledge.
Foucault himself did not directly address the emergence of early Christian asceticism 
(by which I mean both the anchoritic movements of Anthony and the cenobitic institutions of 
Pachomius  as  they arose in the Eastern  stretches  of  the Empire  at  the  turn of  the fourth 
century), he challenged his hearers to take it seriously, and confessed that what he was saying 
on the subject was highly provisional.31 For these reasons, the following analyses will not be 
restricted to Foucault’s own conclusions, for the following reasons.
Foucault’s  concern  with  Christianity  was  determined  by  surrounding  analyses.  So 
instead  of  establishing  fine  lines  of  logical  progression in  thought  and practice,  he  often 
presented Christianity as a fairly flat figure stretching from late antiquity to the Renaissance. 
A case in point is his account of obedience. He describes the practice of total obedience as a 
precursor to the governmental systems that united practices of asceticism to civic loyality. To 
this purpose, Foucault’s histories portray one form of obedience to ecclesiastic authorities as a 
mode of heteronomy. In fact, obedience was only allied to institutional hierarchy in certain 
contexts  (namely  particular  cenobitic  institutions)  and  some  time  after  the  emergence  of 
monasticism.  The  obedience  elaborated  as  a  practice  of  the  self  amongst  early  Christian 
ascetics was long entirely independent of ecclesiastical order, and chapter one below sets out 
a  grammar  of  obedience  at  odds  with  Foucault’s  depressing  picture  of  a  governmental 
technique that in practice undermined the self confidence produced by mystical experience.32
Instead of aping Foucault’s critical studies, then, we will embrace his program of re-
launching the question of what way of life is necessary for telling the truth, what techniques 
allow  a  transformation  of  morals,  and  what  relation  to  the  self  is  generated  by  these 
transformations? We will examine the hagiographical and theoretical reflections on asceticism 
as interrogations of life and self.
The question that is being asked throughout these tasks is: what is the significance of 
the deployment of madness in the Christian experience of holiness? Addressing this question 
will further involve steering between the two tendencies to assert an absolute break with the 
contemporary religious practice, and so to deny the fool’s holiness, and the tendency to claim 
31 In Foucault 2009: 290.
32 Foucault 2009: 302-308. Cf. also the governmental analysis of obedience in lectures of Foucault 2007 [2004]: 
22nd February and 1st March.
complete  continuity  with  existing  experience  of  holiness,  and  so  to  deny  the  fool’s 
foolishness.
The  identification  of  transformations  in  the  experience  of  holiness  presents  three 
primary sub-questions:
1. How are the norms of the holy and the unholy transformed?
2. How is the knowledge of the holy transformed?
3. How is the relation of the self to society in its holy and profane manifestations 
reconfigured?33
Because  these  three  elements  of  experience  –  norms,  knowledge,  and  the  self’s 
relation to society – are all addressed at a profound level by the early Christian ascetics, the 
transformation  elicited  by the holy fools is  unlikely to be limited  to simple  transitions  in 
practical norms, the assertion of one voice in the discussion of religious knowledge, and the 
institution of one new social form of religion. Instead, attention will be directed to the ways in 
which early Christian ascetics and holy fools alike transform and undermine the activities that 
make  norms,  knowledge,  and  the  self-society  relation  possible.  What  does  this  mean  in 
practice?
1. In addressing norm-making activities, the holy fools insert their abnormality into the 
way of life of the desert fathers and mothers through their development of the discipline of 
obedience, their practices of radical dissociation, and their solutions to the practical problem 
of vainglory. These disciplines are themselves practices that make it possible to take a critical 
stance to systems of norms. Obedience – a dominating theme throughout ascetic literature in 
late antiquity and the early middle ages – denies the necessity of an agent’s actions being 
entirely motivated by their own will. By bracketing the moral judgment of the obedient monk 
or nun, a space for critical  assessment  of that  judgment  is  carved out.  Dissociation has a 
similar function, where the moral agent becomes a stranger to herself in order to work on her 
thought  and action,  and how they relate  to  one another.  The problem of vainglory is  not 
simply concerned with morality, but the effects a moral action can have on the self. These are 
all disciplines that work on norm-making activity. They do not merely change the morality 
33 The axes used here are adapted from those outlined by Foucault in his lectures of 1983: cf. Foucault, 2008: 
4-7.
they have received. They are ways in which morality as such can be examined, assessed, and 
transformed.
Against this background, the holy fools appear as challenging the holiness of ascetic 
norm-making activity. They clearly embrace aspects of the religious life, but in such a way as 
to  clash with the values  and traditions  of mainstream Christian  monasticism.  By echoing 
classic instances of obedient acts, practising absolute dissociation, and playing around the sin 
of  vainglory,  they modify  the  way in  which  holiness  had  come to  be experienced.  They 
represent a challenge to Christian asceticism from within. This challenge is the subject of part 
one.
2. How is knowledge of the holy produced and transformed by the holy fools? A key 
mode  of  gaining  control  over  the  production  of  knowledge  amongst  the  early  Christian 
ascetics was mastery over the passions. Disciplines and practices were deployed to have an 
effect on passions, which in turn allowed the thinking agent to exercise choice on how things 
were represented. The ascetic production and critique of knowledge was activated both in the 
realm  of  social  knowledge  –  reconceptualising  money,  gender,  politics  –  and  in  that  of 
theology.
The holy fools continue this program of denying the institutions and practices that 
support knowledge by questioning the knowledge of both the religious and secular realms. 
They undermine  the  practices  and knowledge that  configure gender,  market,  and religion 
through  playing  with  and  making  contingent  divisions  that  seemed  necessary.  In  their 
freedom from passion, they refuse to let holiness underwrite the present. God-talk takes place 
within the context of established values and meanings. The attribution of goodness to God 
then orders hierarchies of goodness and godliness in the world. In this respect, the social order 
of Christendom in late antiquity was a theological order. Holy fools can be seen enacting a 
practical apophatic theology that takes seriously the challenges posed by the conventions and 
practices intertwined with meanings and utterances. With their denial of forms of life and 
their play on religious acts, they perform the twin elements of apophaticism: critique and play, 
or the  via negativa and the  via dissimilis.  It  is  such practices  of knowledge that  we will 
discuss in part two.
3. The holy fools address the problem of the self’s relation to society by their approach 
to  the  universal  demand  of  holiness.  The  early  Christian  ascetics  had  appropriated  the 
philosophical  technique  of  fearless  speech  by  transforming  it  into  a  hermeneutic.  The 
Christian is obliged to hear true speech from anyone. The location of heroic knowledge had 
thereby been transferred from the individual philosophical speaker to the mass of listeners, 
thus posing the problem that had been underlying ancient philosophy ever since Socrates: if 
social and personal transformation is to be valued, who is to be required and who enabled to 
attain to those values?
The issue determines the holiness and the possibility of holiness for both religious and 
secular.  If  the  infinite  demands  of  self-knowledge and self-transformation  are  universally 
obliging, then everyone has to be a monk. If they apply only to a few, then the political and 
personal power that results from philosophical and ascetic techniques is restricted to a few 
aristocrats. These problems are particularly relevant to the range, public communication, and 
obligations  of  the  dogma,  techniques,  and  experts  of  philosophy,  and  are  relevant  as  a 
framework  of  interpretation  both  for  ancient  truth-telling  techniques  and  for  ascetic 
techniques of ethics like the humour and humility of early Christian ascetics and holy fools. If 
humility is a resource for the bracketing and transformation of norms and knowledge, how is 
that resource affected if it becomes a demand rather than a choice? And what are the political 
implications of restricting the demand to a specific group of religious?
The  holy  fools’  response  to  the  challenge  of  universal  asceticism betrays  a  more 
sophisticated approach to the self’s relation to society than might be expected (outside the 
ecclesiological debate taking place at the time between Augustine and Pelagius). In particular, 
their practice of humility owes more to their fidelity to the Christian story than to the political 
and utilitarian techniques of their secular counterparts. As such, they are acutely aware of the 
dangers of ascetic and philosophical accounts of the self that appeal to a momentous identity 
that must be defended and taken seriously. These problems and issues are addressed in part 
three.
All these three questions – concerning norms, knowledge, and the self’s relation to 
society  –  are  part  of  a  larger  investigation:  what  role  does  the  asceticism inhabited  and 
transformed by the holy fools play in the theology and experience of holiness of their time? In 
order to make sense whilst treating the historical problems of the background and contribution 
of holy fools, I will need to assume an understanding of asceticism. It is unavoidable – and 
desirable – that the understanding of asceticism be transformed by these accounts. It is also 
necessary to mark out a starting point.
In what follows, I will start by assuming that asceticism is a form of self-training that 
encompasses techniques of physical  regulation (what one eats, where one stays,  what one 
produces and says) and rational practice (what one thinks and says, how one feels, when and 
to whom one gives an account of oneself) with a view to determining the shape of one’s life. 
In the context of the Christian tradition, I am particularly interested in those who aspired to 
live  a  ‘philosophical  life’,  cultivating  virtual  and  real  solitude  and  practicing  spiritual 
disciplines such as fasting and regular prayer. This tradition culminates in, but is not restricted 
to, the two precedents set by Pachomius (who founded monastic institutions of the common 
life – the ‘cenobites’) and Anthony (who initiated the tradition of Christian desert hermits – 
the ‘anchorites’). It is to the immediate forerunners of these (e.g. Origen, Clement) and more 
importantly their explicit successors (e.g. the desert fathers and mothers, Basil of Caesarea, 
Evagrius of Pontus) that I refer when I mention ‘early Christian ascetics.’
This is not to say that the thesis is purely concerned with practical matters rather than 
theoretical – orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy, as theologians have become accustomed to 
divide  the  field.  It  is  doubtful  whether  this  kind  of  division  is  ever  valid:  certainly  the 
purposes of this discussion would be hopelessly thwarted if we were to think the practical 
elements entirely independently of the dogmatic, or vice versa. Indeed, to take one example, 
the discussion of dispassion (Greek:  apatheia) has been repeatedly confused in secondary 
literature by ignorance of either practical or dogmatic issues, instead of letting ascetic practice 
throw light on the dogma of God’s impassibility, and vice versa. A proper integration of these 
issues will  attribute to dispassion a clearer relation to love, and to practical dispassion its 
active character (on which, cf. below, on page 101).
Studying  Christian  theology  and  experience  of  holiness  will  require  dovetailing 
considerations of practice and theory. Recent theories of holiness have been dominated by the 
description  of  experience:  holiness  has  become  the  preserve  of  anthropologists  and 
phenomenologists.  In  what  follows,  these  approaches  are  partially  undermined,  partially 
transcended.  Undermined  because  there  is  no  theory  of  an  ahistorical,  non-transformable 
founding subject behind the account given here of norms, knowledge, and self and society. 
Everything is negotiated.  Transcended because the objects  of study are taken seriously as 
theoreticians of holiness rather than simply vessels of experience.
The  experience  of  holiness  is  intimately  involved  with  the  knowledge  of  God. 
Theology and holiness are inextricably linked. For all their reticence regarding the discussion 
of God-talk, the desert fathers and mothers alter the way in which theology is thought by their 
transformation  of  the  practice  of  holiness.  Witnesses  can  be  found  to  this  historically  – 
Athanasius’ thought was influenced enormously by his relationship with Anthony the Great 
and his own encounter with the desert – and logically – the characteristics of a holy God that 
are ruled out by theology are bound to be selected according to criteria determined by one’s 
experience of holy renunciation. Linguistic reference is part of an entire language, and there 
are no sections of a language that are entirely segregated from the whole,  least  of all the 
various elements of religious language.
One final note on the normativity of the holy fools. Whilst I have focused on these 
particular figures out of scholarly affection, I am not attempting here to present them as model 
theologians  or Christians.  I do not claim to ‘have found, on all  essential  points,  the final 
solution of the problems’ of Theology with this thesis.34 Instead, the portrayal of asceticism 
throughout the work attempts to steer between the doxological view of asceticism that has 
become typical of certain ‘poetic’ ethical thinkers,35 and the unquestioning critical view that 
assumes we know precisely what is wrong with asceticism without having to state it.
In theological terms, this thesis is written under the aegis of the doctrine of creatio ex 
nihilo. Nothing is assumed to be evil at the outset, but neither is anything unambiguous. Even 
the modern prison can be a tool for art and a beautiful life36; even heartfelt worship of God 
can  become  the  context  of  oppression  and  slavery.  A  paradigmatic  case  of  non-evil 
ambiguous practice is the ascetic aspiration to humility.
Humility is a recurring theme in this thesis. It is the virtue lying behind the critique of 
norms  inherent  in  the foolish rejection of  vainglory in  part  one;  it  drives the positing  of 
contingency in the critique of knowledge in part two; it ultimately becomes problematic as 
constituting the relation of the self to society in part three. It plays a vital distinguishing role 
in the practice of negative theology: is God unknowable because our knowledge is faulted or 
because She is mysterious?37 It is the main objective of most of the ascetic techniques we shall 
speak of in this study. It is also, however, a main objective for techniques of governmentality: 
that we should know our tiny and insignificant place in the world. The negotiation of these 
difficulties  – between abandoning humility and manipulating it;  between espousing it  and 
enforcing it – is an ongoing problem solved neither by the holy fools nor by any theory of 
asceticism that I have encountered.
The merit of the holy fools is their assertion of contingency in an established ascetic 
order. The contemporary relevance of this study of asceticism could be brought out by a study 
34  Wittgenstein, 1961[1921]: introduction.
35 This would apply to anyone wanting to construct their ‘life as a work of art’, but I am thinking specifically of 
Nehamas, 1998 McGushin, 2007 O'Leary, 2002.
36 see Oscar Wilde’s ecstatic appreciation of his prison experience in de profundis: Wilde, 2007[1913].
37 This is the theme in Turner’s recent magisterial treatment in Turner, 2004, where he suggests that we should 
not think God to exist in a banal contained way, but that we have never really understood existence.
of the ways in which we are tempted and required to reflect upon our own training of the self 
today,  which  could  include  analyses  of  popular  psychology,  secular  repentance,  care 
institutions, or national insurances.38 In order to see how these disciplines are neither evil nor 
unambiguous,  though,  they  will  have  to  appear  in  their  contingency  and  exposure  to 
description.  In short,  their  holiness must  be taken away.  It  is precisely this process – the 
deprivation of the holiness of everyday values – that the holy fools enable. Not in order to 
condemn (monks, for example, are both ridiculed and commended), but in order to clear a 
space for thought, laughter and evaluation. In order to see the world as creation: as divine, but 
not God.
It is in the context of this ambiguity and art that the holy fools have a great deal to say 
about  contemporary  and  ancient  asceticism,  through  their  infinite  demands,  their 
transcendence of ethics, their laughter, and their mockery of heterogeneity. That is the tenor 
of my dodgy doxology.
38 in short, it could include all the devices and domains studied by contemporary governmentality studies (I am 
thinking particularly of those inspired by foucauldians Colin Gordon and Nikolas Rose), for which, see Barry, et 
al., 1996 Burchell, et al., 1991.
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1: Becoming Unnormal
Wit, an ‘t be thy will, put me into good fooling! Those wits that think they have thee, 
do very oft prove fools; and I, that am sure I lack thee, may pass for a wise man; for 
what says Quinapalus? ‘Better a witty fool than a foolish wit.’1
What is the nature of the transgression of holy fools? At what level is their challenge 
to the norms of their ascetic background pitched? How do they conform to and transform the 
tradition of ascetic self-ostracism, and what practices allow this transformation?
In this first part, we will address the way in which norms are formed, enforced, and 
transgressed in the ascetic context in which holy fools narratives are set. We will set aside the 
various debates on specific casuistry – how long a monk should fast for, how to deal with 
persistent family trouble, whether to visit other monks – and focus on attitudes to rulings, 
issues of conformity, and the judgement of success and failure in ascetic morality. Attention 
will  in  this  way not  simply  be paid to  the fact  of  the  transformation  of  holiness,  but  its 
technology.
In order to examine norms at such a level, we will first elucidate a prominent mode of 
moral  action  in  the  asceticism of  late  antiquity,  namely  obedience,  and  ask  how  it  was 
transformed in the tradition of the holy fools. Then we will turn to the minimalist trend in 
monasticism, and in particular what was reserved from the maxim to renounce all received 
norms. This will reveal an entire economy of conformity and transcendence regarding ascetic 
rules.  Finally,  we  will  address  two interpretations  of  holy  fools’  relation  to  their  ascetic 
background, in terms of the casuistry of vainglory (itself a mode of relating to moral value), 
and the practice of dissociation from self and society.
A note on ascetic sources: this part will primarily consist in an interpretation of the 
Apophthegmata Patrum collections.  A strange choice,  perhaps, because they are famously 
unreliable as historical material.2 They originated as oral tradition, and we only have textual 
translations.3 They cover an extensive period of time (at least the length of the fourth century), 
and there is substantial evidence of heavy editing on the part of later generations.
1 Shakespeare, 1998: II.5
2 See Rubenson, 1995: 189 for some reasons for this.
3 Introduction to the textual  problems can be found in Guy’s  introduction to the Greek Systematic  texts,  in 
Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): 23-35, and in Chryssavgis, 2003: 9-11 Harmless, 2000: 484-486.
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Their status in the tradition, however, is unparalleled. Later witnesses such as Zosimus 
(fl. 475-525)4, fathers Barsanuphius and John (fl. 520-550?)5, John Moschus (fl. 578-619)6 and 
Johannes Climacus (575-650)7 demonstrate the stature of the texts in the period of Symeon of 
Emesa (portrayed as living around 550; presented by Evagrius Scholasticus as a contemporary 
of  Barsanuphius)  and  his  hagiographers  (Evagrius  Scholasticus,  fl.  590-600;  Leontius  of 
Napolis,  fl.  641-649).  The fame of the desert  fathers  and mothers  (who are more  or less 
defined for later generations by these texts) was such that some of the most renowned church 
fathers and mothers (Jerome, Evagrius Ponticus, John Chrysostom, Cassian) were connected 
to them. We also have records of various journeys into the desert on the part of prominent 
theologians and Christian figures.8 There is good reason to believe that versions of these texts 
were being read by those who read holy fool hagiography, and indeed those who witnessed 
holy fools (to the extent that the hagiography reflects historical experience).
It should further be noted that the very earliest holy fool – which is to say (in this 
thesis), the first story illustrating the word ‘salos’ – comes from a story which found its way 
into  the  Latin  collection  of  the  Apophthegmata  Patrum.  The  story  of  the  nun  from the 
Tabennesiotes  cloister,  whom later  tradition named Isidora,  is probably to be found in its 
earliest form in Palladius’ Lausiac History.9 It soon arrived in the Latin tradition, however (as 
the Latin collection is one of the earliest versions of the Apophthegmata Patrum), and found 
its place in the  Acta Sanctorum.10 A very similar story was recorded of a nun who feigned 
drunkenness in the Daniel of Scetis hagiography.11 The Isidora tradition has even been argued 
to be the founding text for the Cinderella fairy tale.12
So we will be using the Apophthegmata Patrum, in their Greek and Latin Collections. 
The two Greek collections are arranged alphabetically (with a long section of anonymous 
sayings) and systematically respectively, and the Latin collection is arranged systematically. 
Guy has helpfully appended an index to his critical edition of the Greek Systematic collection 
that  shows  where  the  alphabetical  sayings  are  to  be  found  in  the  Greek  Systematic 
4 Quotations and references to be found in Zosimas, alloquia: I, IV, IX, X, XII-XV.
5 throughout their correspondance,  but note particularly the comments in Barsanuphius  and Iohannes,  resp.: 
prologue, the quotation in 287, and references in 128, 143, 150, 256, 469.
6 Moschus, prat.: 55, 212, 219.
7 who quotes the apophthegmata patrum in Climacus,  scal.: Steps 5, 19, 29, although the historical characters 
and themes are present at various points throughout the work: cf. especially stories in steps 4 and 24.
8 Rufinus and Melania in Rufinus, Hist. Monach.; Cassian and Germanus in Cassianus, Collationes.
9 Palladius, h. Laus.: XXIV.
10 Acta Sanctorum: Maii, I (1968), 49f.
11 v. dan. scet.: 5.
12 cf. Ivanov, 2006[1994]: 51-53. Useful comments on the story can be found in Vogt, 1987.
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collection,13 and by including cross references in the margin of the text itself. There is no such 
index for the Latin collection. These factors all make study of these epoch-making texts a 
little unwieldy.
In order to support my interpretation of the texts,  I  will  be referring to four other 
categories of material:
1. Cassian’s writings, which were written down in Latin some time after his journeys 
in Egypt with Germanus. These are an essential resource, and became particularly 
influential  in the Western tradition.  However, they are so different in form (the 
Institutes14 describe  the  rule  of  the  desert  fathers  and  the  eight  temptations  of 
Evagrius  Ponticus,  and  the  Conferences15 are  presented  more  or  less  as  long 
dictated discourses he had heard in Egypt),  and so influenced by Cassian’s own 
concerns and interpretive framework (largely borrowed from Evagrius Ponticus) 
that they are difficult to relate to the  Apophthegmata Patrum, in spite of the fact 
that both Cassian and Evagrius Ponticus feature as desert fathers in that text.
2. Hagiographical  resources:  Palladius’  Lausiac  History16,  Evagrius  Scholasticus’ 
Ecclesiastic History,17 the hagiographic fragments associated with Daniel of Scetis, 
and  Rufinus’  History  of  the  Monks  of  Egypt18 recount  a  number  of  stories 
concerning the protagonists and context of the Apophthegmata Patrum.
3. Ascetic theorists: theologians such as Evagrius of Pontus and Basil of Caesarea, in 
addition  to  bequeathing  a  number  of  exegetical  works,  contain  a  great  deal  of 
reflection  on  the  day  to  day  life  and  problems  of  anchoritic  and  coenobitic 
monasticism, respectively.  Evagrius Ponticus was located in the Egyptian desert, 
and learnt at the feet of Macarius the Alexandrian and Macarius the Great; Basil 
13 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): Vol. III.
14 Cassianus, de institutis.
15 Cassianus, Collationes.
16 Palladius, h. Laus.
17 Evagrius Scholasticus, h.e.
18 Rufinus, Hist. Monach.
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was based in  Palestine,  and is  largely critical  of  the  anchoritic  tradition,19 with 
which he is nevertheless familiar.
4. Later interpretation: the  Apophthegmata Patrum  provided later asceticism with a 
touchstone for authentic monasticism in the context of growing multiplicity.20 Later 
interpreters such as Barsanuphius and John,21 John Climacus,22 John Moschus and 
those he met in his Spiritual Meadow,23 and Zosimus24 help us to understand how 
the texts were applied and interpreted around the time of the holy fools studied here 
and their hagiographers.
19 e.g. in Basilius, renunt.
20 As described by Evagrius Scholasticus, h.e.
21 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.
22 esp. Climacus, scal.
23 Moschus, prat.
24 in Zosimas, alloquia.
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1.1: Negative Obedience
It  is  remarkably  difficult  to  identify  behaviour  that  would  be  considered  mad  in 
antiquity, given that the practices of giving away one’s money, getting naked in public, and 
living in the desert on one loaf of bread per week – all standard, easily recognisable monastic 
tasks familiar to the Christian of late antiquity – are hardly likely to be counted normal in 
occidental society today! There is an element of modern madness in all asceticism.
The problem is  not unique to modern secular observers though. Indeed,  the desert 
monks appear to have seen it as their lot to be considered mad by the world, as their founding 
father Anthony the Great once put it: ‘A time is coming when men will go mad, and when 
they see someone who is not mad, they will attack him, saying “You are mad, you are not like 
us.”’25 It is possible,  however,  to isolate certain acts  that seem to have been recounted to 
religious and secular alike specifically because of their weirdness. Monks did extreme things 
– even those who were not designated holy fools – for extreme reasons.
In  what  follows,  I  will  give  an  outline  of  the  various  kinds  of  strange  behaviour 
exhibited amongst early Christian ascetics before or apart from holy fools, and determine their 
motivation. The practice of obedience is the main reason for weird behaviour amongst these 
Eastern solitaries, and needs to be understood if the holy fools are then to be seen in contrast 
and  continuity  with  it.  The  stories  of  crazy  obedience  can  be roughly divided  into  three 
categories: transgression, distorted interpretation, and crazy tasks.
What I am calling the category of  transgressive crazy obedience is the command to 
actually break rules and laws. A fairly harmless form of this could be the command to lie 
about one’s own virtue. Whilst discussing this, Cassian records that a monk may lie even 
when speakers are perfectly aware of what they are doing.
For if we also wish to consider what we recall our elders used to do unhesitatingly,  making 
believe  that  their  miraculous  powers  and  their  own  deeds,  which  had  to  be  mentioned  in 
conferences for the sake of the younger men, were other people’s doing – what other judgement 
can we make of these things than that they were downright lies? (2) … For it is more justifiable 
to lie by this kind of deception than either to conceal by an inappropriate silence things that 
could edify our listeners or to brag with harmful vanity by speaking truthfully about ourselves.26
25 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Anthony 25 Hieronymus, ep.: xlv.
26 Cassianus, Collationes: XVII.xxiv.1f, and contrast Augustine’s attitude in Augustinus, mend. discussed below 
on page 166ff.
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This is not a particularly subversive transgression, however, as it is a result of practical 
reasoning based on accepted norms. The monk still lives by autonomous ethics rather than 
obedience. He prioritises one rule over another, rather than undermining a set of rules and 
rule-making practices. It may seem transgressive, but it is hardly weird: when another monk 
draws the  diametrically  opposite  conclusion,  it  strikes  us  not  as  abnormal,  but  as  simply 
interesting.27 There is a possibility for conversation.
Other incidents go further, as they break laws almost gratuitously. Here, the form is 
clear:  a  brother  asks  another  brother  to  do  something,  and  the  latter  does  it  without 
questioning the former’s judgement for a moment.
It was said that Abba Saios and Abba Moue lived together. Abba Saios was very obedient, but 
he was very rigid. To test him, the old man said to him, ‘Go and steal.’ Through obedience 
Abba Saios went to steal from the brethren, giving thanks to the Lord in everything. Abba Moue 
took the things and returned them secretly.28
It  is  not  certain  what  the tradition  thinks  about  this  particular  trend – the story is 
followed immediately in the  Apophthegmata with a story of how Abba Moue abandoned 
Abba Saios  on the road,  fainting  from exhaustion,  and  asked the brothers  to  collect  him 
‘because he is lying there helpless’. Is the radically obedient monk helpless? The point stands 
however  that  transgressive  behaviour  is  recorded  as  being  caused  and  justified  by  the 
principle of obedience. The principle is to ‘obey in everything, even if the matter appears to 
you to be sinful’.29 This should hopefully rid us of the idea that obedience was a necessarily 
normalising force in antiquity.  Obedience as a discipline is in this case independent of the 
moral law or common rule, and sinning against a director is worse than sinning against God.30
The second category,  of  distorted interpretation,  is also recorded as an instance of 
obedience. Monks go out of their way to agree with the verdict of their companion out of 
obedience. This form of obedience can be found both on the part of junior monks (e.g. where 
he agrees with his master’s  identification of a boar as a deer31),  and on the part  of elder 
monks:
27 h. mon.: I.14f; Abba Alonius recommends lying specifically to hide murderers from magistrates: Apoph. Patr.  
(alph): Alonius 4; an anonymous abba lies for the benefit of a soul Apoph. Patr. (anon): 92; Climacus discounts 
lying out of prudent motives: Climacus, scal.: Step 12.
28 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Saius 1.
29 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 288. These matters include murder according to letter 615.
30 Climacus, scal.: Step 4 Apoph. Patr. (anon): 158
31 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Mark, disciple of abba Silvanus 2
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He took the fish, intentionally cooked some of it badly, and offered it to the old man who ate it 
without saying anything. Then he said to him, ‘Is it good, old man?’ He replied, ‘It is very 
good.’ Afterwards he brought him a little that was well cooked and said, ‘Old man,  I have 
spoiled it,’ and he replied, ‘Yes you have spoiled it a little.’ Then Abba Athre said to me, ‘Do 
you see how obedience is intrinsic to the old man?’32
Obedience  for early Christian ascetics  could be associated with control  over one’s 
understanding and perception of the world. There is even an example of two ascetics who did 
not manage to follow this principle, both insisting on their identification of a bird, resulting in 
conflict.33 In  Christian  asceticism,  obedience  exerted  an  influence  upon  knowledge  and 
perception.
By far the most common category of obedient crazy behaviour, however, is that of the 
crazy tasks given by monks to teach their disciples. This kind of story is attested in different 
sources: Cassian34 tells of disciples who water a dry stick (xxiv), throw out their supply of oil 
(xxv),  and  try  to  move  an  enormous  boulder  single-handedly  (xxvi);  disciples  can  put 
themselves in great danger at the behest of their spiritual director:
It was said of Abba John, the disciple of Abba Paul, that his obedience was very great. Now 
there were some tombs thereabouts where a hyena lived. The old man saw some dung in the 
place, and told John to go and fetch it. He said, ‘And what shall I do about the hyena, abba?’ 
The old man said to him, jokingly, ‘If she sets upon you, tie her up and bring her here.’ So in the 
evening, the brother went there. And lo, the hyena fell upon him. According to the old man’s 
instruction, he rushed to catch her. But the hyena ran away. He pursued her saying, ‘My abba 
says I am to tie you up.’ He seized her and bound her. Now the old man was uneasy and sat 
waiting for him. When he returned, he brought the hyena on a rope. When the old man saw this 
he was filled with wonder, but he wanted to humiliate him, so he struck him and said, ‘Fool, 
why have you brought a silly dog here?’ Then the old man set her free at once and let her go.35
At  this  point,  we  encounter  the  entire  spread  of  reasonable  and  unreasonable 
obedience, from the drudgery of serving food to the scandal of throwing one’s child into the 
32 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Pistos 1 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XV.60 = the first part of Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XV.43. 
Cf. also the related story of the father that ate lamp oil given by his foolish disciple in  Apoph. Patr. (anon): 19. 
The tradition is  appreciated  in later  generations.  Cf.  Barsanuphius  and Iohannes,  resp.: 842 – ‘Strive hard, 
however, to reach the point of accepting [the words of the fathers], even when they tell you that darkness is 
light.’ (square brackets original).
33 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Nicetas 1 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XVII.33
34 in Cassianus, Collationes: IV.
35 Apoph. Patr. (alph): John, disciple of Abba Paul 1 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XIV.5 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): 
XIV.4
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fire  (from  which  the  father  is  always  saved,  in  an  Abrahamic  way)36.  The  Systematic 
collections of sayings of the desert fathers have a chapter dedicated to obedience recounting 
these tasks. As we have seen, not all of the desert fathers and mothers restricted themselves to 
reasonable requests.
The significance of these stories emerges both in their parallels with the behaviour of 
the holy fools (elaborated below) and in the way in which they interrupt the ascetic’s normal 
conduct. Obedience brackets the importance of community norms, shared understandings, and 
the sense of human limitation. All these factors license a contingent relation to normality and 
reason, as well as an openness regarding the very practice of establishing and creating norms.
When these parallels are borne in mind, the distinction between holy fools and other 
monks and nuns of the time is not as great. In fact, Symeon the holy fool echoes some of 
these stories in his life. The most obvious one is Abba John’s hyena story, which resembles 
Symeon’s début in Emesa:
When the famous Symeon found a dead dog on a dunghill outside the city, he loosened the rope 
belt he was wearing, and tied it to the dog’s foot. He dragged the dog as he ran and entered the 
gate.37
We also witness Symeon stealing from his employers for no apparent reason. As soon 
as he is paid to sell beans for a bean seller on the street, who had been good enough to take 
him in, he gave out half of the food, and ate the other half.38 Abba Mark the holy fool also 
steals from the market, distributing his ill-gotten goods to the fools that surround him: the 
holy fools cover the category of transgressive crazy behaviour extensively.39 As regards crazy 
interpretation, Symeon accepts the accusation that he is responsible for the pregnancy of a 
woman who falsely claimed to have been raped by him, and refuses to protest his innocence.40
What  do  these  parallels  in  the  contemporary  monastic  literature  tell  us  about  the 
behaviour of holy fools? If there is nothing to separate the holy fool from the odd behaviour 
of his predecessors, why should we mark them out as a group? Having noted the continuity of 
the account, we now need to identify the discontinuity.
The key feature that distinguishes these actions from those of previous ascetics is the 
lack  of  command.  Early  Christians  did  weird  things  in  order  to  obey  their  companions 
36 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XIV.8, 18 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XIV.15, 28.
37 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.145.
38 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.146.
39 v. dan. scet.: 2.
40 Leontius,  v. Sym.: 151 Evagrius Scholasticus,  h.e.: IV.34; cf. similar accounts in Palladius,  h. Laus.: LXX 
Apoph. Patr. (alph): Macarios 1 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XV.25 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XV.39.
31
(usually their superiors) without questioning or judging their actions. The holy fools have no 
obvious reason to do what they do. Their acts defy the interpretation given to those outlined 
above, and the narrator is often reluctant to comment on them himself. Certainly the story of 
the tied up dog has thwarted interpreters eager to see some significance in it.41
If we are to characterise the holy fools’ distinctive behaviour as monastic subversion 
torn loose from obedience,  then this  is  a break from the contemporary ascetic  ethos.  We 
argued above that  obedience was central  to all  instances  of weird behaviour  amongst  the 
desert fathers and mothers. A number of texts witness to the priority of obedience above other 
virtues generally considered synonymous with the religious life: continence;42 self control;43 
and solitude.44
So it would seem that a proper understanding of the holy fools will require a proper 
account of the practice of obedience in antiquity. In the following, I will outline an approach 
to this subject by first clearing the ground of modern problems, and then sketching out an 
interpretation around an unremarkable example of obedience. The analysis will work towards 
an understanding of the strategy of obedience, and its relationship to practices of dissociation.
1.1.1: Understanding Obedience
Obedience  takes  many  forms,  and  Christian  asceticism  has  gone  cycles  of 
transformations and re-creations in its two millennium history. The problems arising from the 
notion of religious obedience today would not necessarily apply to the practices of the ascetic 
communities of the Eastern church.
Firstly, it should be pointed out that desert monasticism did not appear in a vacuum. 
There are elements that were common to both early Christian asceticism and the philosophy 
of  late  antiquity.  Obedience  to  someone  who  hears  and  speaks  your  truth  was  not  the 
innovation of Christian monasticism. It constituted an essential part of learning the life skill 
that led to happiness in antiquity. Patristic appropriation of Stoic techniques of confession, 
moderation and calm did indeed in time introduce a new relationship to the code of the law, 
but obedience to a teacher or guide was already present.45
41 Is the dog a cynic reference (so Krueger, 1996: 100-104) or the god-dog Anubis (so Kislinger, 1988)?
42 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XIV.9. The Greek has ‘ascesis’ - Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XIV.17 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): 
Syncletia 16. Ascesis is also compared to obedience in Apoph. Patr. (anon): 161.
43 Basilius, ascet 2: 2 (enkrateia) Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XIV.7,17 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): 14, 27 = Apoph. Patr.  
(alph): Pambo 3 and Apoph. Patr. (anon): 161.
44 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XIV.19 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Rufus 2 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XIV.29; cf. also Apoph.  
Patr. (alph): Basil the Great Apoph. Patr. (anon): 163.
45 Foucault, 2001: 111.
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Secondly, monastic obedience was not necessarily a virtue connected to a hierarchy.46 
Obedience is praised repeatedly in the sayings of the desert fathers, but these stories never 
include a bishop. In fact, quite the opposite is true: bishops are ridiculed and taunted amongst 
the desert fathers, and considered failures in humility.47 The case is a little more complicated 
with reference to the  abba and the disciple (and particularly in coenobitic monasticism),48 
which  is  clearly  a  relationship  of  authority.  However,  the  number  of  stories  referring  to 
obedience on the part of the abba to a disciple (cf. over, on page 29), and brothers obeying 
weaker brothers49 would lead the reader to believe that  obedience is  a virtue exercised in 
relation to people as such, particularly amongst brothers and sisters, and not solely to those in 
authority.
Three old men, of whom one had a bad reputation, came one day to Abba Achilles. The first 
asked him, ‘Father, make me a fishing-net.’ ‘I will not make you one,’ he replied. Then the 
second  said,  ‘Of  your  charity  make  one,  so  that  we  may  have  a  souvenir  of  you  in  the 
monastery’. But he said, ‘I do not have time.’ Then the third one, who had a bad reputation, 
said, ‘Make me a fishing net, so that I may have something from your hands, Father.’ Abba 
Achilles answered him at once, ‘For you, I will make one.’50
It is worth emphasising this point about the mobility of the relationship of obedience, 
because of the obvious connection it has to a critique of the power inherent in asceticism. For 
some  critical  theorists,  obedience  is  the  decisive  factor  that  turned  liberating  antique 
philosophy into controlling discipline.51 If asceticism is a method for producing a group of 
docile people52 then the value of obedience becomes a tool of societal control wielded by a 
small group. It is oligarchy’s plaything.
Now I think it would be ingenuous to deny that the relationship between two solitaries 
is a power relation as soon as obedience becomes a factor. There are naturally at least two sets 
46 Clark, 1988: 635 Chryssavgis, 2003: 60, although contrast Basil of Caesarea’s writings on the common life: ‘I 
noticed  that  as  long  as  the  common obedience  of  the  others  to  some one leader  was  maintained,  all  was 
discipline  and  harmony  in  the  whole  group;’  Basilius,  jud.: §2;  ‘Since  it  is  in  every  way  fitting  that  the 
community be obedient and under subjection to a superior’ Basilius, ascet. 1. This trend dominated the reception 
history of Christian asceticism: Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 242.
47 Moschus, prat.: 1.
48 cf. the references above, in footnote 46: Basil repeatedly uses the Pauline model of obedience to the secular 
authority: Basilius, ascet 2.
49 e.g. brother Acacius in Climacus, scal.: Step 4. Cf. also Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 212.
50 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Achilles 1 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.18 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): X.18. Cf. also Apoph.  
Patr. (Lat): XIV.17 Apoph. Patr. (anon): 161 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XIV.27.
51 e.g. in Bernauer, 2002: , who describes obedience as the essence of fascism (p78) McGushin, 2007: 165-167, 
172 Hunter, 1996: 156 Davidson, 2008.
52 as it is appropriated to do in the modern prison and asylum systems - cf. Foucault, 1991[1975]: 238f Foucault, 
2006[2003]: 174, 249.
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of interests, with strategic moves available on both sides. The fact that one commands, and 
the other obeys, perhaps against their common sense or will, implies that the power flows in 
one  direction.  However,  when  the  strategic  moves  available  to  the  monk  can  include  a 
reversal of this relationship, the situation gains a game-like character. What is missing is an 
institutional  or  scientific  fixing  of  the  definition  of  ‘governor’  and  ‘governed’,53 clearly 
identifiable in oligarchies (which could be enforced by myths of genealogy or anthropological 
myths of race inferiority for example) or disciplinary societies (which could be enforced by 
knowledge of criminal tendencies or ethico-evolutionary laws). In this way, the technique of 
obedience in certain desert communities resembles Foucault’s  description of playful S&M 
practices in its being unafraid of strategic power and unwilling to espouse techniques that 
emphasise unidirectional flows and hide the possibility of resistance:
What strikes me with regard to S&M is how it differs from social power. What characterizes 
power54 is the fact that it is a strategic relation which has been stabilized through institutions. So 
the mobility in power relations is limited, and there are strongholds that are very, very difficult 
to  suppress  because they have been institutionalized and are  now very pervasive in  courts, 
codes, and so on. … On this point, the S&M game is very interesting because it is a strategic 
relation, but it is always fluid.55 
It may indeed be true to say that some early Christians did actually think of obedience 
to a spiritual guide as a goal in itself, with the latter occupying a similar place to absolute faith 
in Kierkegaard’s thought,56 but there is good reason to see the discipline of obedience as a 
means to a further end.57 For some, obedience can be their rule of life – quite independently of 
law, or rule, or will - until they die.58 Obedience is sufficient for them. For others, obedience 
is  most  important  at  the  beginning  of  the  monastic  life,59 and  can  lead  to  another  habit 
entirely. It is for this reason, then, that we can ask the question: what role does obedience play 
in the desert fathers’ establishment of norms? Given that it challenges one set of behaviours, 
what is its objective and function in positive terms?
53 Veyne, 1997[1978]: 160.
54 Foucault’s argument only really makes sense if this sentence refers to social power, and not power in general. 
The interview was originally in English, so it is not possible to check the translation.
55 Foucault, 2000b[1982]: 169.
56 e.g. in Kierkegaard, 1985[1843], and cf. the above references to Abraham in n.36 above.
57 It is the way to dispassion in Climacus, scal.: Step 4 and progress in Step 28.
58 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XIV.12 = Apoph. Patr. (anon): 158a = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XIV.20, and the case of 
brother Acacius in Climacus, scal.: Step 4.
59 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XIV.15 = Apoph. Patr. (anon): 158b = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XIV.24.
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A good example of the result of obedience I want to focus on can be seen in the story 
of a monk from Scythia who came to be guided by one of the old men in the desert. I will give 
the aphophthegmaton in full, as we will be going through it step by step:
A brother in Scetis, on his way to the harvest, approached a great old man and said to him, 
‘Abba, tell me what to do, for I’m going away to the harvest.’ The old man says to him, ‘And if 
I tell you, will you heed me?’ The brother says, ‘I will obey you.’ (obedio tibi/ 0Akou&sw sou) So 
the old man said to him, ‘If you will heed me, rise and take leave of this harvest, then come and 
I will command you concerning what you will do.’ And going out, the brother took leave of the 
harvest, and then came to the old man. The old man said to him, ‘Go into your cell and spend 
the next fifty days eating bread with salt once a day, and then I will command you something 
else.’ And going out, he spent his days thus, and then he came back to the old man. So the old 
man, seeing that he was a real worker [operarius/’erga/thj], taught him how to sit in his cell. 
The brother left for his cell, and there prostrated himself, face to the ground for three days and 
three nights, weeping before God. And afterwards, when thoughts said to him, ‘You have risen, 
you have become great,’ he himself [restraining the vices of his thoughts, humbly]60 brought 
forth his defects, saying, ‘And where are all my errors?’ But if they again spoke to him, ‘You 
have done much that you are unaware of,’ he also spoke, ‘But I will do service [leitourgei/a] 
to God, and I believe that he will deal mercifully with me.’ So succumbing, the spirits [of evil 
thoughts]61 revealed themselves to him visibly, saying, ‘We have been buffeted by you.’ He said 
to them, ‘How?’ They said to him, ‘If we raise you up, you run to humility; if we humble you, 
you return to the heights.’62
Upon  being  asked  what  the  young  monk  should  do,  the  old  man  first  elicits  a 
commitment  to  obedience.  It  is  only  once  the  young  monk  has  committed  himself  to 
obedience by renouncing work, fasting, and showing himself to be devoted to the task set him 
that the old man then introduces him to the monastic life proper, by explaining to him how to 
sit63 in his cell.
Sitting in one’s cell was the particular activity of the desert ascetics. It worked not 
simply as a necessity of life,  but as a virtuous form of life meant to combat demons and 
produce goodness in religious ascetics. It is difficult to discover any one ethical code for the 
desert fathers and mothers based on their sayings in the Apophthegmata Patrum (Cassian is 
60 This phrase is only found in the Latin: ‘temperans vitia cogitationum suarum’.
61 This specification is only found in the Latin: ‘malarum cogitationum’.
62 My translation from the Greek of Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XIV.23, with reference to the Latin of Apoph. Patr.  
(Lat): XIV.14. The story is also recorded in Apoph. Patr. (anon): 159.
63 The Latin ‘esse in cella sua’ is a tempting phrase – ‘how to be in the cell’ – but it  is almost certainly a  
mistranslation: ‘sedere in cella’ is more frequently attested in the Apoph. Patr. (Lat).
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another case entirely). What they have in common, though, is the practice of sitting in one’s 
cell. In this story, it constitutes the initiation of the novice into the ways of the desert fathers 
and mothers. In other stories, it is both an ethical precept64 and the boundary marker of their 
way of life (cf. the discussion below, on page 59-61).65
The way this monk is in his cell is an example of the direction in which obedience is 
meant to lead. The young monk goes down to his cell, lies prostrate on the ground for three 
days and three nights weeping, and notably develops a particular relationship to his thoughts. 
Presumably as a result of the directions of the old man, the monk controls his thoughts (Latin: 
cogitationes/Greek:  logismoi) and his vision (Latin:  conspectus) in such a way as to adjust 
them according to his will. He is able to choose which of his memories he should remember, 
what to have before his eyes.
There are two points  to  be made about this  progression.  Firstly,  the final  state,  in 
which the monk defeats the demons, is not characterised as much by a rule as by a technique. 
It is a technique of control over one’s thoughts and vision. Obedience results in a certain 
relation to the norms of the self which is structured by the Christian story,66 whereby the 
monk can actually make a choice as regards the way he is rather than be a passive receiver of 
impressions,  visions, etc. So we still  have no reference to the law, text,  or common rule, 
merely a critique of the sources of the self. As Johannes Climacus has it, in the chapter that 
resonates  most  with  the  desert  fathers  of  all  his  steps  in  the  Ladder  of  Divine  Ascent, 
‘obedience is self-mistrust up to one’s dying day, in every matter, even the good.’67
The second point to be made is that in the final state, the monk’s thoughts and visions 
are subject to him with the same docility, the same unquestioning obedience with which he 
placed himself in submission to the old man. The obedience has been transferred from an 
inter-subjective  phenomenon  into  an  intra-subjective  phenomenon.  What  had  been  a  two 
person relation has developed into a habit of individual thought. Just as the monk did what his 
spiritual father commanded, his thoughts do what he commands.68
This latter interpretation of obedience is so counter-intuitive that it will need to be 
backed up by more than my exegesis of one text. A factor that argues in its favour is that ideal 
64 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): II.9 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Moses 6 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): II.19.
65 ‘Sicut  pisces,  si  tardaverint  in  sicco,  moriuntur;  ita  et  monachi  tardantes  extra  cellam,  aut  cum  viris 
saecularibus immorantes, a quietis proposito revolvuntur’,  Apoph. Patr. (Lat): = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Anthony 
10 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): II.1
66 Humility’s basis in the Christian story is discussed below, on page 207.
67 Climacus, scal.: Step 4. Cf. also Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 253.
68 The body can also be obedient: Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 159.
36
obedience is praised for being instantaneous.  A story that arises in a number of sources69 
concerns a disciple called Mark, who is called upon by an  abba whilst he is working on a 
manuscript. The proof of his obedience is evidenced by the fact that Mark did not complete 
the letter ‘O’ before running to appear before the old man. So the old man’s love for him on 
account of his obedience is vindicated by Mark’s immediate response to his voice.70
Obedience is internalised as a virtue, and monks are encouraged to be with themselves 
in solitude as their spiritual guides were with them in community.71 If this is the case, we 
might  expect  the  forms  of  crazy  obedience  mentioned  over (on  page  28)  also  to  be 
internalised, and certainly as regards crazy interpretation, we see this result: monks exert a 
freedom of choice as regards what they see and hear:
Then Abba Abraham said to him, ‘If you were to find a woman lying on your mat when you 
entered your  cell  would you think that  it  is not  a woman?’ ‘No,’ he replied, ‘But I should 
struggle against my thoughts so as not to touch her.’ Then Abba Abraham said, ‘Then you have 
not destroyed the passion, but it still lives in you although it is controlled.’72
1.1.2: Political Obedience
To go even further in our interpretation of obedience, attention must be drawn to the 
victory achieved by ascetics in their cells. In the instance mentioned  over (on page  34) the 
monk from Scythia defeated demons, who had tried to change his attitude towards the world 
through bringing certain of his thoughts to his attention. Here it should be noted that although 
the demons are obviously independent agents, it was the monk’s own thoughts that were the 
object of suspicion. The demons were not attacking the body, but the monk’s own mind, his 
relation to his self, his form of life.73 It is in this way that it makes sense to speak of spiritual 
battle:  in  the  attempt  to  gain  mastery  over  one’s  thought,  taking  it  back  from  external 
influences in the world. The assertion of this kind of obedience is the struggle for agency and 
self-determination.
Obedience  towards  one’s  direction  or  director  is  considered  no  more  an  act  of 
submission than disobedience is. Either the ascetic obeys the thoughts she chooses, or those 
69 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Mark, disciple of Silvanus 1 (cf. also Pistos 1) =  Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XIV.11 = 
Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XIV.5.
70 Cf. also Anthony in Palladius, h. Laus.: IV.3.
71 So  Macarius  of  Alexandria  ‘gives  his  mind  a  commandment’  in  Palladius,  h.  Laus.: XVIII.17.  Cf.  also 
obedience as rejection of society in lib. grad.: XXV.7.
72 Apoph.  Patr.  (alph): Abraham 1 =  Apoph.  Patr.  (Lat): X.15  =  Apoph.  Patr.  (Gk.  syst.): X.19.  Cf.  also 
Evagrius,  de mal.  cog.: 3:  ‘on account  of  holy impassibility,  “there  is  no male  and female”’.  Passions are 
discussed in greater depth below, on page 91ff.
73 Demons are also portrayed as seductively praising the monk in Climacus, scal.: Step 26.
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chosen by the demon, or society, or tradition (cf. the quote by Pierre Hadot, under, on page 
39). Early Christian ascetics would not necessarily have seen obedience to a spiritual director 
as any less an act of freedom than obedience to one’s own will, because neither of these are 
uncompromised. It is only when one is obliged to obey – when obedience is necessary either 
because of coercion or because of an established norm74 – that one’s freedom is impinged 
upon. If one chooses to obey, then it can not be obligatory. Conversely, if one’s obedience is 
unconscious, then one cannot choose it, and it becomes necessary. For the desert fathers and 
mothers, when people obey their own will, they are usually simply deluded into thinking that 
they are independent  agents.75 One must  become aware of the principle  of one’s actions. 
Obedience is a way of making norms and norm-making practices visible.
For example, certain desert fathers were actually quite lenient in terms of rules (‘do 
not set any decrees for yourself’)76, but as a matter of pure freedom, they were strict with 
themselves. Sisoi admits that drinking a number of glasses of wine would not be a problem, if 
there were no spiritual force ready to steal one’s freedom.77 So the mortification of the will 
introduced  by  Christian  forms  of  spirituality  is  only  an  act  of  unfreedom if  the  will  is 
otherwise  entirely  free  from  the  compulsion  of  the  ‘principalities  and  powers’78.  The 
demonology of  the  time is  modelled  upon secular  power.  In  a  similar  way,  resistance  to 
demons  is  the  political  act  of  asserting  alternative  authority.  Obedience  is  justified  by 
reference  to  the  Christian  political community,  with  quotations  of  Paul’s  exhortations  to 
obedience to the secular authority in Romans.79
Obedience is central to Christian asceticism in late antiquity, but not in the sense that it 
assumes  the  absence  of  obedience  outside  the  community.  Instead,  monastic  obedience 
simply makes overt the kind of relationship to which the self is subject anyway. Whilst the 
freedom of the city involves the right to choose the goods (in the sense of wares) with which 
to satisfy one’s desires – the object of desire80 – the freedom of the desert refuses that right in 
order to choose the way in which to desire – action upon the subject of desire. The difference 
between these is  not as much that  of the presence or absence of obedience,  but between 
74 The so-called ‘conduct of conduct’ questioned in governmentality literature: Barry, et al., 1996 Burchell, et al., 
1991.
75 This is when active force becomes reactive force in Nietzsche’s work: ‘he who cannot obey himself will be 
commanded.’ Nietzsche, 1961[1885]: II On Self-Overcoming. Cf. also Deleuze, 2006[1962]: part 2.
76 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 21.
77 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): IV.37 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Sisoes 2 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): IV.45; cf. Apoph. Patr.  
(alph): Xoius 1.
78 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Theophilus the Archbishop 4.
79 Basilius, ascet 2.
80 This freedom later bases Locke’s conception of liberty: cf. Goodchild, 2002: 33 – “Liberty compresses the 
good of human action to a single value, easing discomfort, by an arbitrary choice of taste: cheese or lobsters.”
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having or not having an influence upon one’s obedience. Bob Dylan was therefore describing 
ancient society as well as his own time when he wrote:
Might like to wear cotton, might like to wear silk,
Might like to drink whiskey, might like to drink milk,
You might like to eat caviar, you might like to eat bread,
You may be sleeping on the floor, sleeping in a king-sized bed
But you're gonna have to serve somebody, yes indeed
You're gonna have to serve somebody,
Well, it may be the devil or it may be the Lord
But you're gonna have to serve somebody.81
The  deployment  of  asceticism  in  late  antiquity  did  involve  work  upon  norms  of 
behaviour, and taking control of one’s obedience was a first step in becoming free from the 
forms of being in the world necessary for urban citizen participation. So obedience is not just 
a matter of conforming one’s will to something, but also tearing it loose from another order, 
as Herbert McCabe has pointed out:
our  obedience,  our  solidarity  with the  community,  is  the  way in  which  we find  ourselves. 
Obedience for us is not a denial of self but a discovery of self. For – to say it again – obedience 
is  not  the  suppression  of  our  will  in  favour  of  someone  else’s,  it  is  learning  to  live  in 
community, in solidarity, which is simply learning to live. Of course to discover yourself is to 
unlearn as well as to learn; it is to abandon a notion of yourself that you had before in favour of 
a new and deeper one.82
The notion of obedience – which would later be a touchstone of good citizenship83 – 
was in antiquity a tool of sanctification, setting a life apart from the ways of the majority. 
Although this sounds very religious (both in the modern and in the traditional sense), the very 
point  of  most  philosophical  disciplines  in  late  antiquity  –  like  examining  one’s  thoughts, 
being vigilant, and calling principles to mind – was to aristocratically separate oneself from 
common suppositions and attitudes. This necessarily involved a certain amount of ostracising 
81 Dylan, 1979. Cf. also Barsanuphius’ contrast of Christian grace to human rule in Barsanuphius and Iohannes, 
resp.: 23.
82 McCabe, 2000[1987]: 231.
83 Cf. the value of ‘passive obedience’ in Berkeley, 1953[1712] and Mill, 1999[1859]: II.
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society,  as  opinions  and preconceptions  are  the  building  blocks  of  common life.84 In this 
respect, far from being the tool of conformity to the law, enforcing normal standards with 
military discipline, obedience was a philosophical technique naturally growing out of Plato’s 
work, rejecting as it does the preconceptions and insecure opinions of the masses. Consider 
the following passage from Epictetus:
So  what  means  can  we  resort  to  against  a  form  of  life  [Greek:  ethos =  custom,  habit, 
presupposed practice]?85 The opposite form of life. You hear laypeople saying, ‘That poor man 
just died! His father died, and his mother: he was cut off by an untimely death, whilst abroad.’ 
Hear the opposing analyses, tear yourself away from those voices, oppose one form of life with 
another.86 
 Epictetus  here  clearly  exhorts  paying  attention  to  one’s  attitudes,  and not  simply 
accepting  everything  one  sees  and  hears.  He  also  talks  about  dealing  with  distress, 
uncertainty,  and scepticism, and the mental actions to be taken against them. This kind of 
attitude has recently been argued – by the likes of Pierre Hadot, Alexander Nehamas, and 
Paul Rabbow – to constitute the essence of ancient philosophy, from Socrates to Plotinus.87 
The  action  exhorted  by  this  kind  of  ancient  philosophy  involves  taking  control  of  one’s 
attitudes  in  an  act  of  self  mastery,  and  separating  oneself  from the  attitudes  that  present 
themselves in those around one.
It is precisely for this that spiritual exercises are intended. Their goal is a kind of self-formation, 
or  paideia, which is to teach us to live, not in conformity with human prejudices and social 
conventions – for social life is itself a product of the passions – but in conformity with the 
nature of man, which is none other than reason. Each in its own way, all schools believed in the 
freedom of the will, thanks to which man has the possibility to modify, improve, and realize 
himself.88 
In fact,  that kind of separation was indeed the effect of Christian asceticism. They 
were not producing docile conforming citizens, for the religious of late antiquity were widely 
despised for their  radical  sexual mores  and social  habits.  Abstinence withdrew them from 
public space and household duty, challenging the civic norms of the time. In particular, the 
84 Badiou, 2001[1998]: 50f.
85 Lampe, 1961 notes that the word is also used of liturgy in antiquity: liturgy as a philosophico-spiritual exercise 
in antiquity is unfortunately under-studied in philosophy and patristics.
86 Epictetus,  Ench.: xxvii.4-6, my translation. Cf. also the account of obedience as humbly resisting the public 
super-ego in Basilius, reg. fus.: 21.
87 Hadot, 2002[1995] Nehamas, 1998 Rabbow, 1954.
88 Hadot, 1995: 102 - cf. also  Clark, 1988: 632, 635.
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recommendation  of widows staying  single and young women remaining virgins provoked 
comment, and indeed anger directed at early Christian communities.89 The entire movement of 
early Christian asceticism was one of revolt and independence from society at large. Monastic 
communities  broke  away from secular  groups  both  physically  and spiritually.  Physically, 
because they retreated to the desert and communities outside the city; spiritually, because they 
problematised the configuration of their relationship to their body, perceptions, thoughts, and 
language.
This  break  epitomises  the  behaviour  of  the  holy  fool.  After  Symeon  had spent  a 
number of years in the desert, fasting, praying, and through silence separating himself from 
all earthly bonds, he decided to return to the city in order to ‘mock the world’ (e)mpaizw– to 
ridicule, make dance, make fun of). He and John had already spent a good deal of time and 
attention in tearing themselves away from their families, not least their female dependents. 
Now Symeon decided to engage with the world, through consciously making an effort to be 
contrary to it.
1.1.3: Foolery as Religious Emancipation
In Leontius’ narrative, the life of Symeon is punctuated by ruptures in Symeon’s life, 
as he steadily forsakes more and more of the world. First he leaves his career and normal life 
by adopting coenobitic monasticism. Then he abandons the common life of the monastery for 
the desert. In the desert, he abandons his family, both in terms of obligation and emotionally. 
Finally, he abandons the solitude of the desert and embraces the city. This final step can be 
interpreted as an ascetic move against asceticism, as he forsakes the outer trappings of the 
religious life (including obedience to a spiritual father or brother), whilst internalising them. 
His vocation is an ethical move of abandoning the vainglory of religion and constructing an 
internal solitude (cf. under, on page 73).
‘Beware, be on your guard, brother Symeon, unless as the desert gathered together, the world 
disperses; and as silence helped, commotion hinders; and as much as keeping watch brought, 
you lose through sleep. Be on your guard, brother, lest the delusion of worldly things corrupt the 
prudence of the monastic life. Beware, lest the fruit from the privation of women, from whom 
God has saved you until today, be destroyed by spending time with them. Beware, lest the love 
of possessions carry off poverty,  lest foods fatten the body,  which fasting had melted away. 
Beware, brother, lest you lose your compunction through laughter and your prayer through your 
carelessness. Beware, please, lest when your face laughs, your mind be dissolved; lest when 
89 Brown, 1988: ch. 1.
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your hands fondle, your soul fondles as well; lest when your mouth eats, your heart eats as well; 
lest when your feet walk, your inner silence dances along recklessly; and to speak concisely, lest 
as much as the body does outwardly, the soul does inwardly. But if [144] you receive strength 
entirely from God, brother, so that whatever the forms, or words, or actions the body makes, 
your mind and your heart remain unmoved and untroubled and in no way are defiled or harmed 
by them, truly I rejoice in your salvation…’90
The behaviour of the holy fool can be seen in continuity with the asceticism of the 
time: that much has been demonstrated before.91 Moreover, it has to be seen in such a context. 
If it is not narrated as a form of late antique or early medieval asceticism, then there is no 
sense in which they are holy fools: they are simply fools. Their  holiness consists in their 
conformity with the values that they (at least apparently) reject. This is the challenge faced by 
their hagiographers. The challenge to interpretation is to give an account of both the foolish 
element and the recognition of holiness therein.
We  should  understand  Symeon’s  foolery  as  a  step  in  asceticism,  away  from  the 
specific relationships of asceticism. So for example, late antique monks restrict their eating by 
fasting  and  table  fellowship  at  weekends  with  the  eucharist,  and  in  doing  so  separate 
themselves from the eating habits of their society.92 Instead of eating together with family and 
friends, two or three times per day, food bought from the market, priced according to its taste 
and nourishment, they deliberately ate alone, once a day or less, food which had no taste and 
was  not  especially  nourishing,  or  with  their  spiritual  family  gathered  around  a  ritual  of 
remembrance. Practices obviously varied, but moderation was the rule, and the aim of the 
asceticism appeared to be to become acutely aware of ‘where you are and what you want’.93
When Symeon comes to town, he also separated himself from the eating habits of his 
society, but in a completely different way. He is also in control of his desire for food (having 
fasted in secret for a week before this incident), but he demonstrates this control by eating 
insatiably in the street (not at a table). He eats superhuman amounts of lupines, on the street, 
whilst giving out all the goods he has been employed to sell.94 This is a form of asceticism, 
but not the form recognisable at the time.
90 Leontius, v. Sym.: III.143f.
91 cf. on page 29, and Gorainoff, 1983: chapter 1 Ivanov, 2006[1994]: chapter 1 Krueger, 1996: chapter 3.
92 Palladius, h. Laus.: XVIII.2.
93 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 49 Hence the practice of eating a little every day so as to avoid gluttonously 
ending the period of fasting (Apoph. Patr. (alph): Agathon 20), and eating a great deal if required by hospitality 
(Apoph.  Patr. (Lat): XIII.3 =  Apoph. Patr. (alph): Cassian 3 =  Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XIII.3 Cassianus,  de 
institutis: V.25).
94 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.146.
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Symeon breaks away from contemporary forms of gender relations in a similar way. 
Contemporary monks would – instead of supporting their mothers and pursuing their women 
contemporaries – flee from women in order to be alone with other men. Both mothers and 
wives were dangerous because they placed the monk within a natural family rather than in the 
family  of  God  –  they  were  a  sign  of  worldliness.95 This  kind  of  behaviour  radically 
undermined the political  unit of the household, and male leadership of women, who were 
proof of his honour and virility.
Symeon transgresses the forms of life of the time, but not in order to embrace a new 
community of asceticism. He openly befriends prostitutes, for example, and demands fidelity 
of them.96 Honest women in church, on the other hand, he pelts with nuts. Similarly, he sits 
loose to gender markers: whilst those in the city had two sets of baths for the sexes, and those 
in the desert did not even allow that degree of sharing, Symeon deliberately goes into the 
wrong bath area. And all this he accomplishes on account of his severe asceticism, through 
exerting power over his self and controlling his actions. After this last episode, for example, 
his confidant, Deacon John, asks him:
‘For God’s sake, father, how did you feel when you entered into the women’s bath?’ He said, 
‘Believe me, child, just as a piece of wood goes with other pieces of wood, thus was I there. For 
I felt neither that I had a body nor that I had entered among bodies, but the whole of my mind 
was on God’s work, and I did not part from Him.’97
This is the case in many of the markers of asceticism at the time: Cassian goes to great 
lengths to describe the attire of the desert monks, that separate them out from the society of 
their time,98 but Symeon puts all his clothes on his head;99 monks stay silent for months out of 
fear of accidentally saying something wrong100 – Agathon kept a stone in his mouth for three 
years in order not to say anything101 – but Symeon babbles away like one possessed;102 the 
desert fathers work hard in their cell to earn their keep by making ropes, whereas Symeon 
95 Brown, 1971: 92.
96 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.156.
97 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.149. The Daniel of Scetis hagiography, which is deeply marked by the holy fool ethos 
(including  in  its  corpus  the  story  of  abba  Mark  the  fool),  includes  two  stories  of  cross-dressing  ascetics: 
Athanasia who pretended to be a man, and Anastasia who pretended to be a eunuch.  v. dan. scet.: 7 and 8. 
Another is described in Moschus, prat.: 170.
98 Cassianus, de institutis: book I - cf. also Palladius, h. Laus.: XXXII.
99 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.148.
100 cf. the exhortations to silence in Barsanuphius and Iohannes,  resp.: 279, 283 et passim, Moschus, prat.: 67, 
156, 187.
101 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): IV.7 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): IV.7 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Agathon 15.
102 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.155.
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wanders the streets dancing, playing, begging, and gallivanting with prostitutes;103 Christians 
mark time by following the liturgy of holy week with fasting and prayer, but Symeon gorges 
himself with cakes on Holy Thursday.104 All this he is enabled to do by the freedom he attains 
by his spiritual exercise:
When [John] saw him on Holy Thursday sitting in  the cake shop having eaten since early 
morning, he said to him, ‘How much does it cost, Fool?’ And he said to him, holding forty 
noumia in his hand, ‘Here’s my follis, stupid,’ showing that he was eating after forty days (of 
fasting).105
It is through these ascetic disciplines of transgression, through his obedience cut loose 
from community,  sitting loose to the necessities of society and the traditions of anti-social 
religious life, that Symeon the holy fool attempts to separate himself from the necessity of the 
forms of life presented to him in the city and in the desert. He removes himself from both of 
them by mockery,  discipline,  and obeying  the voice from nowhere.  As such,  his  practice 
represents a thoroughgoing development of Christian asceticism, understood as a practice of 
freedom and a rejection of history’s necessity.
103 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.156.
104 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.156f.
105 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV,157.
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1.2: Foolery and negations: the shape of ascetic rejection
Holy fools  deny the constructive  elements  of  early  Christian  asceticism,  including 
their theology and practices of holiness. But given the extreme renunciation that characterises 
the asceticism of their time, the question arises: what exactly is being denied here? And if 
their spiritual practice denies the God-reference of asceticism, what holiness or theology is 
left them?
The  prior  question,  then,  is  what  grounds  have  we  for  giving  a  theological 
interpretation to the early Christian ascetics,  when those most clearly marked out by their 
ascetic practice do not appear to have written theological treatises? Even if we identify certain 
exceptions  (like Evagrius of Pontus), their  work is almost  incomprehensible  if  we do not 
interpret  it  as  a tool for ascetic  exercise.  The question of theology seems entirely lost  on 
groups like the desert fathers.
Early Christian asceticism was not simply a form of philosophical practice. Although 
it  is  important  to understand the debate into which they were speaking – and the overall 
assumptions of the philosophical project in late antiquity – it would be deceptive to claim that 
both  religious  and  secular  philosophers  were  simply  doing  the  same  thing.  It  is  indeed 
plausible that ancient thinkers had in common a concern for the practice of philosophy rather 
than the dogma thereof, as Hadot has argued.106 However, the discontinuities  between the 
philosophical schools and monastic communities are still  far too numerous and striking to 
claim unbroken continuity. These discontinuities can all be associated with the particulars of 
their different doctrines, and specifically their different theologies.
The founding fathers were inspired to the ascetic life for reasons distinct from those 
given by their non-Christian contemporaries. Where Plato was more or less recognised as a 
uniting factor by all philosophical schools in late antiquity – whether Stoic, neoplatonist, or 
Pyrhonnian – the Christians were committed to exegesis of the Bible. Exegetical practices 
may have been continuous with the philosophical  heritage,  but  the texts  themselves  were 
different. Augustine had read a good deal of platonism as a professional rhetor before he was 
persuaded to adopt the “the blessed life” by a combination of the lives and sayings of the 
fathers  and reading the Bible.  Similarly,  Anthony was not called  out  to  the desert  by an 
argument, but by Jesus’ words to the rich young man.107 These two were to set the pattern for 
their successors.
106 in Hadot, 1995 Hadot, 2002[1995].
107 Athanasius, v. Anton.: 2; quoting Matthew 19.21; cf. also Apoph. Patr. (alph): Apollo 2 amongst others
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This new inspiration is not seen only at moments of conversion, however. Ascetics are 
extremely suspicious of Plato, however much he is worked into the Theology of the age.108 
Similarly, the Bible becomes an integral part of their way of life.109 Although it is difficult to 
gauge the importance of exegetical  debate in  monastic  communities,110 the sayings  of the 
fathers and mothers are peppered with quotations from the Scriptures.
The Bible is also the basis of the liturgy at the time. Again it is often forgotten that 
early Christian ascetics followed a liturgy.111 Far from being grouchy hermits immersed in 
their own thoughts, their days and weeks were punctuated by gatherings for the celebration of 
the eucharist with psalms and prayers (the synaxis). They also kept to a cycle of psalms.
These things set ancient Christian ascetics apart from the philosophers of the time. 
Although it was common practice, for example, to memorise phrases and quotations so that 
they were to hand when needed (Diogenes Laertius112 represents a collection of these, and 
Epicurus’ letters  and Evagrius Ponticus’ book against sadness in particular appear to have 
been used in this way),113 there was no real liturgy amongst the anchorites in terms of ordering 
weekdays with set prayers and songs. And while monks and nuns also memorised the sayings 
of their mentors, they were quick to form a completely new canon, rejecting the wisdom built 
up by the Hellenists and Romans for the previous seven centuries. By the time of Zosimas, for 
example,  the  Apophthegmata  Patrum had  already  become  material  for  constant  reading 
among religious. ‘For the blessed Zosimas always loved to read these  Sayings all the time; 
they were almost like the air that he breathed.’114 
Perhaps as a result of these practices, the value content of the spiritual practices was 
different amongst the Christian ascetics. As we saw in the passage on obedience (over, on 
page  34), the aim for the religious was to attain to radical humility without losing faith in 
God.115 So the monk in question learned to resist the temptation to be encouraged to self-
confidence by his own discipline, whilst still believing in a merciful God.
108 The relation between Christianity and Platonism is too marginal to this thesis to be addressed here: in our 
literature, Plato is at least given a positive appraisal in Palladius,  h. Laus.: prologue 11 Basilius,  leg. lib. gent 
Evagrius Scholasticus, h.e.: I.21.
109 Evagrius frequently read the Bible through the night, and most desert fathers and mothers had committed vast 
sections of Scripture to memory. cf. Casiday, 2006: 121.
110 Burton-Christie, 1993.
111 Basil of Caesarea lays out the hours of prayer for his community in Basilius, reg. fus.: question 37.
112 in Diogenes, vit. phil..
113 Sinkewicz, 2003: Intro, p. xxxiii. Augustine wrote his Enchiridion in response to a request for a handbook. He 
did not oblige. Cf. Augustinus, Ench.: VI.
114 Zosimas,  alloquia: XII.b. For more on memory of the desert fathers and mothers as a spiritual practice, cf. 
Harmless, 2000: esp. 513-517.
115 A theme also found in Apoph. Patr. (anon): 54.
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This  form  of  humility  and  faith  is  simply  not  to  be  found  among  ancient 
philosophers.116 The values behind most spiritual exercises appear to be freedom (as we have 
explained above), and release from suffering. So Epictetus for example did not work on the 
self in order to attain a particular relation to creation (namely humility and hope), but in order 
not to be bothered by it and other people (cf. over, on page 39): a non-relation.
A good example of the continuity and diversity of ancient asceticism can be found in 
the practice of death. It is a common feature of ancient philosophy to be concerned with one’s 
attitude towards death. Cicero’s work in particular is concerned with undermining one’s fear 
of it. However, an understanding of the (non-)phenomenon of death is only half the story for 
ancient  philosophy.  It  is  one thing to  be able  to  think coherently  about  death.  It  is  quite 
another to cease to fear it, as the ancients recognised.
On  the  other  hand,  a  response  to  the  latter  problem  did  include  discussion  as  a 
philosophical  exercise.  As  Hadot  and  others  have  taught  us  to  realise,  study  of  ancient 
philosophy needs to take into consideration both what is being said, and the result of saying it. 
Philosophy  has  both  content  and  function,  and  it  is  not  always  possible  or  desirable  to 
distinguish the two.
This is particularly the case for the ancients’ view of death. Cicero’s work can be read 
as  an  instance  of  the  Stoic  practice  of  praemeditatio  futurorum  malorum,  whereby  the 
philosopher  would consider  future evils  in order  to  prepare  his  soul  to  peacefully  endure 
them. The aim is clearly to overcome fear and sorrow (miseria).117
Christian  asceticism  also  cultivated  a  practice  of  meditation  on  death,  but  with 
significant changes that have to do with content as well as practice. Firstly, death is associated 
with  accountability  and  judgement  before  God.  Much  ink  has  been  spilt  concerning  the 
origins of the Christian view of the afterlife118, and I do not intend to write its history and 
parentage  here.  For my purposes,  it  is  simply important  to  note the result:  death became 
associated with standing before the judgement seat of God.
Even more significant, however, is the result this doctrine has in terms of spiritual 
exercises. The story of the death of abba Arsenius links the experience and thought of death to 
virtues central to ancient Christian monasticism:
116 Clark, 1988: 630 Dagron, 1990: 930 and below, on page 203ff.
117 Cicero, tusc. disp.: III.13f.
118 Cf. Milbank’s summary of the debate between Warburton and Lowth in Milbank, 1997: 55-72, and  McGrath, 
2003.
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When his death drew near, the brethren saw him weeping and they said to him ‘Truly, Father, 
are you also afraid?’ ‘Indeed,’ he answered them, ‘the fear which is mine at this hour has been 
with me ever since I became a monk.’119
Comparing Cicero’s frame of mind with Arsenius, we can see that whilst the former’s 
spiritual  exercise  was  intended  to  eliminate  sadness,  fear,  and  humility,  the  latter’s 
consideration of death actually provoked it. Whilst Cicero’s writings inspire confidence, those 
of the desert fathers undermine all confidence in one’s own righteousness, and pre-empt the 
judgement of God by blaming themselves for their sins.120
Mistrust in one’s own good deeds diverts trust towards the mercy of God. The ancient 
Christian ascetic could never be sure that she had done right, but could still trust in the mercy 
of God: ‘I shall have no confidence until I meet God.’121 This again results in the practice of 
humility and trust, as outlined in the story of obedience (cf. over, on page 34): I am neither 
confident nor condemned. However, the practice of blaming oneself is to be found throughout 
the Christian tradition of asceticism in late antiquity.122
It is in these ways that, although we can see clear lines of continuity between ancient 
philosophical and early Christian asceticism, providing an account of these latter that left out 
theological considerations would lead to substantial lacunae. Indeed, the continuity can also 
be  seen in  precisely those areas  where  I  have pointed  out  essential  discontinuity  –  Stoic 
avoidance  of  sadness  must  have  influenced  Christian  accounts  of  the  sin  of  listnessness 
(‘accidie’), and Christian values of humility gained in sophistication through contemporary 
philosophical debate on the attainability of the sage and the good life – but the practices of 
thought, together with the forms of elaboration and explanation, had irreversibly acquired a 
vital reference to God and the Christian story.
1.2.1: Negative Theology
So there is good reason to assert the specificity of the Christian thought of the desert 
fathers and mothers, not least with regard to their view of God. If their way of life and values 
were at least strongly influenced by the notion of accountability to God, what kind of God is it 
that  determines  their  discourse and practice?  If  the understanding  and experience  of God 
119 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Arsenius 40 - cf. also Theodore of Pherme 2 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): VII.9  Apoph.  
Patr. (anon): 3, 6, 14, 50, 64 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 20, 242 Climacus, scal.: Steps 4 and 15
120 Climacus equates the Christian and Stoic practices of death in Climacus, scal.: Step 6
121 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Agathon 29 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XI.2 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XI.9,10
122 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Agathon 3, Anthony 4 =  Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XV.2 =  Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XV.2 
Zosimas, alloquia: XIV.a
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decides the way in which one thinks, conceives ideas, and speaks, then the nature of one’s 
theology will be all important for the configuration of norms.
I  will  be  arguing  here  that  the  asceticism  of  the  early  Christians  had  a  strongly 
apophatic element. It was a theology of estrangement from the world. It will also become 
clear that fleeing the world involved positively constructing a new way of life. So – as is the 
case  with  all  apophaticism  –  there  is  a  cataphatic  element  to  early  asceticism,  however 
understated.
It will perhaps be an unfamiliar move to assert a third variety of negative theology, 
namely  the  practical,  alongside  the  familiar  categories  of  intellectual  and  affective 
apophaticism. Of course there is no question here of discerning an interpretation of Denys the 
Areopagite. So what is meant in this context with “the practice of negative theology”?
It  is  perhaps  most  understandable  that  we  are  not  simple  speaking  here  of  an 
intellectual movement.  Doubtless ascetic practice has consequences – to be expanded on in 
part two – for speculative thought, but that is not the primary focus when giving an account of 
monastic practice. The primary question for the practice of negative theology is “How do I 
live a holy life when confronted with unknowing regarding the divine?”
This  question unites  speculative  thought  regarding God with monastic  criticism of 
secularism. The secular life does not allow us to speak of God because it embraces worldly 
values that do not stand in the darkness of faith. Flight from the world is justified both by the 
criticism of worldly values and by the project of forming a life that will re-form our reference 
system so as to speak rightly of and to God.
On the other hand, the practice of negative theology is not to be identified with the 
affective tradition of apophaticism. As Lossky has pointed out,  apophaticism and mysticism 
are by no means united in early Christian writings. We could even oppose the two in certain 
forms of negative theology. John of the Cross (whose work can also be described both as 
speculative  negative  theology  and  a  practice  of  apophaticism),  for  example,  specifically 
advocates  rejecting  mystical  experience  because  of  the  apophatic  cause  of  spiritual 
mortification. The unambiguous embrace of mystical experience does reduce the theological 
agent to a passive recipient  of God’s grace in the world rather than an actively engaging 
person capable of love and creative understanding. The practice of negative theology, on the 
other hand, consciously assesses life and the world in an attempt to guard itself  from the 
worship of idols.
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To approach negative theology in this way is neither unnatural or innovative. It has 
long been admitted that the work of, for example, Denys the Areopagite owes as much to the 
ascetic tradition as it does to the speculative.123 His work is obviously rooted in monasticism: 
the  Ecclesiastical Hierarchy includes a chapter on the initiation of monks;124 ascetic saints 
have cosmic significance;125 many of the letters are clearly to monks, and make reference to 
the monastic life.
The mastery of speech and thought is in other words an essentially ascetic task. Just as 
physics is to be examined both in terms of it theoretical content and in terms of its effects on 
the soul, so negative theology has specific practical effects. So in our examination we will 
both be considering what kind of theology is being appealed to, but also how this theology 
participates  in  the living of  the godly life.  What  kind of  theology grounds confidence  in 
prayer (as in the story of the monk at harvest above, on page 34)? What effects does it have 
on the thought  and life  of  the ascetic?  These questions  – largely ignored by accounts  of 
negative theology hitherto – are essential to the study of the practice of negative theology.
The first way in which early ascetic theology is identifiably apophatic is the common 
refusal to explain or elaborate on theological themes. This happens at precisely those points 
where religious authorities would be expected to resolve issues and deliver explanations. In 
particular, many religious avoid the interpretation of Scripture:
One day some old men came to see Abba Anthony. In the midst of them was Abba Joseph. 
Wanting to test them, the old man suggested a text from the Scriptures, and, beginning with the 
youngest, he asked them what it meant. Each gave his opinion as he was able. But to each one 
the old man said, ‘You have not understood it.’ Last of all he said to Abba Joseph, ‘How would 
you explain this saying?’ and he replied, ‘I do not know.’ Then Abba Anthony said, ‘Indeed, 
Abba Joseph has found the way, for he has said: ‘I do not know.’’126
It is precisely the element distinguishing early Christians from philosophical ascetics – 
namely the interpretation of the Bible – that is treated with such reticence. As mentioned over 
(on page 45), this does not mean a refusal to quote the scriptures, but instead a climbing down 
123 Once again most recently in Louth 2008a: 581f; 2008b: 588, 591-593.
124 Denys Areopagitus e.h: VI.
125 Denys Areopagitus e.h. VII.iii.6.
126 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Anthony 17 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XV.4 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XV.4. This is not an 
isolated example. Arsenius (Apoph. Patr. (alph): Arsenius 42 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XV.10 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk.  
syst.): XV.11) tried to avoid exegesis, Zeno (Apoph. Patr. (alph): Zeno 4 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.22 = Apoph. 
Patr. (Gk. syst.): X.27) preferred to think of his sins than interpret the Bible, Pambo would refuse to answer a 
Biblical question for months (Palladius, h. Laus.: X.7), Copres chastises himself for accepting an invitation to a 
bible study (Apoph. Patr. (alph): Copres 3 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XV.24 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XV.38).
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from authority, a refusal to set oneself up as a reference point in addition to the word of God. 
It is entirely in keeping with the refusal to close the question of God in negative theology, 
resulting in the undermining of any certain knowledge of divine nature.127
The desert religious would also avoid speech and the prestige of theology particularly 
regarding  the  final  judgement.  This  is  notably the  case in  terms  of  the  content  of  God’s 
judgement:  they refuse to hand out  dispensations or predictions  of the final  judgement.128 
Moreover,  abba  Sisoes  even  embraces  unknowing  regarding  the  very  event  of  final 
judgement.  When he was approached by other monks plagued by very specific visions of 
punishment in the afterlife, he replied:
‘For  my  part,  I  do  not  keep  in  mind  the  remembrance  of  any of  these  things,  for  God is 
compassionate and I hope that he will show me his mercy.’ Hearing this, the old men went back 
offended. But the old man, not wishing to let them go away hurt, said to them, ‘Blessed are you, 
my brothers; truly I envy you. The first speaks of the river of fire, the second of hell and the 
third of darkness. Now if your spirit is filled with such remembrances, it is impossible for you to 
sin. What shall I do, then? I who am hard of heart and to whom it has not been granted so much 
as to know whether there is a punishment for men; no doubt it is because of this that I am 
sinning all the time.’129
The saying is particularly striking because once again it inserts a doctrine of negative 
theology precisely where the monks had a distinctive practice.  Although contemplation of 
death  and judgement  in  these  communities  was  neither  unimportant  nor  indeed based on 
unknowingness,130 there  is  certainly  an  element  of  simplicity  that  tempers  this  kind  of 
philosophical exercise.
A second important respect in which the desert fathers and mothers refused knowledge 
is cosmology. The form is common: a visitor comes to see a solitary, and begins immediately 
to speak of difficult problems about the way the physical and spiritual world is. The hermit 
remains  silent.  Eventually  he  is  challenged  to  come  with  an  answer,  and  responds  with 
reference to his way of life. ‘This is what I do.’ Here the reference is not even to the nature of 
the soul (although the actions and passions of the soul are relevant), but to simple and visible 
actions.131
127 Evagrius, de orat.: 72f
128 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Agathon 29, Ammonas 8, 10, John the Persian 1, et passim;  Apoph. Patr. (anon): 175 
Evagrius, ep.: 7. This is also the case with the Syriac community of the lib. grad.: V.11, XXX.10, 12.
129 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Sisoes 19
130 For examples of contemplation of the final judgement, cf. Evagrius,  hypo.: 9  Apoph. Patr. (alph): Elias 1, 
Silvanus 2, and especially Evagrius 1
131 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Poemen 8 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.39 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): X.54
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Thirdly,  the negative theology of early Christian ascetics is related to the reductive 
nature of their way of life. Here it is perhaps useful to compare it with the asceticism of the 
philosophers.
Whilst the reasoning behind asceticism in late antiquity was fairly constant (subdue 
desire in order to separate oneself from convention and opinion), the techniques changed with 
desert  asceticism.  Instead  of  applying  their  philosophy  with  anti-social  self  ostracism, 
philosophers in antiquity in general attempted to adjust their way of being in the world. Not to 
reject the world, but to adapt to it. So Seneca’s asceticism did not consist in abandoning table 
fellowship, but in moderating his consumption. In general, it could be said that the practices 
of the self were exercises in being an individual in society.  They were originally political 
actions.132
Desert asceticism, on the other hand, is characterised by rejecting social goods. Most 
noticeably, Christians would reject the security of their civil standing (Arsenius, for example, 
was advisor to an emperor) and family (a number of monks refuse to see their parents). In 
addition,  they shun eating  habits,  sleep,  drink,  the  company of  others,  and ownership  of 
property.
So we could say that Christian asceticism is a form of forsaking things and abandoning 
ways of life. Whilst the philosophical life primarily regulates people’s needs and the needs of 
their  body,  Christians  actually  rejected  them,  as  far  as  was  possible.  It  was  an  ethos  of 
estrangement rather than temperance.
They thought of this movement away from society as a movement from the world and 
towards God. This is only logical, given that a good deal of their motivation to do these things 
was  the  judgement  of  God,  as  I  have  suggested  over (on  page  46).  The  practice  of 
estrangement may well have been associated with the refusal of idols. In fact, one of the more 
prominent authors of Eastern asceticism in the early sixth century, abba Zosimas, reveals an 
acute sensitivity to the temptation inherent in this form of life towards embracing something 
that is not God once one has torn oneself from the world. He advocates a radical abandonment 
of things in favour of the unknown God who is not a thing, in terms reminiscent of Žižek’s 
account of fetishism.133
132 Foucault, 1992a[1984]: 87.
133 In Žižek, 2001: 13-15; cf. also Apoph. Patr. (alph): Gelasius 5 – ‘Your spirit is more enslaved by the needle 
with which you work than the spirit of Gelasius by these goods.’ and Cassianus, Collationes: I.6 Cassianus, de 
institutis: IV.13 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 336 Climacus, scal.: Step 17.
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‘There are times when someone will ignore large sums of money; nevertheless, when it comes 
to a small needle, one’s attachment to it may cause one much trouble. Then the small needle 
replaces  the large amount  of  money.  Therefore,  one becomes  a slave of the  needle,  or  the 
monastic cap, or the handkerchief, or the book, instead of being a servant of God.’134
The fourth reason I have for characterising the theology of early Christian ascetics as 
primarily apophatic is their tendency towards silence (cf. for example Agathon over on page 
42).135 Silence is not simply a good alternative to saying something one shouldn’t, although 
that is certainly an element of it: as Arsenius said, ‘I have often repented of having spoken, 
but never of having been silent.’136 Silence was also the alternative to elaborating a theology 
of  spiritual  things  and  cosmologies,  in  the  way  mentioned  over (on  page  50).  It  is  the 
discursive equivalent of fasting: we abandon words in order to embrace God.137 
Silence is repeatedly associated with the central tasks of the ascetic in their sayings.138 
There even appears to have been a debate as to whether one should speak at all.  Spiritual 
leaders  are  repeatedly  praised  for  teaching  without  saying  anything.  Although  Poemen 
appears to have tried to resolve the dilemma by recognising both apophatic and cataphatic 
theology – ‘The man who speaks for God’s sake does well; but he who is silent for God’s 
sake also does well’139 – the scales tend to come down on the side of silence.  Silence is 
portrayed as the ideal theology. The story of Pambo’s silence is set within the stock frame of a 
visit for edification:
The same Abba Theophilus, the archbishop, came to Scetis one day. The brethren who were 
assembled said to Abba Pambo, ‘Say something to the archbishop, so that he may be edified.’ 
The old man said to them, ‘If he is not edified by my silence, he will not be edified by my 
speech.’140
For some, the fear of speaking ‘unnecessary words’141 was bound up with the fear of 
heresy,  which was acute.142 Christian ascetics  would blame themselves  for everything but 
134 Zosimas, alloquia: V.ii.b.
135 Apoph. Patr.  (alph): Agathon 16, Isidore of Pelusia 1, Macarius the Great  26, Nisterus the Cenobite 1f, 
Poemen 3, 37, 42, 187, 205 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 469.
136 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Arsenius 40 - cf. also Isidore of Pelusia 1.
137 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Zeno 8.
138 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Andrew 1, Arsenius 2, Bessarion 10, Poemen 37, 168, Sisoes 42.
139 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Poemen 147; cf. also the discussion of Poemen’s ruling in Barsanuphius and Iohannes, 
resp.: 287.
140 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Theophilus 2 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XV.42 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XV.59.
141 the phrase comes from Apoph. Patr. (alph): Macarius 26.
142 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Theodore of Pherme 4 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.23 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): X.32.
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heresy,  because to speak words against God was to separate oneself from God.143 For this 
reason, extreme caution had to be exercised in speaking theology. Teaching was dangerous 
for the soul, and an ascetic does well to avoid it. The dilemma is obviously that if a religious 
is  obliged  to  speak  out  of  courtesy,  the  subject  should  not  distract  from  God,  but  the 
arguments against speaking of God outlined above still  hold. The dilemma is discussed at 
great  length  with  a  casuistry  of  courtesy,  gossip,  small  talk,  obedience,  and  scriptural 
interpretation in the correspondence of Barsanuphius and John.144 When confronted with the 
dilemma, abba Amoun decided that it is better to speak of the sayings of the fathers than of 
the Bible.145 The words of God are dangerous.
These traits of the desert fathers – their reticence concerning theology and judgement, 
their ascetics of estrangement, and their keeping silence – justify aligning their theology with 
apophatic  theology.  They refuse  to  speak  of  God,  discourage  theological  discussion,  and 
claim ignorance concerning God’s view on the world (his judgement). Negative theology is 
their ideal.
How then  do  the  holy  fools  reject  a  worldview and way of  life  characterised  by 
negation? In keeping with this approach of negativity, early Christian ascetics like the desert 
fathers and mothers concentrate more on what they reject than what they embrace. So their 
lives are marked by the grammar of negation. They do not embrace the desert – their abode 
varied from suburbs through wilderness to riverbanks – but abandon the city. Their lives are 
marked by the denial of a particular order rather than the espousal of a religious way of life. 
This denial of the particular opens them up to a gaping freedom.
1.2.2: Apophatic Diversity
The result of this practice of negative theology is flexibility as regards the form of life 
that is to be adopted: St Paul’s principle of diversity in the Spirit (1 Cor 12) is appropriated to 
identify the holy life with a God that can not be fixed down.146 Whilst there certainly are 
common features amongst early Christian ascetics, and it would not be difficult to sketch out 
an overview of the two or three main streams of withdrawal from the world, it is striking how 
much diversity the movements allow for.
143 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.10 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Agathon 5 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): X.12.
144 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 286-294. Cf. also Apoph. Patr. (anon): 170, 186.
145 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Amoun of Nitria 2 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XI.20 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XI.56, echoed 
in Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 469.
146 Apoph. Patr. (alph): John the Dwarf 43.
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There are four discernible attitudes to diversity in the tradition of the desert fathers, 
representing various points in the range between complete conformity and unfixed pluralism. 
They may all be justified within the context of the theology of asceticism and so all retain a 
constant principle throughout their renunciation.
One attitude to plurality that emerges clearly is the tendency to experimentation. The 
first generation of desert fathers and mothers had rejected the world’s form of life and had no 
obvious alternative to embrace as yet. As a result, a number of different lifestyles developed 
amongst the anchorites, and disciples would learn their discipline from a particular  abba or 
amma rather than from a fixed rule (Basil’s rules were not written until the end of the fourth 
century,  and  had  little  or  no  influence  in  the  Egyptian  desert;  Pachomian  cenobitic 
monasticism followed a rule from the beginning).147 Later, Abba Antiochus is even reported 
(by Climacus) to have offered three totally different rules of life to his disciples.148 For this 
reason, when people approached a holy man or woman in order to learn from them, they 
would not simply ask how to become a better monk. Instead, the very definition of being a 
monk was open to debate.
For our perfect fathers were not limited by any particular rule. Indeed, their daily rule included 
singing Psalms a little,  repeating [verses] by heart a little,  examining their thoughts a little, 
taking a little break for food, and [all] this with fear of God.149
The  ‘way  of  life’  of  a  Christian  was  not  fixed,  but  young  ascetics  approach  old 
experienced ones and ask them ‘Abba, give me a way of life’150. Macarius the Great tells of 
his experience of meeting quintessential monks, who rejected the world, and were given a 
way of life (oi0konomia) by God.151 Palladius describes the 5000 monks on the Mountain of 
Nitria as having different modes of life, varying according to their capacity.152 At the same 
time, Nisterus the Great lays no great store by the specifics of the way of life: none of them 
allow one to refer to God, or delimit God’s nature.
147 For plurality within Pachomian monasticism, cf. Palladius, h. Laus.: XXXII.2.
148 Climacus, scal.: Step 4.
149 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 85, square brackets original.
150 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Elias 8 Apoph. Patr. (anon): 193 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 189 Moschus, prat.: 
52.
151 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Macarius the Great 2.
152 Palladius, h. Laus.: VII.2.
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‘Are not all actions equal? Scripture says that Abraham was hospitable and God was with him. 
David was humble, and God was with him. Elias loved interior peace and God was with him. 
So, do whatever you see your soul desires according to God and guard your heart.’153
In  contrast  to  ascetic  experimentation,  the  second  attitude  to  multiplicity  presents 
reasons  to conform to one particular  local  way of  life  that  do not  justify it  as  being the 
exclusive  way  of  living  before  God.  In  order  to  avoid  becoming  an  ascetic  hero,  and 
endangering your soul by attracting praise and respect, a Christian should follow local – and 
therefore arbitrary – customs. Abba Motius’ maxim was ‘Wherever you live, follow the same 
manner of life as everyone else and if you see devout men, whom you trust doing something, 
do the same and you will be at peace.’154 This maxim assumes two things: firstly, that a place 
will have an identifiable way of life, presumably formed by a number of people adopting the 
habits  of  certain  old men or women;  secondly,  that  the specifics  of  this  form of  life  are 
entirely  irrelevant  as  compared  to  the  avoidance  of  praise.  So this  approach relativises  a 
particular lifestyle and at the same time subverts the economy of that way of life by refusing 
to earn honour or shame within its framework.
The third attitude to multiplicity represents a reaction against this kind of pluralism 
however.  In  time,  the  particular  traditions  stemming  from the various  ascetics  would not 
simply act as alternatives, but as models from which the present generation has fallen away.155 
As a result, the ways of forerunners became authoritative, such that variety became frowned 
upon by some.  It  is  in  the nature of teaching  that  one way of  life  is  recommended over 
another. However, there is good evidence to suggest that the sayings of the fathers tended 
towards a rejection of plurality itself as well as other ways of life.
‘Abba, give me a way of life.’ The old man said to the brother, ‘In the days of our predecessors 
they took great care about these three virtues: poverty, obedience and fasting. But among monks 
nowadays avarice, self-confidence and great greed have taken charge. Choose whichever you 
want most.’156
The  final  relationship  to  plurality  that  I  want  to  present  here  comes  closest  to 
uniformity. Although the fathers and mothers are fairly lenient with their disciples, they make 
it clear that they do this out of mercy rather than accepting many different ways of life. In this 
153 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Nisterus 2 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): I.18 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): I.11 - cf. also X.7.
154 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Motius 1. A similar moral is taught in Apoph. Patr. (anon): 125.
155 Among many sayings that tell of disillusionment, cf. Apoph. Patr. (alph): Felix Apoph. Patr. (anon): 96, 218 
Moschus, prat.: 130, 168.
156 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Elias 8 - cf. also Theophilus the Archbishop 1 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XV.19 = Apoph. 
Patr. (Gk. syst.): XV.31. The quote can also be found in Moschus, prat.: 52.
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way they  maintain  the  taxonomy of  one  communal  lifestyle.  So  for  example,  Joseph  of 
Panephysis gives one piece of advice to one monk, and conflicting guidance to another.157 
However, when questioned about this, he explains that to only one of them did he talk ‘as if to 
himself’.
In a similar vein, Poemen (who was one of the monks that went to Joseph in the above 
apophthegmatum) affirms the way of life of a monk who works hard in the fields and gives to 
the poor. When questioned about it  by a disciple however,  he refuses that  way of life as 
unworthy of a monk. It is certainly allowed, but it is ‘not the work of a monk.’158 Basil takes 
the attitude to its furthest point and advocates uniformity for its own sake – ‘for all who aim at 
the same goal are alike in as many ways as possible’.159
From  this  brief  overview,  a  picture  emerges  of  the  desert  fathers  as  initially 
experimenting  with  their  ways  of  life,  advocating  many  ways  in  different  situations,  but 
eventually settling down into one particular form. This form would then develop its own way 
of allocating praise and blame, honour and shame, so that true monks may be distinguished 
from false ones, and ascetics could vie with each other for respect.
Abba Joseph asked Abba Poemen, ‘How should one fast?’ Abba Poemen said to him, ‘For my 
part, I think it better that one should eat every day, but only a little, so as not to be satisfied.’ 
Abba Joseph said to him, ‘When you were younger, did you not fast two days at a time, abba?’ 
The old man said: ‘Yes, even for three days and four and the whole week. The Fathers tried all 
this out as they were able and they found it preferable to eat every day, but just a small amount. 
They have left us this royal way, which is light.’160
This  saying  is  instructive  because it  lays  out  the three options  available  regarding 
asceticism. The first is living in the world and not fasting at all. The second is the way of 
extreme renunciation,  such as fasting for an entire week. The third way is a compromise 
between the two. Poemen calls  it  a “royal  way”,  which is  significant:  the reference is  to 
Numbers 20.17 and 21.22, where the people of Israel walk along the royal  road (Lat:  via 
regia; Gk:  o(doj basilikh), and ‘not turn aside to the right or to the left’. It is a standard 
patristic way of expressing the third way between two extremes or two vices.
157 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Joseph of Panephysis 3 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.29 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): X.38.
158 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Poemen 22 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.46 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): X.66.
159 Basilius, reg. fus.: 22.
160 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Poemen 31 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.44 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): X.61. This rule is also 
offered in Evagrius, hypo.: 10, and more severe abstinence discouraged in Evagrius, de mal. cog.: 35 Evagrius, 
excerpts: 2. Barsanuphius’ diet recommendation can be found in Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 63.
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It  is  tempting  to  see  here  a  premature  solution,  to  the  problem  of  practical 
apophaticism.  The  way  of  the  world  is  rejected,  but  since  no  form  of  renunciation  is 
unproblematically holy (extreme fasting can lead to gluttony or vainglory for instance), the 
monk must follow the way of religious authority. There is no reference here, however, to the 
way of divine holiness: it is a pragmatic solution that is conscious of its failure to construct 
one true way of life. The monk continues what he has received, and the way is ‘light’, but not 
necessarily God. It is perhaps beyond affirmation and denial  of a holy way of life,  but it 
equally appears to have given up on the appellation ‘holy’.
The  desert  fathers  and  mothers  adhered  to  rules  in  different  ways.  Rather  than 
enforcing one form of life in the desert, they cultivated a number of different monastic ideals. 
These were not always thought of as competing, although in time – and with the introduction 
of more rules of common life – they boiled down into a small number of distinct forms. This 
was a historical development, however, and by no means a necessary part of early Christian 
asceticism. In what follows, we will see this pattern repeated, whereby the monks and nuns of 
the desert embrace a radical form of renunciation, but ultimately transmit a very concrete way 
of life that will become standard for the monastic tradition.
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1.3: Ascetic Positivism: the sine qua non of renunciation
In spite of their resistance to form and dogmatism, there are ways of describing the 
positivity  of  the desert  ways  of life  of late  antiquity.  In order  to contrast  early  Christian 
ascetics with the early holy fools, we will have to discover some specific characteristics that 
mark out both. So apart from their refusal of the city, what do early Christian ascetics have in 
common?
Even in the most radical statements of pluralism, something is reserved as the sine qua 
non of the blessed life. We saw over (on page 55) that Nisterus the Great could recommend 
any way of life, but insisted on the practice of guarding one’s heart (Greek:  phulaxon tēn 
kardion sou; Latin: custodi cor tuum). This is a common theme.161
It  would be a mistake to understand the practice of guarding the heart  as a vague 
mental action with only indistinct symbolic force. All studies of this kind of spiritual exercise 
need to be specific and concrete in their descriptions.162 Indeed, this is the tendency of the 
texts themselves. For example, Agathon is questioned concerning the relationship between the 
interior  guard and bodily work.163 The systematic  collection – which represents an earlier 
source  than  the  alphabetical  –  records  this  interchange  and  then  adds  details  about  what 
Agathon did, in terms of work, thought, food and clothes.164 It is clear from this that what 
today might be termed a psychological state, independent of everyday life, was thought of by 
the desert fathers in terms of practices and habits.
It is therefore natural to consider the phenomenon of guarding the heart in terms of 
place, prayer, and social practices. Since this particular virtue is widely attested as central to 
the monastic life,165 we will thereby gain an understanding of a fixed point around which the 
Christian ascetics allowed their various degrees of plurality.
161 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XI.27, XI.37 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XI.78 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Orisius 2. Cf. also 
Apoph.  Patr.  (Lat): XI.45,  II.1  =  Apoph.  Patr.  (alph): Anthony 10,  (τη ενδον φυλακη;  interior  custodia); 
Apoph. Patr. (Lat): IV.55 (custodierunt se), V.14 (cogitationem suam custodiens), VII.34 (custodit conscientiam 
suam), XI.26 =  Apoph. Patr. (alph): Peter the Pionite 2,  Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XVI.16 (custodire mentem), and 
Apoph.  Patr.  (alph): Poemen  135  (νηφειν διανοιαν).  Palladius,  h.  Laus.: XXVIII  (  9o  fu&lac  thj 
swfrosu&nhj) lib. grad.: VI.2, XXX.20 Evagrius, de mal. cog.: 25, 27, 36 Evagrius, de orat.: 87 Barsanuphius 
and Iohannes,  resp.: 137B Basilius,  renunt Climacus,  scal.: Step 4 Apoph. Patr. (anon): 33, 58, 70, 141, 211. 
Noted also by Linge, 2000: 553.
162 As exemplified by Michel Foucault, e.g. in Foucault, 2000[1985] Foucault, 2000[1981] Foucault, 2005[2001] 
Foucault, et al., 1988 and Pierre Hadot, in Hadot, 1995 Hadot, 2002[1995].
163 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Agathon 8 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.11 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): X.13.
164 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.11. In both the alphabetical and the systematic collections in Greek, the details form a 
separate apophthegm - AP Syst (Gk) Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): X.13,14 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Agathon 10.
165 e.g. in Lossky, 1976: 202.
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‘If Pambo fasted for two days together and ate two loaves, would he become a monk in that 
way? No. And if Pambo works to get two pence and gives them in alms, would he become a 
monk that way? No, not that way either.’ He said to them, ‘The works are good, but if you 
guard your conscience towards your neighbour, then you will be saved.’166
1.3.1: Place
One of the practices most associated with guarding the heart is that of staying in the 
cell.167 Whilst this does not appear to modern ears to be a practice, it had very concrete forms 
and significance for the desert fathers and mothers (cf. over, on page 34). It is notable that in 
the case of the monk who came in from the harvest, the only teaching he received from the 
experienced desert  father  concerned ‘the manner  in which he should sit  in  the cell.’  (my 
translation – Latin:  quomodo oporteret esse in cella sua; Greek:  pwj dei kaqisai e)n tw 
kelliw:  over, on page 34) In addition to forming a kind of macrocosm for the soul,168 the cell 
was a constitutive feature of the understanding of spiritual exercise, the presence of God, and 
solitude.
The  practice  of  the  cell  forms  a  bare  essential  in  ascetic  life.169 It  is  a  common 
occurrence in the apophthegmata that a monk approaches one of the desert fathers or mothers 
to tell them how severe they are in their strict life, or occasionally to complain that they are 
not able to be so extreme. Either way, the response is the same: do not try to be so intense, 
just sit in your cell.170
The instruction is sometimes meant to prevent distraction: the cells were bare, and 
there was a good deal more temptation outside it. However, temptation in and of itself was not 
necessarily a bad thing in these environments:  quite the opposite.171 Being in the cell is a 
particular  practice  that  replaces  other  forms  of  renunciation.  So when someone is  feeling 
tempted to go to live with other people in a coenobitic monastery, they come to Paphnutius 
for advice:
166Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.65 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Pambo 2; cf. also Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XI.2. = Apoph. Patr.  
(alph): Agathon 29.
167 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): II.1 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Anthony 10 and Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): VIII.12 = Apoph.  
Patr. (alph): Serapion 4 =  Apoph. Patr. (Lat): VIII.9  (although the Greek here uses the more philosophical 
expression ‘piροσεχε σεαυτω’ – attend to yourself. cf. Hadot, 1995: 130-136)Evagrius, hypo.: 5.
168 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Ammonas 4 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.16 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): X.20.
169 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Pambo 8 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): I.16 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): I.25 Barsanuphius and 
Iohannes, resp.: 172.
170 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Heraclides - cf. also Arsenius 11 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): VII.27 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): 
VII.34 Apoph. Patr. (anon): 15, 63, 66, 70, 73 Evagrius, hypo.: 6f.
171 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Anthony 5 et passim; Moschus, prat.: 209.
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The old man said to him, ‘Go and stay in your cell; make only one prayer in the morning and 
one in the evening and one at night. When you are hungry, eat, when you are thirsty, drink; 
when you are tired, sleep. But stay in the cell and take no notice of this thought.’ The brother 
went and found Abba John and told him what Abba Paphnutius had said and Abba John said, 
‘Don’t pray at all, just stay in the cell.’172
The  significance  of  sitting  in  the  cell  was  not  simply  the  absence  of  meaningful 
political activity, however: the cell is not necessarily the place of Agamben’s bare life.173 The 
cell was supposed to ‘teach you everything’,174 and there were good ways and bad ways of 
being  in  the  cell.175 For  Poemen,  for  example,  sitting  in  the  cell  was  synonymous  with 
‘manual work, eating only once a day, silence, meditation’.176 It was the place of struggle with 
demons and one’s own thoughts.177 It was importantly a place of the presence of God.178
Perhaps the greatest significance of the cell was its solitude. The hermits would come 
together on weekends and meet to celebrate the eucharist and pray together, and then they 
would flee to their cells in order to preserve their silence. The cell was the place of the self 
and solitude. It was the place of self examination.179 Macarius the Great defines ‘fleeing from 
men’ as ‘to sit in your cell and weep for your sins’.180
So although the habit  of staying in the cell  certainly had specific  significance and 
content for early ascetics, its value was precisely the effort of being with oneself,181 without 
distraction,182 in order to work on the self and examine the self. Abba Ammoes was so strict in 
this matter that he did not even look at his cell’s contents,183 and this is a natural working out 
172 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Paphnutius 5. cf. also freedom of thought in the cell -  Apoph. Patr. (Lat): VII.37 = 
Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): VII.45.
173 Agamben, 1998[1995]. Which is not to say that the cell does not develop into the place of the homo sacer in 
European  asceticism  and  biopolitics.  Barsanuphius  significantly  calls  his  cell  a  cemetery,  for  example: 
Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 142.
174 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Moses 6 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): II.9 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): II.19.
175 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Poemen 96 Moschus, prat.: 110; cf. also quotation above, on page 34.
176 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): VII.24 - cf. also X.64 =  Apoph. Patr. (alph): Poemen 168 =  Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): 
X.93.
177 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Moses 1 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XVIII.12 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XVIII.17.
178 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Gelasius 6, Daniel 5 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XI.8 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XI.16.
179 Evagrius, hypo.: 9 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 237.
180 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Macarius the Great 27. Macarius is quoted by John, who adds ‘as well as to remain 
vigilant so that the intellect is not taken captive but rather struggles, and, if it is taken captive, to return it to its 
place.’ Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 172. Cf. also the unserious cell, below on page 213.
181 ‘ita erunt et cogitationes ejus qui propter Deum tolerabiliter in cella sua resederit;  quia etsi ad modicum 
nutant, sed iterum revertuntur ad eum’ Apoph. Patr. (Lat): VII.30 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): VII.37.
182 Evagrius, excerpts: 32
183 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): IV.11 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): IV.11 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Ammoes 3; cf. also Apoph.  
Patr. (Lat): IV.16 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): IV.16 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Helladius 1.
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of the logic of the cell. It was the context – remarkable for its minimalism184 – for the care for 
the self.
Having  identified  ‘guarding  your  soul’  as  a  positive  element  in  early  Christian 
asceticism, we have now also isolated one aspect of its content in the practice of the cell. This 
practice itself, though, can be treated both as a specific form of life (with rules of fasting, 
praying, repenting, etc.), and as a place of inactivity. Cell solitude is also a renunciation of the 
standards and conventions of the common life.
1.3.2: Prayer
As  regards  the  prayers  of  early  Christian  ascetics,  the  relations  to  freedom  and 
positivity can be seen fairly clearly. There is certainly an ideal of prayer without form, where 
the solitary stays before God in undisturbed contemplation. However, even the anchorites of 
the desert would meet on weekends to pray together in set forms, as Gould has shown.185 It is 
as a result of this that the dilemma of meeting in order to pray or cultivating one’s own prayer 
life alone in the cell arose. This dilemma evoked various responses, some of which we have 
already occasioned upon: Motius says that one should not mark oneself out by staying away 
from the  synaxis (the liturgical office said in common by hermits of the area – cf.  over on 
page  55); many others advocated running away as soon as it was over.186 There are a few 
aspects that served to pin down monastic prayer in specific ways, and I will here concentrate 
on three of the most significant, namely psalmody, set prayers, and the liturgy.
The most common form of prayer we see being practiced in the deserts of Egypt and 
Palestine in late antiquity is psalmody. The saying of psalms made up the main component of 
the common prayer  of  both anchorites  (solitaries)  and cenobites  (ascetics  of  the common 
life).187 It is also spoken of as one of the key features of being a monk, the way in which true 
Christian ascetics could be recognised.188
184 as Brown points out concerning Daniel the Stylite, who ‘avoided being placed’ - Brown, 1971: 92. Cf. also 
Evagrius on the cell as non-attachment in Evagrius, hypo.: 5.
185 Gould, 1993.
186 E.g. Apoph. Patr. (alph): Isaac the Theban 2 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XI.47.
187 E.g. in Barsanuphius and Iohannes,  resp.: 85, 248 Evagrius,  excerpts: 2 Evagrius,  de mal. cog.: 27 Apoph.  
Patr. (alph): Eulogius the Priest, John the Dwarf 35, Serapion 1, Syncletia 27 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.71, and 
Apoph. Patr. (alph): Thenaton of Enaton 3 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XI.11 - cf. also IV.57, VII.17, 27, X.20, XI.9, 
XIV.1. The Latin translation of ‘synaxis’ in the systematic collection here is literally ‘to make the ministry of 
psalming’ in Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XIV.2 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Arsenius 24 and Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XIV.1
188 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): V.18, VIII.4  =  Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): V.22, VIII.4  =  Apoph. Patr. (anon): 36 and 
Apoph. Patr. (alph): Eulogius the Priest.
62
The  frequent  chanting  of  defined  texts  is  specific  enough  to  form  a  constructive 
element  to  ascetic  renunciation.  Monks  and  nuns  would  say  psalms  in  order  to  exercise 
control in their lives, but the control led in the direction dictated by the content of the psalms.
In addition to the specification of the text to be chanted, it would appear that a certain 
choice of psalms was selected for the synaxis.189 Often mentioned are the ‘twelve psalms’,190 
so that it is not simply a case of saying psalms, but of saying the psalms, i.e. those selected for 
the task. This specifies the form even further.
The practice developed over time. Isidore the Priest tells us that when he was young, 
he  put  no  limits  whatsoever  on  the  psalms  that  he  would  read.191 Others  read  the  entire 
psalter.192 But just as extreme fasting was dampened to moderate eating (cf. over, on page 59), 
excessive psalmody was also discouraged in time.193 In this way we can see the practice of 
saying psalms as a radically new way of life, and attaining an order that was followed in 
common life.194
The saying of set prayers was also a common feature of the Christian ascetic liturgy.195 
Not only did they pray together, but when in their cell, monks and nuns would say prayers in 
private.
This  practice  in  itself  is  a  specific  element  in  Christian  renunciation.  Whilst 
philosophers  would  memorise  the  sayings  of  their  teachers,  as  well  as  tests,  rules,  and 
principles by which to focus and to judge a situation, Christians would address God when 
challenging situations arose.196
On the other hand, some of the desert fathers could be decidedly bland on this count, 
encouraging their disciples to use few words. Whilst it is most likely that a number of the 
sayings of the desert fathers were preserved so that their prayer could be repeated, this is not 
always because of their formulation. A good example of a combination of a set prayer with a 
bland prayer is the following story about abba Macarius:
189 The  study  of  psalm  selection,  collection,  and  recitation  has  attained  a  certain  degree  of  complexity, 
particularly in relation to ancient psalm books. For a good introduction, cf. Frøyshov, 2005.
190 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Macarius the Great 33, an Abba of Rome 1 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.76 - cf. also X.97 
Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 143.
191 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Isidore the Priest 4 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.17.
192 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Serapion 1.
193 Evagrius, excerpts: 22.
194 With a corresponding complexity as the tradition develops: cf. Barsanuphius and Iohannes,  resp.: 142  et  
passim.
195 Cf. the summary in Apoph. Patr. (Lat): V.18.
196 Cf. the list of practices against a wandering mind in Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.20 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): X.25.
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Some brothers asked Macarius, ‘How should we pray?’ He said, ‘There is no need to talk much 
in prayer. Reach out your hands often, and say, ‘Lord have mercy on me, as you will and as you 
know.’ But if conflict troubles you, say, ‘Lord, help me.’ He knows what is best for us, and has 
mercy.’197
There  does  appear  to  have  been  a  canon of  prayers,  however,  and  they  could  be 
enumerated.198 This would imply that the prayers were short phrases or sentences addressed to 
God, clearly identifiable as separate entities. If these prayers were indeed such set forms as 
those suggested by Macarius above, then the practice of frequent or continuous prayer goes 
from being a minimalist practice of focus and renunciation to being a constitutive way of life.
There is also evidence for the introduction of a timetable of prayer in the desert. The 
most frequent context for prayers in the Systematic collection in Latin is that of a meeting of 
monks, who pray before sitting down together or leaving each other.199 In this way, the monks 
and nuns inculcated in their common life specific habits that would form them in particular 
ways.
In addition to the prayers said when a Christian was in trouble or when they met each 
other, early Christian ascetics marked time by the prayers they said. As was the case with the 
psalmody, there is some debate as to the origins of the liturgy of desert fathers and mothers. 
What is certain is that this liturgy had a particular relationship to renunciation and conformity.
Keeping the hours of prayer – mirroring in various degrees the monastic offices of 
matins,  lauds,  prime,  terce,  sext,  none,  compline  etc.  –  was  a  natural  part  of  ascetic 
renunciation.200 Instead  of  marking  time  by  work,  market,  and  authority,  early  Christian 
ascetics  would  ‘measure  the  hours’  (Greek:  melein  tas  hōras  tōn  sunaxeōn) with  regular 
prayer and fasting. The two go together.201
197 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XII.12 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): Gk. Syst XII.11 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Macarius the 
Great 19. Cf. also discussion in Sinkewicz, 2003: Intro, p. xix. Barsanuphius recommends the prayers ‘Lord have 
mercy.’; ‘God, have mercy on me, the wretched one’; ‘God, you see my affliction; help me.’ Barsanuphius and 
Iohannes,  resp.: 87, 143, and compares the prayer  of Macarius to the Lord’s Prayer in letter 140. The Jesus 
prayer is recommended in Climacus, scal.: Step 15.
198 103 prayers are counted in Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XII.15 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XII.18; 24 in Palladius, h.  
Laus.: XVII.10, 12 in XXXII.6 300 in Apoph. Patr. (anon): 148, and 500 repetitions of “Lord have mercy” in 
Moschus, prat.: 104.
199 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): VII.24, 43, VIII.9, X.76, XII:3, 15, XIV.16, XV.66.
200 More prevalent in coenobitic monasticism than in its anchoritic variant: Barsanuphius and Iohannes,  resp.: 
143.
201 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Poemen 168 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): X.93 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.64: lat: ministerii 
horas; Gk:  µη αµελειν ... των συναξεων τας ωρας. Cf. also  Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): IV.71 =  Apoph. Patr.  
(Lat): IV.58,  and  Basil’s  and  Evagrius’  rejection  of  the  market:  ‘keep  yourself  from  buying  and  selling’, 
Evagrius, hypo.: 8 Basilius, ascet. disc.
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Once again, the monks and nuns tend towards transcending the specific form for the 
sake of the general virtue.202 Whilst it is important to mark the times of prayer, it is even more 
important to be present to God the entire time, rather than at regular intervals.
‘By your prayers we have kept our rule; we carefully observe the offices of terce, sext, none and 
vespers.’ But Epiphanius rebuked him and said, ‘Then you are failing to pray at other times. The 
true monk ought to pray without ceasing. He should always be singing psalms in his heart.’203
Nevertheless, the result of this debate among the fathers has indeed been a set form of 
prayers for the hours, and the influence of monastic movements upon the liturgical practice of 
the church has been immense in this respect.204 Not only are there monasteries surviving in a 
direct line of descent from the fathers and mothers of Egypt and Palestine, but through the 
journeys of Cassian, Jerome, and Alypius (the close friend of Augustine), these prayer habits 
have constituted the starting point of the Western monastic orders.
In this respect, the prayers of the early Christian ascetics can also be identified as a 
positive aspect of their practice that was to be embraced. Whilst Christians were encouraged 
to renounce the ways of the world, they were also given something to embrace. On the other 
hand, there is evidence to suggest that this form was not always fixed down. There were rules, 
and ascetics would also transcend these rules in a disciplined fashion. In this way, the practice 
of prayer is both a support and resistance to the formation of a normal ascetic life.
1.3.3: Clothing Practices
There are other practices that demonstrate this tension between particular forms and a 
transcending renunciation  that  can be found in the ascetic  observance of the cell  and the 
prayers. The final feature that appears to have become essential to the monastic way of life 
that I want to explore here is that of clothing.
The monastic habit was an essential identity marker for the monk. Cassian chooses to 
open his  Institutions  and Evagrius Ponticus his  Praktikos205 with a description of the desert 
fathers’ apparel; a priest of Pelusia makes use of the habit to include and exclude monks;206 
Basil counts the monk’s habit as a marker alongside that of the soldier, senator, and authority 
202 Basil dictates hours of prayer so people can’t use their extreme piety as an excuse not to work: Basilius, reg.  
fus.: question 37.
203 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XII.6 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XII.6 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Epiphanius 3. Cf. also  lib.  
grad.: VII.20 .
204 cf. Frøyshov, 2005: and references there.
205 Cassianus, de institutis: I Evagrius, Prakt.: Prologue 2-7.
206 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Poemen 11.
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(as well as the down and out);207 Isaac the priest of the Cells uses incorrect habit as a reason to 
exclude a brother208; a monk leaving the monastic life removes his habit,209 and an anonymous 
abba speaks of adopting the habit as a rite of passage equivalent to baptism.210
The principles  that decided which clothes were chosen were those of renunciation. 
Although Cassian does give an allegorical interpretation of the clothes towards the end of his 
account, the function of the main robe is to replace nudity (elsewhere listed alongside fasting, 
vigils, work, and reading amongst the forms of ascetic renunciation)211 without conforming to 
fashion.212 Similarly, the hood is in place for the ‘regulation of the character’.213 So, as we saw 
was the case  over with obedience (on page  39) the form of asceticism appears to be based 
upon  a  deliberate  exercise  of  renunciation,  working  out  the  implications  of  negative 
theology.214
In  spite  of  the  uniformity  that  Cassian  both  observes  and  prescribes  for  his  own 
community, there is still a movement amongst the desert fathers and mothers to transcend this 
rule. Abba Isaac, the priest of the Cells, appears to have been particularly concerned about 
this.215 Once again we have a kind of chronological form that bewails the development of 
conformity at the cost of the radical renunciation of the first fathers:
Isaac said to the brothers, ‘Pambo and our predecessors used to wear old and much-patched 
clothes. You wear good clothes. Go away, you have made this place into a desert.216
207 Basilius, reg. fus.: question 22.
208 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Isaac, Priest of the Cells 8 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): VI.9 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): VI.8. It 
is unclear what the error consisted in: Guy claims that the Greek koussoulion has been incorrectly translated as 
‘cucullum’ in the Latin (in a note to the Greek Systematic version), because of Cassian’s description of the 
desert uniform, which includes a hood – Cassianus, de institutis: I.4: de cucullis Aegyptiorum. There is nothing 
to say, however, that Isaac was not simply reacting to the traditions of a uniform that diverged with his own 
standard: either as a development in his community, or simply originating from a different geographical area 
(which is most likely, as the hooded monk seems to be arriving).
209 Moschus, prat.: 118.
210 Apoph. Patr. (anon): 234. Similarly when Symeon Salos and John receive the habit in Leontius,  v. Sym.: 
I.131, 134.
211 Cassianus, Collationes: I.7.
212 Cassianus, de institutis: I.2.
213 Cassianus, de institutis: I.3.
214 Evagrius,  hypo.: 4 Evagrius,  sent. ad mon.: 82 Evagrius, sent. ad virg.: 23 Evagrius,  de mal. cog.: 6. Later, 
the monastic vestments become a source of religious power. Barsanuphius is requested to send his hood to a 
disciple in Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 1.
215Cf. footnote 65 above. Isidore flouted the rule by wearing almost no linen: Palladius, h. Laus.: I.1.
216 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): VI.9 (translation adjusted) = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): VI.10 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Isaac, 
Priest of the Cells 7 - cf. also  Palladius, h. Laus.: LXVI.2, LXVIII.4.
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A further instance of ascetics transcending the rule concerning clothes can be found in 
the  story  of  the  monk  who  paraded  naked  down  the  street.217 As  with  abba  Isaac,  the 
motivation appears to have been renunciation of convention.
The negative theology of early Christian ascetics was interpreted in constructive and 
specific ways in many elements of their practice – in the cell, in prayer, and in their clothing – 
whilst  throughout struggling with the ideal  of transcending these ways.218 In rejecting the 
world and shunning the self-glorifying image of the ascetic athlete, they constructed norms 
that avoided sin without policing a fixed way of holiness. Not only did the monks form a rule 
for themselves, but they were then ambivalent in their relationship to this rule.
It  is difficult  to avoid the fact,  however,  that  the way of the desert  was a way of 
holiness. It is not a simple matter to be adhere to a religious way of life with no appeal to 
God. The norms of the desert were religious norms, and were justified by theological and 
scriptural  reasoning.  Monastic  practical  apophaticism renounced  the  world  in  historically 
specific  ways.  They  rejected  worldly  norms  of  eating  and  work,  and  then  embraced 
disciplines  of  regular  fasts  and  particular  occupations  (e.g.  rope  baskets).  The  negative 
theology of the desert fathers had a uniqueness that we are justified in calling its cataphatic 
element.
217 Palladius, h. Laus.: XXXVII Sarapion 14. Cf. also the grazer abba Sophronios who went naked for seventy 
years: Moschus, prat.: 159.
218 This is the burden of Memra 14 of lib. grad..
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1.4: Empty Fools: Vainglory
On the basis of this analysis of the theology of early Christian ascetics, we may now 
turn to the case of the holy fools. What kind of renunciation to they embrace? Is their practical 
apophaticism more or less consistent  than that  of other early Christian ascetics? To what 
extent do they stand in continuity with the renunciation of the desert fathers and mothers? Do 
they take up elements  of  constructive  renunciation,  or  do they tend towards  transcending 
those constructions?
One of the most nuanced accounts given of holy fools is to be found in an article by 
Gilbert Dagron about honour in the Byzantine world.219 He sees the behaviour of the fools in 
terms of an ascetic defence against vainglory. The monastic vice of vainglory is described as 
essentially becoming a part of the honour system of the world. Whilst honour and shame have 
been important factors constituting the world of the Eastern Mediterranean, Dagron claims 
that holy fools are characterised by their transcendence of them.
As such,  their  holiness  consists  in  an  intervention  precisely at  the  point  of  norm-
making  activity.  They  do  not  simply  transgress  rules,  but  deny  the  validity  of  their 
recommendation. For the command ‘be honourable’ is like ‘be good’ or ‘be rational’. It has 
no content, but denying its validity is part of the revaluation of all honour-based norms.
Vainglory  is  a  particularly  pernicious  temptation,  as  it  appears  precisely  when 
someone has done something right (even by obeying). ‘Like the sun which shines on all alike, 
vainglory beams on every occupation.’220 In order to avoid it, religious have to be completely 
unaware of their own goodness, which requires a certain degree of self-alienation. The holy 
fools, by accepting insults, transgressing identity-marking laws of the church, and hiding all 
their virtues, achieve this to a unique extent.
Dagron’s  analysis  is  persuasive,  and gets  to  the heart  of  one of  the techniques  of 
renunciation among Christian ascetics, namely the activation of the observant surroundings. 
This  ascetic  practice  consisted  of  a  close  accountability  of  the  Christian  to  his  or  her 
confessor. A good monk is a watched monk.
The way this worked in practice, as we know, formed the beginnings of the general 
discipline  of  regular  confession.221 Monks sift  through their  thoughts  in  order  to  evaluate 
them. They suspect their thoughts and classify them by verbalising them, and telling them to 
219 Dagron, 1990.
220 Climacus, scal.: Step 22 – cf. also Step 2 and 26 Evagrius, de mal. cog.: 3 Evagrius, excerpts: 43 Evagrius, de 
orat.: 7 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 278 Maximus, carit. 1-4: II.35, III.59.
221 cf. Foucault, 2000c[1982] Foucault, 2000a[1983] on this.
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another. The emphasis is not just on making right judgements, but on being exhaustive.222 No 
thought must be allowed to get through the net. All must be revealed.
Whenever the demon troubles you, come to me, and this will rebuke him, and so he will go 
away. Nothing troubles the demon of lust more than laying bare his urgings. Nothing pleases 
him more than the concealment of the temptation. Eleven times the brother went to the hermit, 
and blamed himself for his imaginings (Latin: cogitationes)223
So monks and nuns would present themselves to the scrutiny of their spiritual advisors 
in order to produce a kind of bodily discipline of self-mastery, conscientising themselves so 
as  not  to  uncritically  accept  the  sins  of  the  age  or  of  their  tradition.  In  this  respect,  the 
confessor took the place of the eye of God.224 Monks would also activate  the function of 
societal honour and shame in order to strengthen their moral resolve. The form of the moral 
rule was: do not do anything that you would be ashamed to do before God:
He said to her,  ‘Come with me.’  When they came to a crowded place, he said to her, 
‘Come on, I will lie with you here as you wanted.’ She looked round at the crowd and said, 
‘How can we do it here, with all these people standing round? We should be ashamed.’ He 
said, ‘If you blush before men, should you not blush the more before God, who discloses the 
hidden things of darkness?’225
It  is  this  tendency that also caught Kristeva’s attention in her reading of Christian 
asceticism, as exemplified by St Anthony.226 Monks would spend their entire lives examining 
themselves as if their  confessor were actually present. Through verbalising their  thoughts, 
they would place themselves in a realm of a specific public morality, even when alone in their 
cell.
Given time,  the  physical  presence of  the  confessor  became less  essential  than the 
imagination of one. So monks constitute the presence of a judge – and thereby of God – in 
order to discipline themselves.227 It is in this kind of framework that we may understand the 
222 Apoph. Patr.  (alph): Anthony 38 =  Apoph. Patr.  (Gk.  syst.): XI.2.  This demand does not seem to have 
continued long. John specifically contradicts it in Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 165.
223 ‘sed  magis,  quoties  molestus  est  daemon,  veni  ad  me,  et  increpatus  abscedet.  Nihil  enim sic  extaediat 
daemonem fornicationis,  quomodo si  revelentur  stimulationes  ejus.  Et  nihil  eum sic  laetificat,  quomodo si 
abscondantur cogitationes. Venit ergo frater ad senem undecies, accusans cogitationes suas.’ Apoph. Patr. (Lat): 
V.13 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): V.16 (λογισµος). Cf. also Cassianus, de institutis: IV.ix.
224 cf. also the Rule of Benedict IV.49, where every monk should know for certain that God sees him in every 
place (in omni loco Deum se respicere pro certo scire), and its equivalent in Basil of Caesarea: Basilius, renunt; 
on the perspective of God as a technique of morality, cf. Thomas, 2006a Thomas, 2008.
225 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.21 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): X.26 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Ephrem 3. Epicurus had this 
role for his disciples well after his death – cf. the discussion in Hadot, 2002[1995]: 124.
226 Kristeva, 1982[1980]: 130.
227 Imagining the face of the superior is an expression of obedience in: Climacus, scal.: Step 4.
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contemplation of final judgement throughout one’s life.228 Only God can be a right judge, so 
thinking of self judgement involves thinking of God’s judgement.
It  is  at  this  point  that  the practice  of negative theology can be inserted.  If  God is 
defined by all the good values shared by one particular group of people, then shame in the 
face of God will generate exactly the same behaviour as shame in the face of  that society. 
However, if one’s theology includes a divergence between shared values and the character of 
God, then the behaviour produced by the two forms of shame will be different. The desert 
fathers and mothers  are certainly characterised by their  prioritisation of God over society. 
That prioritisation would however have no effect whatsoever were it not for the content of 
their  theology.  Since the apophatic  theology of early Christian ascetics disallows defining 
God by the values of the city, the behaviour produced by the observing confessor and God is 
quite different from the manners of the city.
As Foucault observed concerning the Cynic Crates,229 the radically observable life can 
be  expressed  both  as  conformed  to  norms  and as  shamelessness.  Cynics  were  shameless 
because their values were not those of the masses. Early Christian ascetics could be shameless 
because they did not seek the praise of men and women, but of an unknown God. So in the 
story about abba Ephrem quoted here, it is the monk that is ready to do something outrageous 
before people, while the prostitute will not. Ascetics that abandon the world no longer blush 
before the scandal of society,230 but bring their sins before the judgement of a superior, or 
companion. In this way they deny the honour/shame system of the world, only in order to 
embrace the hidden honour of the kingdom of God.
Even this rejection is not enough for the holy fool. Precisely because this form of 
confession and openness is a solution to the problem of honour and shame, it allows for the 
danger of vainglory.  ‘All  recognised virtue is suspect:  so one must  go beyond communal 
discipline  which  reintroduces  honour  under  cover  of  imitation,  beyond  individual  ascetic 
exploits which arouse admiration.’231 Vainglory can only be defeated if the honour of both the 
world and the desert are transcended. The holy fool does not blush before the world, or before 
holy people, or anyone else.
228 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Anthony 33, Agathon 29, Evagrius 1, Cronius 3, Silvanus 2.
229 Foucault 2009: 234f.
230 As pointed out by the monk who challenged the nun to put all her clothes onto her head in Palladius, h. Laus.: 
XXXVII. Similarly, a monk who goes back on his intention to sleep with a religious woman is then exhorted by 
her not to ‘let shame get the better’ of him in Moschus, prat.: 204.
231 Dagron, 1990: 933f, my translation.
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Dagron  is  therefore  interpreting  holy  fools  as  a  particular  kind  of  ‘secret  saint.’ 
Maximus the Confessor appeals to secrecy as the solution to vainglory,232 and the holy fool 
hagiography is  associated  with the  related  category  of  secret  saints,  who hide  their  good 
works from others in cunning ways. The story of Mark the holy fool, for example, is followed 
by the story of a monk masquerading as a blind beggar, a nun feigning drunkenness (who 
resembles Isidora), and two cross-dressing nuns.233 In these stories, praise is offered to God 
‘who alone knows how many secret servants he has.’234
This analysis has advantages over its rivals.235 The first is that it is substantial: instead 
of  simply  noting  the  parallels  with  contemporary  asceticism,  it  applies  colour  to  the 
comparison. It places the holy fools in a robust understanding of their ascetic context. The 
second advantage is that it fits well with the reading of asceticism given above concerning the 
pattern in early asceticism of renunciation accompanied by a tension between a specific form 
and transcendence of that form. According to Dagron, the holy fools are simply taking the 
element  of  transcendence  seriously,  following through the  original  impetus  of  ascetics  to 
renounce  all  forms  of  honour  system.  As  an  example,  see  Barsanuphius’  response  to 
compliments:
Brother, through you the Scripture has been fulfilled in me that says: ‘My people, those who 
praise you are deceiving you,’ and so on. Such a compliment does not permit us to look upon 
the shame of our very own countenance. For I believe that it is harmful even for those who have 
reached some measure, since it removes them from faith in God. For it is said, ‘How can you 
believe in me when you  accept  glory from one another?’  Therefore,  those who acquire the 
humility of the Apostle will instead choose foolishness for themselves, in order that afterwards 
they might become wise.236
So, for example,  where monks and nuns renounce the world by wearing extremely 
simple  clothing,  the  holy  fools  continue  their  renunciation  of  all  forms  of  vainglory  by 
renouncing monastic clothing too. Symeon takes off his belt,  then his habit,237 and Isidora 
leaves her veil – just as defining as the habit was for monks238 – to wrap a rag around her 
232 Maximus, carit. 1-4: III.62, IV.43, IV.49.
233 v. dan. scet.
234 v. dan. scet.: 5, echoed in Moschus, prat.: 37. Cf. also 108 and 111 on the same theme.
235 for  example  Krueger,  1996  Feuerstein,  1991  Gorainoff,  1983  Ware,  2000  Rydén,  1981  Saward,  1980 
Frøyshov, 2003 Syrkin, 1982.
236 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 126. Cf. also Moschus, prat.: 110. The same verse is quoted for the same 
reason in Apoph. Patr. (anon): 205.
237 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.145, 148.
238 Brown, 1988: 260f.
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head.239 It is a thought precisely in line with the consideration of clothes summarised above 
(cf. over, on page 65). The fools neglect ascetic morality in order not to be proud of keeping 
to the code.
In other words, the holy fools’ rejection of vainglory is of a piece with early Christian 
ascetic  practical  apophaticism.  Recognition  of  religious  goodness  is  also  constructive 
theology. It claims to have identified an unambiguous and univocal aspect of God’s goodness. 
By transcending both the world’s norms and those of the religious life, holy fools establish a 
practice of the ongoing denial of norms. Whenever ascetic renunciation rests by asserting a 
“royal way”, it is denied by the holy fool and her accusation of vainglory.
There  are,  however,  certain  problems  with  Dagron’s  suggestion.  In  his  article,  he 
argues that the fools appear at the intersection of the interpretation of the Pauline trope of 
‘fools for Christ’240, the social phenomenon of madness, and the moral reflection on honour 
that  takes place in the casuistry of vainglory (Latin:  vana gloria;  Greek:  kenodoxia).  The 
interpretation of Paul in terms of the phenomenon of madness seems undeniable: whatever the 
meaning of the word  salos/salē in Greek, the holy fools are also called mad (‘touched’ – 
Latin: fatua), and Paul is quoted to explain them.
The casuistry of vainglory is more difficult to discern in their behaviour. True enough, 
holy fools call down dishonour upon themselves,241 and hide their virtue,242 which appear to 
be standard defences against vainglory, but it is less certain that they were seen as shameful 
and  immoral  people.  Their  actions  can just  as  easily  be  seen  as  ultra-holy acts,  however 
inconvenient or embarrassing.  In fact,  parallels  to the practice of the desert  fathers would 
suggest that the narrators of their lives would not have been the only ones to have considered 
them  as  holy  people  in  their  society.  The  children  that  Symeon  first  encountered  did 
immediately recognise him as ‘a crazy abba’. Evagrius Scholasticus, after having introduced 
Symeon as one who hid his virtue in order to avoid vainglory (confirming Dagron), then goes 
on to  recount stock proofs of his  holiness  that  were witnessed by the general  public:  the 
accusation  of  fathering  a  child;243 maintaining  celibacy  whilst  visiting  prostitutes,244 and 
239 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XVIII.19 Palladius, h. Laus.: XXIV.1.
240 similarly Vogt, 1987.
241 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XVI.19.
242 For exhortations and examples of the deployment of secrecy against vainglory in the early ascetic tradition, cf. 
Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): VIII.6 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 257.
243 cf. Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XV.25 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Macarius the Great 1 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XV.39 
and Palladius, h. Laus.: LXX 'The Lector Calumniated'
244 e.g. Apoph. Patr. (alph): John the Dwarf 40 and Serapion 1 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XIII.17 and XVII.34
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prophecy. We cannot explain the entire account of Leontius, for example, with the concept of 
vainglory.
At this point the analysis becomes more complicated, because we have to distinguish 
between varieties of transgression. It is fairly simple to trace the roots of a positive morality, 
but what distinctions can be made in a lack of morality? This problem lies at the root of many 
unnuanced  accounts  of  holy  foolery.245 In  order  to  describe  this  domain  of  anti-morality, 
consider the forms of renunciation in the following story: 
A brother settled outside his village and did not return there for many years. He said to the 
brethren, ‘See how many years it is since I went back to the village, while you often go up 
there.’ This was told to Abba Poemen and the old man said, ‘I used to go back up there at night 
and walk all round my village, so that the thought of not having gone up there would not cause 
me vain-glory.’246
Here we clearly find a case of monastic life outside the desert that is justified by the 
casuistry  of  vainglory:  Poemen  transgresses  the  general  rule  in  order  to  remember  his 
limitations. The reasoning is specifically not based on a test of endurance. He goes there at 
night  so  as  not  to  be  tempted  by  people.  The  effect  it  has  is  upon  Poemen  himself,  to 
demonstrate his own limitations and his attachment to a place. Compare this with the account 
of another transgression of space rules in the form of the Grazers, whose way of life Symeon 
the fool embraced in the first part of Leontius’ account, before becoming a holy fool.247
Another mode has also been devised, one which reaches to the utmost extent of resolution and 
endurance: for transporting themselves to a scorched wilderness, and covering only those parts 
which nature requires to be concealed, both men and women leave the rest of their persons 
exposed both to excessive frosts and scorching blasts, regardless alike of heat and cold. They, 
moreover, cast off the ordinary food of mankind, and feed upon the produce of the ground, 
whence they are  termed  Grazers;  allowing themselves  no more  than  is  barely sufficient  to 
sustain life.248
This way of life also transgresses the rule of the place of the cell,  but they do so 
simply because they can. The motivation is extreme renunciation, transcendence of human 
society, and the ascetic life.
245 in particular, Feuerstein, 1991 and Saward, 1980.
246 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Poemen 110. Cf. also Apoph. Patr. (alph): Matoes 13 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XI.79.
247 Leontius, v. Sym.: I.133, II.137. For more on grazers, cf. Moschus, prat.: 19, 21, 92, 129, 159, 167.
248 Evagrius Scholasticus, h.e.: I.21.
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Both  these  spatial  transgressions  are  based  in  a  form  of  renunciation,  the  one 
renouncing the discipline of the cell to avoid vainglory, and the other renouncing it in order to 
transcend human order.
The crucial question is: which form of renunciation is exemplified by the holy fools? 
Certainly the avoidance of vainglory is a key issue in Evagrius Scholasticus’ treatment of 
Symeon.  There  are  also  elements  of  this  motivation  in  the  story  of  Isidora.249 Leontius, 
however, portrays the life of Symeon as one heroic renunciation after another. It is telling that 
the return to the city that forms the fulcrum of the story and starts off the foolish antics is not 
for the benefit of the ascetic’s soul – to remind him of his human nature and defend against 
vainglory – but for the sake of the city itself.
‘What more benefit do we derive, brother, from passing time in this desert? But if you hear me, 
get  up,  let  us  depart;  let  us  save  others.  For  as  we  are,  we  do  not  benefit  anyone  except 
ourselves, and have not brought anyone else to salvation.’250
This  addition  to  Dagron’s  thesis  is  confirmed  by  his  best  support,  Evagrius 
Scholasticus. In the chapter that describes the Grazers, he continues by recounting another 
category  of  ascetic  that  lived  in  the  city  and hid their  extreme asceticism,  in  words  that 
indicate holy fools, not least by their similarity to his chapter on Symeon:251 they bath with 
members  of  the  opposite  sex,  eat  when they are not  supposed to,  and  disregard  clothing 
conventions. Interestingly, though, he says that these ascetics represent a combination of the 
ways of life of the Grazers and of communal ascetics of the laurae (coenobitic settlements).
This combination has to be further specified, however. We may argue for a continuity 
between early Christian asceticism and the holy fools. It cannot be denied, however, that they 
exemplify a particularly extreme version of that asceticism. Whereas monks had spent nights 
in prayer  with prostitutes,  Symeon sits on their  back while they whip him; some ascetics 
spend months in silence, while the holy fool never speaks a word of sense; desert religious 
hide their virtue, but the holy fool transgresses all rules of good conduct and disappears as 
soon  as  any  of  their  virtues  are  discovered.  Symeon  and  Mark  the  fool  die;252 Isidora 
disappears into the wilderness. The problem this raises for our thesis is that it is precisely 
249 Palladius, h. Laus.: XXIV.1 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XVIII.19.
250 Leontius, v. Sym.: III.142.
251 Compare  Evagrius  Scholasticus,  h.e.: I.21  with  IV.34.  Ivanov  says  that  Evagrius  Scholasticus  is  being 
disingenuous and ‘refusing to call a spade a spade’ - Ivanov, 2006[1994]: 101. It is rather more likely that the 
holy fool simply did not represent a commonly recognisable category for his readership.
252 v. dan. scet.: 2.
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extreme ascetic acts that are eschewed by those trying to combat vainglory. Monks who are 
too ascetic are criticised.
A brother came in and saw that they were drinking wine, and fled up on to a roof, and the roof 
fell in. When they heard the noise, they ran and found the brother lying half dead. They began to 
blame him, saying, ‘It served you right, you were guilty of vainglory.’253
The  number  of  sayings  in  the  apophthegmata  patrum that  mention  vainglory 
specifically  is  not  great,  despite  the  prominence  of  the  theme.  There  are  many  further 
instances where the thought lies behind the text as a motivating factor, however. The story of 
Poemen and the village above is one. The justification of uniformity on the grounds that it 
does not set one above others is another (cf. over, on page 55). In fact, it could be argued that 
this is the motivation of all the instances of an ascetic playing down or hiding their virtue. 
Simple obedience to a master was generally considered sufficient and sufficiently insane for 
the task of overcoming the temptation to evaluate oneself. Dramatic feats of madness were 
unnecessarily ostentatious.
in accordance with the Apostle’s precept, make yourself foolish in this world so that you may be 
wise by scrutinizing nothing and examining nothing of what has been enjoined on you; instead, 
always exhibit an obedience characterized by utter simplicity and faith, judging only that as 
holy, useful, and wise which the law of God or the deliberation of your elder has imposed on 
you. Once you have been well established by training of this kind, you will be able, under this 
discipline, to abide forever, and you will not be drawn away from the cenobium by any trials of 
the enemy or by any factions.254
The point here is that the holy fools’ transcendence of the positive elements of ascetic 
renunciation does not fit with the techniques employed to avoid vainglory amongst Christian 
ascetics. Sure enough, the life of the holy fools does indeed meet the challenge of vainglory: 
the problem that every time one does something good, one is aware of it can be solved by a 
dissociation of the self. However, the casuistry of vainglory that is to be found in the context 
of Eastern monasticism does not solve the problem in this way. It stops short at hiding virtue, 
feigning vice and – most importantly – eschewing extreme acts of asceticism.
253 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): IV.54 - and the parallel that justifies the vain monk in Apoph. Patr. (anon): 16; cf. also the 
tale of the extreme nun who closed herself in her cell and denied all luxury before falling through vainglory 
(kenodoxia): Palladius, h. Laus.: XXVIII.
254 Cassianus,  de institutis: IV.41.3.  Cf.  also the example  of  brother  Isidore  who endured  the dishonour of 
standing by the gate and falsely claiming to be epileptic (‘Eu]xai u#per e0mou, pa&ter, o#ti e0pilhptiko&j e0imi’): 
Climacus,  scal.: Step 4. Climacus elsewhere complains ‘I dress well or badly,  and am vainglorious in either 
case’ (step 22).
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1.5: Distracting Holiness: Dissociation
It is perhaps because the problem of vainglory was solved at a different level that the 
holy fools were free to show their asceticism so freely. Because they exercised such a degree 
of  dissociation  from the  self,  they  did  not  have  recourse  to  the  methods  of  compromise 
espoused by other  early  ascetics.  They could  therefore  continue  their  program of  openly 
transcending the cataphatic elements of Christian asceticism unhindered.
In this respect, Dagron was right to point out that the holy fools transcended systems 
of honour and shame by deploying the motive of secrecy against it. They even appear to have 
transcended norms that belong to the ascetic movement from which they sprang. But they did 
not do this in continuity with early Christian ascetic techniques of humility. Their works seem 
all too vainglorious for that. The rejection of honour and shame is important as a device of 
apophaticism, but there is more to be said about their practice.
What is the significance of the technique of dissociation in late antique asceticism and 
the holy fool stories? A brief overview of the practices in place in late antique philosophy and 
religion as regards perspective upon the world is perhaps in order. In particular I want to bring 
out  the  philosophical  view from above,  the  religious  separation  from the  world,  and  the 
internalisation of that separation, ultimately in the holy fools’ ideal of ‘mocking the world’.
Pierre Hadot has done a great deal of work on the tradition of seeing things from 
above in historic European philosophy.255 For him, the perspective from above – or the god’s 
eye view, the flight of the soul, the view from universality and objectivity,  the view from 
nature – was a hermeneutical key to the spiritual exercises of the philosophers. In order to rid 
themselves of the delusions of society, passion, and prejudice, ancient philosophers from all 
schools would make an effort to separate themselves from needs and desires, the very things 
that connected them to the world.
This aspect of ancient philosophy is seen by Hadot in a number of features of ancient 
thought. The gods are thought to dwell on mountains, the sea, and the underworld: all vantage 
points of infinity that place the world. Fantasies of flight, appearing in sources as diverse as 
Plato, Homer, Cicero, Ovid, Lucretius, Lucian, and various cynics256 (we might add St. Philip, 
Augustine257,  desert fathers,258 and later  monastic traditions of flying ascetics259),  are often 
255 The theme appears throughout his work, but is most concisely put in Hadot, 1995: ch. 9.
256 sources and bibliography to be found in Hadot, 1995.
257 e.g. in the ascent with Monica at Ostia in Augustinus, conf.: IX.x.23-26.
258 The alphabetical source alone records flying or transported monks in the following apophthegmata:  Apoph.  
Patr. (alph): Anthony 30, Ammonathas, John the Dwarf 14, Macarius the Great 14.
259 h. mon.: X.20.
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interpreted  as  the  soul’s  unbounded  vision.  Projects  within  the  discipline  of  physics  are 
embarked  upon  in  order  to  free  thought  to  travel  within  and  beyond  the  world.  Cynic 
philosophers are called ‘overseers’ (Greek:  episkopoi - bishops) of the world, because they 
look upon it and judge it from such a height.
One of the key perspectives  from which people may see the world,  however,  was 
death. The philosopher should consult with Charon, the gatekeeper of Hades, and die to the 
world in order to see it as it is. In this way, ancient philosophy had a startlingly modern view 
of objectivity: to see the world as it is, one must adopt the view from nowhere.
These same themes are taken up by another historian of late antiquity, namely Peter 
Brown, in his seminal account of the holy man.260 Here the context has shifted from the cities 
of the Mediterranean to the Syrian desert. Brown attempts to get beyond the modern disgust 
with the seeming dualism and misogyny of Christian monks in order to examine the practical 
function of these holy men, and their relation to power.
The conclusion arrived at is that the location of the monks – in the desert, the cell, the 
tomb,261 or on the pillar, as with the Stylites – is designed to be the opposite pole of human 
society.262 The  holy  man  would  attempt  to  push  himself  away  from  all  ties  to  family, 
economic interest, and village society. The reason they fled from women was not that women 
were disgusting: they fled women and bishops for fear that they would be fixed to a place 
within a public order, namely that of priest or of husband.
the holy man drew his powers from outside the human race: by going to live in the desert, in 
close identification with an animal kingdom that stood, in the imagination of contemporaries, 
for the opposite pole of all human society. Perched on his column, nearer to the demons of the 
upper air than to human beings, Symeon [the Stylite] was objectivity personified.263
It is this formation of the opposite pole of human order that constituted the holy man’s 
objectivity. Insofar as he did not participate in a public order, he could judge that order. This 
view from the desert (where the monk dies to a society) is a close relative of the philosophical 
view from nowhere.
Brown goes one step further though. In addition to separation from the world, ascetics 
would  internalise  foreignness  in  order  to  become  dissociated  in  themselves.  They  would 
260 Brown, 1971.
261 Palladius, h. Laus.: V.1.
262 beyond all its desires, power, and material concerns: Evagrius, hypo.: 3.
263 Brown,  1971:  92  –  he  makes  his  analysis  more  precise  later,  claiming  that  the  monks  ‘mobilized’  the 
misogyny of the ancient world ‘as part of a wider strategy’: Brown, 1988: 243 For bishops placing monks, cf. 
also Palladius, h. Laus.: XI.1
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cultivate the ‘objectivity of a stranger’264 within their own life. This is the meaning of self-
mortification: not the punishing of the self, or even the elimination of the self, but the gradual 
pushing of the self away from what it is meant to regard. It is a renunciation of the world and 
a construction of objectivity – as Brown put it, ‘the deep social significance of asceticism as a 
long drawn out, solemn ritual of dissociation – of becoming the total stranger.’265
Dissociation  works  upon  ascetics’  knowledge  by  not  only  undermining  the  value 
systems surrounding them, but also by withdrawing them from their own understanding of 
morals. Ignoring others’ moral judgement is insufficient to defeat vainglory. The ascetic has 
to wage the ‘double warfare’266 of ignoring her own moral judgement as well: ‘if we feel that 
our  work  is  pleasing  to  God,  …  this  is  the  ultimate  vainglory  in  ourselves.’267 So  the 
apophaticism  of  early  Christian  ascetics  regarding  moral  knowledge  has  itself  a  moral 
motivation in the casuistry of vainglory. We do not know when we have been good because 
we refuse to know. We refuse to be told.
An old man said, ‘If the baker does not put blinkers on the beast of burden, she does not turn the 
mill  and eats his wages; so it is with us. By the divine economy we receive blinkers which 
prevent us from seeing the good we do, from glorifying ourselves and thus losing our reward. 
For this reason we are sometimes handed over to bad thoughts, and we see ourselves in order to 
blame ourselves. These bad thoughts become blinkers for us which hide from us the little good 
we do. In truth, every time a man blames himself, he does not lose his reward.’268
The internalisation of dissociation was all the more important for female ascetics than 
for  men.  Women  were  more  often  deprived  of  the  physical  separation  of  the  desert  that 
reminded them of their stranger status, so that they had to be particular over the activities of 
dissociation,  rather  than  its  location.269 It  is  perhaps  for  this  reason  that  the  one  most 
concerned with inner dissociation among the desert fathers and mothers is amma Syncletia: a 
woman of the desert. In her gathered sayings, she is particularly concerned with the practice 
of spiritual exercises270 and the regulation of food and word.271 She is also very particular 
about the interior life,272 which outweighs the importance of the desert for her.
264 Brown,  1971:  99  -  foreignness  is  recommended  in  Apoph.  Patr.  (anon): 174,  236  Evagrius,  hypo.: 3 
Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 55 Moschus, prat.: 12.
265 Brown, 1971: 99 Climacus, scal.: Step 3.
266 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 324.
267 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 61.
268 Apoph. Patr. (anon): 191.
269 Brown, 1988: 269f.
270 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Syncletia 7, 8, 12, 15, .
271 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Syncletia 4, 8, 9, 15.
272 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Syncletia 12, 19, 24.
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Amma Syncletica said, ‘There are many who live in the mountains and behave as if they were 
in the town, and they are wasting their time. It is possible to be a solitary in one’s mind while 
living in a crowd, and it is possible for one who is a solitary to live in the crowd of his own 
thoughts.’273
Through these  forms  of  life,  therefore,  we may  arrive  at  an  understanding  of  the 
dissociation involved in the holy fool’s ‘mocking the world’. Ascetics within society have to 
be careful to dissociate themselves from that society by non-geographical means. They must 
carry the desert within them, and thrust themselves against society, thus pushing their own 
self away from it.
Laughing  in  this  instance  is  a  technique  of  distancing  oneself.  Hadot  records  the 
laughter of flying souls when they see the world from a distance.274 Fools carry this kind of 
distance  within  themselves,  rendering  the  world  ridiculous.  The  fool  attempted  to  retain 
objectivity by a dissociation of the self, constructed as the preservation of the unmoved soul:
But if [144] you receive strength entirely from God, brother, so that whatever the forms, or 
words, or actions the body makes, your mind and your heart remain unmoved and untroubled 
and in no way are defiled or harmed by them, truly I rejoice in your salvation,275
The holy fools use the techniques of early Christian asceticism – in the tradition and 
development  of  ancient  philosophy  –  to  dissociate  themselves  from the  world.  The  real 
development they make is that they include in their understanding of the world the place that 
has  been  allocated  to  the  holy  man.276 The  holy  fool  dissociates  from the  desert,  ascetic 
exercise,  and  church  practice,  as  they  were  being  affirmed  in  the  society  of  ancient 
Christianity. The motivation for this can be thought of both as a renunciation of honour and 
vainglory,  and  as  an  apophatic  denial  of  the  specific  forms  of  religion,  the  former  in 
continuity with the program of the desert fathers and mothers, and the latter in discontinuity 
with it.
It is only once we have understood the holy fools’ rejection of both worlds – that of 
the city and that of the desert – that we gain a framework to understand their theology. In 
following the God who was without place, the fools eluded all identification. They refused to 
be placed. In order to become strangers to themselves, and to therefore draw near to God, they 
273 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Syncletia 19 = Apoph.  Patr. (Gk. syst.): II.27 =  Apoph.  Patr. (Lat): II.14 (where it is 
altered somewhat and attributed to Matrona, possibly a translation of 'amma')
274 Hadot, 1995: 246.
275 Leontius, v. Sym.: III.143f; cf. also the longer quotation above, on page 40.
276 For a discussion on the problem of becoming placed as similar and exotic, cf. below on page 138.
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had to reject community, judgement, and convention. The fool would do precisely what the 
early Christian ascetics did, all over again, this time renouncing religion.
Just as ascetics reject the community of the world in order to embrace solitude, the 
fools renounced community tout court. Anthony had fled to the desert. Symeon the holy fool 
–  following a similar  pattern  – went  further  and  further  into  solitude,  rejecting  cenobitic 
monasticism for the life of the hermit. Symeon’s rejection of community is a pursuit of the 
God of the desert, of no-place.277
After Anthony, however, ‘the desert became a city’.278 With steadily more monastic 
communities  being planted,  even  those  who had not  espoused the  community  life  of  the 
cenobites  had  to  consider  their  relationship  to  their  neighbour.  More  importantly  for  our 
purposes, the desert ascetics’ homes had become places of pilgrimages. It is to this kind of 
journey that we owe a good deal of our literature about these ascetics on the edges of society. 
Both Cassian’s work and the  Historia Monachorum in Aegypto are essentially accounts of 
travellers that went from settlement to settlement in order to sit at the feet of the great spiritual 
masters.
In  line  with  the  monastic  habit  of  abandoning  judgement,  the  fools  abandon  all 
authoritative judgement (apart from when insulting everyone they met, of course!). The desert 
fathers and mothers would avoid magistrates like the plague,279 and cover over any sins they 
happened to witness. Similarly the holy fools would accept abuse without resisting,280 and 
overturn the judgements they found in place, abusing those considered to be holy (those in 
church,281 those  observing  religious  orders282)  and  embracing  those  thought  unholy 
(prostitutes, demon-possessed).283
The radical separation espoused by the desert fathers had not been continued by holy 
men and women of later generations who settled in the Palestinian desert. Symeon Stylites, 
for example, whilst embracing a serenity and a detachment far greater than the heroes of the 
Egyptian desert, also regularly dispensed judgement concerning disputes in the secular world. 
Indeed, this seems to have been a major function of the holy man in the early middle ages, 
according  to  Peter  Brown.284 Holiness  was  no  longer  identified  with  renunciation  and 
277 Leontius, v. Sym.: II.137.
278 Athanasius, v. Anton.: 14.
279 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Arsenius 7, Poemen 5, 9, Simon 2.
280 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.147f.
281 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.145f.
282 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.153.
283 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.162.
284 Brown, 1971: 93.
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exclusion: it had found a place in the world, albeit a marginal place in the desert, or on a pole. 
Not so Symeon the holy fool. As soon as holy fools are placed in a situation of established 
reverence, they disappear.285
Just as the early Christian ascetics (and their philosophical predecessors) attempted to 
work their way out of the conventions of the world, the holy fools also reject established 
religious  and  philosophical  functions.  We  saw  above  that  the  desert  ascetics  marked 
themselves out with their location, their prayer, and their clothing. Similarly, the holy fools 
ignored conventions of market, table fellowship, and marking time in their way of life.
In the Syria of Symeon the holy fool, however, the asceticism of the desert fathers was 
no longer something that made them offensive to the world. The cycle of psalms and liturgy 
had become a part of church life, and state life. The monastic garb could be easily recognised, 
and located.286 Monasticism had become a part of the life of the city. The holy fools (and here 
we have to draw a sharp distinction between those of late antiquity/early middle ages and 
those of the Byzantine Middle Ages, cf. above, on page 10) have no place in the economy of 
the world: they do not bless people, and they do not accept requests. They say no liturgy, and 
play no part in the public life of the church.
In these ways, the holy fool returns Eastern monasticism to its roots in the Egyptian 
desert by refusing to become a part of the world. They reject the community of saints, refuse 
holy judgement, and abandon all markers of holiness. The structure of their life echoes the 
‘not then … not there … not that’ of negative theology.
In denying the God-reference of religious space, however, they also refuse the “royal 
way”  that  allows  practical  theology  to  rest  after  its  renunciation.  Where  early  Christian 
ascetics concentrated on one negation – that of the holiness of the world – the holy fools hold 
to an entire series of negations: neither the good Christian life, nor that of the monastery, nor 
that  of  desert  solitude,  nor  even that  of  the  fool  in  the  city  may represent  God.  Neither 
assertion nor renunciation is safe.
This is perhaps the holy fools’ practical solution to the speculative problem posed by 
Denys the Areopagite’s idea that God is ‘beyond assertion and denial’.287 Instead of collapsing 
the two into one practice, the holy fools insist on a continued habit of laughter, denial, and 
renunciation.
285 Expressed most clearly in the case of ‘Isidora’ the nun:  Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XVIII.19 Palladius,  h. Laus.: 
XXXIV.7.  The motif  of  a  Christian  disappearing  from the  world  in flight  from honour  is  common in  the 
literature: Apoph. Patr. (alph): Philagrios 1 Apoph. Patr. (anon): 62, 176 Cassianus, de institutis: IV.30.
286 Basilius, reg. fus.: question 22.
287  Denys Areopagitus, myst. 1048B. For a discussion of this text, cf. below, on page 145.
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In embracing the continuous practice of ascetic and theological denial, the holy fool 
comes  close  to  Kolakowski’s  type  of  the  jester  that  opposes  the  priest.  Whilst  the  latter 
attempts to re-state truths in the culture of each age, the jester laughs each time and points out 
his complete failure.
The jester’s  philosophy always  has the same role:  it  reveals the shakiness of the seemingly 
unshakeable  and  casts  doubt  on the  seemingly  certain;  it  exposes  the  contradictions  of  the 
seemingly obvious, the self-evident, the incontrovertible; it ridicules accepted common sense 
and discovers truths in absurdities.288
Whilst the point may seem facile, the practice of continuous re-statement and rejection 
in  the  presence  of  an  unknown  God  has  a  good  pedigree.  The  statement  about  God’s 
transcendence  of  assertion  and  denial  is  after  all  part  of  the  conclusion,  rather  than  the 
beginning, of Denys’ Mystical Theology, and he himself follows it up by a simple statement 
of what he does as a theologian; ‘We make assertions and denials of what is next to it’.289 No 
silence, then, or even a re-instatement of a new transcendent theological discourse. Simply 
further assertion and denial around God, like a beautiful, and needless dance.
There is  also a good deal of exegetical support for the idea that the holy fools are 
ascetics who try not to occupy a place in their search for a genuinely transcendent God. We 
could even say that their holiness is not to be found in space, leaving their madness to the 
world. In trying to be holy and without space, they take mortification to an extreme point.
Let me describe for you a crazy person, so that when you see a crazy one who treats himself  
with contempt and does not own a house or a wife and any property, not even [extra] garments 
besides his clothes, nor food apart from a day-to-day [supply], say, ‘These are my [ways of life] 
and I should imitate them’. When you see him talking insanely with everyone – and [if] he 
establishes a law for himself so that he may not become angry in order not to be found at fault, 
and [if] he despises the wisdom [of] the wise sage of the world and the philosopher because he 
is  contemptuous  of  whatever  is  visible  –  say,  ‘These  are  mine,  this  is  the  madness  of  the 
apostles’.290
288  Kolakowski 2004 [1959]: 260.
289  Denys Areopagitus,  myst.  1048B. A more systematic statement of the task of cautious denial and foolish 
assertion is given below, on page 145.
290 lib. grad.: XVI.7, square brackets original.
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A crucial point, made by de Certeau, is that the fools are not seductive.291 They do not 
invite others to their way of life. Contrary to the impression given by the continuing tradition, 
Byzantine holy fools do not take disciples.
The desert masters all took disciples, who would then copy their way of life. They 
were often reluctant to do so, and sometimes even seemed to repel their disciples. But it was 
broadly understood that this was the way of things, so that when a disciple does not feel he is 
learning anything, he can with justification complain to the other monks of the area.292 Holy 
fools do not have disciples that copy their way of life. They live in solitude socially as well as 
physically.
It is more than that, however. The holy fools do not simply decline to take disciples. 
They repel followers. Those who admire them are called fools, and receive nothing but abuse. 
They hide their way of life, so that no-one can copy it. They live in secret and eat in secret. It 
is impossible to take up their way of life.
The only person who can even witness the holiness of the holy fools is a phantom 
narrator (to the narrator). This is a trope of the hagiographical genre,293 and is required for the 
logic of the story: if no-one at all recognised the holiness of the fool, then neither would the 
narrator know about it. John the Deacon becomes Symeon the Fool’s witness and supposedly 
tells his story to the hagiographer, Leontius of Neapolis.
The narrator could presumably not take that place himself: that would be to boast of 
his own discernment over against that of the inhabitants of Emesa. So it is only natural that 
the person picked to be the phantom narrator  tends to be a  highly-placed member  of the 
church. His merit is great, but only earned through his recognition of the fool, never his own 
foolishness. He does not emulate Symeon’s behaviour.
The witness does not get away from the fool’s abuse either: if anything, he becomes a 
target for it. It is in the witness’ presence that the fool strips naked294; it is the witness’ friend 
who gets beaten up by the fool;295  he is frequently called an idiot and shares the blame for 
half the things Symeon Salos does. In this respect, the fool treats him like any other: he is part 
of the city order.
291  Certeau, 1979: 536.
292 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Isaac, Priest of the Cells 2. The problem is also raised in Barsanuphius and Iohannes, 
resp.: 123
293 Dagron, 1990: 933 Krueger, 1996: 23.
294 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.148.
295 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.149.
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The witness does not share the life of the fool. Whilst he does invite him to the baths, 
Symeon the fool makes a point out of marking their differences. They never share fasts, nor 
do they act the fool together, except insofar as Symeon joins in with communal games. They 
are not together, even though he is a privileged observer.
It is perhaps for these reasons that Dagron claims that the narrator does not reveal 
Symeon’s holiness to the world in the story. He is a witness who doesn’t see. Because there is 
no sign in the story that Symeon has not received the secrecy he asks for.296 That secrecy is at 
least a part of the story that remains intact.
He  is  like  an  eye  hidden  away  at  the  bottom  of  a  consciousness  which  only  allows 
objectivisation in a story of what would ordinarily stay forever concealed.297
Further support for the interpretation of the fools’ holiness as being the practice of a 
non-place is found in the manner of the fool’s death. The revelation of holiness and the fool’s 
disappearance (or death) coincide. In the case of Isidora, her holiness is divinely revealed, so 
she disappears  into the desert.  In  the  case  of  Symeon  the holy fool,  he  dies,  and so his 
holiness is revealed (his body even disappears, and only then do people come to their senses 
and tell each other of his holy deeds).298
The  obvious  interpretation  here  is  that  it  is  only  when  the  fool’s  foolishness  has 
disappeared, when s/he has entirely disappeared, that the holiness can be recognised. Their 
holiness and their foolishness can not occupy the same space. Only when there is no longer a 
place marker for the holy can it be captured. Notice in particular that the holiness can not even 
be tied down to the relics of the saint.
If we set this practice of death in the context of the ascetic practices of late antiquity 
though, the picture becomes starker. As we saw over (on pages 46 and 76), the ancients would 
use the concept of death to gain a clearer perspective on their life. Secular philosophers would 
consider  their  life  from the  point  of  view of  death  (the  view  from nowhere),  and  early 
Christian ascetics would bring the final judgement to bear in their self-assessment throughout 
their life. Similarly,  the asceticism of the desert sought to push the self to the margins (in 
death, in the desert, in the sea), in order to see the whole. For the holy fools, the truth about 
themselves was not revealed until they had been pushed beyond the margins to occupy no 
space. Once again, the fools have embraced the apophatic impetus of Christian asceticism and 
296 Leontius, v. Sym.: III.144.
297 Dagron, 1990: 933, my translation.
298 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.168.
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radicalised it, refusing its constructive norms. They embraced not the practice of death, but 
death itself.
This gives us a context for understanding the non-seductive nature of the holy fools’ 
way of life. No-one can occupy their space in the world because it is no space. They have not 
created a category in the world, but attempted to eradicate one. To want to be a holy fool is to 
want death. It is to want to leave the world.
In these ways, fools adopt a practice of negative theology. They are not seductive; they 
are not spoken about or witnessed to; their holiness is only seen in their death; they occupy no 
space. At each point, we see the holy fools using ascetic techniques to follow a transcendent 
God. They identify the theology driving the norm of the religious society that places even the 
asceticism  of  the  desert,  and  they  deny  it.  They  undermine  the  holiness  of  their 
contemporaries and push their own holiness off the edge. They follow the God who has no 
place.
Strictly speaking, writing must end here. If fools attempt to write themselves out of 
history, it is futile to attempt to describe them and categorise them. All success in that task 
will  simply  mark  failure  in  their  task.  If  they  are  trying  to  construct  a  practice  of 
apophaticism,  then  a  description  of  that  practice  will  inevitably  be  confused  (just  as  the 
narrative of these stories inevitably becomes unstable).
So identifying the holy fools will always be a case of showing what they have avoided. 
There can be no positive criteria for entry into the class until the fools meet their ultimate 
failure in  institutionalisation.  Their  view from nowhere,  however,  does have the effect  of 
circumscribing the world, making the saeculum contingent. In identifying themselves as not 
of the world, they have an effect on the world’s self understanding.
For now, the conclusion is clear. The theology of the holy fools forces the contingency 
of the theologically driven norms of religious society. It challenges the way holiness is placed 
and packaged by forcing the possibility of a radical apophaticism, subverting the production 
of norms of behaviour, consumption, and worship. It is not just that we don’t know who God 
is, but we don’t know who we are. It is a practice of dissociation from all that is, in order to 
embrace the one who is without place.
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2: Practised Ignorance
We may have knowing of our Self in this life by continuant help and virtue of our high Nature. 
In which knowing we may exercise and grow, by forwarding and speeding of mercy and grace; 
but we may never fully know our Self until the last point: in which point this passing life and 
manner of pain and woe shall have an end. And therefore it belongeth properly to us, both by 
nature and by grace, to long and desire with all  our mights  to know our Self  in fulness of 
endless joy.1
 
2.1: Practices of Thought in the Desert
In discussing the holy fools’ transformation of norms against the background of the 
desert fathers and mothers, feigning madness was considered as a response to the problem of 
self-consciousness. What kind of self-knowledge is it licit for a Christian to own? Whilst most 
early  ascetics  avoided  vainglory  by  keeping  their  saintly  self  secret,  holy  fools  were 
unashamed of their extreme renunciation whilst practising such asceticism as to make self-
consciousness impossible. They refuse ethical knowledge of the self.
There is reason to further this investigation by looking more carefully at the way in 
which holy men and women in the patristic period treated moral knowledge. If dissociation 
and unknowing is one method of being unaware of one’s own godliness, what knowledge is 
therefore licit? Do holy fools leave worldly knowledge as it is? So we need to move from the 
ethics of knowledge to the knowledge of ethics and the holy. Insofar as such knowledge is 
part  of  the  experience  of  holiness,  it  will  be  an  important  part  of  our  mapping  of  the 
transformation the fools exerted on that experience.
In what follows, we will build upon these studies of the practice of practice by turning 
towards its awareness, expression, and knowledge. Once again, we will not be asking so much 
‘what did the holy fools and early Christian ascetics know?’ Instead, attention will be turned 
towards  how knowledge  is  arrived  at,  and  ways  in  which  it  is  expressed,  critiqued,  and 
judged.
Just as the transformation of norms was examined through the means of producing, 
transforming, and assessing forms of life, the transformation of knowledge of holiness will be 
studied through the practices of knowledge division and production. By looking at the ways in 
1 Julian, 1901: XLVI.
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which knowledge can be ratified, discounted, and assessed, we identify what could be called 
the technology of epistemology.  Where all  science has its  investigative and technological 
disciplines,  epistemology can be divided  into  theoretical  and applied  parts.  The one  asks 
whether and to what extent knowledge is possible, whereas the other asks how knowledge 
may be produced and treated. To the extent that these projects can be at all separated, our 
focus on the transformation of knowledge dictates that the first be temporarily set aside for 
the sake of the second. In the following, the technology of epistemology will be mapped out 
with a view to identifying the ways in which early Christian ascetics and holy fools transform 
the practice of knowledge.
In keeping with the emphasis of the foregoing, the investigation will be further limited 
to the expression of values, as they are encapsulated in (firstly) the language of ethics, and 
(secondly)  the  problems  of  God-talk.  Eventually  this  will  enable  the  ascetic  scepticism 
towards language and society to emerge. In contrast to the above account, though, this will be 
presented  not in  terms of  ethical,  but  of epistemological  practice:  the ascetic  espousal  of 
objectivity for the sake of truth and god-talk.
So in this part, the first theme to receive attention is the constitution and criticism of 
ethical  knowledge  in  terms  of  praise,  blame,  and  ethical  representations.  After  a  more 
technical account of ancient Christian epistemology, we will plot the fools’ transformation of 
holiness onto the discussion and practice of negative theology in its practical implications for 
social critique, silence, and babbling.
2.1.1: Praise and Blame: speaking ethics
How is ethics thought in antiquity? Let us start with an example. The verbal habit of 
praise and blame, whereby things are designated as good or bad through the post-modern non-
descriptive verbalisation of one’s attitude to them, is argued by James Smith to be central to 
Augustine’s  Confessions.2 It is portrayed as the Christian contribution to the philosophy of 
language. Not only does it have the advantage of avoiding onto-theology, but it gives us a 
verbal  practice that may reinstate  all  the hesitations and criticisms concerning the secular 
world that may emerge from his Christian Theology. We could call it a practice of ethical 
knowledge.
Smith’s  exegesis  of the text  is  excellent:  Augustine does indeed primarily  use the 
language of praise in his search for God through his own history. He rummages through his 
bag of memories in order to find the immanent God there, avoiding idolatry by attributing all 
2 Smith, 2002.
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good to God, and all bad to the evil in himself. He addresses God in telling his own story, 
expressing the rather stiff truths of  creatio ex nihilo and evil as  privatio boni in an elegant 
literary style. Conversely, he addresses himself in his confusion and regret over the evil in his 
life,3 which  is  a  point  missed  by most  interpreters,  who read  the  ‘you’  consistently  as  a 
reference to God.
The praise/blame mode of reference is actually a product of these theories as well. It is 
difficult to call God a good thing when one has identified ‘good’ with ‘created’. Christian 
theology had, at least since the third century, established that all that is, is good, because all 
that is, is created. But God is not created, so the adjective ‘good’ needs two different modes of 
reference  to  account  for  the double meaning (created/creator).  The practice  of  praise and 
blame sits loose to knowledge of cosmology,  and so manages to speak with this problem 
unresolved. On the other hand, it is difficult to call anything evil, insofar as evil is a privation 
of good. So there is no evil thing, only things that have not yet achieved goodness. But praise 
and  blame  are  not  confined  to  the  form  of  subject/predicate  statements.  Their  force  is 
independent of their specific reference. I can say that I am fascinated by the beauty of music 
and led astray by the glamour of prestige without attributing cosmological status to either 
music or prestige.
What is missing in Smith’s interpretation,  however, is an account of the modes of 
ethics  of  late  antiquity  in  general.  In  his  enthusiasm for  a  God language that  evades  the 
problems of reference in theology (which for Augustine is more a practical problem regarding 
the obligation of praise than a theoretical one touching on the violence of language),4 he fails 
to realise the peculiarity of his own (non-Augustinian) theological tradition. Describing the 
good in terms of praise and blame is by no means the preserve of Augustine’s work. Instead, 
praise and blame were the rhetorical moves whereby morality was spoken in late antiquity.
A few examples will suffice. Firstly, in Augustine himself: outside of the Confessions, 
he repeatedly refers to good things and bad things in creation in terms of praiseworthiness. It 
is  even part  of his  famous Plotinian argument  of the goodness of creation,  and evil  as a 
privatio  boni,  where  he  clearly  demonstrates  the  parallelism  between  goodness  and 
praiseworthiness:
3 E.g. Augustinus, conf.: IV.11.16-IV.13.20.
4 Augustinus, doctr. chr.: I.vi.6.
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[Augustine:] Nevertheless, all things are rightly deserving of praise by the very fact that they 
exist, since they are good inasmuch as they exist.5
Secondly,  Diogenes  Laertius  records  this  technique  as  defining  ethics  in  the  two 
primary directions of thought in late antiquity, Stoicism and Epicureanism. Here it should be 
noted that these are not simply examples of the use of praise and blame. His Lives of Eminent  
Philosophers – which was to have a unique position in later understandings of both Stoicism 
and Epicureanism – makes it central to the philosophical theory of aesthetic life and ethical 
action, relating it to necessity, freedom, beauty and action:
By the beautiful is meant properly and in an unique sense that good which renders its possessors 
praiseworthy, or briefly, good which is worthy of praise;6
For  he  sees  that  necessity  destroys  responsibility  and  that  chance  or  fortune  is  inconstant; 
whereas our own actions are free, and it is to them that praise and blame naturally attach.7
This is similarly the place praise and blame have in Cicero’s work on the passions of 
the  soul  (lat:  perturbationes:  cf.  under,  on  pages  93ff),  where  he  outlines  the  grief  and 
pleasure  to  be  eschewed and embraced in  the  world.  In  the  course  of  enumerating  these 
phenomena, he comes upon the word ‘Aemulatio’, which can be interpreted with both praise 
and blame (‘ut et in laude et in vitio nomen hoc sit’).8 Given that this practice of discerning 
goods and evils is central to the philosophical way of life in late antiquity, it is significant that 
Cicero notes that it takes place in this idiom.
Cicero is not alone in using the rhetoric of praise and blame as the expression of moral 
judgement. Somewhat closer to the home of the desert fathers, Clement of Alexandria refers 
to the verbal device in the context of the possibility of morality: without freedom, praise and 
blame is not possible.
But neither praise nor blame, neither honour nor punishment are right when the soul has no 
command over appetite and aversion, and the evil is obligatory.9
5 Augustinus, lib.art.: III.vii.21. This expression of cosmology appears throughout the corpus, e.g. in Augustinus, 
de trin.: V.1 (prologue) Augustinus, de civ. dei: X.9, XII.1,4.
6 Diogenes, vit. phil.: VII.1.100.
7 Diogenes, vit. phil.: X.133.
8 Cicero, tusc. disp.: IV.VIII.
9
 Clemens, str.: I.17, my translation.
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We can thus see that both philosophers and theologians of the Greek and Latin world 
of late antiquity used the practice of praise and blame to identify and express the good in the 
world and to establish a moral language concerning actions.10
In the light  of this  standard expression of late  antique ethics,  the practice of early 
Christian ascetics stands out as unusual. To reject praise and blame is not a simple act of 
modesty: that would only account for the rejection of praise. To reject blame as well is to 
refuse to accept potentially useful criticism. It is the rejection of moral judgment  per se. So 
desert fathers refuse to blame themselves, in a phrase reminiscent of Paul.11 In order to grasp 
this rejection, we need to understand it as a reaction against the ethical knowledge of late 
antique society itself,  rather than as simply the association of a favourable self-assessment 
with vanity, flattery, or self-deception.
This  is  not  to  say that  the  rejection  of  praise  is  the  innovation  of  early  Christian 
ascetics: we may see a similar rejection in many of the sources just appealed to. We could say 
that on the level of principle, praise and blame was the way in which to think ethics, whereas 
on the level of practice, it was rejected.
Amongst stoic philosophers, for example, this was all a part of the program originating 
in Plato of separating oneself from the opinions of the masses. A philosopher is to guard his 
thought by not engaging in conversation that is  entirely independent  of truth,  the kind of 
conversation that in fact ensures the smooth running of society.12 Hence the philosophical 
topos of the rejection of small talk.
But rarely, and when occasion requires you to talk, talk, indeed, but about no ordinary topics. 
Do not talk about gladiators, or horse-races, or athletes, or things to eat and drink – topics that 
arise on all occasions; but above all, do not talk about people, either blaming, or praising, or 
comparing  them.  If,  then,  you  can,  by  your  own  conversation  bring  over  that  of  your 
companions to what is seemly. But if you happen to be left alone in the presence of aliens, keep 
silence.13
The avoidance of praise and blame also comes under the theme of rejecting imperfect 
goods. The praise of other people is a temptation, a good that seems satisfying but which can 
10For further examples of uncritical use of praise and blame for the substantives ‘good’ and ‘bad’, see Evagrius, 
ep. ad mel.: 34, 50, 54 Evagrius, schol. in eccl.: 51, 52, 56 (51: ‘yektoij pragmasin … de e)painetoij’ )
11 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Paphnutius 3, Agathon 2 =  Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XI.2 =  Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XI.8 
Basilius, hom. 20 and Paul’s statements in 1 Corinthians 4.3.
12 This understanding of opinion and society has most recently been put forward in Badiou, 2001[1998]. Cf. the 
Hadot quotation above, on page 39.
13 Epictetus, Ench.: xxxiii.
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not be relied upon, as others can be mistaken either in their good opinion of you (flattery) or 
in their bad (resentment).
Signs of one who is making progress are: He censures no one, praises no one, blames no one, 
finds fault  with no one,  says  nothing about  himself  as  though he were somebody or  knew 
something. When he is hampered or prevented, he blames himself. And if anyone compliments 
him, he smiles to himself at the person complimenting; while if anyone censures him, he makes 
no defense.14
Both these tendencies can be seen amongst the early Christian ascetics. Their practice 
of silence is particularly imposed in relation to small talk and the assessment of others. The 
theme of being entirely neutral to praise and blame is also attested:
Meekness is a permanent condition of that soul which remains unaffected by whether or not it is 
spoken well of, whether or not it is honoured or praised. … The first stage of blessed patience is 
to accept dishonour with bitterness and anguish of soul. The intermediate stage is to be free 
from pain amid all such things. The perfect stage, if that is attainable, is to think of dishonour as 
praise. Let the first rejoice and the second be strong, but blessed be the third, for he exults in the 
Lord.15
There  is  reason  to  believe,  however,  that  certain  desert  Christians  achieved  this 
independence in judgement more thoroughly than their secular counterparts. Where Epictetus, 
for example, accepts all negative judgement dealt him by strangers and ignores flattery, early 
Christian ascetics had an altogether more neutral attitude. The examination of conscience was 
an established practice amongst early Christian ascetics,  but when it  comes to reacting to 
flattery,  young monks are encouraged to disregard all thoughts of guilt.  The good is good 
whether it is done in order to achieve glory or for its own sake.16
So the practice of praise and blame is both less and more than we originally implied. It 
is less than a Christian contribution to the problem of ethical reference: praise and blame were 
a mode of expressing knowledge of morality common to a wide variety of thinkers in late 
antiquity. It is more than a form of expressing values: conceptualising the practice enabled 
thinkers to isolate and assess their development of ethical knowledge. So that discussion of 
14 Epictetus, Ench.: xlviii. Other examples of rejecting praise as an imperfect good can be found among both the 
philosophers and theologians of late antiquity: Evagrius, de orat.: 40 Moschus, prat.: 153.
15 Climacus, scal.: Step 8.. Cf. also Step 25, h. mon.: X.11 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 412.
16 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XIII.6, 19 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Poemen 51, Sarah 7 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XIII.6 
Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 290 Climacus, scal.: Step 12: ‘if a few drops of vainglory fall on you, what 
harm? Provided of course, that you become a source of profit to many.’
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the praiseworthiness of certain practices or phenomena could then develop into discussion of 
the  usefulness  of  moral  assessment.  Whilst  ancient  philosophers  took  sceptical  attitudes 
towards the usefulness of positive moral assessment, early Christian ascetics adopted a critical 
stance towards moral knowledge  per se, as it was expressed in the practices of praise and 
blame. This is the first aspect to be noted of the ascetic practice of moral knowledge.
2.1.2: Death: escaping from ethics
There is more to be said about this technological stance, however. We are interested 
not  simply  in  the  fact  of  a  critical  distance  between  the  ascetic  and  the  construction  of 
knowledge. There still remains the question of how this critical distance was conceived. What 
practices motivated, produced, and enacted the ascetic scepticism towards moral knowledge?
The practice of death has already been mentioned elsewhere in this thesis (cf. above, 
on  page  46).  Death  was  a  multivalent  notion  in  the  practice  of  early  Christian  ascetics, 
however.  We  saw  how  it  related  to  God’s  judgement  and  acted  as  a  place-holder  for 
transcendence in the desert and madness. It also has a function with regard to the practice of 
human judgement.
The force of speaking death in the above-mentioned practices has been death as the 
locus of judgement and death as the lack of being. In other contexts, however, it is thought as 
independence from the desire of the world. Death is not concerned with status or judgement. 
It is of another order, which can not compete or react to the blessings and abuses of the world. 
Crucially  for  us,  death  is  not  affected  by  praise  or  blame.  The  paradigmatic  story  that 
demonstrates  this,  whilst  found  in  many  forms  and  sources,  probably  derives  from  the 
teaching of Macarius the Egyptian (c. 300-390).
A brother came to see Abba Macarius the Egyptian, and said to him, ‘Abba, give me a word, 
that I may be saved.’ So the old man said, ‘Go to the cemetery and abuse the dead.’ The brother 
went there, abused them and threw stones at them; then he returned and told the old man about 
it. The latter said to him, ‘Didn’t they say anything to you?’ He replied, ‘No.’ The old man said, 
‘Go back tomorrow and praise them.’ So the brother went away and praised them, calling them, 
‘Apostles,  saints  and righteous men.’  He returned to the  old man and said to him,  ‘I  have 
complimented them.’ And the old man said to him, ‘Did they not answer you?’ The brother said 
no. The old man said to him, ‘You know how you insulted them and they did not reply, and how 
you praised them and they did not speak; so you too if you wish to be saved must do the same 
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and become a dead man. Like the dead, take no account of either the scorn of men or their 
praises, and you can be saved.17
Here the ideal is a paralysis of all feelings that react to praise and blame. The image 
implies a non-reaction to the movements of the passions provoked by others (as we saw in the 
case  of  the  obedient  monk  above,  on  page  34).  Macarius  exhorts  the  monk  to  be  at  a 
completely other level to the judgements of men. The aim is not a positive virtue (meekness, 
generosity), but complete neutrality.18
Other versions of this story are more striking in their refusal to recommend a particular 
way of life. It becomes obvious that this is not a specific and concrete Christian virtue when 
Anoub uses the example of a stone idol to demonstrate the monastic life.19 Here once again, 
the emphasis is put on negative virtues: ‘Did it get angry? No. Did it refuse to forgive? No.’ 
Anoub’s fellow monks are being exhorted to inaction.
Versions of this edificatory story can be discovered in foundational texts for ancient 
Christian  asceticism.  Macarius  the  Egyptian  was  the  leader/initiator  of  the  famous  Scetis 
community,  and  Anoub  is  speaking  to  the  community  around  Poemen,  responsible  for 
preserving the sayings of the desert fathers.20 So it perhaps comes as no surprise that the story 
should exemplify a virtue central to the monastic enterprise, namely that of  apatheia. If we 
are to understand the force of death in its meaning of the rejection of values, we must see it in 
its relation to the rejection of passions. This kind of interpretation of death will be vindicated 
if it is also the case that the practice of apatheia in late antique asceticism also functioned to 
negate the canons of knowledge and veridiction practiced in the society of late antiquity.
How is the virtue of  apatheia related to the rejection of moral knowledge amongst 
early  Christian  ascetics?  The understanding  of  the  early  Christian  concept  of  apatheia is 
fraught with difficulties. It is set in a web of meanings with a long history,21 and even longer 
consequences. 
A few problems should be highlighted at the outset. The first is a commonplace of 
modern literature on the topic: whilst it is tempting to translate the Greek apatheia (and the 
Latin impassibilis) with the English ‘apathy’, such an understanding would serve only to take 
17 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Macarius 23 =  Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): X.47.
18 Climacus, scal.: Step 8.
19 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Anoub 1 =  Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XV.11 =  Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XV.12. Cf. also the 
comparison of death and the eradication of passions in Symeon the New Theologian 1980: XXIV.3.
20 According to Harmless, 2000: 484.
21 A large part of this history is traced in Sorabji, 2000: I draw on his work particularly in reference to the ancient 
philosophers in this section.
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us further from that of the early Christian ascetics, for whom the attainment of apatheia was 
the result of extreme effort and ascetic exertion.
A  further  distraction  in  these  studies  has  been  the  relation  of  the  doctrine  to 
Pelagianism. Although not always acknowledged explicitly, the pelagian debate must be the 
cause of such studies22 that  avidly pursue the question of  whether  a human can attain  to 
apatheia in this life, to which Evagrius of Pontus – the most prominent theorist of the subject 
– was frustratingly ambiguous. This question need not detain us long: it is usually associated 
with the understanding of  apatheia as  a condition  of prayer  – and so related  to the later 
tradition of hesychasm in Byzantine theology23 – rather than a practice of asceticism, and so 
does not affect our question. It is clearly a practical ideal for God and humanity, whether it is 
achievable on earth or not, and that is enough for our argument.
A good translation may therefore be ‘dispassion’. This has a number of advantages: 
firstly,  it  is  borne  out  by  etymology  (pathos  =  passion);  secondly,  it  answers  to  the 
background,  entrenched as it  is  in  the question of human passions;  thirdly,  it  reflects  the 
practical implications of the concept (which we will examine below); and fourthly, it solves 
the problem of partial apatheia, as the soul can achieve freedom from some passions and not 
others, and still grammatically be attributed with apatheia – dissociated from a passion.24
In our literature, the passions were almost exclusively understood as a problem and an 
excess, and whatever the tradition they inherited may have thought about the desirability or 
otherwise  of  the  passions,  certainly  the  desert  fathers  and mothers  with  few exceptions25 
understood them as part of the network of sin and temptation.
The technology developed for dealing with passions in antiquity was already complex 
by the time of the birth of monasticism with St Anthony the Great. Certain Stoic philosophers 
had boiled the experience of negative passions down to two judgements: an evaluation of the 
favourability  of  the circumstances,  and the appropriateness  of  a  response.  In this  respect, 
passions could be isolated, discussed, and acted upon. It is this kind of attitude that constitutes 
the ancient technologies of the self,26 or ‘therapies of the emotions’ in Sorabji’s phrase.27
22 Rasmussen, 2005 is typical in this respect.
23 For which, cf. Lossky, 1976.
24 Linge has a similar account, whereby  apatheia can be thought both as technique and as condition - Linge, 
2000: 557.
25 Noted in Ware, 1989 Williams, 1993.
26 Foucault, 2000c[1982].
27 Sorabji, 2000.
94
That passions can be treated and manipulated was the consensus view amongst ancient 
philosophers, and by far the most important method was to introduce further passions.28 The 
schools of philosophy would then differ as regards taxonomy of passions, the role of the will 
in passions, and the ideal attitude towards passions, all in relation to their various theories of 
the soul. One debate, for example,  was the extent to which passions should be eliminated 
(apatheia), or controlled (metriopatheia), a discussion which was to survive into the theology 
of early Christian ascetics.
The  early  Christian  ascetics  retained  this  attitude  towards  the  passions  as  another 
aspect of the Christian philosophy. In order to understand the ideal of apatheia, we shall have 
to give an account of their thought concerning the passions.
The  passions  were  regularly  thought  of  in  terms  of  politics.  It  was  not  simply  a 
question of suffering from distasteful  passions, but of ruling them, or being ruled. Whilst 
treatments and ideals concerning passions varied in antiquity,  most early Christian ascetics 
held this  in  common:  that  the passions are to  be defeated29 and governed.30 In their  turn, 
passions can dominate;31 enslave;32 attack,33 and move.34
At this  point  the  uniformity  ceases,  however.  Christian  treatments  of  passions  are 
almost as wide-ranging as those of the ancient philosophers. A diverse collection of sayings 
such as the Apophthegmata Patrum35 brings out a number of contrasts nicely.
1. One solution to the affliction of the passions is to ‘love [agapēson] all conflicting 
passions, and your passions will abate’.36 Another passage, in an equivalent context 
(a list of exhortations to a young monk in the form of commands, all in the aorist 
imperative) recommends exactly the opposite: ‘hate the passions!’.37
2. On the level of cosmology, there is disagreement as to the nature of the passions: 
whilst one monk categorises three distinct forms of attack,  whereby the flesh is 
28 cf. Olympiodorus’ summary in Sorabji, 2000: chapter 19.
29 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XIV.22 Evagrius, de orat.: 135.
30 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): IV.57 Evagrius, schol. in luc.: 4 Evagrius, excerpts: 23.
31 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): I.11.
32 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XI.31 lib. grad.: VII.8 Evagrius, de orat.: 71.
33 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): VII.12.
34 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): IX.25f Evagrius, de orat.: 73.
35 for the formation of the Apophthegmata Patrum, see above, on page 23.
36 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): V.53.
37 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XI.50.
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different from passions which are different from demons,38 others refer specifically 
to ‘the passions of the flesh’.39
3. There is also a variety of taxonomies of passions. On the one hand, passions are 
simply  negative  attitudes  and  actions,  like  (predictably)  fornication,  unbridled 
speech/gossip,  and  vainglory.40 On  the  other,  they  appear  as  direct  temptations 
towards good things like money, honour, and rest.41 Some of the monks appear to 
make  finer  distinctions  between  passions,  whereby  they  each  represent  various 
routes to wrongdoing.42 
The question of responding to passions, however,  did form a discussion that drew 
various  schools of asceticism together,  with a common language and aim,  in spite  of the 
varying  theories  and  cosmologies  underlying  them.  Out  of  the  different  accounts  of  the 
passions, there arise debates over specific questions of application. The monks discuss the 
extent to which they should yield to the passions,43 how to trace the origin of the passions,44 
and of course how to oppose them, to gain control over them. Whilst theories diverged, the 
shared project of dealing with passions enabled a conversation.
The advice given is in keeping with the ascetic techniques we have seen above. The 
monk is told to guard the heart45 so the passion does not produce knowledge in the eyes, the 
tongue, and pass into deeds. It is also important to speak one’s passion,46 just as they would 
speak or write their thoughts (cf.  above, on page 67). Again, the desert fathers and mothers 
were a lot clearer about the technology of the passions than they were about their theory and 
nature.  Thoughts had to  be kept  free from passions,  or they would draw the ascetic  into 
illusions  about  self  and  the  world.  The  practice  of  dispassion  was  the  most  important 
technology of knowledge amongst early Christian ascetics.
38 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): V.54.
39 ta pathē tēs sarkos: Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): IV.20; pathē ta sarkikē: Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XI.36 Evagrius, 
cap. paraen.: III.6. ‘Passions of the soul’ is also a standard expression: Barsanuphius and Iohannes,  resp.: 72 
Climacus, scal.: Steps 4 and 15.
40 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): V.34, X.11/49, VIII.6.
41 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XI.30.
42 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): V.51.
43 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): X.38.
44 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): III.50, V.37 Evagrius, Eulog.: 29.31.
45 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XVIII.23, cf. above, on page 58.
46 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): VII.9.
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One of the most  sophisticated thinkers  concerning the passions in late  antiquity  is 
numbered amongst the desert fathers, namely Evagrius of Pontus (fl. 385-399). Drawing upon 
a wealth of learning from the philosophical schools, and having sat at the feet of central desert 
fathers such as Macarius of Alexandria and Macarius the Great of Egypt, he was to exert an 
influence upon Christianity entirely out of proportion with the number of works preserved 
under his name. In the East, he was a main proponent of the Origenist school, and the hero of 
church historian and politician Rufinus; in the West, he provides the inspiration for the work 
of his disciple, John Cassian. In his work, we find that rare phenomenon: a consistent and 
systematised ascetic theology.
Evagrius Ponticus is perhaps most famous for being the Christian originator of the 
seven deadly sins, although he started with a list of nine, which he then boiled down to eight47 
(Gregory the Great reduced them further to seven), and didn’t just term them vices (although 
his  successors  in  both  East  and  West  did).  Evagrius  Ponticus  is  unique  in  holding  to  a 
taxonomy of passions, thus helping us to understand apatheia better.
Apart from his book on the nine vices,48 Evagrius Ponticus is fairly consistent with his 
list of eight, which are:
1. gluttony
2. fornication
3. avarice (philarguria – literally ‘love of money’)
4. sadness
5. anger
6. acedia (listnessness – the ‘midday demon’)
7. vainglory
8. pride.49
They correspond (somewhat artificially) to eight virtues:50
1. abstinence
2. chastity
3. freedom from possessions
4. joy
47 The ‘eight vices’ survived for some time in the Eastern ascetic tradition: Climacus, scal.: Step 13, although he 
sides with Gregory's seven in Step 22.
48 Evagrius, de vitiis.
49 A list that echoes this can be found in Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 137B: ‘gluttony, fornication, avarice, 
sorrow, despondency, anger, wrath, gossip, hatred, vainglory, pride’
50 Evagrius, de vitiis.
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5. patience
6. perseverance
7. freedom from vainglory
8. humility.
In this way, the eight list up the plural and various ways in which an ascetic can be led 
astray. Whilst it is tempting to treat these as an exhaustive list, Evagrius Ponticus’ comments 
on these (which act as a framework for various parts of his writings) enlarge on and expand 
the  list  extensively.  Besides  the  ninth  temptation  of  jealousy (opposed to  ‘freedom from 
jealousy’)51, he also writes of the passions of licentiousness,52 irascibility,53 and others.
So is this a list of passions? Or a list of eight deadly sins? The question is at times 
difficult to answer: some of Evagrius Ponticus’ treatments of this list take the form of sayings 
selected under these categories, so the definition of the categories is entirely editorial. The 
most obvious reference for the list, for example, is a book that bears the title ‘On the Eight 
Thoughts’.54 Some manuscripts, however, have the title ‘On the Eight Spirits of Wickedness’, 
and the text opens (with the chapter on gluttony) with the words:
1. Abstinence is the origin of fruitfulness, the blossom and beginning of the practical life. / 2. 
He  who controls  the  stomach  diminishes  the  passions;  he  who is  overcome  by food gives 
increase to pleasures. / 3. ‘Amalek was the first of the nations’ (Num. 24:20); and gluttony is  
the first of the passions.55
So the titles suggest conceiving of gluttony as a thought or a spirit of wickedness, 
whereas  the  contents  immediately  suggest  understanding  it  as  a  passion.  It  is  not  always 
editing that throws up problems, however. In general, the items in the list are explicitly given 
four different manifestations:  vice, thought,  passion, and demon/spirit.  But when Evagrius 
Ponticus is writing about the items themselves, he does not seem to care which of these he is 
referring to. The list of nine refers explicitly to vices, and yet when describing the interaction 
between vainglory,  jealousy,  and pride,  he calls  them ‘the three-strand chain of vices,  the 
threefold poisonous mixture of passions, the threefold tongue of heretics.’56
Similarly,  in  the  Praktikos,  Evagrius  Ponticus  uses  the  list  to  describe  thoughts 
(exhaustively:  unlike  the  multiform  passions,  there  are  only  eight  possible  categories  of 
51 Evagrius, de vitiis: 8.
52 Evagrius, oct. spir.: 2.10.
53 Evagrius, de mal. cog.: 13.
54 Evagrius, oct. spir.
55 Evagrius, oct. spir.: 1, emphasis mine.
56 Evagrius, de vitiis: 7.
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‘thought’),  together  with their  remedies,  before changing tack in order to move on to the 
subject of passions. He introduces the fifth thought of anger, however, with the words ‘Anger 
is a passion that arises very quickly.’57 All these factors have led commentators to assume 
(rather brazenly) that passions, thoughts, demons, and vices are the same thing for Evagrius 
Ponticus.58
Evagrius Ponticus’ lists are therefore not the place to look for a consistent theory of 
how thoughts, passions, demons, and sins relate. All we can say from these texts is that they 
all can manifest in instances of one of the (at least) eight categories described above. This 
does  not,  however,  mean that  Evagrius  Ponticus  has  no theory for how the thoughts  and 
passions  worked.  Outside  of  the  lists  themselves,  he  has  a  very  coherent  account  (pace 
Sinckewitcz).59 In order to discern this, however, we will need to pay very close attention to 
his use of the terms ‘thought’, passion’, ‘vice’ and ‘demon’ and concentrate less on which 
temptation is being treated at the time. The justification for this exegesis is the hermeneutical 
assumption that a text is coherent rather than incoherent. Assuming that the author neglected 
to distinguish between the passion of gluttony and the thought of gluttony simply because he 
was elucidating gluttony rather than thoughts and passions, what distinctions does he make 
when explaining thoughts and passions?
It is my hypothesis that Evagrius Ponticus not only systematised the temptations into 
eight (or more) kinds, but that he in turn systematised them into four different manifestations. 
So in all,  Evagrius Ponticus is noticing at least 32 (4x8) operations: the thought, passion, 
demon, and vice of gluttony, then the thought, passion, demon and vice of fornication, and so 
on.
Sorabji60 has argued that  Evagrius  Ponticus’  ‘thoughts’  are his  conception  of what 
Seneca  calls  ‘first  movements’,  which  is  to  say  the  involuntary  reaction  to  an  external 
phenomenon, for example salivating at the smell of lamb chops, tensing one’s muscles on 
hearing  a  gunshot,  etc.  They  are  unavoidable,  they  resemble  more  substantial  emotions 
(eagerness, fear), and they may only last a moment.
Whether or not all these thoughts trouble the soul is not within our power; but it is for us to 
decide if they are to linger within us or not and whether or not they stir up the passions.61
57 Evagrius, Prakt.: 11, emphasis mine.
58 Ware, 1989: 317f Rasmussen, 2005: 149.
59 Sinkewicz, 2003: intro, p. xxv. Linge also claims that Evagrius pursues no ideas in a systematically connected 
way in Linge, 2000: 541.
60 Sorabji, 2000: 359f.
61 Evagrius, Prakt.: 6.
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So much for the relation between thoughts and passions. The picture is elaborated 
somewhat  when  Evagrius  Ponticus  applies  it  to  perception  and  interpretation.  Here  the 
distinction is not simply one of succession, but of mental  act.  Whilst  he simply appeared 
confused in his account of the eight categories above, the acuity of this analysis of perception 
is  remarkable.  In  his  account  of  the  phenomenology  of  the  temptation  of  greed,  he 
distinguishes precisely the elements we attempted to prise apart above:
Suppose the thought of avarice is sent by [the enemy]; distinguish within this thought the mind 
that received it, the mental representation of gold, the gold itself, and the passion of avarice; 
then ask which of these elements is a sin. Is it the mind? But how? It is the image of God. But 
can it be the mental representation of gold? And who in his right mind would ever say this? 
Does the gold itself constitute sin? Then for what purpose was it created? It follows therefore 
that  the  fourth  element  is  the  cause  of  the  sin,  namely,  that  which  is  not  an  object  with 
substantial  subsistence,  nor the mental  representation of an object,  nor even the incorporeal 
mind, but a pleasure hostile to humanity, born of free will, and compelling the mind to make 
improper use of the creatures of God:62
Here the relation between thoughts,  passions,  and sins is cleared up. The innocent 
mind innocuously represents a morally neutral object, but the representation is attached to the 
passion of avarice, which compels to sinful action. We have a sequence of thought-passion-
vice.  The question  of  demons  is  also implied.  Time  and again,  demons  are  portrayed  as 
suggesting a thought or a passion (more often than not, the two are connected in the memory), 
and the ascetic may decide what to do about this new knowledge. The passion would then 
have the character of a ‘first movement’ that reacts to the initial thought. By inserting a moral 
evaluation in the middle of this sequence, Evagrius Ponticus is making an attempt to gain 
control over his knowledge. Whilst assuming an analysis of human action that involves a self 
beset with external and historical constraints, he resists a deterministic account that assumes 
the passivity of the self. The passions denote a motivation to action and judgement that is not 
constituted by the moral agent, and as such threaten the ascetic’s freedom. But where freedom 
is threatened, it can also resist. For this reason, a control over and renunciation of the passions 
is in keeping with self-determination.
This  portrayal  of  the  demons  in  Evagrius  Ponticus  elaborates  on  the  question  of 
agency that has been implicit throughout the discussion of the passions. The ascetics struggle 
against demons not simply because of the process demon-thought-passion-sin. They struggle 
62 Evagrius, de mal. cog.: 19.
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for self-determinacy.63 They struggle for the control of their own thoughts. Evagrius Ponticus’ 
advice is not simply ‘Do not fall into sin’, but ‘We must not obey them!’.64 The ideal ascetic 
is not simply good, but is ‘kingless’.65
Evagrius Ponticus’ ascetico-technical brilliance is not limited to his taxonomy of the 
passions however. He furthers the ascetic tradition with his methods of achieving dispassion. 
As we saw above, analysis and the examination of thoughts and conscience is an important 
aspect of this, which will form an element of a number of different methods. One technique 
he is well known for, though, is that of using the demons against each other.
This  particular  method  of  attaining  to  dispassion  takes  advantage  of  the  theories 
outlined above: the passions and thoughts can be divided up according to the same categories 
as the demons and vices. Not all thoughts are sinful,  however. And not all categories are 
compatible. So if one is able to have a thought without it eliciting a passion, then that thought 
is morally neutral. If it is a kind of temptation incompatible with that of the current enemy 
(Evagrius Ponticus recommends the use of anger against tempting demons;66 one can imagine 
it being particularly effective against sadness or acedia (the sixth vice, on page 96)), it can be 
used against that enemy, even if they do not have the same status (e.g. a thought against a 
demon, etc).
The demon of vainglory is opposed to the demon of fornication, and it is impossible for them to 
attack  the  soul  at  the  same  time,  since  the  former  promises  honours  and  the  latter  is  the 
forerunner of dishonour. Therefore, if one of these approaches and presses hard upon you, then 
fashion within yourself the thoughts of the opposing demon. And if you should be able, as the 
saying  goes,  to  knock  out  one  nail  with  another,  know that  you  are  near  the  frontiers  of 
impassibility [apatheia],  for  your  mind found the strength to annihilate  the  thoughts of  the 
demon by means of human thoughts.67
Here  the  distinction  between  demons  and  thoughts  is  employed  effectively.  The 
demon is not the same as, but makes use of thoughts. Far from mixing up the various forms in 
63 Evagrius, schol. in luc.: 4.
64 Evagrius, Prakt.: 22; Cf. also the theme in the lib. grad.: XV.6, et passim Moschus, prat.: 45.
65 abasileutos –  Evagrius,  cap.  xxxiii: 19.3.  cf.  also  Evagrius,  hypo.: 3,  where  apatheia is  associated  with 
resistance to principalities and powers.
66 Evagrius, schol. in eccl.: 56 Evagrius, defin.: 11.
67 Evagrius,  Prakt.: 58. Cf. also Evagrius,  excerpts: 43 (fornication against vainglory).  Climacus attempts to 
combat vainglory with gluttony, but without the nuanced distinction between vice and passion: Climacus, scal.: 
Step 14. He does the same with the demons and passions of vainglory and anger in Step 22, and the thoughts and 
demons of gluttony and vainglory in Step 26.
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which fornication can manifest itself, this technique is reliant upon clear distinctions in the 
cosmology of the passions, thoughts, and demons.
In spite of the at times rather vague cosmology, and the work’s resistance to questions 
concerning  perfection  and  the  enumeration  of  passions,  Evagrius  Ponticus’  writings 
exemplify a thoroughgoing ascetic theory and a systematic phenomenology of the mind. His 
thoughts concerning dispassion reveal a technology of objective knowledge, where passions 
are neutralised for the sake of the cultivation of freedom and virtue. Where passions, reacting 
immediately to  praise  and blame,  draw the  ascetic  towards  evaluation  and desire,  ascetic 
practices resist relating to the world in such an unreflective way, based on the knowledge of 
received values.
The early Christian ascetics’ dispassion was not a virtue of passive spiritual docility, 
but a practice designed to have an effect on knowledge, as a form of scepticism and critique 
of knowledges that appear as given, mediated by tradition and habit. As Foucault describes 
the concept  among Stoics  and Epicureans,  ‘Not  having passions  is  no longer  having any 
passivity’.68 It is not an adherence to the soul over against fleshly passion; it is not static 
tranquillity, and it is not a divine lack of activity. All these attitudes might be complicit with 
the world’s knowledge. The difficulty of holding these two thoughts together – that dispassion 
means non-reaction to provocation and that it  is a robust state of activity – has caused a 
number of problems in the secondary literature.69
This analysis does not simply rely upon the theories of Evagrius Ponticus. The refusal 
of passions was always meant to work against inactivity. One of the passions to be rejected is 
that of rest (Greek: anapausis), which hinders the ascetic from progressing.70 The passion of 
vainglory is particularly dangerous for god-talk, as it persuades the thinker that he has arrived 
at the right concept of God.71 So the person who is free from the passions would naturally not 
be  inactive.  Evagrius  Ponticus’  fifth  temptation  is  sadness.  The  passion  of  sadness  is 
characterised  by encumbrance  and lack  of  movement.  It  is  like  apatheia’s  evil  twin:72 it 
resembles dispassion but is in reality a muffling of all virtue and goodness. Something similar 
could be said for the passion of acedia (vice 6, on page 96).73
68 Foucault, 2007[2004]: 178.
69 Rasmussen, 2005: 155 Chryssavgis, 2003: 58. It lies at the root of modern theology’s anxieties concerning the 
impassibility of God.
70 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XI.30. Sleep is also counted a passion in Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 216.
71 Evagrius, de orat.: 72f, 116.
72 Evagrius, oct. spir.: 12 (5.15). A point also made in Linge, 2000: 564n32.
73 Evagrius, oct. spir.: 16 (7.20) .
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The grammar of the passion of vainglory has the same structure. Ascetics who listen to 
praise for their actions have no further need of struggle. They have arrived at their objective 
and received their reward. For this reason, Evagrius Ponticus does not simply recommend 
secrecy and humility against vainglory and pride, but also perseverance.74
The point about perseverance, the infinity of God always being more abundant and 
more  fascinating  than  our  desire  and  progress  can  attain  to,  is  brought  out  by  other 
theologians contemplating God’s infinitude. It is perhaps this kind of thought that founds the 
refusal of sadness and rest in the desert fathers and mothers. The contemplative life is not a 
life at rest, but a ‘renewal of wonder’, as one author has put it, commenting on Gregory of 
Nyssa.75
It is perhaps not surprising that the secondary literature struggles with this concept of 
active impassibility. The difficulty is not simply attested at the level of technique, but also 
finds its context at the level of cosmology. Arguments were raging in the cities whilst the 
gnomic  statements  of  the  Apophthegmata  Patrum were  being  composed,  and  one  of  the 
crucial questions in these discussions was how God, who is impassible, could be an active 
creating force in the world. What is the nature of God’s action? The traditional way to solve 
this problem was by way of divine logos or energy, a demiurge or a spirit of God. But when 
the Christological version of this argument developed on the basis of the history of the son of 
God and the divinity of the word of God, the same problem arose. If the logos is divine, how 
can it be active and still impassible? This kind of question led the Arians to deny the divinity 
of Christ and the orthodox to re-interpret impassibility.
There are, as we have now seen, a number of reasons to interpret the practices of the 
early  Christian  ascetics  as  exercises  in  control,  critique,  and  objectivity.  It  should  be 
sufficient,  therefore,  to  embrace  the  mastery  of  the  passions  without  having  to  write  off 
passions as a whole. Sorabji traces this option through antique philosophy, and argues that it 
was embraced by a number of theologians  connected with asceticism,  including Basil  the 
Great, in his ascetic rules.76 If that option was available to desert Christians, and given the 
stamp of orthodoxy by such authorities, why is it that the word for moderation of passion – 
metriopatheia – does not appear once in the  Apophthegmata Patrum,  whilst  apatheia is a 
firmly established aspiration?
74 Evagrius, Eulog.: 13, 20. He is followed by Symeon the New Theologian 1980: IV.5.
75 Williams, 1993: 241.
76 Sorabji, 2000: 392. Kallistos Ware argues something similar for Abba Isaias and Theodoret of Cyrus in Ware, 
1989, and Rowan Williams portrays  the discussion of this subject  between Gregory of Nyssa and his sister 
Macrina in Williams, 1993: esp. pp236f.
103
Explanation  could  take  various  avenues  here.  Self-mastery  was  simply  one  step 
towards dispassion. Regulating one’s life in order to get rid of the passions was crucial to the 
ascetic life.77 Self mastery was not the end, but the means. Whilst ancient Christian ascetics 
cannot be divorced from their philosophical background, their appropriation was a Christian 
one: the aim of apatheia is love.78
Freedom of thought was decisive. An ascetic should try to be free from the passions in 
order to think freely. So we have a tentative view of the progress of the ascetic: self mastery 
leads to dispassion, which leads to free thoughts, and prayer. Thoughts become bound to one 
thing and static when that thing is represented with passion. The mind that has knowledge of 
an item with passion becomes bound to that insignificant item, and gives it more attention 
than it is worth purely on account of its use for the mind as an object of passion.79 Only by 
throwing off the passion can the mind move on, and retain its flexibility and freedom.80 Only 
by rejecting passionate knowledge is the person in a position to love.
The area in which the early Christian ascetics were clearest in their need to reject the 
passions was in their understanding of representation. This in turn is where their struggle for 
objectivity is itself most clear, and their function as world-rejecting free thinkers most on trial.
We have already seen over (on page 99) Evagrius Ponticus’ conception of the relation 
between passionate representation and sin. The sight of gold is not sinful except insofar as the 
passions represent it to us as for us, an object of my pleasure. Here the passions are the names 
given to a kind of capitalist ‘seeing as’.81 The vision of the world without passion would be 
one of extreme intimacy and unknowing, whereas with the passions, the world becomes a set 
of concepts of things to be used, subjected, bought and sold.82 This is the explanation both of 
Evagrius Ponticus’ texts on sin in representation and the story of abba Abraham quoted above 
(on page 36), which continues with the words
‘Again, you are walking in the road and you see stones and shards, and amongst them gold: do 
you have the power in your mind to think them of equal value?’ And he said, ‘No, but I will 
77 Evagrius, Prakt.: 35.
78 Evagrius, Prakt.: 81, 84.
79 Basilius, hom. 10.
80 Evagrius, de mal. cog.: 22, 40.
81 cf. Marx, 1891: chapter on 'The Nature and Growth of Capital'. Cf. also on Bataille, below, on page 110.
82 ‘it is possible to remember gold with greed and without greed, and similarly in the case of other things.’ 
Evagrius, de mal. cog.: 4 cf. also Linge, 2000: 564. The consequence of this is to make no distinction between 
people, as regards whether they are enemies or friends, helpful or adverse: Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 68 
Maximus, carit. 1-4: I.25.
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make war against the thought so as not to take it.’ The old man said, ‘Behold therefore, the 
passion lives, but is chained.’83
So  the  understandings  of  gender,84 economic  value,  and  political  utility85 are 
determined by the passions. The practice of  apatheia involves thinking things without their 
implications  and  meanings  for  the  activity  of  evaluation  and  exchange.  The  passionless 
ascetic receives only ‘bare representations’.86
Whilst  it  would  be  claiming  too  much  to  say  that  passions  are  identical  to 
representations, they are certainly linked at many points in the desert corpus. Passions are 
associated  with  mental  images  in  the  memory  that  distract  from  prayer,87 and  Evagrius 
Ponticus  uses  the  language  of  ‘impassioned  representation’  again  and again.88 There  also 
appears to have been a debate in his circles as to whether it is the passion or the representation 
that comes first.89
Images  with  passions  are  a  particular  problem when addressing  the  mind  towards 
God.90 In Evagrius Ponticus, this is given three reasons, in terms of practice, theology, and 
mental acts. Firstly, it is distracting to think about images when one is attempting to direct 
one’s thought to a God whom one has not seen.91 Secondly,  it  is not in keeping with the 
principles of negative theology to have an image in one’s mind whilst praying. God is without 
image,  so  all  representations  are  necessarily  not  to  do  with  prayer.92 Finally,  Evagrius 
Ponticus anticipates Augustine’s doctrine of the image of God being seen in the soul only 
when the soul remembers, understands, and loves God.93 To pray to God is to withdraw into 
oneself, and ‘passionate attachments to material things’ distort the soul’s capacity to act as a 
reflection of God, making it incapable of prayer.94
Being  aware  of  the  significance  of  this  ‘seeing  as’  becomes  a  rule  in  Evagrius 
Ponticus.  Whilst  keeping  to  the  idea  that  the  bare  perception  of  an  item  is  human  and 
83 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): X.19 (my translation) = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Abraham 1 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.15.
84 Evagrius, de mal. cog.: 3.
85 Evagrius, de mal. cog.: 26.
86 Evagrius,  excerpts: 12 Evagrius,  de orat.: 55f.  Here I use Casiday’s translation in Casiday, 2006: 192. Cf. 
Symeon the New Theologian’s condemnation of seeing things ‘in accordance with their passionate desires.’ in 
Symeon the New Theologian 1980: XXIV.3.
87 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): II.22 Evagrius, de mal. cog.: 3f.
88 Evagrius, de mal. cog.: 4,53,54,71 Evagrius, skem.: 16.
89 Evagrius, Prakt.: 37.
90 Evagrius,  Eulog.: 30  Evagrius,  sent.  ad  virg.: 6  Evagrius,  de  mal.  cog.: 16,  36,  and  Symeon  the  New 
Theologian 1980: XXIV.3f.
91 Evagrius, Prakt.: 23. Cf. also Climacus, scal.: Step 28.
92 Evagrius, de mal. cog.: 2 Evagrius, de orat.: 66 Evagrius, schol. in eccl.: 35.
93 Augustinus, de trin.: 15.
94 Evagrius, par. ad mon: 2.5 Evagrius, ep. ad mel.: 23.
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innocent,  he  attributes  knowledge  associated  with  acquisition,  enjoyment,  and  esteem  to 
demonic thoughts, and the knowledge of the perception as a sign of the nature of things and 
spiritual  principles  (essentially  perception  informed  by  scriptural  exegesis)  to  angelic 
thoughts.95 The bare thought and the angelic thought are not associated with passions. But the 
demonic thought is all to do with passions of jealousy, acquisition, and vainglory. Although 
Evagrius  Ponticus  doesn’t  ascribe  to  the  practice  of  measuring  the  passions,  his  ideal  of 
freedom from the  passions  is  associated  with bracketing  knowledge of  values,  measuring 
thoughts, and determining one’s own life.
2.1.3: Withdrawal from the world: challenging ethics
What was the meaning of apatheia for the ethical knowledge of the desert fathers and 
mothers? It is clear that dispassion amongst the desert Christians – and especially Evagrius 
Ponticus – was a polyvalent ideal.  There was general agreement, though, that the passions 
were bound up with prejudice and knowing the world as something to be used. In rejecting 
the passions,  they were attempting to gain control  over and direction to their  actions  and 
understanding. Dispassion was an ideal of an active life of non-passivity. This understanding 
and lifestyle was still  a significant part of the knowledge and discipline of early Christian 
ascetics (pace Foucault).96
Dispassion is also a mode of emancipation from the knowledge mediated by social 
living. Passions define things as beneficial for me as a member of the exchange society. They 
define people as useful for marriage (fornication), politics (pride), and honour (vainglory),97 
and things as sellable (avarice) or consumable (gluttony), etc. Dispassion signifies withdrawal 
from these exchanges, engendering objectivity. Dispassion leaves the world as it is: for this is 
the only way in which it can be beautiful.98
For these five causes men love one another, whether it be to their praise or their blame: namely, 
for God’s sake, as the virtuous man loves everybody and as the man who is not yet possessed of 
virtue loves the virtuous man; or for natural reasons, as parents love their children and vice 
versa; or for vainglory, as the man that is extolled loves the extoller; or for avarice, as one loves 
a wealthy man for benefits received; or for love of pleasure, as the man who cares only for his 
95 Evagrius, de mal. cog.: 8, quoted below, on page 108.
96 ‘What does the absence of  pathē,  of passions, mean for Christianity?  Essentially it means renunciation of 
egoism, of my own singular will.’ Foucault, 2007[2004]: 178. cf. Macrina’s argument against passive passion in 
Williams, 1993: 237.
97 ‘the wages of vainglory’: Evagrius, ep.: 7.1.
98 On this approach to art, cf. Fried, 2007.
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belly and things of sex. The first is praiseworthy, the second is in between, the rest belong to the 
passions.99
This reading of dispassion in terms of withdrawal from exchange brings us back to a 
consideration of the meaning of the desert. The  anachoresis of the early Christian ascetics 
included both the psychological withdrawal into the heart, and the physical withdrawal into 
the desert: becoming an anchorite.
The reasons for choosing the desert for this purpose were obvious. In the desert there 
was  no  food  to  eat,  nothing  to  evoke  the  passion  of  gluttony.  There  were  certainly  no 
members  of  the  opposite  sex  unless  they  were  also  Christian  ascetics:  late  antique 
Mediterranean society tended to confine women to the household – ruled by a husband or 
father  –  and exceptions  to  this  (e.g.  women  of  independent  means  and prostitutes)  were 
restricted to the city. There was very little audience for one’s heroic deeds, no-one to boast to. 
There was no market society, and no political structure. The desert was indeed a place for 
economic and political refugees. The desert is outside the reach of even the most eager tax-
collector.100
So the city was the space connected with practices of acquisition and manipulation, 
whilst the desert refused these practices. In the city, one could speak of justice and mercy; 
righteousness and temperance. In the desert, the will and means to attain these values were 
not in place. The desert was the great exception. As such, the fathers and mothers of the desert 
rejected not just the praise, practices, and passions of the city: they rejected its knowledge.
In going out to the desert to be free from passion, early Christian ascetics denied their 
membership in the human race, for ‘it is human to have passions’. What were considered 
human functions – eating, sleeping, drinking, having sex, speaking – were denied. The space 
of the monks’ cells was a place of wild animals and other non-humans.
Peter Brown puts an emphasis on this interpretation of Christian monasticism as ‘the 
opposite pole of all human society.’101 The desert was not the place of humanity, but that of 
animals. Hence the most extreme ascetics were those who lived the life of a ruminant, the so-
called  ‘grazers’  mentioned  in  the  histories  of  Evagrius  Scholasticus  and  John  Moschus. 
Danger from wild animals was very real, and a number of stories represent desert fathers and 
mothers braving the lairs of hyenas and big cats.102
99 Maximus, carit. 1-4: II.9.
100 Chitty, 1966: 7.
101 Brown, 1971: 92.
102 Apoph. Patr. (alph): John, disciple of Abba Paul 1 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XIV.4 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): 
IV.5 Climacus, scal.: Step 7 Moschus, prat.: 2, 18, 58, et passim.
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A further non-human inhabitant of the desert was the demon. The model text on desert 
asceticism, Athanasius’ Life of St Anthony, is graphic in its portrayal of Anthony’s retreat to 
his desert fortress where he was tormented by demons.103 But other stories are more everyday 
in their approach: one desert father wanders in search of a new location, and spends the night 
in an abandoned pagan temple in the wilderness, and demons try to disturb him all night.104 
The  message  comes  from  all  parts  of  Christian  desert  writing:  the  desert  was  first  and 
foremost the home of demons, and only experienced ascetics may go there with impunity.
All this reversal of human society serves primarily to throw light on what has been 
abandoned by desert Christians.105 The point of elaborating and living out a life in the desert 
was to demonstrate the contingency of the world of the city. The desert fathers and mothers 
went into the desert in order to deny all the assumptions of secular life.106 Where human life 
had been assumed to be contained by the ways of human society, and anything without was 
simply bestial or spiritual, early Christian ascetics made ‘the desert a city’. They lived the 
alternative. In crossing the boundaries of possibility,  they made it possible to describe and 
know what was within those boundaries as something specific, contained, contingent, and that 
therefore might be otherwise. ‘The world’ had lost its necessity, and the saeculum had been 
placed.
103 Athanasius, v. Anton.: 12-14.
104 Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): V.28 = Apoph. Patr. (anon): 44.
105 cf.  the  emphasis  on  disconnection  from  identity  and  society  in  Linge’s  account  of  ancient  Christian 
asceticism, in stark contrast to the ‘gentlemanly asceticism’ of ancient philosophy: Linge, 2000: 550f.
106 Hence  the theme of  being ‘strangers/foreigners  in the world’  in the Christian literature of  late antiquity: 
Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): X.20, 45, XVIII.40 lib. grad.: V.18, XIV.1, XXI.3 Evagrius, hypo.: 6 Barsanuphius and 
Iohannes, resp.: 55 Climacus, scal.: Step 4, receiving a magisterial exposition in Williams, 2005: ch. 2.
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2.2: Ascetic Epistemology
Monastic treatment of the passions developed through various trajectories. The most 
famous being their reception as deadly sins or vices, which were a matter of dialogue between 
East and West in the early Middle Ages.107 Passions also became a matter for medical science 
and  the  understanding  of  humanity  in  modern  philosophy.108 In  matters  of  epistemology, 
however,  they  were  part  of  the  presupposed  language  of  philosophy.  They  represent  the 
unreasonable, the uncontrollable aspects of human nature. So far have they come from the 
accounts of antiquity that their relation to reason is one of patient to doctor and prisoner to 
guard rather than clay to potter and glass for the eye. It is striking that in antiquity, unreason 
can be understood as a result of dispassion, whereas in the modern age, passion is one domain 
of unreason.
The domain of control over the passions has a peculiar character amongst the early 
Christian ascetics, as compared with their philosophical heirs. We have seen that for Evagrius 
Ponticus  and the desert  fathers,  to  master  the  passions  is  to  insert  one’s  agency into  the 
process of representation.  In order to discern how the holy fools transform knowledge of 
holiness, we therefore need to identify the theory and technology of epistemology among their 
ascetic predecessors. How did their asceticism transform and produce knowledge?
After lengthy observation we have learned to recognize this difference between angelic and 
human thoughts, and those that come from the demons. Firstly angelic thoughts are concerned 
with the investigation of the  natures  of  things and search out  their  spiritual  principles.  For 
example, the reason why gold was made and why it is sand-like and scattered through the lower 
regions of the earth, and is discovered with much labour and toil; how when it is discovered it is 
washed  and  delivered  to  the  fire  and  then  placed  in  the  hands  of  artisans  who  make  the 
lampstand of the tabernacle, and incense burner, the censers, and the vessels from which by the 
grace of the Saviour the king of Babylon no longer drinks, but it is Cleopas who brings a heart 
burning with these mysteries. The demonic thought neither knows nor understands these things, 
but without shame it suggests only the acquisition of sensible gold and predicts the enjoyment 
and esteem that will come from this. The human thought neither seeks the acquisition of gold 
nor is concerned with investigating what gold symbolizes; rather, it merely introduces in the 
intellect the simple form of Gold separate from any passion of greed. The same reasoning can 
be applied to other matters by mentally engaging the exercise of this rule.109
107 Johannes Climacus discusses the reduction to seven deadly sins by Gregory the Great, and concurs with the 
identification of vainglory with pride, in Climacus, scal.: Step 22.
108 Starting with Descartes, 1989[1649].
109 Evagrius, de mal. cog.: 8.
109
In this  passage,  Evagrius  Ponticus  outlines  for  us one of the ways  in  which early 
Christian ascetics may distance themselves from their knowledge of the world and produce 
new  resonances  and  meanings.   His  angelic  thought  allows  reality  and  even  natural 
knowledge,  but  it  is  then  inserted  into  an  entirely  different  set  of  significations,  each 
themselves referring to themes of ascetic and Christian theology. In this case, he takes the 
conventional and practical understanding of gold mining, and sees it as part of the story of the 
Exodus, the symbolism of the tabernacle, and the motif of the return from exile. These stories 
in turn evoke an understanding of the soul as the temple of God, its return from the exile of 
sin,  and its  participation  in  the sacraments  of Christ,  all  summed up in the model  of the 
conversion and resurrection vision on the road to Emmaus.
The above analysis  of technologies  of the passions amongst  desert  fathers  showed 
early Christian ascetics attempting to create a break from secular knowledge by transforming 
their  understanding  and  associations  towards  thoughts  and  phenomena.  Their  allegorical 
interpretation of life saturated perceptions with the presence of God. The everday is known as 
holy, as opposed to being subject to my desires, manipulation and market interests.
Assuming  that  this  is  no  mere  facet  of  cosmological  dualism,  where  the  pristine 
incorporeal mind has to be protected from the dirt of fleshly influence, what philosophical 
move is being made here? We have outlined the ethical implications of this kind of practice 
above. Here we will elaborate the theoretical implications for epistemological technology.
If  the  project  of  eradicating  market,  gender,  and political  assumptions  from one’s 
epistemology were to be espoused by a modern Christian movement,  it  would be entirely 
familiar to us. Scepticism towards the mode of representational thought is a standard facet of 
contemporary  post-Kantian  philosophy.  Whether  we  are  reading  Foucault’s  work  on  the 
historical  a  priori,  Wittgenstein’s  appeal  to  forms  of  life,  Bataille’s  religious  critique  of 
reification/commodification, or Saussure’s structural account of the sign, the assumption is 
that the way in which we think – our language, logic, and concepts – is historically mediated, 
and could be otherwise. We are bound to think as we do, but others might think differently. 
Our signs are contingent and obligatory.
Early Christian  asceticism on our  reading  resembles  an  inherently  modern,  indeed 
secular project, but there are good reasons for believing that early Christian ascetics thought 
of their departure from the ‘world’ and the city as a semiotic as well as a politico-religious 
task.  The  above  exegeses  have  certainly  implied  parallels  with  these  assumptions  about 
thought. Representations are contingent: not only may we be led astray by the simplest of 
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images, but we are not obliged to believe our eyes. ‘Knowledge falsely so called is trusting in 
one’s own thought that things are exactly as they appear to us.’110 The agency of demons was 
capable  of  providing  illusions,  but  bad  habits  would  do  just  as  well.111 Similarly, 
representations are not simply chosen, or easily manipulated: the practice of obedience was 
one way in which a monk may challenge the felt obligation to believe one’s representations 
(cf. above, on page 28). Giving up one’s will to another was not primarily a way of destroying 
agency, but of forcing scepticism regarding thought. Humility allows the monk to challenge 
socially produced knowledge, of which he is himself a product.
There are obviously clear differences. Whilst Bataille critiques the practice of ‘seeing 
as’ as a whole, and appeals to the intimacy of being in the world like water in water, the 
desert fathers and mothers attempt to produce a ‘natural’ perception of the world: ‘The rule 
and limit of absolute chastity is to have the same feelings regarding animate and inanimate 
beings,  rational  and irrational.’112 This does not deny the fact that both Bataille and early 
Christian ascetics reject the economic perception of the world as primarily utilitarian benefits, 
equivalent to labour and market values. Their reactions, however, diverge. Whilst Bataille 
eliminates thought’s connection to the market through needless and irrational consumption, 
the ascetic cultivates practices of interpretation that read the world as caught up in a semiotic 
system pointing to God through symbol and metaphor.
So far, all these readings of ancient texts could be a generous interpretation of certain 
ascetic practices. Can evidence be found that this ascetic approach was grounded in a thought 
through epistemological technology that required the Christian to interrupt the interpretation 
of the world with their moral agency? In order to investigate this, we must leave the oriental 
desert fathers and mothers, who eschewed the making of philosophical theories, and look to 
the other end of the Mediterranean at another ascetic theologian.
Why  should  we  consider  Augustine’s  work  as  a  contribution  to  early  Christian 
asceticism?  There are a great number of reasons internal to Augustine’s own life and work 
that  would suggest such a move:  his  lifelong monastic  vocation;  his  correspondence with 
ascetic  thinkers  (noticeably  Jerome);  the  influence  of  the  story  of  St  Anthony  in  his 
conversion113; his debate with Pelagius on asceticism and the city, along with its reception in 
the community of John Cassian, and more could be added. There are also a series of literary 
parallels:  his  interpretation  of  Platonism as  a  call  to  the religious  life;  the wave of Latin 
110 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 373.
111 Climacus, scal.: Step 26.
112 Climacus, scal.: Step 15; cf. Bataille, 1989[1973] and above, on page 103.
113  Augustinus, conf.: VIII.vi.14 and VIII.xii.29.
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(translations of) hagiography into Latin in his time114; Augustine’s Rule (whose authorship – 
unlike its connection to Augustine’s circle – is disputed);115 and the general appropriation and 
discussion of philosophical considerations of asceticism.116
But the claim to relevance here is not a very bold one. It is not that Augustine was read 
by the Eastern ascetic tradition, or that his aims were the same. The level of philosophical and 
theological reflection in his work – far more systematic and speculative than even Evagrius 
Ponticus – are all but unthinkable in the Egyptian and Palestinian desert communities of his 
time. However, precisely because the latter were silent on issues of epistemology, we may 
turn  to  Augustine  as  someone  who shared a  starting  point  –  the ascetic  life  of  monastic 
community  –  and  faced  similar  moral  problems  of  the  practice  and  conceptualisation  of 
desire.  The differences  between them were to contribute to setting the scene for the later 
developments of Eastern and Western monasticism.  Their  similarities  are a result  of their 
treatment and practice of a shared heritage.
In what may be his most overtly philosophical work,117 Augustine makes an appeal to 
pre-discursive conditions that are vital to have in place before any good interpretation may be 
endeavoured. So he prefaces his essay on the function of signs, which was to set the agenda 
for Mediaeval philosophy of language in Europe, with a book on things, to which signs refer. 
This book outlined a categorisation into things that are to be used (uti), and things that are to 
be enjoyed (frui). The latter have value in and of themselves, whereas the former are loved 
because of the value they derive from another.
The relation this distinction bears to signs is complex, but essentially, the use/enjoy 
division is overlaid the sign/thing distinction. We refer signs endlessly until we reach a thing, 
and  we use  things  endlessly  until  we reach  something  to  be  enjoyed.  In  both  cases,  the 
endpoint is God: all signs refer ultimately to God through natural signs – smoke is a sign of 
fire, the world is a sign of God; all things are to be used except God, who can be enjoyed. 
However, since all things are created, God can be recognised (as reference) and enjoyed in 
everything.118 God is not a thing, however,119 and so paradoxically, the only one that can be 
enjoyed rather than used, referred to rather than used to refer, undermines the general rule that 
signs refer to things.
114  e.g. Cassianus, Collationes; Rufinus, Hist. Monach.; Hieronymus, v. Pauli.
115  For a translation and discussion, cf. Lawless, 1987.
116  Most explicitly in his rule and op. mon. For a longer discussion, cf. Lawless 2002.
117 Augustinus, doctr. chr.: I.
118 Thomas Aquinas,  summa theologiae: 1a 5.1,4 For more on this line of interpretation, see Thomas, 2003 
Williams, 1989.
119 Augustinus, doctr. chr.: I.v.5.
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In short, Augustine gets himself into a muddle, and bangs his head against the limits of 
language. This is a result of the fact that he is directing his intervention before language. He 
is  attempting  to  lay  out  the  ground  rules  for  reference,  in  his  own  words.  All  logical 
consideration of meaning will have to make use of different types, or a meta-language, which 
will itself require a logic, enquiry into which generates an infinite regress. It is concerning this 
regress that Wittgenstein bids us be silent,120 or to play with our self-conscious nonsense.121 
We speak of what we do not know.
The specific warning Augustine is making concerns reference and love. He wants to 
point out that we read scriptures in order to help us to love God. Yet this very project is 
flawed. Because in reading, we refer to things that we can and have identified through thought 
and  language.  They  are  what  we love  and  make  use  of.  But  God  is  not  to  be  used,  or 
identified, or read off from a script. God is the creator of every reader, and so cannot be an 
element in a system, discourse, or instruction. God is to be enjoyed as the immanent presence 
to all thought.
After his ethico-theological introduction to God-language, Augustine continues with a 
treatment  of  signs  in  the  interpretation  of  scripture.  He  points  out  that  the  systems  of 
signification and coding that we have received are established by long years  of habit  and 
established authority.122 This habit and authority is neither necessary nor always desirable, so 
he directs the student of scripture to the learning of these codes and institutions, but with a 
critical eye towards their origin and implications. The result is what could be called the first 
project of semiotic cultural criticism.
The aim is for the Christian user of signs to cultivate their agency as regards culture 
and language. To that end, the reader is directed to the origin and validity of each regime of 
truth.  Magical  knowledge,  for  example,  is  rejected  because  of  its  origin in  contracts  and 
common language with demons.123 Logic and number are accepted because of their rational 
validity.124 Other areas of knowledge are contingent: they are useful for the smooth running of 
society, but the Christian is not bound by them. These include the configuration of gender, 
rank,  measurement,  and economic value:125 precisely those domains the desert fathers and 
Evagrius called impassioned meanings.
120 This is the reference of ‘that of which we cannot speak’ in the closing line of Wittgenstein, 1961[1921].
121 Wittgenstein, 1998[1977]: 64.
122 Augustinus, doctr. chr.: II.xiii.19.
123 Augustinus, doctr. chr.: II.xx.30-xxiv.37.
124 Augustinus, doctr. chr.: II.xxxix.58.
125 Augustinus, doctr. chr.: II.xxv.39.
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Augustine  echoes  Evagrius  Ponticus’  use  of  the  knowledge  of  his  day,  baptised 
through the complex web of scriptural references. He even recommends young theologians to 
draw up reference books of the ways in which the Bible refers to the various sciences: what 
animals signify what, what all the numbers refer to, and so on. However, this is not simply for 
the sake of understanding the Bible but also of understanding the world. It is an ascetical task 
as well as a hermeneutical one.126
Augustine inserts love into the faculty of speech and representation. His semiotics is 
both cast as a preliminary stage of interpretation and as an ascetic exercise in ‘seeing as’, akin 
to that of Evagrius Ponticus and the desert fathers and mothers. His biblical interpretation is 
part and parcel of this: both appropriating non-doctrinal knowledge for the sake of discerning 
truth, and using the text to exert an influence upon the truth of the world.
If we are to accept that early Christian asceticism proposed an epistemological practice 
of inserting agency into the process of knowledge and representations,  there are a certain 
number of implications. Firstly, the knowledge we have received in the world is contingent, 
so that it is possible to manipulate it and change it into something else. Secondly, knowledge 
is bound up with forms of life, so that the transformation of knowledge entails a practice, and 
not just a thought. It involves assessing the production of knowledge in the light of Christian 
taxonomies and ordered love.
The first  implication,  asserting that  knowledge-making processes are contingent,  is 
bound to be surprising. It does not only question common knowledge, but common concepts 
and systems of thought, the pre-requisites of knowledge. So, for example, desert fathers and 
mothers did not challenge the geography of holiness in late antiquity by discussing whether 
prostitutes  could  be  holy:  they  visited  prostitutes  and  prayed  with  them.  Their  practice 
transforms the way in which prostitution is thought and known without discussion.
One  way  of  making  knowledge  contingent  is  to  make  it  specific.  If  a  system of 
knowledge can be described, it is not all there is, but one way among many. Therefore it is not 
necessary, and can be transformed or rejected. So for example we saw a number of different 
attitudes to the law and to monastic variation in part one (on page 54): these attitudes make it 
possible to experiment with new Christian relations to law and monasticism. They refuse to 
let the practical discussion of the definition of monasticism be closed. The early Christian 
ascetics were innovative regarding new forms of life. Whilst withdrawal from the world of 
126 This will mean re-casting the debate concerning the function of the de doctrina christiana, which has arisen in 
the wake of the seminal article Verheijen, 1974. For more on this, see Thomas, 2003 Arnold and Bright, 1995 
Harrison, 2006.
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politics  was  a  commonplace  in  the  philosophy  of  late  antiquity,  the  communities  and 
asceticism constructed by the desert fathers and mothers were both radical and new.
The  perspective  gained  by  these  new  forms  of  life  in  the  desert  enabled  the 
transformation of a concept. The ‘world’ had for some time been thought of not only in terms 
of political life, but as a system of desire, by those embracing monastic withdrawal to the 
desert. The biblical source most quoted is the definition given by John: the desire of the flesh, 
the desire of the eyes, and the pride of life (1 John 2.16). The geographical move, however, 
gave this denomination a very concrete character. The world becomes the life of the city. It is 
the  contingent  configuration  of  family,  political  alliance,  money,  and  desire.  Physical 
departure from this environment allowed the desert fathers and mothers to conceptualise that 
system of life and knowledge as just  one among many.  It  is  specifically the way of ‘the 
world’, as opposed to that of angels or demons or the desert.
This is the epistemological implication of the technique of dissociation outlined in part 
one  (on  page  75ff).  Once  the  world  could  be  looked  at  as  an  object,  it  could  be 
conceptualised, made into a specific variable. Becoming a stranger means seeing one’s life – 
what one has become estranged from – as an object, as one among many. It is the privilege of 
foreigners to see very clearly the difference between what is necessary and what is contingent 
in a culture.
The  conceptualisation  of  ‘the  world’  is  therefore  a  test  case  of  the  technological 
epistemological revolution of early Christian asceticism. It is an instance – along with their 
control of the passions – of someone inserting their agency into the process of knowledge 
through forcing into place a governing concept. Later traditions of asceticism combine the 
tasks:
Someone  withdrawing  from  the  world  for  the  sake  of  the  Lord  is  no  longer  attached  to 
possessions, that he should not appear to be deceived by the passions. If you have left the world, 
then do not begin to reach out for it. Otherwise your passions will come back to you.127
This particular technique assumes that describing something involves transcending it 
in  some  way  (virtual  or  otherwise).  It  is  only  when  the  desert  fathers  and  mothers  had 
withdrawn from the world that they were able to describe it as such in any detail. It is not that 
it had no function in forms of life previous to the flight to the desert, but that it gained a set of 
127 Climacus, scal.: Step 3.
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functions afterwards. The specificity of these functions, and their descriptive nature, all imply 
that the agent is not necessarily participating in what previously had described everything.
The grammar of ‘the world’ – irrespective of the specific transformation forced by the 
flight to the desert – is such that it lends itself to transcendence. John’s original definition in 
terms of desire and pride was already revolutionary. Because the world is all that is (the case). 
To describe it as contingent is to assert the possibility of revolution. John’s statement implies 
that everything can and has changed. Everything can be questioned. Everything is contingent. 
Because everything can be compared to the realm of the Father. In concrete terms, this means 
for the first Christians that everything can be compared to the church. For the desert fathers 
and mothers, everything (including the church) can be compared to the desert. And this does 
not preclude comparing everything (including the desert) to a further situation, for example 
madness.
Each  comparison  suggests  a  new bifurcation  of  reality  and  allows  new modes  of 
description. But since we may in each case be describing everything that is (the case), the 
bifurcation implies total revolution. Everything becomes liable to transformation. The simple 
act of description forces contingency by transcendence: pushing oneself away from what one 
thought was the unmoveable edge.
This practice of knowledge that objectifies a contingent world of course mirrors the 
modern revolutionary practice of criticising the now, highlighted in Foucault’s exegeses of 
Kant.128 The question as to what determines the present and what is to determine the future is 
addressed  by  Kant  and  Foucault  as  the  paradigmatic  philosophical  task.  Describing  the 
present by tracing its limits is merely the chronological equivalent of the topological practice 
of  placing  the  world  through  fleeing  to  its  borders.  Both  are  epistemological  as  well  as 
political projects.
The  second  implication  of  the  early  Christian  ascetic  insertion  of  agency  into 
technologies  of  knowledge  and  representations  that  we  noted  was  the  integration  of 
knowledge with forms of life. There are obvious examples of this. Living in community will 
give you a reading of Paul’s letters  to the churches that sympathises much more with his 
reconciliatory words than life in absolute solitude. Rituals structure one’s sense of history and 
relation to the everyday, and everyday negotiations are the context for one’s knowledge of 
manners and social order.
128 Foucault  presented  a  number  of  different  exegeses  of  Kant’s  article  ‘What  is  Enlightenment’  (Kant, 
2007[1784]) during the final years of his life, e.g. in Foucault, 2000[1984] Foucault, 2007[1990] Foucault, 2008: 
8-39.
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The key areas we mentioned above – gender, economic value, political alliances – that 
were shunned by desert fathers as generated by the passions are all both practices of life and 
domains  of knowledge.  Gender  is  configured by social  roles and marital  practices  in late 
antiquity. It corresponds to a code of knowledge concerning what is masculine and what is 
feminine. This knowledge can be adhered to or transgressed. Economics is configured by a 
market, and entails knowledge of everything’s price. Political alliances are forged through 
friendship and civic duties, and yield knowledge of the city’s life, its people, and of politics.
In  each  of  these  cases,  abandoning the  form of  life  threatens  the  necessity  of  the 
knowledge. Someone who does not care how much his property costs does not strike his bank 
manager as odd: they can not have a conversation. They are strangers to each other, just as 
those initiated into the world of facebook cannot be ‘friends’ with those who are not. As 
Jerome says, ‘each is a madman for the other.’129
A further example can be given from our above discussion of vainglory. Whilst there 
are  indeed  a  great  number  of  practical  solutions  to  the  problem of  vainglory  –  secrecy, 
exposure  to  the  elements,  refusal  to  attempt  extreme  asceticism,  holy  foolishness  –  one 
solution suggested was ignorance. You can avoid the practices that lead you to glory in your 
own fabulousness,  or you  can simply be ignorant  of  the categories  that  qualify you  as a 
successful monk: ‘simpler people do not usually succumb to the poison of vainglory, which 
is, after all, a loss of simplicity and a hypocritical mode of behavior.’130
In other words, we have an asceticism that integrates knowledge and practice so as to 
make them mutually dependent. We have seen that challenging the form of life that founds 
particular  knowledges  will  produce  effects  within  that  knowledge.  At  the  same  time,  to 
challenge the knowledge (by for example claiming that women are not created as wives; that 
money  is  defined  by  human  sovereignty,  and  friendship  is  more  godly  than  status)  will 
produce other behaviours (as we saw in part one).
The  ascetic  revolutionary  epistemology  outlined  here  is  based  on  the  ethics  of 
renunciation.  A casuistry of vainglory and objectivity justifies denying worldly knowledge. 
The denial is further allied to a thesis concerning the knowability of God.
The early  Christian  ascetics  addressed  their  practice  to  the  process  of  knowledge. 
Their control over passions, forcing of concepts, and reflection on knowledge-shaping forms 
of life were all ways of inserting agency into the formation of the conditions of knowledge. 
129 Hieronymus, ep.: xlv.
130 Climacus,  scal.: 22.  Hence  John considers  ‘acting stupid’ as  a  response  to  vainglory:  Barsanuphius  and 
Iohannes, resp.: 332.
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Some of them even reflected on the issue and developed epistemological theories to deal with 
the problem.
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2.3: The Work of a Silence
Ascetics and philosophers work on their  language and knowledge.  Once again,  we 
have constructed a picture containing very little theology.  We must therefore add this one 
element, in order to consider their contribution not simply to the technology of knowledge 
and epistemology, but also to the challenges of theology and god-talk.
The ascetic  and  foolish  approach  to  theology is  of  central  importance  not  simply 
because we are interested in their religious knowledge just as much as their religious practice. 
It  is  also  the  foundation  stone  and  breaking  point  of  their  knowledge:  foundation  stone 
because they reject the knowledge of the city and embrace the desert as the place of God and 
the theological location; breaking point because they embrace the desert for its featurelessness 
– the desert is the place of the impossibility of God-talk.  This breaking point defines the 
location and manner of the transformation of knowledge. When the desert becomes a city, the 
knowledge of God can be spoken. When the holy fools take desert solitude back into the city, 
they challenge the theology of urban Christianity.
We will therefore have to investigate not only the theology of early Christian ascetics 
and holy fools, but their specifically apophatic theology. The norms of the desert fathers and 
mothers were described by their techniques of withdrawal from the world. Their knowledge 
will  be  described  in  the  ways  by  which  they  refuse  to  speak  of  God:  their  ‘practice  of 
ignorance.’131 How do they avoid the danger of misrepresenting God? How do they work on a 
language and knowledge that does not reach out to God and yet shapes their lives? How to be 
holy when the holy is inexpressible? In this way, we will be forced to treat the subject both 
historically  and  notionall  through  elucidating  the  words  of  early  Christian  ascetics  and 
through explaining the moves allowed by the domain of negative theology. In this way, I will 
draw on two very different sources in what follows: our closely defined historical sources will 
yield arguments concerning manifestations of negative theology in early Christian asceticism, 
and the Christian tradition as a whole (including modern authors) will elucidate the grammar 
of negative theology as such, by showing what moves are and were available to the project.
2.3.1: Saying No to Theology
Theology and religious practice were intimately bound up for early Christian ascetics. 
In  spite  of  their  reticence  regarding  God-talk  and  doctrine,  their  asceticism  demanded 
reference to God:
131 Climacus, scal.: Step 4.
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The man who wants to talk about love is undertaking to speak about God. But it is risky to talk 
about God and could even be dangerous for the unwary. Angels know how to speak about love, 
but even they do so only in proportion to the light within them.
“God is love”. But someone eager to define this is blindly striving to measure the sand in the 
ocean.
Love, by its nature, is a resemblance to God, insofar as this is humanly possible. In its activity it 
is  inebriation of  the  soul.  Its  distinctive character  is  to  be a  fountain of  faith,  an abyss  of 
patience, a sea of humility.
Love is the banishment of every sort of contrariness, for love thinks no evil.
Love, dispassion, and adoption are distinguished by name, and name only. Light, fire, and flame 
join to fashion one activity. So too with love, dispassion, and adoption.
… There is nothing wrong about offering human analogies for longing, fear,  concern, zeal, 
service, and love of God. Lucky the man who loves and longs for God, as a smitten lover does 
for his beloved. Lucky the man whose fear of God is in no way less than the fear of the accused 
in front of a judge. Lucky the man who is caught up with the zeal of loyal slaves toward their 
owner. Lucky the man who is as passionately concerned with the virtues as a jealous husband 
watching over his wife. Lucky the man who prays before God like a courtier before the king. 
Lucky the man who strives without end to please the Lord as others try to please men.132
The Christian who attempts to live the good life is caught in a dilemma, according to 
John Climacus.  Either  they  call  their  love  purely  their  own,  and so  fall  into  the  trap  of 
vainglory, or they attribute it to God’s work. But then they stand in danger of defining God 
according to their own life. So Climacus exhorts the Christian to refuse the task of measuring 
love and goodness, and instead fill up the measure of human goodness within them.
So theology is a dangerous necessity of speech about love. At the same time, it is only 
the person whose love has been purified that can properly engage in theology. In the same 
step, Climacus described the pure Christian as someone completely distracted by the love of 
God, unaware of hunger, or danger, or self. It is only when these concerns of measuring the 
self and the body have been brushed aside that theology can take place.
So the good life entails and warns against theology. But good theology is not possible 
until the good life has been achieved. For Climacus, apophaticism and kataphatacism are pre-
requisites and results of love. By loving and not knowing God, we can become good. By 
132 Climacus, scal.: Step 30.
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becoming good, we can know the Trinity and the analogical nature of our love. For ‘Purity 
makes of a disciple someone who can speak of God, and he can move on to a knowledge of 
the Trinity.’
How can a Christian  attempt  to  not  know God? If  all  apophatic  theologians  were 
consistent, we would not know about it. Because they would not be able to tell us that they are 
theologians. Sooner or later, an apophatic theologian has to say something, and at some point, 
she will say something about God.133
For all its heuristic usefulness, the discipline of apophatic theology is not typically 
something  embraced by individual  theologians.  Denys  the Areopagite  is  not a  monolithic 
apophatic theologian,  because his works include a great deal of constructive theology, not 
least his interpretations of ecclesiastical practice in the  Ecclesiastical Hierarchy.134 It would 
be more accurate to say that certain theologians sometimes write in an apophatic mode.
The  Christian  tradition notes  an  overriding  theological  reason  to  abandon  the 
apophatic mode, break silence, and say something (wrong) about God, and that is described 
by Augustine, after he had once more banged his head against the limits of language:
Have I spoken something, have I uttered something, worthy of God?  No, I feel that all I have 
done is to wish to speak; if I did say something, it is not what I wanted to say. How do I know 
this? Simply because God is unspeakable. But what I have spoken would not have been spoken 
if  it  were unspeakable. For this reason God should not  even be called unspeakable, … Yet 
although nothing can be spoken in a way worthy of God, he has sanctioned the homage of the 
human voice, and chosen that we should derive pleasure from our words in praise of him.135
So strict  apophaticism on its  own is  insufficient,  as  it  is  incapable  of  praise,  and 
therefore strives against the purpose of humanity to serve and praise God. It also assumes 
something  positive  about  God,  namely  unspeakability.  But  speaking  of  God  is  also 
insufficient,  as it is doomed to failure.  We do not know when we are speaking the truth. 
Words refer to things, and God is not a thing. The need for silence is accepted by those who 
allow the validity of the project of knowing God. But not accepting the task of knowing God 
also implies silence about God.
133 For Michel de Certeau, this defines the domain of spirituality as well: where silence and speech are equally 
impossible. Certeau, 1973: 153.
134 Denys, e.h.
135 Augustinus, doctr. chr.: I.vi.6. Cf. also Denys, e.h.: I.2.
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Theology  is  therefore  caught  between  disobedience  and  nonsense:  either  it  keeps 
silent, and lives in rebellion to God, or it speaks of and to God, but only does so falsely. Why 
is God-talk so doomed to failure?
Take the statement ‘God is immutable’. An argument for the statement could be ‘We 
know that God is immutable because if She were mutable, then there would be something that 
causes action in God. God is not a caused thing but the cause of things, so God is immutable.’
This argument (with which I have no great problem) is not an apophatic one. Although 
‘immutable’ means the same as ‘not mutable’, it can still be thought as a positive quality. This 
can be shown both  de facto and de jure: on the one hand, it is a positive quality because it 
determines God’s relation to movement and causality, namely that God is always the subject 
rather than the object of these predicates; on the other hand, certain theologians136 have had 
problems with this  doctrine,  which hinders  them from speaking of  God’s  repentance  and 
mercy. So it is not an instance of saying nothing about God.
This  particular  problem arises  because  of  the  logical  form of  the  denial.  Suppose 
someone were to assert the traditional statement of apophatic theology, that ‘God is darkness’. 
If we are to be strict about our language, we would have to deny this. So the alternative would 
be that ‘God is light’. That doesn’t seem to solve our problem though, so we have to look at 
the grammar of the terms. Darkness and light are comparative terms: if we are in complete 
darkness, we can see nothing. If we then are able to see something at all, it means that there is 
a tiny degree of light, so that it is not completely dark. If it is not completely dark, therefore, it 
must be slightly light. So the statement ‘God is not dark’ means the same as ‘God is light’, as 
long as we do not take either term to be complete. If we want to, we could say that God is 
neither light nor dark, but that would – in keeping with the grammar of light and dark – also 
allow the statement that God is both light and dark.137
The only way, it seems, to preserve strict apophaticism and deny the statement that 
‘God is dark’ is to work on the scope of the word ‘not’. ‘Not’ can grammatically be treated as 
an adverb, and therefore can function adverbially or sententially. We have so far only used it 
adverbially of the adjective ‘dark’. If we raise the scope of the ‘not’, it can refer to the entire 
sentence, producing ‘It is not the case that God is dark’. Now this does not commit us to 
applying the categories of darkness and light at all: it has the force of a blank denial.
136 e.g. Karl Barth, Walter Moberly.
137 Kant argues something similar to this  with regard to the proposition that a body has a good smell in Kant,  
1929[1781]: B 531; Denys the Areopagite is also acutely aware of the ambiguity of certain negations: Denys, 
myst.: I.
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However, this is not quite right either. Having denied that we can predicate concepts 
of light and dark (mutability, or size, or longevity, etc.), we still have the problem of what we 
can predicate of God. But if we look at the word ‘dark’, we all know more or less what we 
mean with the word. It has a meaning in other sentences so that we can at least be clear about 
the parameters of meaning even when we use it metaphorically. For apophatic theology, this 
is not the case with the word ‘God’. The words are used in entirely different ways. As Kant 
puts it:
The cosmological ideas [viz. ‘darkness’ etc.] alone have the peculiarity that they can presuppose 
their object, and the empirical synthesis required for its concept, as being given.138
Since there is no such givenness with the concept of God, which has been inherited by 
the Christian tradition from various sources and translations – the pagan ‘gods’ of Greek and 
Roman  religion,  the  Hebrew  tetragrammaton,  Plato’s  demiurge  and  Aristotle’s  unmoved 
mover – we can not simply assume its meaning. We know what it means for a night and hair 
to be dark, because we have experience of truly predicating things of nights and hair, and 
predicating dark of things like them. This is not the case with predicating things of God, who 
is the only one of her species, so that no one is like him. So the very project of theology is 
problematic before we even begin to say something about God (whatever/whoever God may 
be).
There are three solutions to this problem that I want to outline here, based on religious 
experience, values, and work on thought, respectively.
1. We could replace  the word ‘God’ with the expression ‘the one whom we pray 
to/worship/obey etc.’ Whilst this solution has advantages that it does not assume 
much notional content, it does assume that our prayer, worship, etc. occur in the 
context  of  true  religion.  Prayer  and  worship  have  their  own  reference,  and 
Augustine’s  Confessions is  possibly  one  of  the  most  consistent  attempts  at  a 
systematic work of God talk using the word ‘you’ as reference. However, speaking 
to  God begs all  the questions that  speaking of God does: it  assumes that  he is 
listening, that she interacts with the world, etc. True religion is informed by and 
informs theology, but does not cut the Gordian knot of God-talk.
2. We could replace the word ‘God’ with a traditional reference, such as ‘that than 
which no greater can be conceived.’ Although a popular choice, this way forward is 
138 Kant, 1929[1781]: B 507.
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subject to a variety of factors. Firstly, it is fairly clear to any modern reader of the 
fathers and mothers of the church that their concept of greatness is quite different to 
our modern everyday understanding. These values and definitions are presupposed 
in language and theology. Augustine makes regular139 appeal to sanity in reference 
to God: pagan theology is not just wrong, it is mad and foolish. Such a break with 
the religious  culture of his  time is,  as  we have seen (over,  in  2.1:  Practices  of
Thought in the Desert) in keeping with the dissociation of the desert fathers and 
mothers from the ethics of the city. If we are to call God great, then we have to be 
aware of what our language also calls ‘great’.140
3. The  third  solution  is  to  work  on  our  language.  Given  that  our  religion  and 
definitions have to take for granted that we already live in an encoded world, that 
we already have an established set of meanings, then we must deal with what we 
have before we can propose new practices of true religion or new meanings of the 
divine.  As Rowan Williams has put it in his attempt to define the enterprise of 
Theology:
I assume that the theologian is always beginning in the middle of things. There is a practice of 
common  life  and  language  already there,  a  practice  that  defines  a  specific  shared  way  of 
interpreting human life as lived in relation to God. The meanings of the word ‘God’ are to be 
discovered by watching what this community does.141
The obvious example for this approach in late antiquity is the development of a 
common language to speak of God in the various doctrinal formulations. In each 
case, theologians and churchmen take up language already being used in Scripture, 
thought, prayer, and philosophy, and refine it for their current use. It is also for this 
reason, I take it, that Thomas Aquinas lays out the various ways in which we speak 
of God at the beginning of the Summa.142 He did not then write ‘Now we know the 
truth about God’, but ‘and this is what we all call God.’ He then attempts to carve 
out a language that is consistent, based on these established verbal practices. It has 
been argued that this is what he is doing when he establishes God’s ‘formal 
features’ in questions 2-25 of the first part of the Summa.143
139 Augustinus, doctr. chr.: I.ix.9 Augustinus, de civ. dei: VI.10 et passim.
140 Denys, d.n.: VII Evagrius, de orat.: 73.
141 Williams, 2000: xii.
142 Thomas Aquinas, summa theologiae: 1a.2.3.
143 Turner, 2004: 41-44.
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Augustine does something similar with the word ‘God’ in the words following his 
admission of nonsense (quoted over on page 120). Acknowledging that all who use 
the word ‘God’ (both Christians and non-Christians) are inspired to think of a 
‘being than which there is nothing better or more exalted’,144 and that we know 
nothing from the name itself, he proceeds to list the values held dear by various 
people, showing what they will imagine or conceive when they hear the name 
‘God’. He then describes a process of identifying superior values, eliminating 
inferior ones, and abstracting high virtues from the things we esteem highest (life 
from living things, wisdom from the wise, etc.). The conclusion of all this is 
ultimately the work of God’s grace in our thoughts and character:
our minds must be purified so that they are able to perceive that light and then hold fast to it. Let 
us consider this process of cleansing as a trek, or a voyage, to our homeland; though progress 
towards the one who is ever present is not made through space, but through integrity of purpose 
and character.145
Given that the apophatic theologian is caught between the necessity and insufficiency 
of language and knowledge, one of these solutions must be espoused, or another proposed. 
Our knowledge is saturated with terms that apply to the world, and belief in God the Creator 
of that world implies that this is not a problem. We have only to identify the goodness of 
creation and apply it analogically to God. However, our standards are so burned that we never 
know  when  we  have  achieved  a  genuine  perception  of  the  good.  It  is  only  when  our 
knowledge of the good has been utterly transformed that we can know the good.
An apophatic theology that consistently suspects knowledge of God must therefore be 
suspicious of the language of theology.  Whether it  grounds its  God-reference in religious 
practice, authoritative definitions, or everyday language, it is unable to avoid the suppositions 
of human culture. It is obliged to embrace a form of language-critique. Its voice is not its own.
One thinker to have done more than most to advance the study of apophaticism in the 
Christian tradition in recent years is Denys Turner,146 and it will perhaps be useful at this point 
to take his position as an example of a sophisticated statement of the possibility of restating 
the apophatic (and cataphatic) position. I choose Turner (rather than, for example, Marion, 
Derrida, McGinn or Lash) because he gives good answers to some of the difficult questions I 
have raised here. Ultimately these answers themselves become problematic.
144 Augustinus, doctr. chr.: I.vii.7.
145 Augustinus, doctr. chr.: I.x.10.
146  e.g. in Turner 1995, 2002, 2004, and 2008.
125
Turner bases his statement of apophaticism on the patristic expression of unknowing 
that unites Plato’s cave with Moses’ ‘face to face’ meeting with God. The framework for this 
is given by Denys the Areopagite. The apophatic theologian must progressively deny both 
similarities and contrasts, progressing through the concepts of human knowledge, from those 
we are not tempted to apply to God (‘God is a teapot,  a body,  a rock, a dove,  an angry 
soldier’) to those which we are (‘God is being, existent, light, the perceiver of the universe, 
our maker’). We deny both similarity and contrast because our words – learnt as they are in 
application to created reality – are not appropriate  for predication of divinity,  even in the 
negative.  We deny both  bad  and good  concepts  of  God  to  avoid  thinking  that  we  have 
sufficiently understood her.147
For  Turner,  theological  language  breaks  apart  and  is  meant  to  break  apart.  No 
language is appropriate of God. ‘If it is apophatic, then it is  beyond language.’148 Language 
collapses  as such. It is not simply that we have not managed to use it properly. It does not 
work.
theological talk has a grammar. It is a language. But that said, it is the grammar of a mystery, of 
language which breaks down according to determinable rules of breakdown. Theological speech 
is subject to a sort of programmed obsolescence.149
After the breakdown of language, the theologian still needs certain strategies to make 
theology fall apart correctly.  There must be no opening for the temptation to rest in one’s 
success  or  to  capture  God’s  essence.  For  this  reason,  the  theologian  must  muster  all  the 
resources of theological style and pragmatics – how language is used, and to what purpose – 
that will succeed in making theology act properly without positing a set of true propositions. 
Turner’s  examples  of  this  span  the  mixed  metaphors  of  Denys’  mystical  theology150 and 
Eckhart’s rhetoric151 that both show what cannot be said: that this theological sentence is not 
true.
Here I  shall  be forced to  sacrifice  the canons of fairness in  order  to use Turner’s 
presentation to demonstrate a few further problems with the apophatic project as he (and I) 
attempt  it.  The  problems  concern  the  necessity  of  language,  the  successful  statement  of 
theological failure, and defaults in everyday practice.
147 for Turner’s exegesis of Denys, cf. Turner 1995: 19-49.
148 Turner 2004: 160.
149 Turner 2004: 186.
150 Turner 2002: 18.
151 Turner 2004: 104-107.
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Firstly, it should be noted that concerning the theory of language, Turner is certainly 
not naïve. It is tempting to assume that it is an easy thing to say that language is deficient. To 
think that when I fail to express my thought, it is because of a fault in language, whereas my 
pristine thought is prior to language and untainted by its creaturely historical nature. In reality, 
the rejection of language as such is also the denial of knowledge, science, and perhaps more 
seriously all the ways of being together which are entirely dependent on speech and truth. It is 
easy to claim that our modern age lacks the common references and standards of truth that 
held previous communities together, but if that were the case, then I would surely be utterly 
bewildered when a stranger asks me for the time, small talks about the weather, or tries to sell 
me a watch. I am not, and my lack of bewilderment is evidence of the good functioning of 
language.
I am, however, confused about who I refer to with the word ‘God’, and Turner informs 
me  to  my relief  that  this  is  because  of  the inadequacy of  language  itself  rather  than  my 
religion.  Now,  leaving  aside  my  relief  (which  would  no  doubt  be  short  lived  when  I 
contemplate how who I am is constructed by what I say), how is my language inadequate? 
Turner wants to stress that it is not merely my conception of God that is at fault,  but my 
understanding of everything – of existence itself – falls apart in light of the apophatic task.
Instead of positing that it is only theological language rather than everyday language 
that falls apart, Turner embraces the connectedness of all language.152 It is simply not possible 
to  challenge  the grammar  of  existence  and then assume that  we can go on talking about 
physics and atoms and stars in the same way. Theology does not take place in a sealed room.
I suspect that Turner will want to steer between the two dangers of denying all forms 
of language-mediated community on the one hand and allowing all everyday language (even 
the kind that appeals to theology like coronations, spiritual exercises, etc.) to continue as it is. 
He might claim that the difference imposed on language and thought by the existence of a 
creator  who  is  not  created  but  is  not  different  from creation  either  is  not  a  discernible 
difference. He calls it a displacement of reason.153 It is a change in perspective, but not one of 
substance.
The  rhetoric  of  the  breakdown  of  language  does  however  bear  an  uncomfortable 
resemblance  to  the  values  of  detachment  of  solitude  that  so  often  accompany  apophatic 
theology.154 Turner’s theology comes close to resulting in a silent hermit’s theology, itself so 
152 Turner 1995: 255; 2002: 17.
153  Turner 2004: 242.
154  Detachment in particular is part of Turner’s reading of Eckhart in Turner 1995: 168-185.
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easily conditioned by particular theological justifications and forms, as we saw in our above 
analysis  of  the  desert  fathers  (above,  1.3:  Ascetic  Positivism:  the  sine  qua  non  of
renunciation). We will return to the problem of telling silence below (on page 136).
Turner’s  apophaticism  does,  however,  include  a  set  of  practices  that  contribute 
specific substance to his refusal. We mentioned issues of style and act above. We could also 
go into further detail concerning liturgy and asceticism. Turner reads Eckhart and the Cloud 
of Unknowing, together with its cognate literature as providing a critique of desire that comes 
close to our above analysis of passions.155
It is crucial that the apophatic process yield such specific result because of the prior 
existence of life and language. Apophatic theology may not simply withdraw from the task of 
transforming  language  because  theology is  already  deployed  in  the  everday to  justify  an 
entire range of social functions, from the most obvious religious and state practices to the 
subtle theological references of money,156 celebrity cults (‘idols’) and education.
For this reason, it is so disappointing that Turner resorts to such secular theological 
discourse when describing the most  specific  part  of his  project:  namely the ‘program’ by 
which Theology falls apart. Why does he describe the breakdown of language and theological 
achievement  as  being  ‘embarrassed  into silence’157 or  a  ‘crisis  of  depression’158 when the 
theologically processed language of vainglory and dispassion is available to him?
This is not merely a challenge to Turner’s highly prized orthodoxy.  It is a warning 
concerning  our  replacement  of  knowledge  about  God with  knowledge  about  the  ways  in 
which  we fall  short  of  her.  If  we do  not  know who we are  trying  to  describe  with  our 
theological  concepts,  then  neither  do  we  know  ‘how  to  describe  their  degree  of 
inadequacy.’159 We are cut  loose and there  is  no standard  to  judge by.  That  is  why it  is 
essential to be alert to the ways in which we describe the breakdown of theology, lest we re-
insert a standard of goodness (adequacy, health) after we have undermined the idea of the 
possibility of speaking goodness.
Turner  appeals  twice  to  the  notion  of  shame:  first  through  the  theologian’s 
embarrassment, and then in describing the crisis of depression.  The ascetic theologian feels 
shame  at  their  inability  to  describe  God.  She  may  also  then  either  embrace  what  early 
Christian  ascetics  would  call  vainglory  at  her  discover  (Turner  deploys  an  Aristotelian 
155  cf. Turner 1995: 183-185; 209.
156  on which cf. now Goodchild 2007.
157 Turner 1995: 23; 2002: 18.
158 Turner 1995: 243.
159 Turner 1995: 39.
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argument and calls it smugness) or face the consequences of her discovery in the loss of all 
standards by which honour and shame might have been allocated. This loss is also the loss of 
self, and is experienced as a crisis of depression.
Now Turner is aware of the problems of using imported vocabulary,  and therefore 
includes his own analysis of depression. This is not the case with embarrassment, although I 
suppose it would be possible. Here I want to mark out the danger. It is tempting to assume 
that  we  have  achieved  something  by  grounding  or  explaining  our  apophaticism  in  lived 
experience  (of embarrassment,  vainglory,  etc.).  But  Turner  wants to think of this  kind of 
theology as an ongoing process. He speaks of ‘arrested apophaticism’,160 and the dangers of 
stopping at self-congratulation.161 I would suggest that these dangers had already been mapped 
out by those who thought out the practice of apophaticism in late antiquity and warned against 
the stagnation inherent in vainglory.
So to sum up my reading of Turner, we can see that he certainly does take seriously 
the practical implications of the apophatic project. However, in attempting to draw the failure 
of language from the inside, he makes appeal to a series of standards – shame, depression, 
coherent language – that themselves are vulnerable to apophatic critique.
How do we proceed from here  to  the  theological  practice  of  late  antiquity?  What 
practices  of theological  breakdown are licit  and able  to resist  the stagnation of apophatic 
denial? We will consider first the way of holy foolishness, in its development of the critique 
of religious practice and knowledge developed by the desert fathers and mothers. Then we 
will continue to assess holy foolishness in the light of the diverse practices of silence and the 
failure of knowledge in negative theology.
2.3.2: Babbling against the Machine
In part one it was argued that the holy fools denied the  cataphatic element in early 
Christian asceticism (cf. above, on page  40). The techniques of the desert fathers and their 
theological  partners  worked towards  estrangement  from society.  This  estrangement  had a 
positive element: the monk abandons the city to fall into the arms of the common life and 
ordered solitude of monasticism, with all its forms, rituals, and practices. In this section, we 
will  return  to  this  thesis  about  the  holy  fools,  but  with  particular  reference  to  the 
transformative technology of knowledge and its critical relation to cultural institutions. After 
160 Turner 2002: 16.
161 Turner 1995: 243.
129
a summary of the relevant aspects of the fools’ way of life, we will consider the significance 
of these specific ways of challenging the smooth running of society.
Holy  fools  distance  themselves  from both  the  knowledge  of  the  city  and  that  of 
Christian  asceticism through  a  non-silent  refusal  of  technologies  of  knowledge.  Isidora’s 
reaction to her discovery by the visiting monk is a case in point:
When she came in he saw the rag on her head and, falling down at her feet, he said, ‘Bless me!’ 
She too fell down at his feet and said ‘Bless me, my lord.’ All the women were amazed at this 
and said, ‘Abba, do not let her insult you. She is touched.’162
De Certeau  draws  attention  to  the  way in  which  Isidora  refuses  to  be  set  up  by 
Piteroum in the position of a beneficent leader, working in the forms and language of the 
community to support the forms of honour and shame that have become institutional.
He loosens her from her infinity.  He fixes her into the place he formerly occupied,  that  of 
blessing, and of being “father” (superior of the order). … In this case, the idiot defines the man-
master: it is for “you,” man, to “bless”; for you, the institutional, virile, and parternal power of 
articulating with a signifier (the blessing) the divine exteriority on the exteriority of the faithful. 
Stay in your place, which is the ministerial power of the signifier, linguistic ob-jectification. 
From this  point  of  view,  she  “refuses”  to  take  the  place  that  he  occupies  in  the  symbolic 
institution.163
Here the language functions – blessing, leading, commanding – all serve to place the 
speaker within the culture. By renouncing these words, this holy fool renounces the social 
place  of  religion,  and  embraces  the  infinite.  Notice  the  double  use  the  author  makes  of 
quotation marks here: he is quoting an ancient text, but he is also expressing the dissociation 
between the two characters. The holy fool is using the language of the spiritual leader, not her 
own. She echoes, she quotes. She becomes foreign to the language of her own community, no 
longer using its words as tools, but letting them pass through her mouth and body without 
gaining foothold. She sees the world with its language as an object.
Systems  of  honour  and  shame  appeal  to  a  community:  when  working  within  this 
discourse, the moral agent assumes – and thus refers to – a common understanding of what is 
honourable behaviour, and what is dishonourable. In this way, honour and shame work in 
ways similar to Augustine’s values (over, on page 124). Therefore, when we break with this 
162 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XVIII.19.
163 Certeau, 1979: 531f, my translation.
130
understanding, we appeal to a different system, a different community of discourse (in the 
case of Christian monasticism, this community would imply the notion of God, which is why 
the holy fools’ practice was a negative  theology rather than just negativity). It is one of the 
conditions  of  language  and  thought  that  can  not  even  be  discussed.  Specific  cases  of 
honourable and dishonourable behaviour may be disputed in shared language, but this itself 
assumes established canons of interpretation and standards of judgment by reference to which 
the discussion may take place. If not even this minimal agreement concerning honour and 
shame as describing terms is in place, then no discussion is possible (for a description of the 
way in which this technology can work, cf. above, on pages 67ff).
Again,  this is parallel  to Augustine’s values: those who do not share them are not 
unreasonable, simply mad. It is perhaps for this reason that systems of honour and shame 
have provided such fruitful material for anthropologists, for they are one of the ways in which 
many cultures configure our forms of life. And so Dagron describes the holy fools as radically 
other.  If  one  does  not  conform to  the  conditions  of  language,  one  can  not  be  described. 
Outside these conditions is the realm of alterity and madness ‘The monk and the saint come 
from without,  they flock to  another  family,  belong to  another  city and adhere to  another 
code.’164 
This other community was at that time represented by monastic groups in the desert – 
different ways of life, different fields of discourse, different ways of constructing honour and 
shame.  It  is  small  wonder  that  Symeon  is  immediately  greeted  as  ‘a  crazy abba’:  desert 
asceticism challenges the smooth running of society. What separated this alterity from that of 
the holy fools, however, was that holy fools did not acknowledge the holiness of the saintly 
desert  either:  they embraced filth,  mocked monks,  threw off  their  habit,  did not fast,  and 
openly expressed their virulent sexuality. As we noted above (on page 83), a key witness to 
this is the lack of relic veneration:165 the body of Symeon can not be found and Isidora simply 
disappears  into  the  wilderness.  Dostoevsky  is  faithful  to  the  tradition  when  he  recounts 
another strategy for his holy fool abba Zosimus in The Brothers Karamazov, by telling how 
the body of the saint began to stink immediately after death.166 Similarly, Symeon the New 
Theologian refuses to identify the world with the secular city as if withdrawal from it in the 
religious life could define holiness.167 A further witness is the way the Daniel of Scetis stories 
164 Dagron, 1990: 936, my translation.
165 Johannes Climacus recounts how saints could be buried as confessors, where the holiest corpses emitted a 
sweet  fragrance:  Climacus,  scal.: Step  4.  Relics  play a major  part  in  John Moschus’  hagiographical  work: 
Moschus, prat.: 56, 84, 90.
166 Dostoevsky, 1994[1880]: VII.1.
167  Symeon the New Theologian 1980: V.16 and XXII.5.
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are punctuated with the emptying of the Scetis monastic settlements of monks seeking the 
blessing of unlikely saints (Mark the fool, a blind beggar, a cross-dressing ascetic).168 The 
pilgrimage destination becomes its starting point. Holy fools defy the institution of the praise 
of religious achievement. They subvert holiness language. Even their own.
Symeon’s practice echoes Isidora’s.  He is  described as fleeing from honour in the 
manner of a typical desert monk.169 In particular, he would distance himself from praise by 
secrecy, insults, and laughter.
But if anyone saluted him with an inclination of the head, he would leave the place angrily and 
hastily, through reluctance that his peculiar virtues should be detected by many persons.170
Secrecy. As previously noted (cf.  above,  on page  82)  there  are  actually  people  in 
Leontius’ narrative who honour Symeon, if only for the wonders he does. The narrative slips 
back into more common hagiographic formulae. It is however only when the fool disappears 
that these confessions come to light. The truth of the fool is not in himself, but in his absence. 
There is no sense in his life, but enlightenment at his death – ‘Then all came to their senses, as 
if from sleep, and told each other … that he had played the fool for God’s sake.’171 To the 
extent that any can honour the fool during his life, they can not express that honour to others – 
their acts of praise do not exist in the honour-shame society.
The secrecy of holy fools and secret saints undermines systems of discerning goodness 
amongst ascetics that had become formalised and attached to authority by the time of Symeon 
and  Leontius.  Johannes  Climacus  tells  us  that  whilst  he  was  handing  out  judgment  and 
punishment in his community – according to codes of equivalence between sins and penance 
that were to become more and more established and rigid in the Middle Ages – his task was 
confounded by secret saints:
I knew a man who sinned openly but repented in secret. I denounced him for being lecherous 
but he was chaste in the eyes of God, having propitiated Him by a genuine conversion. … If a 
man commits a sin before you at the very moment of his death, pass no judgment, because the 
judgment of God is hidden from men. It has happened that men have sinned greatly in the open 
but have done greater good deeds in secret, so that those who would disparage them have been 
fooled, with smoke instead of sunlight in their eyes.172
168 v. dan. scet.: 2, 3, 7.
169 .Apoph. Patr. (alph): Moses 8 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): VIII.10 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): VIII.13.
170 Evagrius Scholasticus, h.e.: IV.34.
171 Leontius, v. Sym.: 168.
172 Climacus,  scal.: Step 10.  Cf.  also the deliberate  confusion caused  by monks claiming responsibility  for 
others’ sins in Step 4, and the discernment of those who feign passion in Symeon the New Theologian 1980: 
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Insults. In addition to the secrecy,  Symeon alienates  himself  from the city through 
insults. Just as he is rejected through the naming of his foolery, he distances himself from the 
community by naming them fools, not worthy to be spoken to (negating the assumption of 
address: you are one who will listen to me). He is especially violent towards those who come 
to him as a person of theological power:
They sought him out and found him in the phouska-seller’s  shop,  eating beans like a bear. 
Immediately one (of the fathers) was scandalized and said to himself, ‘Truly we have come to 
see a great sage; this man has much to explain to us.’ As they approached him, they said to him, 
‘Bless us.’ He said to them, ‘You have come at a bad time, and the one who sent you is an 
idiot.’ Thereupon he grabbed the ear of the one who had been scandalized and gave him such a 
blow that (the bruise) could be seen for three days.173
This rejection of the community and its authorities undermines the practice of praise 
and blame.  Knowledge of  goodness  and badness  is  formed together  with  others,  through 
discussion,  shared  values,  and  common  meanings.  By continually  jarring  with  the  moral 
judgment of a group, the holy fool rejects its knowledge and no longer shares in its judgment 
even implicitly.174
Laughter. Just as the discourse of the crazy nun did not engage with that of the abba, 
Symeon’s discourse is radically at odds with that of Emesa in the alienation of laughter. This 
is  inherent  in  the very nature of  laughter  at  others’  expense.  When one partner  laughs – 
without replying – at the words of another, then communication has failed. Laughter creates 
distance between words – the distance of a perspective. We laugh at things that do not work in 
our grammar: at climbing ivy that misses a step, or mistaking a song for a toothpick. It is a 
mark of a lack of sense, of moves that do not have any use in our language game: the dead 
wood of discourse.175
Through laughter, a language’s limitations are configured. It marks the border between 
sense and nonsense that is determinative for knowledge.  It is the shared activity of ruling 
statements out as what cannot be said. In reference to this role Wittgenstein claimed that the 
depth of jokes is the depth of philosophy.176 Attention to laughter shows us the limits of our 
knowledge.
VIII.1.
173 Leontius, v. Sym.: 153.
174 For more on the effect insults have on one’s relation to self and others, cf. below, on page 149ff.
175 Wittgenstein, 2001[1953]: 42.
176 Wittgenstein, 1993[1933]: 168f.
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These techniques of the avoidance of honour might be interpreted, however, as more 
than a simple moral discipline. They could be interpreted as resistance to the very possibility 
of  honour,  to  the  very  nature  of  institutions  that  produce  discourse,  honour  and  shame. 
Symeon is not just resisting this way of organising community respect, he is resisting respect 
in itself, as something human and obstructive of God-talk.
The forms of honour bring us back to the point of appeal to a community. If the holy 
fools do not sit well in any system of honour and shame, then neither will they need any 
community  for  their  status.  Signs  of  honour  and shame require  at  least  the institution  of 
discourse, and the holy fools attempt to escape from all these institutions. There are a number 
of reasons to interpret the lives of the holy fools as non-references, lives that refuse to be 
signs.
The madness of the idiot does not enter into the discourse of communication any more than 
death  does.  It  is  not  symbolisable.  Garbage  does  not  know how to turn  itself  “holy”.  The 
monastic operation fails.  The madness  of  the madwoman consists  in not  (being able to be) 
participating in the circulation of the signifier; in being nothing, in relation to madness itself, but 
its “simulation”;177
In  line  with  their  refusal  to  participate  in  sign  systems,  the  holy  fools  resist  key 
features – signifiers, tools of knowledge, forms of life – of the semiotic system that allows 
knowledge of God. They undermine technologies of moral knowledge.
The main  signifier  Symeon  relieves  himself  of  is  monastic  morality.  He does  not 
define God by demonstrating what is good and religious in his own life. On the contrary, he is 
openly sinful,  tries  to  bring condemnation  upon himself  by confessing to  making women 
pregnant, acting guiltily around prostitutes, stealing and gorging himself, all whilst retaining 
his monastic habit and the markers of his identity as religious. In this way, he undermines the 
claims he might have to understanding the infinitely good in his way of life and practices of 
holiness. He does not give up the project of reference, merely the way in which it is practised 
in his present world.
For a drunk person is ridiculed by people, is beaten, despised, does not account himself worthy, 
offers no opinions, teaches no one, gives no advice about anything, cannot discern between 
what is good and what is wrong.178
177 Certeau, 1979: 534, my translation.
178 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 37.
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The  second  signifier  Symeon  denied  is  the  worship  of  the  church.  Evagrius 
Scholasticus  notes in particular  that  his  solitude is  one of prayer,  as he affords ‘none the 
means  of  knowing  how and  when  he  propitiated  the  Deity’.179 Similarly,  he  disrupts  the 
liturgy – something unheard of for a Christian of the Eastern Orthodox church at the time – 
and does not follow the church year. He also undermines the church hierarchy, singling out 
monks for particularly heavy ridicule.180 Other fools focus on abbots and Bishops.181
The sage who is supposed to know – Daniel or Piteroum – is there purely in order to offer a 
space of language to the others’ knowledge (that is to say, to their madness) and in order to 
thereby mark  the  altering  effects  in  the  privileged places  of  meaning  (the  patriarchate,  the 
monastery).182
Holy  fools’  choice  of  targets  reveals  a  concern  to  challenge  the  institutions  of 
knowledge.  Through  attacking  liturgy  and  liturgical  persons,  they  question  the  locus  of 
theological  exegesis,  disrupt  the  technology of  theological  knowledge  in  the  liturgy,  and 
interrupt the community that is bound together by and produces speech about God.
The third resistance to reference comes in the deceptions and the secrets of these fools. 
Even though he is named a fool, believed to be immoral, and considered a demoniac, in all 
these  things  he  is  only  pretending.  That  is  what  a  holy  fool  is,  according  to  their 
hagiographers (including modern interpreters): a monk who has just gone mad is not a holy 
fool. This is an issue that runs through the text – that the fool pretends to be what he is taken 
to be. Even when he babbles, he ‘pretended to babble’.183 At the end of the day, he is not even 
mad. His contemporaries will only penetrate the deceptive exterior. Only God sees the heart, 
and can therefore interpret the exterior truthfully.
Resistance to language is most obviously seen in Symeon’s refusal to express himself. 
Not only does he associate with the other misfits of that society – prostitutes and demoniacs, 
those without names or recognition – but he babbles out nonsense, refusing to confess his 
truth.  In  this  way,  ‘he  was  just  like  the  many  who  babbled  and  prophesied  because  of 
demons.’184 Even the demons he alienated.
179 Evagrius Scholasticus, h.e.: IV.34.
180 Leontius, v. Sym.: 153.
181 e.g. Mark the fool in v. dan. scet.: 2.
182 Certeau, 1979: 539, my translation.
183 Leontius, v. Sym.: 155.
184 Leontius, v. Sym.: 156.
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therefore some daimoniacs cried out and said, ‘O violence, Fool, you jeer at the whole world. 
Have you also come by us to give us trouble? Retreat from here; you are not one of us…’185
In  all  these  strategies  for  avoiding  the  conditions  of  discourse,  the  holy  fools  are 
avoiding the ways in which we speak the concept of God. When they restrict themselves to 
attaining the praise of God, they in reality act as if they do not accept any praise at all. God 
does not participate in their honour-shame systems. Symeon tries desperately not to refer, to 
be an apophatic ascetic. In avoiding honour, he is attempting to retreat from what should only 
be given to God. ‘He irritates, amuses, provokes admiration or beatings, but he does not divert 
language toward what has no place.’186
De Certeau sees holy foolery as ‘practices of the infinite, or if you prefer, effective 
and spatial deployments of the unanalysable.’187 As their bodies do not signify, they can do 
bodily  theology without  referring  to  the  one  without  body.  So  the  rejection  of  language 
primarily takes the form of rejecting language that designates them as holy, even when that 
language describes their avoidance of vainglory (which is as far as Dagron’s analysis takes 
us).188 Playing the fool, pretending to be insignificant, all constitute relations to the body that 
do not then make claims to portray the infinite. They are broken signifiers of God, words that 
dance  around  the  infinite  without  presuming  to  understand,  contain,  or  define  it.  Their 
articulate silence gestures towards the nameless one.
The foolish practice of the infinite is probably most evident in laughter. By laughing at 
the world, the fool bears witness to the possibility of being addressed by one without place.189 
For the laughter creates distance, but the world is all that is. The derision does not come from 
the institution of holiness – the church or the monastery – and yet there is no other discourse 
to  replace  it.  Laughter  objectifies  its  victim,  thus  undermining  any  society’s  ‘centre 
complex’.190 It is important to remember that holy fools are almost always foreigners. At the 
same time, it does not define itself as anything except discursive nonsense. Laughter does not 
have to seek a place to stand. It is a sign with no self-reference. ‘It bring to a standstill the 
fading of the Other into indefinitely trading simulacra.’191 
185 Leontius, v. Sym.: 162.
186 Certeau, 1979: 536, my translation.
187 Certeau, 1979: 542, my translation, emphasis original.
188 Dagron, 1990. Cf. the discussion above, on page 67ff.
189 Evagrius warns against the temptation of reducing God to the place of the strange and exotic: Evagrius,  de 
orat.: 67.
190 Koyama, 1984.
191 Certeau, 1979: 542.
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In the laughter of the mad all are brought into question. The projects of making sense, 
of giving honour, are relativised by laughter. At the same time as it refuses the definition of 
its own space, it questions the knowledge of any society, so that those nearer the margins are 
closer to it than those in the middle. The laughter of the spaceless one masquerades as the 
grimaces of those who are not given space.
The holy fools are not simply on the edge of society, they attempt to undermine God 
signification  by  deriding  and  withdrawing  from  those  institutions  that  portray  God.  As 
Symeon fooled, theologians and philosophers were penning their apophatic theology, unaware 
that any attempt to speak apophaticism would be doomed to failure.
2.3.3: Telling Silence
Our account of the holy fools’ attitude to God-talk assumes an analysis of religion’s 
relation to knowledge in late antiquity and a thesis concerning the construction of silence. 
More specifically, it assumes that the radical ascetics of the desert had assumed a particular 
space in relation to ‘the world’, and it implies that this space legitimated the forms of social 
life rather than challenging them. Religion had become describable, and its place allocated by 
a knowledge ratified and moderated by the city. It had become an object, and part of a social 
order. In addition, silence is assumed to be insufficient as an apophatic strategy, in that it is 
just as constructed,  just as telling,  and just as significant as speech. In this section, I will 
justify these assumptions.
Turning to the place of religion first, this analysis is simply one further step in the 
argument made above (on page 79) plotting the progress of early Christian asceticism from 
the embrace of negativity and death to the assumption of a religio-juridical role in the society 
of late antiquity. The very first desert fathers took steps to avoid being placed as functional 
holy men that were useful to society:
Blessed Archbishop Theophilus,  accompanied  by a  magistrate,  came one day to  find Abba 
Arsenius. He questioned the old man, to hear a word from him. After a short silence the old man 
answered him, ‘Will you put into practice what I say to you?’ They promised him this. ‘If you 
hear Arsenius is anywhere, do not go there.’192
Arsenius objects to acting as a religious authority for the institutional urban church 
and the legal system. The way he expresses this is moreover suggestive of a deeper reaction 
against being placed in relation to structures of goodness and right. He does not want to give 
192 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Arsenius 7 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): II.4 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): II.6.
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the impression that it is easy to find holiness. He does not want his visitors to feel they know 
where he is.
Certainly Arsenius’ task was not easy:  not only do we know of the travels  of the 
companies of Cassian193 and Rufinus to visit solitaries in the Egyptian desert,194 but the group 
of cells in Nitria and the Cells – around which the Apophthegmata Patrum developed – were 
served by bakeries, doctors, and a guest house where people could find free accommodation 
whilst they visit the fathers living there.195
The ideal, however, is demonstrated by the various stories in which the monks refuse 
judgement.  We have already mentioned their  renunciation of judgement over one another. 
They  would  also  flee  from the  role  of  adjudicator.  Those  among  the  desert  fathers  and 
mothers who were revered were also those most sought after as judges. So they would also 
have to be the most cunning in fleeing that place given them.196
The most spectacular failure in transcending the system of the world was Symeon the 
Stylite. This Syrian ascetic was dramatic in his rejection of worldly values, living a life of 
severe self-discipline on top of a pillar in the desert. But it was only a matter of time before 
his life became known and his pillar was surrounded by curious Christians, people seeking 
patronage,  disputing parties,  and pilgrims.  He was no longer outside the conventions  and 
knowledge of the world, but part of it, one function alongside others in the rural society of 
late antiquity.197 This was not a tension that early Christian asceticism seemed able to resolve.
In  this  way,  the  monastic  life  came  to  stand at  the  edge of  urban society  in  late 
antiquity. Nevertheless, it played an important role in determining the truth of that community 
and configuring their  relations  to one another.  Hence Isidora refuses to  take the place of 
religious power: it is associated with and determinative of gender, rank, value, and measures 
(cf. above, on page 129). All those factors that Augustine allows to his young theologians are 
rejected by Isidora. They have nothing to do with the infinity she is practising. She upholds 
her break with the world.
A natural application of this theory – and one related to our topic – would be to the 
mediaeval and ancient Carnival. Each year, social relations are turned on their head in the 
193 Cassianus, Collationes.
194 Rufinus, Hist. Monach.
195 Chitty, 1966: 31.
196 Moses feigns madness -  Apoph. Patr. (Lat): VIII.10 =  Apoph. Patr. (alph): Moses 8 =  Apoph. Patr. (Gk.  
syst.): VIII.13; the problem of giving advice without judgment is addressed directly in Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): 
IX.26.
197 For a social analysis of the role of Symeon the Stylite, see Brown, 1971: 90-93.
138
feast of fools,198 and mayhem results. Whilst the carnival could be seen as resistance to the 
social power of the world, it may all too easily simply re-affirm the normal order by appeal to 
the disastrous chaos of the carnival. Anyone who challenges the present hierarchy is seen to 
be recommending social chaos.
There is something to be said for the celebration of the carnival, however. Given that 
this  is  specifically  a  religious –  and  therefore  permanent  –  festival,  it  does  maintain  the 
impression of the contingency of social order. God’s order is seen at least as much in the 
upside-down relations  of the carnival  as it  is  in the justice and peace of the divine king. 
Neither orders exhaust the kingdom of God on their own.
The relation of contingency to affirmation cuts both ways, however. Whilst it flags the 
importance  of  configuring  society  in  different  ways  in  order  to  provoke  reform,  it  also 
demonstrates  the  insufficiency  of  the  contingency  strategy  we  noted  above  (on  pages 
113-115). Demonstrating that the present order is not the only possible one may simply lead 
to a polemical characterisation of the alternatives.
The danger of affirming rather than undermining social orders with one’s difference 
comes into force when the alternative becomes the exotic. When one has almost nothing in 
common with the other, the obligation to take it seriously as an alternative way of life is 
weaker.  So for example,  we saw Symeon renouncing the various markers of monasticism 
with his crazy behaviour.  If he had also permanently renounced his habit,  there would be 
nothing to identify him as a serious monk. So he would no longer be delivering a critique, but 
a spectacle. The alternative has to offer a possible, or even an unavoidable place to stand in 
order to make the normal appear as absurd in its turn.
Monasticism stood in danger  of becoming exotic,  and the process could be traced 
through the steadily more extreme forms of asceticism espoused by various groups in Syria.199 
The process culminated in the Stylites on their holy poles, and the grazers who lived on grass 
and herbs. Holy fools stand in danger of going the same way. So what resources do negative 
theologians have to resist being placed by knowledge of the exotic, and so functioning as a 
tool for forcing the necessity of normality?
It has become common to refer to God as ‘The Other’, so as not to reduce Her to 
something  familiar.  ‘The  Other’  is  a  placeholder  for  a  noun  that  should  represent  the 
unknown, the challenging, the foreign. In ethical theories (principally stemming from Levinas 
198 cf. the analysis in Cox, 1969, which does not consider the thesis of the social role of the exotic.
199 Described clearly by Evagrius Scholasticus, h.e.: IV.
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and Løgstrup),200 this foreign address poses a challenge to me that is constitutive of the ethical 
experience.  The  move  is  similar  to  Augustine’s  practice  of  calling  God  ‘you’,  and  then 
critically honing one’s concept of God to eradicate elements of humanity and inconsistency. It 
is a move that is least assertive concerning God’s nature, and may be described as apophatic.
As  such,  the  theology  of  ‘The  Other’  does  not  fall  prey  to  pre-given  decisions 
concerning divinity and religion. It is, however, vulnerable to a whole set of assumptions that 
require further elucidation to avoid:
1. It assumes a particular form of difference without establishing and identifying any 
shared features. The grammar of difference is such that it describes any two things, 
and that it fails to describe them. Two things are always different, in that were they 
entirely the same, they would be only one thing. As soon as they are distinct in 
time, place, or nature, they become different, and two. They might be two identical 
trees,  distinct  in  space;  two identical  grains  of  corn,  distinct  only in  time;  two 
attributes of an identical molecule,  distinct only in character.  At the same time, 
insofar as we can describe them as two anything, they are not absolutely different. 
Two different people are still the same species; a dog and a cat are two animals, 
and so are of the same kingdom; however,  sovereignty can not be compared to 
Orville the duck. They are not two of anything, and so have nothing in common. As 
such, it is not grammatical to call them ‘different’. ‘Sovereignty is different from 
Orville the duck’ and ‘Orville the duck is sovereignty’s other’ are both nonsense. In 
this  way,  difference  and otherness  are  empty  adjectives  unless  they  are  further 
qualified by a shared attribute: space, time, character, etc. As long as that shared or 
analogous attribute is ignored, the identity of God as totally different will be empty 
of content and critical force. God becomes either unthinkable or exotic.
2. It is self-referential. ‘Different’ and ‘other’ are two place adjectives. In this way, 
what is ‘other’ is entirely dependent on what is ‘the same’, i.e.  myself.  What is 
200 Critchley, 2007.
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foreign to  me might  well  be familiar  to  a  Norwegian woman.  Whilst  sounding 
specific and minimalist, the signifier ‘other’ is actually general and comprehensive. 
The concept (in my case) includes all things feminine, French, feline, mediaeval, 
metallic,  and royal.  Furthermore,  in  the light  of  the grammar  of  difference  and 
otherness,  to  call  God ‘the Other’  is  at  least  to  say that  we have something  in 
common with God (otherwise She could not be compared with us). If the name is to 
have any non-general sense, it must be further defined, and apophaticism must be 
abandoned.
3. To  the  extent  that  I  am addressed  by  this  other,  we  are  both  confined  to  the 
conditions of the negotiations of identity. The form of the self is conditioned by my 
social context. Butler argues that this is also the case of the one by whom I am 
addressed and challenged.
When  we  come  up  against  the  limits  of  any  epistemological  horizon  and  realize  that  the 
question is not simply whether I can or will  know you,  or whether I can be  known,  we are 
compelled to realize as well that ‘you’  qualify in the scheme of the human within which I 
operate, and that no ‘I’ can begin to tell its story without asking: ‘Who are you?’ ‘Who speaks 
to me?’ ‘To whom do I speak when I speak to you?’ If this establishes the priority of rhetoric to 
ethics, that might be just as well. The mode of address conditions and structures the way in 
which moral questions emerge.201
The  language  of  difference  will  not  fulfil  the  function  of  a  founding  theological 
quality, no matter how minimalist it attempts to be. The conditions and assumptions of our 
context challenge the apophatic project in the very notion of address and speech.
Silence is further insufficient as a denial  of speech about God because it is full  of 
content. If we appeal to silence out of distrust that our words will express something we do 
not want to say, or something not appropriate to say, then silence is not the answer. Silence 
has  a  structure,  a  context,  and a  significance  just  as  salient  as  those  of  language.  In  the 
twentieth  century,  this  lesson  has  perhaps  been  posited  most  forcefully  by  avant-garde 
201 Butler, 2005: 134.
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classical music. The silences of composers like John Cage and Morton Feldman are just as 
considered and expressive as the sounds. They are an integral part of the music.
Christian ascetics are very often acutely aware of the implications of silence. We have 
read above of the admonitions to silence in early monasticism. But in the communities of 
common life, silence had to be regulated. Desert fathers and their heirs were all too aware of 
the various ways in which we can be silent in the face of our companions. Just as Foucault 
reacted against the boring ‘obligation to speak’ in pre-war France,202 Cassian’s desert fathers 
warned  against  using  silence  as  an  expression  of  anger  (the  silent  treatment),  and  John 
Climacus admonished his disciples ‘Do not become silent in an unreasonable way that causes 
disturbance and hard feeling in others’.203
If silence is always a part of its context, then further strategies need to be considered 
that may resist the significance of the discourse of theology. An apophatic theology can not 
even take refuge in not speaking, so how can it speak of God without assumptions? How can 
apophaticism be thoroughgoing in its thought and practice?
2.3.4: Effusive Silence
The early Christian ascetics and holy fools were caught between speaking and silence. 
Speaking of God and goodness was dangerous because of presumption and vainglory. Silence 
presented  the  self  as  serenely  unbothered  by  the  confusion  caused  by  exposure  to  the 
almighty:204 ‘…in order that you may not be considered as being silent, say something from 
what  you  know,  but  be  brief  and  avoid  too  many  words  or  inopportune  glory’205 was 
Barsanuphius’ advice to a monk aspiring to the virtues of non-silence.
There are three techniques of defying language through non-silence that will be treated 
here,  arising from various domains  of the Christian tradition.  Firstly,  I  will  appeal  to the 
practice of glossolalia, then relate it to the  via dissimilis, and finally to the ascetic habit of 
mocking the world.
Glossolalia,  or  speaking  in  tongues,  is  a  solution  to  the  horns  of  the  Augustinian 
dilemma we noted over (on page 124). Speech of God is good, but no speech is sufficient. De 
Certeau describes it as a transition from ‘I cannot say’; through ‘I believe in saying’; ‘I must 
202 Foucault, 2000a[1982]: 122-123.
203 Climacus,  scal.: Step 5. See the treatment in steps 4 and 8, and related points concerning ‘non-silence’ in 
Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 314, 320. Cf. also Muers, 2004, esp. pp146f, for a sensitive treatment of the 
avoidance of being silenced and manipulating silence as a kind of speech act.
204 as portrayed in Climacus, scal.: Step 30.
205 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 698.
142
say’; ‘I can say nothing’ to ‘I can say’.206 Glossolalia assumes the vacuity and necessity of 
language.  So  the  glossolalist  opts  to  change  the  currency:  all  speech  is  bound  by  the 
conventions and corruptions of human society, so we shall liberate ourselves by throwing off 
the conditions of speech.  It is a moment of abandon.
Speaking in tongues is defined by resistance to meaning. If the utterance makes sense, 
then it is not glossolalia. Even interpretations of glossolalia – in the Christian tradition (1 Cor 
12,14) – must be divinely inspired. Human interpretation is not interpretation of glossolalia. 
So it is entirely separate from human discourse, the language of God and the angels. Not 
silent, but not speech either.
It seems that the threshold between muteness and speaking can be extended and organized, can 
be reconstituted like a ‘no man’s land,’ a space of vocal manipulations and jubilations, already 
free from silence but not yet subject to a particular language.207
This stretching may only occur at the expense of its neighbours, however. The raucous 
babbling of glossolalia is offensive towards pious silence and critical to religious speech. It 
not only assumes the insufficiency of speech and silence:  it  also asserts  them. All human 
speech  is  necessarily  subordinate  to  divine  speech,  and  no  theology  may  express  itself 
meaningfully  in  divine  speech.  As  such,  there  is  a  struggle  between  glossolalia  and 
interpretation. Hence their appearance in the New Testament is invariably in the context of 
community  conflict:  the  controversial  acceptance  of  Samaritans  into  the  church;  Paul’s 
attempt  to  wrest  the  Corinthian  congregation  from their  pagan  habits.  In  the  latter  case, 
glossolalia is forbidden unless it is wedded to interpretation, for the sake of order. Speaking in 
tongues was clearly experienced by the early church as deeply subversive.208
De Certeau notes that his above transition may also be reversed. Instead of glossolalia 
as the final solution to a prior problem, it is the initial given that leads to the rejection of a 
problem: from ‘I can say’, through ‘I can say nothing’; ‘I must not say’; and ‘I do not believe 
in saying’ to ‘I cannot say’. This movement embraces glossolalia, but re-applies it to speech. 
We could say that the first transition mimics speech because of the necessity of language, 
whereas the second transition mimics speech in order to undermine and replace that necessity.
In many respects like poetry, glossolalia produces a looser relation to speech. It may 
serve to shift speech somewhat, by forcing alternatives. As the basis for community, however, 
206 Certeau, 1996[1980]: 32.
207 Certeau, 1996[1980]: 38.
208 This tendency is celebrated in Cox, 1995: 143-157.
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it can be deeply pernicious. Again like poetry, it is parasitic on normal language. There is no 
transgression without normality.  This is of course not a criticism,  but a restriction.  Weird 
speech only has critical force insofar as it may be considered an alternative to established 
speech. Glossolalia is immediately so exotic as to be emptied of its critical power. This is 
essentially Paul’s point in his letter to the Corinthians, where he points out that an outsider 
witnessing a congregation speaking in tongues regards it as insane and thus to be disregarded, 
whereas prophecy has the power of transformation and conversion.209
Should glossolalia become a part of normal speech, it would act as false liberation. 
The practice may be used as an illusion of freedom, the end product.  Once achieved,  the 
speaker may accept whatever other institutions are offered uncritically. Proof of the absence 
of  manipulation  is  given  in  the freedom of glossolalia.  Speaking in tongues  becomes the 
exception that justifies the community’s sovereignty.210
A further instance in which speech is freed from its debt to the conditions of language 
can be found in the apophatic nonsense of the via dissimilis, whereby disciplined philosophers 
are given free rein to speak of God as they wish, unconfined by the careful  and specific 
language of metaphysics, and free from the fear of blasphemy. The only condition is that the 
language used not have the aura of believability. It becomes entirely unproblematic to refer to 
God as a rock, a king, or a woman, as long as one is keeping to this idiom. Motivations vary, 
and it is certainly true to say that this trope is used as a key to interpreting Scripture. Denys 
the Areopagite mentions two prime objectives, however:
that the divine things remain inaccessible to the profane and so that all those with a real wish to 
see the sacred imagery may not dwell on the types as true. So true negations and the unlike 
comparisons with their last echoes offer due homage to the divine things.211
 The motivation for this is surprisingly similar to that of glossolalia. It is admitted that 
God-talk is  a hopeless project,  but the challenge  of interpreting the wordy scriptures  and 
tradition  necessitates  belief  in  language,  so  the  solution  becomes  to  sanction  all  words 
concerning God, as long as one is aware that they do not refer in the same way as they usually 
do. This awareness is best preserved alongside language that couldn’t possibly be univocally 
referred to God, and so the philosopher is encouraged to speak nonsense of God.
209 1 Cor 14.22-25.
210 For a more detailed application of this theory to British charismaticism, cf. Thomas, 2006b.
211 Denys, c.h.: 145A.
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In this way the wise men of God, exponents of hidden inspiration, separate the ‘Holy of Holies’ 
from defilement by anything in the realm of the imperfect or the profane. They therefore honor 
the dissimilar shape … For this reason there is nothing ridiculous about representing heavenly 
beings with similarities which are dissimilar and incongruous.212
In practice, this means that serious metaphysics becomes deeply suspicious, as it will 
always tempt the writer into thinking that she has said something true about God. So in order 
to counteract this temptation, we may replace sophisticated theological statements like ‘God 
is  timeless’ with what  might  be considered barbarisms like ‘God is  a warrior’;  ‘God is a 
flower’, or ‘God is a clown’. And the Christian scriptures – which posed such a problem to 
the sophisticated rhetoricians of late antiquity – provide us with a rich source of barbaric 
attributes for God. Denys the Areopagite lists up the sun, stars, light, fire, water, ointment, a 
corner stone, a lion, a panther, a leopard, a bear, and a worm.213 More could be added.
The speaker of these barbarisms is therefore committed to speaking nonsense, and like 
the glossolalist is aware of the senselessness of her speech whilst uttering it. As such, this 
language flouts  a  number  of  the  maxims  of  natural  language.  For  example,  it  is  entirely 
grammatical in this context to say ‘God is an animal, but I don’t believe she is’, which is a 
form of proposition that is otherwise illicit.214 In this respect, apophatic nonsense is a way of 
working  on  language  and thought  that  has  direct  consequences  regarding  how a  speaker 
relates to knowledge and truth-claims, dislocating the relation to language and belief.
It should be noted here that unlike glossolalia, the via dissimilis includes a technique 
for adapting to the shifting conditions of normal speech. Should the use of grotesque imagery 
in reference to God become standard fare in any theological discourse, it will no longer be the 
via dissimilis. In this instance, the practitioner of the mode of reference to God will have to 
come up with further ways of speaking of God that do not command belief. It is perhaps 
unnecessary  to  draw  out  the  practical  implications  for  a  theology  of  holiness  and  the 
knowledge of godly behaviour.
The practice can further be related to Evagrius Ponticus’ technique of manipulating 
thoughts (described  over, on page  100). Evagrius Ponticus also described the temptation to 
think of God through an image, and whilst he did not embrace the way of dissimilarity, he did 
accept  the challenge  of  wresting  one’s thoughts  from the intellectual  project  of believing 
212 Denys, c.h.: 145A. The theme is discussed thoroughly in chapter two of this work (136D-145C), and occurs 
also in Denys, d.n.: 865B-C, 869A Denys, myst.: 1045D-1048B.
213 Denys, c.h.: 144D-145A.
214 It is an example of ‘Moore’s Paradox’, first discussed in Moore, 1942.
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oneself to have identified a truth that captured God’s essence. His technique of summoning a 
thought that he knew to be unholy in order to drive out one that he suspected of being so 
corresponds to the practical significance of apophatic nonsense.215
This linguistic practice assumes apophaticism rather than asserting it. Like glossolalia, 
it can leave normal language exactly as it is. It is not the habit of using dissimilar terms for 
God that undermines the use of similar terms. This way is entirely reliant upon the choice of 
the theologian. It is perfectly possible for the dissimilar way and the more dangerous similar 
way to exist alongside one another.
Apophatic nonsense thereby provides a way out of Augustine’s dilemma, but it does 
not  further  the  project  of  negative  theology as  such.  Indeed,  it  requires  and assumes  the 
practice of verbal denial in order to make sense. Instead of pointing out what is to be denied 
of God, it licenses speech of God that does not have to be denied, because it is based on 
reference that does not reach its referent.
We may identify two essential aspects of apophaticism: the denial and critique of God-
talk  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  absurd  play  of  dissimilar  God-talk  on  the  other.  Without 
critique, the God-talk merely sets up an exotic alternative rather than a corrective; without 
absurd play, the denial stands in danger of assuming that its words of negation have arrived at 
a knowledge of God.
It is beyond assertion and denial. We make assertions and denials of what is next to it, but never 
of it, for it is both beyond every assertion, being the perfect and unique cause of all things, and, 
by virtue of its pre-eminently simple and absolute nature, free of every limitation, beyond every 
limitation; it is also beyond every denial.216
The final  practice  of  negative  theology to  be mentioned  here  combines  these  two 
maxims through a form of double dissociation.  The practice of mocking the world can be 
found in a variety of sources apart from the holy fool literature. Its most common form is the 
holy  man’s  insult.  Through  mockery  and  offensive  behaviour,  early  Christian  ascetics 
attempted to extract themselves from the moral values of the world, and to provoke a critical 
attitude in their quarry.
We have described the practice of early Christian ascetics as dissociative before (cf. 
above, on page  75ff), and will not repeat the exegesis here. Let it suffice to point out that 
215 Evagrius, Prakt.: 42, 58. Apophatic work on concepts is described as a specific activity in Denys, c.h.: 164D 
Denys, e.h.: 369.
216 Denys, myst.: 1048B.
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mockery of central structures and values in city life functions as a flight from such values. If 
one can insult an institution such as court justice or ecclesial hierarchy, then that institution 
will have less influence in forming one’s own judgement.
More pertinent to our purposes is that the insult specifically critiques assumptions and 
values that are not available for discussion. It provokes a dissociation in its victim’s relation 
to self. It is characterised precisely as an insult, and not merely an observation, because of its 
personal nature: it is a challenge to a person’s values and self-image. It is a statement that 
should not be said, and this is marked by the offence caused. This is the critical aspect of the 
insult. It is a form of linguistic-normative transgression, because it both speaks and acts in a 
way not allowed by the linguistic community.
The aspect of absurdity is inherent in the fact that the insult takes the form of mockery, 
mimicry, and play. In the case of the ascetic insult, it is not just an individual that is being 
mocked,  but the entire world.  As such,  the insulting monk takes up the perspective from 
nowhere.
It is as apophatic mockery of the world that I intend to interpret the holy fools in the 
final part of this work. In this respect, the interpretation will be obliged to defend two theses 
henceforth regarding their strategy:
1. that it includes both apophatic maxims of critique and play;
2. that these two maxims are effective as practices of apophaticism.
My methods for achieving this will be largely those already employed in the first two 
parts: to describe the holy fools as a development in the asceticism of late antiquity; to assess 
their  practice philosophically as techniques of the self  and modes  of critique;  to plot this 
interpretation in the context of theological themes of obedience, repentance, and humility.
.
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3: The Unserious Self
And Dionysius with so great desire
  To contemplate these Orders set himself,
  He named them and distinguished them as I do.
But Gregory afterwards dissented from him;
  Wherefore, as soon as he unclosed his eyes
  Within this heaven, he at himself did smile.1
The  problem  of  knowledge  and  veridiction  in  early  Christian  asceticism  led  us 
naturally to the practice of the knowing self, in its relation to its tradition, context, and values. 
In this final part, the practice of truth-telling will be described in terms of its influence and 
dependence on the self. To what extent does truth-telling and truth-hearing allow and provoke 
the transformation of the self and its relation to society?2 The asceticism of the desert fathers 
and mothers and the holy fools form part of a long truth-telling tradition in antiquity that has 
particular forms and objectives that need to be outlined and set in the context of their societal 
function and their place as condition and result of Christian holiness. Are these techniques 
appropriated for the sake of revaluation or in order to allow citizens to adapt to their societal 
and political conditions? How resilient is holiness?
Truth-telling and asceticism are – by the time of the desert  fathers  and mothers  – 
intimately entwined in the early Christian experience of holiness. We will give an account of 
the  contribution  made  by  Christianity  to  this  longstanding  discussion  (specifically  in  its 
practice  of  the  insult),  and  assess  its  significance  in  processes  of  transformation  and 
homogenisation.
The form of truth-telling most relevant for the study of holy fools is comedy. How 
does the comic insult relate to universal truth and the transformation of the self? Approaching 
humour as a kind of asceticism, the holy fools will be read – alongside critical studies of 
humour  and an  account  of  the  problematic  nature  of  truth-telling  – as  a  response  to  the 
ambiguous place of honesty and ethics in the transformation of self and society.
1 Dante, 1997[1867]: Paradiso, canto xxviii.
2 This question should be distinguished from that of later epistemology, which asked what relation to self and 
society allows truth-telling. Cf. Foucault, 2005[2001]: 6th January.
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Finally,  the holy fools’  objective  of  humility  emerges  both as  dangerous and as  a 
source of critique, so we will have to ask what characterises Christian and foolish humility 
and whether its transformation of the self is autonomous, or whether it is unavoidably and 
perpetually a tool for provoking conformity and social homogeneity. I will also be arguing 
that humility – and particularly the consistent humility of the holy fools – is a central part of 
the Christian tradition, and the mainstay of asceticism.
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3.1: Knowledge and truth: the insult
The insult is the practice of truth-telling that early Christian ascetics and holy fools 
held in common. It was a mode of cultivating humility and listening to strangers. A typical 
description is  the story told by abba John the Dwarf about a young man trying  to obtain 
forgiveness from his philosopher guardian:
Although the young man came and asked his guardian to forgive him he would not receive him, 
but said, ‘Go and work for three years as a ferryman and I will forgive you.’ After three years 
the young man came to him again, and this time he said, ‘You still have not done penance; go 
and work for three more years, and give away all you earn, bearing all insults.’ So he did this, 
and then his guardian said to him, ‘Now go to Athens and learn philosophy.’ There was an old 
man who sat at the philosophers’ gate and he used to insult everyone who entered it. When he 
insulted this young man, the boy began to laugh, and the old man said, ‘Why are you laughing, 
when I have insulted you?’ He told him, ‘Would you not expect me to laugh? For three years I 
have paid to be insulted and now I am insulted free of charge. That is why I laughed.’ Abba 
John said, ‘The gate of the Lord is like that, and we Fathers go through many insults in order to 
enter joyfully into the city of God.’3
We  will  examine  the  philosophical  background  and  implications  of  this  practice 
below. This story at least outlines the framework. Firstly, the insult was heard by the sinner, 
and in this case as a form of penance. Early Christian ascetics would hear insults in order to 
identify and expose their own sin. Secondly, the virtue corresponding to the truth-practice is 
‘bearing all insults’, which implies patience and humility. We will see below that the insult is 
associated with dispassion. It is the patience that puts aside bias and irritation in order to look 
the objective truth in the face. Thirdly, it is related to philosophy. The insult is a practice of 
truth and part of the search for it. Fourthly, it results in joy. The truth is essentially good news, 
which is why it is neither vertiginous nor horrifying to face it.
The history of truth-telling which lies behind the practice of the desert fathers and 
mothers revolves around the virtue of frankness. More specifically, the virtue of  parrhēsia: 
saying everything, or fearless speech. Parrhesia is the virtue of speaking the truth regardless 
of  the  consequences  to  one’s  own  concerns  and  safety.  It  is  a  complicated  concept  in 
3 Apoph. Patr. (alph): John the Dwarf 41 Cf. also the letter of John the disciple of Barsanuphius, who surely 
refers to this apophthemgaton when he claims that ‘Many people have paid a price in order to be insulted and to 
learn patience. Yet you are learning patience at no cost, since the Lord says: “By your patience you shall gain 
your  souls”.  We should  give  thanks  to  the  person  who afflicts  us;  for  through  such  a  person,  we acquire 
patience.’ Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 554.
150
antiquity,  associated with democracy,  courage, friendship, marriage, sovereignty,  and good 
character. Very schematically – because the most important point here is to demonstrate the 
transformation carried out by the early Christian ascetics – we can distinguish the following 
moments:4
The institution of democracy: fearless speech is the sine qua non of democratic rule. It 
is only when all citizens are free to speak their own mind (rather than that of an oligarch, 
monarch, or other sovereign) that we can speak of the people’s rule. Parrhesia is thereby both 
a legal concept concerning civic order (who is allowed to say what) and a practical concept 
describing what happens in the democratic assembly, the ekklesia (how decisions are made). 
Fearless speech would be employed in the assembly, and is every citizen’s right.
Speaking  unpopular  truths:  once  this  understanding  of  democracy  is  assumed, 
however, there is a distinction made between those who have an equal right to speak, and 
those who actually do speak.  Those who speak to the assembly must speak fearlessly, free 
from the influence of power and money. So whilst there is a general right concerning the right 
to speak, there is also a particular quality limited to those who  do  speak, and are thereby 
heard, in the democratic city. So fearless speech is a practice that divides the people into those 
who speak and those who are spoken to.
Addressing sovereignty:  this latter quality can then be generalised to other political 
systems, whether they be democratic or not. Fearless speech is indispensable for the sovereign 
(hence its role in democratic assemblies) in order for him/them to govern well. For this to 
happen, an unspoken parrhesiastic contract is negotiated, whereby the fearless speaker agrees 
to tell the truth to the sovereign on condition that the latter gives the speaker license to speak 
without fear of punishment. Hence the ‘fearless’ element in parrhesia, because the contract 
requires constant re-negotiation, and the one who granted permission to say everything can 
just as easily withdraw that permission. The parrhesiast is always in danger.
Ethical frankness: the Socratic appropriation of fearless speech moved it away from a 
specifically political practice towards a tool for forming the good and modest citizen. It is 
through  Socrates’  parrhesia  that  he  is  able  to  interrogate  everyone  concerning  their  own 
concerns and their own wisdom. He does so in order to turn them towards themselves and 
listen to uncomfortable home truths, that they may measure themselves against truth. This 
kind of citizen is certainly useful for the city, but like Socrates, they would not necessarily 
4 In the summary of pages 150 to 151, I will be following Foucault’s work closely, as he is most responsible for 
bringing the concept of parrhesia to current debate. Until further courses are published, the most important books 
are Foucault, 2008, Foucualt 2009 and Pearson 2001. 
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play a major role in state politics (in contrast to the kind of bold politician we see in Solon for 
example).5
Rejection  of flattery:  fearless  speech is  opposed to the lies and flattery told to the 
sovereign or the political agent in order to curry their favour. As such, the fearless speaker 
must  be  both  courageous,  and  disinterested.  Disregarding  personal  gain  and  safety 
corresponds to the relentless concern for truth. And the practice of fearless speech therefore 
shuns the joys of pleasant speech (and thereby often stands in contrast with rhetoric).
Scandalous speech:  the Cynics took the Socratic life to a different level and spoke 
fearlessly to anyone and everyone.  They brave not only individual  wrath by insulting the 
powerful (most paradigmatically in the case of Diogenes the Cynic’s mockery of Alexander 
the great) but also ostracism from society by transgressing social rules and taboos. Like the 
holy fools,6 their sphere of activity was the street rather than the school, and their target group 
was everyone.
Identifying  a  fearless  speaker:  the  importance  of  hearing  fearless  speech  became 
generalised  in  the  generations  after  Socrates,  although  still  linked  to  the  political  life.  It 
became important for a philosopher to identify someone who could speak the truth to him. 
Stoics in particular would visit certain figures who would tell them the truth objectively. The 
development of spiritual guides who would listen and speak in order to make the agent a 
better philosopher was prevalent in late antiquity, and took a number of different forms (from 
visiting gurus to attending schools).
All these moments entail a particular relation between truth and the self. The sovereign 
hears truth-telling through withholding his violent force. The parrhesiast speaks the truth by 
braving violence that threatens to annihilate the truth by destroying or constraining the self. 
The truth-teller risks scandal, ostracism and death by challenging community boundaries and 
provoking the wrath of the people.  Truth can be prioritised or deprioritised in relation to 
political power, status, and self-indulgence. It is therefore entirely reasonable in antiquity to 
ask ‘what value has truth?’
Against  this  background,  the  Christian  practice  of  the  insult  is  a  little  more 
understandable. The insult is an example of an utterance that of its very nature arouses anger 
and puts the speaker  in danger.  It  is  opposed to flattery,  and can often be the context of 
penetrating truths that will not be heard on the lips of more polite company. Insults – both in 
the  political  sphere  and  in  social  relations  –  court  danger  and  require  courage,  even 
5 Foucault contrasts the parrhesia of Socrates and Solon in Foucault 2009: 70f.
6 The comparison receives in depth consideration in Krueger, 1996: chapters 5 and 6.
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foolishness. They have a lot in common with fearless speech, and were certainly part of the 
philosophical repertoire of Cynic philosophy.
The cynic practice of telling uncomfortable truths appears in the Christian literature of 
late  antiquity  as  characteristic  of  secular  philosophy,  and  in  this  respect  we can  see  the 
tradition continued among the desert fathers and mothers. Naturally, Christian hagiography is 
full of stories about the transfiguration of Pagan philosophy in the Christian philosophy (like 
the above story of John the dwarf). In our literature, however, the practice of tolerating insults 
is singled out as a particular locus for comparison.
Let that foe of yours upbraid you, but do you not upbraid him. Regard his words as a training 
ground in which to exercise philosophy.7
If perhaps in temptation your brother insists on abusing you, do you not be carried away from 
your charitable dispositions, suffering the same wicked demon to infest your mind. And you 
will not be carried away if, being reviled, you bless, being tricked, you remain well-disposed. 
This  is  the  philosophic way according to  Christ;  who will  not  walk it,  does  not  enjoy His 
company.8
Ancient  Christian ascetics,  rather  than dealing  out  insults,  set  a  high value on the 
ability to endure them. The ideal is justified in various ways, including the obvious ones of 
turning  the  other  cheek,9 and  being  patient  with  one’s  brother  or  sister.10 The  two main 
justifications  for  accepting  insults,  however,  were  the  struggle  against  vainglory  and 
judgement.
Vainglory has already been treated above (on page 67ff), where the more zany works 
of the desert fathers and mothers were considered as a tool against it. Obedience to insulting 
commands is a technique of opposing vainglory.11 Whether it is accompanied by commands 
or not, however, the way in which insults can be used in this struggle is to accept the unfair 
judgement over oneself as truth, in order to dethrone ‘the unrealistic opinion every man has 
about  himself’12 imposed by vainglory within and flattery without.13 Insults  are  not  to  be 
opposed or even endured, but embraced and surpassed, because ‘every insult falls short of the 
7 Basilius, hom. 10.
8 Maximus, carit. 1-4: IV.30. Cf. also Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XVI.16 = Apoph. Patr. (anon): 211 = Apoph. Patr.  
(Gk. syst.): XVI.25.
9 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Daniel 3 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XV.14 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XV.15.
10 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Isidore the Priest 1, Moses 3, Phortas 1 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XV.52, 84.
11 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XV.64 = Apoph. Patr. (anon): 174 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XV.83.
12 Basilius, hom. 10.
13 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Moses 4, Serapion 4 Evagrius, Eulog.: 26.27 Basilius, moral.: LXXII.
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truth’14. For this reason, Macarius the Great would not speak to people who approached him 
with fear and honour, but if he was offered the greeting, ‘Abba, when you were a camel-
driver, and stole nitre and sold it again, did not the keepers beat you?’15 then he would open 
up and welcome the heckler.
The monk should be humble in this way, keeping silence when beaten and abused, and 
offering no retaliation. Only in this way would he benefit his soul.16 Nisterus the Cenobite (i.e. 
who lived in a community) was known for his reticence in the face of arguments and trouble. 
When approached, he explained his actions by likening himself to a donkey, who remains 
silent though beaten and ill-treated.17
Enduring insults therefore refers back to another of the monastic techniques discussed 
above,  namely  freeing  oneself  from  passion.18 Nisterus  is  another  of  the  exemplars  of 
apatheia who wanted to be like gravestones, statues, or idols in their dispassion as regards 
praise and blame (cf. above, on page 91). The monk’s attitude towards the insult becomes one 
more facet of the collection of techniques associated with that ideal: ‘Just as a dead man feels 
no praise or insult, so a man of faith disdains esteem and dishonour.’19
The  desert  fathers  and  mothers  also  used  the  acceptance  of  insults  to  oppose  the 
temptation to deal out judgements. Abba Moses instructs his disciples to accept abuse in order 
to avoid judgement of others. As soon as one accepts responsibility for what one is being 
accused  of  in  an  insult,  one  receives  forgiveness  from God.  But  it  is  still  necessary  to 
concentrate on one’s own sins to prevent the attention from turning to others for the sake of 
hatred or slander. Insults are accepted to avoid judgement, just as freedom from passions is 
pursued to establish objectivity.
So how is the insulting behaviour of the early Christian ascetics different from that of 
their philosophical counterparts? Christian practice is strikingly similar to that of the Cynic 
philosophers,  who can be thought of as the aggressors of ancient  philosophy.  These zany 
thinkers spoke out their doctrines and perceptions regardless of the consequences of insulting 
kings, transgressing taboos, and challenging accepted truths. The two person relation of truth 
teller to student was similarly an attempt to find the truth regardless of the potential damage 
14 Basilius, hom. 10.
15 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Macarius the Great 31; cf. also Agathon 5 =  Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.10 = Apoph. Patr.  
(alph): X.12.
16 Evagrius,  Eulog.: 4.4  Apoph. Patr. (alph): Anthony 15, Zacharias 3, Isaiah 1 =  Apoph. Patr. (Lat): VIII.2, 
XV.17 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): VIII.2, XV.19 Barsanuphius and Iohannes,  resp.: 125, 237 Climacus,  scal.: 
Steps 2, 4 and 8 Maximus, carit. 1-4: I.28 Moschus, prat.: 206
17 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Nisterus the Cenobite 2 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XV.30 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XV.46.
18 Passion is the defining feature of an insult’s power according to Basilius, hom. 10.
19 Evagrius, par. ad mon: II.14.
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done to either party. The danger is that the one hearing the truth will be so offended by the 
truth  that  they  abandon  the  quest,  and  in  the  worst  case  attack  the  truth-teller.  In  both 
contexts, the results take place in the hearer of the truth, but the philosophical hero is the 
speaker of truth.
With the ascetic tradition we have summarised here, the hero-role has been transferred 
to the hearer of truth: hearing insults gives you treasure in heaven.20 The speaker of the insult 
is no longer in focus, even in the case of a spiritual leader insulting a monk in order to give 
him  ‘frequent  opportunities  to  gain  crowns  …  through  having  to  put  up  with  insults, 
dishonour, contempt, and mockery.’21 In contrast to cynic philosophers, the ascetic Christians 
of late antiquity do not in general go into the city and proclaim their offensive truths. Instead, 
they withdraw to the desert in order to hear them. In this respect, the practice has become a 
good deal more individual, and less committed to the transformation of a community.  The 
implications of truth-telling for democracy have become less evident.
On the other hand, by releasing the role of truth teller from its connection to the brave 
philosopher, they idealise the attitude of the community. It is no longer an isolated practice of 
truth-telling, it is a virtue that anyone can have. Anyone can hear the truth, because everyone 
is offended at some point. The element of courage is still intact, but it has become the courage 
of  hearing  rather  than  that  of  speaking:  ‘With  unshakeable  courage  they  accepted  the 
criticisms of the superior and indeed of those far below him in rank.’22 The desert fathers and 
mothers do not adhere to fearless speech, but to fearless hermeneutics. Dare to hear truth that 
you would ordinarily dismiss. Assume that everyone is reasonable and worth listening to. Do 
not let the boundaries of your world and your view of the self get in the way of your quest for 
truth.
The transition is also one of internalisation. Although the element of courage has been 
moved from speech to hearing, the object of fear has remained the same, namely the fear of 
damage to one’s self,  and one’s own anger and reprisals.  Fearless hermeneutics  is thus a 
practice of the self, whereby one takes a decision to expose one’s self to the insult in order to 
eradicate self-image as a hindrance in the quest for truth. It still requires an external agent, but 
only because of inner weakness. If we were able to be imaginative enough in our self-critique, 
other people would not be necessary.
20 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 125, Symeon the New Theologian 1980: IV.12.
21 Climacus, scal.: Step 4.
22 Climacus, scal.: Step 4.
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There are two kinds of disregard of oneself: one is from within the heart, and the other from 
injuries received from the outside. The second is greater, namely the one that comes from the 
outside. For the one that comes from the heart requires less labor than the one that comes from 
other people, because the latter creates more pain in the heart.23
The  danger  of  reprisals  is  nevertheless  entirely  necessary:  anger  and  provocation 
manifest the interruption and transformation of one relation of the self to shared values. The 
self is mediated by and in keeping with the meanings and transactions of a society, so that 
experiencing  insults  as  offensive  marks  the  transgression  of  shared boundaries.  Flattery 
therefore  becomes  an  expression  of  positive  evaluation  within  those  shared  values  that 
confirms those values, whereas an insult expresses a negative evaluation according to shared 
values that can call them into question. If I do not share the value assumed by the flattery or 
insult, then neither can I be provoked or soothed by it. It is actually very difficult to insult a 
foreigner. I am not insulted when a Norwegian calls me unsporty, just as a Norwegian is not 
insulted when I call them a bad sport. We do not share those values. So insults and flattery are 
not only practices of the self, but ways of relating to and accepting shared values. Detachment 
regarding insult and flattery implies revaluation of those values.
We  can,  therefore,  plot  the  insult  on  a  logic  of  truth-telling.  Early  philosophers 
discover  that  truth  is  difficult  to  hear.  They  introduce  techniques  to  overcome  the 
stubbornness of belief in assumed truths (Socratic irony, mathematical proofs, insults). The 
insult forces the thinker to reveal and challenge their own beliefs. The thinker enlists the help 
of truth-tellers to challenge the beliefs and practices that they do not see and cannot change 
because of their own convictions and self-image. Christian thinkers see that the insult has this 
function regardless of its  speaker.  They embrace the insult  as a  practice  of truth-hearing, 
making the role of the truth-teller redundant. They identify the hindrance to truth-hearing as 
the vainglory of the listener rather than the flattery of the speaker.
Someone  who  notices  that  he  is  easily  overcome  by  pride,  a  nasty  temper,  malice,  and 
hypocrisy, and who thinks of defending himself against these by unsheathing the double-edged 
sword of meekness and patience, such a man if he wishes to break free entirely from these vices 
ought to go live in a monastery, as if it were a fuller’s shop of salvation. In particular, he should 
choose the most austere place. He will be spiritually stretched and beaten by the insults, injuries, 
and rebuffs of the brothers. He may even be physically beaten, trampled on, and kicked, so that 
he may wash out the filth still lying in the sentient part of his soul. There is an old saying that 
23 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 278.
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reproof is the washtub for the soul’s passions, and you ought to believe it, for people in the 
world who load indignities onto someone and then boast about it to others like to say, ‘I gave 
him a good scrubbing.’ Which, of course, is quite accurate.24
In this  context,  the practice of the holy fools emerges as a regress in the process. 
Instead of hearing insults, they are once again dealing them out to anyone who will listen. 
They return to the city, and don’t seem to be willing to listen to anyone. Once again, it is the 
speaker of insults that is the hero, rather than the hearer.
This resemblance to the cynic philosophers is only skin deep, however: the holy fools 
were still obviously marked by the ascetic values of defeating vainglory by letting insults fall 
upon  themselves.  The  one  to  whom Symeon  the  holy  fool  exclusively  speaks  truth,  for 
example (John the Deacon in Leontius’ narrative), only ever calls him ‘fool’, and does not 
show him any honour. The people who did show him honour got only abuse in return.25 
The two distinctive features marking the holy fools out from early Christian ascetics 
that we noted, however, are still valid. Firstly, the fools leave their solitude and return to the 
city; and secondly, the insulter receives back the hero role. There are instances of insulting 
behaviour praised amongst the desert fathers and mothers,26 but in general it is condemned by 
early Christian ascetics,27 and enduring offence encouraged.
There is reason to pause at this point, however. Symeon the holy fool did indeed go 
around the city insulting people, and was thrashed for it. He is also portrayed, however, as 
accepting the accusations against him.28 The earliest record of a holy fool was Isidora, who 
gained the nickname ‘the human sponge’ because she accepted all the abuse and insults that 
were piled upon her.29 If we interpret the holy fools stories as a development of the ascetic 
tradition of the insult, what should we focus on as readers? The insults of the holy fool would 
then  be  examples  of  words  we should  hear  as  truth.  They  are  tools  for  our  fearless 
hermeneutics.
The setting of the stories of holy fools does direct our attention towards those who 
recognise the holiness of the fools. The story of Isidora is about the discovery and revelation 
24 Climacus, scal.: Step 8.
25 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.153.
26 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Theodore of Pherme 28, Macarius the Great 4 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): VII.9 Apoph. Patr.  
(Gk. syst.): VII.14 Climacus, scal.: Step 4.
27 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Theodora 4, Nisterus 5 Basilius, hom. 10 Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 614. Gould 
overstates the case against insulting others: Gould, 1993: 132, 134. However, the condemnation runs into the 
tradition: cf. Symeon the New Theologian 1980: XXVII.7.
28 e.g. when accused of making a slave pregnant: Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.151f Evagrius Scholasticus, h.e.: IV.34.
29 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XVIII.19 and Palladius, h. Laus.: XXIV.
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of her holiness: it is only the first few lines that are devoted to her way of life. The anchorite 
Piteroum only knows of it whilst being chastised for pride by an angel. The climax of the 
story comes when her holiness is recognised. Her behaviour remains constant. The account of 
Symeon  the  holy  fool  in  the  history  of  Evagrius  Scholasticus  is  also  marked  by  the 
recognition and veiling of Symeon’s holiness: each story (abusive behaviour in taverns; the 
accusation that he had fathered a slave’s child; visiting a prostitute; dancing among pillars) 
includes an element of suspicion that he is not a holy man at all (he gets angry, isn’t celibate 
or sedate), the author’s explanation of holiness, and a moment of revelation (confiding in 
friends, a pregnant woman’s confession before childbirth, the prostitute’s poverty revealed, 
the dancing revealed as prophetic). The stories are both about holy fools and about discerning 
holiness.
It is therefore particularly striking that one of our handful of stories about holy fools 
(that use the Greek designation ‘salos’) appears in the context of a story about Daniel of 
Scetis. Whilst the historical status of the collection is in doubt, it is at least established that 
after the introductory story, the Daniel narratives are all discoveries of other people’s piety. 
The stories witness to a tendency for early Christian ascetics to discern holiness outside the 
boundaries of their own monastic ways of life. But the collection gains status in time (being 
one  of  the  seven  great  paterika –  collections  of  stories  about  the  fathers),  and  thereby 
witnesses to the virtue not only of leading a holy life, but of discovering holiness in others. 
Daniel of Scetis has almost no other virtue to speak of.30
Leontius’ work on the life of Symeon appears in a similar light. In his introduction, he 
accuses those who do not recognise Symeon’s holiness of being subject to passions, and not 
knowing the Scriptures. This accusation is then claimed to be the intention of the holy fool’s 
life:
Indeed, I say that through spending time in the city, hanging around with women, and the rest of 
the deception of his life, he truly sought to show to the slothful and pretentious a weakness in 
the virtuous life and the power granted by God to those who truly serve against the spirits of 
evil with all their souls.31
So the stories of holy fools are every bit as concerned with the perception of holiness 
as they are with its practice. As we noted above (on page  77), the holiness of the fools is 
concealed from all: it is this non-knowledge of holiness that constitutes their success, because 
30 v. dan. scet.
31 Leontius, v. Sym.: intro.122, translation modified.
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awareness of holiness is a part of the principle of vainglory. The function of holy foolishness 
– disrupting liturgy, transgressing taboos, babbling, and denying asceticism – is to disabuse 
all of the suspicion they might have that they are being confronted with a good person. The 
morality of the witness is therefore at odds with that of the fool: in order to be good, the 
witness must attribute holiness to the fool; whereas the fool must shun that attribution both in 
herself  and  in  others.  It  is  here  that  the  holy  fools  become  challenging:  whilst  Evagrius 
Scholasticus and the story of the mad nun contain stories of divine revelation, Leontius’ Life  
of Symeon relates divine veiling.
This paradox generates many of the tensions in these works of hagiography. The fool 
is holy because of the attempt to hide that holiness, whereas the unrighteousness of the world 
is revealed by not perceiving what has been hidden. The concealment is proof both of the 
fool’s holiness and the world’s corruption. What is more, the concealment is God’s doing (in 
answer to the fool’s prayer):32 it seems the decks are stacked in favour of the fools in this 
struggle.
Divine concealment is not simply seen in the fool’s prayer,  however: the narrative 
requires witnesses to the fool’s holiness in order to include a vindication that identifies the 
fool as holy. Miracles must happen, not only for the sake of establishing the reader’s holiness 
in hearing the insult, but for the fool’s in giving it. But this leaves the problem of how the fool 
remains recognisably holy but still unrecognised. In Leontius’ narrative, the problem is solved 
by the natural and supernatural confounding of the witness’ speech. A merchant stays silent 
because he was embarrassed, and accepts everyone else’s judgment concerning the fool;33 the 
fool’s former employers didn’t dare to contradict public opinion that ridiculed him;34 some 
circus  fans  had  become  monks  as  a  result  of  one  of  Symeon’s  miracles,  but  they  were 
supernaturally  hindered  from  saying  anything  about  it;35 a  local  authority  investigates 
Symeon, who strips and dances for him, but as soon as he decides Symeon is only pretending 
to be mad, his tongue is bound;36 a Jew catches Symeon in the act of speaking to angels, but 
as soon as he attempts to expose him, he is struck dumb, and then reprimanded in a dream;37 a 
group of theologians are also struck dumb so they could not repeat his critique of Origen;38 
32 Leontius, v. Sym.: III.144; cf. also ‘God hid Abba Symeon’s plan’ – IV.165.
33 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.159.
34 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.154.
35 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.164.
36 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.156.
37 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.154.
38 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.153.
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others  simply seem to lose their  senses and not  understand him until  they receive  divine 
revelation.39
Knowledge of the fools’ holiness becomes possible only at the time of death: those 
who lose their senses can understand and tell of the holy fool once s/he has died. As soon as 
Isidora is discovered, she disappears into the desert. We non-fools, we witnesses and readers 
are not able to win the struggle with the fools over the recognition of their holiness. We can 
only await their death. If they strive to conceal, and we to recognise, then they always prove 
to be the stronger. Even the possibility of venerating their memory after their disappearance is 
frustrated: their bodies disappear. We are denied the cult of the saints. The recognition of true 
holiness in the world is impossible. Once again the reader is thrown up against the extreme 
negative theology of the hagiography. The holy fools exist, but we do not know who they are, 
just  as  God and creation  are good,  but  in  ways  that  we do not  understand.  We have no 
standards by which to recognise the holiness of the fool or the goodness of God (cf. above on 
page 124).
The earliest holy fool literature has therefore an odd message: there are holy fools, but 
they can not be recognised. And the corollary of this statement is that for us, anyone may be a 
holy fool. As far as the reader is concerned, holy fools exist and are nowhere to be found. 
Therefore holy fools are concealed everywhere. No speaker can be ruled out a priori.
The conclusion that anyone may be a holy fool is also drawn in the closing paragraphs 
of the  Life of Symeon.  After Symeon has given an account of his life to Leontius’ secret 
informer, he instructs the latter in matters of holy living:
And he spoke again, ‘I beg you, never disregard a single soul, [167] especially when it happens 
to  be  a  monk  or  a  beggar.  For  Your  Charity knows that  His  place  is  among  the  beggars, 
especially among the blind, people made as pure as sun through their patience and distress.’40
Symeon was masquerading precisely as a monk and a beggar. He hid all his virtues, 
but never hid the fact that he was a monk, in spite of the respect he is reported to have had for 
the  habit  when  he  first  embraced  the  religious  life.41 Similarly,  he  would  often  accept 
charitable gifts from people and associate with beggars,42 in spite of the fact that he obviously 
39 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.150, 168.
40 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.166f.
41 Leontius, v. Sym.: I.131f.
42 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.163.
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had a great deal of money at his disposal (he ‘employed’ a large number of prostitutes on a 
permanent basis).43
It is in this context – that of producing the expectation of holy fools among certain 
groups of society – that we can see Symeon’s other impersonations. By his pretending to fit in 
with particular  identities  and groups,  he could challenge  the impression we have that  we 
understand who they are.  We do not understand demon possession,  because we might  be 
mistaking holy fools for the possessed. Identities Leontius portrays Symeon as contesting in 
this way included the possessed (IV.156, 162), the clients of prostitutes (IV.155f),44 circus 
workers, dancers and fans (IV.147, 154f, 163f), rapists (IV.148, 151), the godless (IV.148), 
and the mad (IV.155 et passim). Our conception of the place of holiness in the world needs to 
be re-negotiated. Values need to be re-thought, and society’s currency needs to be changed.
For  sometimes  he  pretended  to  have  a  limp,  sometimes  he  jumped  around,  sometimes  he 
dragged himself along on his buttocks, sometimes he stuck out his foot for someone running 
and tripped him. Other times when there was a new moon, he looked at the sky and fell down 
and thrashed about. Sometimes also he pretended to babble, for he said that of all semblances, 
this one is most fitting and most useful to those who simulate folly [156] for the sake of Christ.45
To  recap,  the  holy  fools  narratives  condemn  the  non-recognition  of  holy  fools; 
demonstrate that their recognition is impossible (through the nature of the case and divine 
intervention); and direct the reader’s attention to the typical domain of holy fools in groups 
that  otherwise  would  be  dismissed  as  unholy.  If  we  apply  these  theses  regarding  the 
objectives of holy fool literature to our outline of the development of the interpretation of 
insults, we can see these works of hagiography generalising the insult. The holy fool might be 
anywhere, so the insulting truth may come from anywhere.
The holy fool stories are  therefore entirely in line with the early Christian ascetic 
tendency towards cultivating an attitude of listening that is open to insult. They both confirm 
this approach, and aim to produce it in their readers. After hearing about the lives of holy 
fools, the Christian of late antiquity will know that some insults are the product of someone’s 
resentment,  but  that  some might  be the  prophetic  act  of a  divinely inspired holy man or 
woman.  But we don’t know which is which. The speakers (the holy fool; God) are directly 
attempting to hide the source of their words. The task of the good person is to recognise holy 
fools for who they are.  But if  the corollary of this  paradoxical  situation is  that  fools are 
43 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.155.
44 cf. also Evagrius Scholasticus, h.e.: IV.34.
45 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.155f.
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everywhere, the conclusion regarding the insult has to be that no insult can be ruled out as 
false a priori: all are an opportunity to listen humbly. And because insults are founded upon 
values that are put into question, no insult is the final word. All humility is also playful.46
The paradoxical struggle between the holy fool and the listener corresponds to the two 
elements of apophatic theology we established above (on page 145), namely critique and play. 
Just as the holiness of the fools is necessarily hidden, and their uninhibited play mere pretence 
that  mocks  the  values  of  the  world,  so  apophatic  theology  will  always  necessarily  tend 
towards ignorance, and the free play of lies about God. God and the fool are hidden; stories 
about them are a pretence.
The critical element of the apophaticism of holy fools consists in the prophetic action 
from nowhere. The holy fools refuse to accept the configuration of holiness that they meet in 
the city (with its centre in liturgy and its boundaries in acceptable behaviour) and so deny 
them through insult and transgression. Symeon puts out the candles in church and then goes 
out to steal beans.47 He denies the centre and the perimeter of holiness because God has no 
perimeter, and Her centre is everywhere.
The playful element consists in their pretence. The behaviour of the fools is so wild 
that it is unlikely to be taken as a portrayal of God. The only way in which it may be taken as 
such is by recognising it as simulated. They are not  really foolish. But that still leaves the 
question open as to what their holiness consists in. Whilst the hagiographer (and the modern 
interpreter) attempt to validate the behaviour of the fool through interpretation, the holy fools 
themselves will admit no imitators. They cannot condone their own behaviour.
This is of course part of the project: an imitator would be an admiring disciple, so that 
the holy fool’s virtue would no longer be hidden. But even when faced with someone who has 
seen the holy fool’s pretence, Symeon begs them to follow another way. John the hermit at 
the beginning of the story is sent back to the desert,48 and John the archdeacon towards the 
end of the story is presented as an ideal observer, not as a disciple or a new holy fool.49 
Instead of being seductive holy figures, they cultivate apophatic observers of godliness.
The  holy  fools  thus  embrace  the  challenge  of  apophatic  theology  and  social 
transformation. Through the technique of the truth-telling insult, they question the placing of 
holiness in their society, the values it entails, and the relations of the self. Their behaviour, 
46 For more on this theme, cf. below, on page 214.
47 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.145f.
48 Leontius, v. Sym.: III.144.
49 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.166f.
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and  the  attitude  they  produce  in  their  readers,  transcend  assertion  and  denial.  The  fools 
themselves critique Theology and posit laughter, whilst their readers become sceptical to all 
forms of holiness,  seeing holy fools in all  things – from demoniacs to dancers,  and from 
prostitutes to prattlers.
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3.2: Fearing Speech
Brutal  truth-telling  and  biting  insults  are  perhaps  not  standard  characteristics 
associated with ascetic saints in the Christian tradition.  Whilst truth is acknowledged as a 
value in itself, the practices of truth-telling are fraught with moral danger. Fearless speech, 
which started off as a way of resisting domination and asserting wisdom, has a trajectory that 
may be traced – precisely through the use of insults – to the brutal forcing of humble self-
knowledge in disciplines such as early modern psychiatry and criminology.50 It may be a tool 
for the transformation of the self’s relation to society, or for forcing the self to submit to its 
place in society. Flexibility is ambiguous.
Early Christian ascetics themselves were ambivalent to the practice of telling people 
the truth about their lives. Not everyone could bear it, and not everyone was meant to follow 
the way of the desert, as we saw in the discussion of multiplicity (above, on page 54). This 
made it difficult for disciples:
Again abba Poemen said: I once came to lower Heracleon, to abba Joseph, and he had a really 
beautiful mulberry tree by his hermitage; and in the morning he said to me, ‘Go and get some 
for yourself, and have a nibble.’ Now it was a Friday. So I did not eat because of the fast, and I 
asked him about it, saying ‘Tell me by God the reason for your telling me “Go and have a 
nibble.” Because I didn’t go because of the fast, but now I’m ashamed of myself,  because I 
didn’t follow your command, thinking that you’d given me an instruction for no reason.’ But he 
replied, ‘The old men did not speak clearly to the brothers at the beginning, but with great 
distortion: and if they saw anyone doing these distortions, then they would only speak profitably 
to them, realising that they were obedient in everything.51
In addition to demonstrating once more the centrality of obedience for early Christian 
ascetics, this saying shows us the subtle play of assent between master and disciple that would 
lead to the kind of relation where the master could exercise his or her parrhesia towards the 
disciple. The practice was only meant for a few people, and they had to signal very clearly 
that they were willing to listen.  The parrhesiastic contract  is negotiated through a play of 
transgression, discernment, and obedience. For early Christian ascetics, honest and profitable 
truth-telling  can  only take  place  within  this  context.  They are  consciously  hesitant  about 
telling the truth.
50  According to Foucault 2009: 9.
51 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.30 (my translation) = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Joseph of Panephysis 5 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk.  
syst.): X.39.
164
So it is possible to ask the question ‘What value has truth?’ In this chapter, we will 
examine more precisely how truth-telling constructs a relation to the self. In particular, focus 
will be directed towards the place of and value of truth-telling (and in particular as regards 
uncomfortable  home  truths)  in  a  specific  community.  Truth  and  listening  are  necessary 
elements of the task of ordering and defining any community. I will describe the practices as 
relevant to ecclesiology, with its issues of obligation, dogma, and constituted experts.
The practices of truth-telling in late antiquity have come under the scrutiny of certain 
recent  philosophers  as  part  of  a  history  of  the  present.  In  spite  of  his  reputation  as  an 
‘historian  of  discontinuity’,  Foucault’s  work  attempts  to  draw  lines  of  descent  from the 
Socratic  exercises  of  Stoics  through  Mediaeval  spiritual  direction  to  modern  relations  of 
government and counselling.52 
Rather than tracing this history here, I propose to identify various respects in which 
the  different  forms  of  truth-telling  and truth-hearing  are problematic.  How and why is  it 
recommended? From where does the value of truth derive? What kinds of truth are being 
told? The interface between truth-telling as a resource for self-determination bears specific 
relations to its practice as a requirement of the community, both logically and historically. I 
will  be drawing on historical  sources throughout the tradition depending on the particular 
quality being studied at each point. But instead of using the sources to illustrate an historical 
progression, I will be calling on them to demonstrate a logical principle which may apply to a 
number of different manifestations of the phenomenon of truth-telling. In this way, I hope to 
avoid the twin errors of historical criticism, namely the temptations to describe history as on 
the one hand a rational progression of thought, and on the other as the betrayal of a pure and 
rational origin.
Truth-telling  is  a  problem in  its  tendency to  universalism.  Foucault  considered  all 
antiquity  to  have  been  a  ‘profound error’53 because  it  aspired  to  being  a  philosophy for 
everyone. This aspiration is dissatisfactory. Universal truth telling can either be applied as a 
requirement or as an ideal. Requiring people to tell and hear the truth about themselves in 
order to be part of the universal fellowship makes this particular philosophical technique a 
way  of  forcing  the  populace  instead  of  a  tool  for  transformation.  Positing  universal 
philosophy as an ideal results in the same determination of culture by techniques of truth-
52 A  brief  summary  can  be  found  in  McGushin,  2007:  ch.  6.  Cf.  also  chapters  one  and  two  of  Foucault, 
2005[2001].
53 Foucault, 1996[1984]: 466.
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telling, although without including everyone in the same way. Either way, the attitude to truth 
ceases to be definitive of good and desirability, and acquires the status of being ‘a’ good.
Keeping truth-telling  as  the  reserve  of  small  groups  of  people  does  not  solve  the 
problem,  however.  Truth-telling  as  a  secret  good  will  then  allow  the  marketing  of 
philosophical techniques to whoever has the means to nurture the habit of telling the truth 
about themselves. This market may integrate its interests with the universal ideal mentioned 
above, or it may simply offer its goods on their own terms. Either way, a marketable lack is 
constituted in order to sell truth-telling. Even if the technique is offered freely by its expert 
philosophers, as long as it is to avoid the above dangers of the universal ideal or requirement, 
it will only ever be able to achieve the constitution of an aristocratic group protecting their 
own access to the truth. It will only be natural to make the transition from seeing the non-
initiated as truthless humans to untrue humans. And if the philosopher attempts to keep the 
technique entirely to himself, then he loses both the telling and the truth.
So  the  philosophers  of  late  antiquity  were  caught  between  social  stagnation  and 
aristocracy. They chose the latter. Enlightenment social thought would later choose the former 
in their theories of raison d’état.54 For the potential for transformation elicited by truth-telling 
and truth-hearing induce flexibility in the subject.  That flexibility may be used to put the 
subject into question in its relation to society and produce new forms of life. It may cause a 
critical voice that refuses to accept its place from the state. Flexibility may also be deployed 
as an instrument of homogeneity however. Truth-telling may simply require the subject to 
adapt  its  life  and  truth  to  society.  It  may  require  modesty  and  docility  for  the  sake  of 
suppressing the socially transforming self. Truth-telling facilitates both.
Techniques  of  truth-telling  and  truth-hearing  are  not  however  doomed  to  either 
aristocracy or homogeneity. Truth is not immoral but dangerous. Universalism is not the same 
as forced homogeneity. Accounts of truth are not all wrong, but they do all owe us a way of 
steering between the dangers of elitism and normalising coercion. This argument concerning 
the nature of truth telling and asceticism will be the basis of my evaluation of truth, humour 
and humility in the final sections of this thesis.
In  order  to  facilitate  a  critical  account  of  truth-telling  in  its  relation  to  the 
transformation of society and its relation to the self, let us now turn to the various ways in 
which the logic of veridiction is  configured positively.  How does truth-telling become an 
obligation,  and  what  kinds  of  truth  are  included  in  that  obligation?  Are  truth-telling 
54 Foucault, 1979 Foucault, 2007[2004].
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techniques committed to certain truth values, and how do those values place and restrict the 
self? What role does the truth-telling expert have in configuring particular relations between 
self and society? In all these issues, we will have an eye to the value of truth-telling and truth-
hearing for the projects of revolution and homogenisation.
3.2.1: Lying
Lying is  the opposite  of telling the truth.  However much I  may believe  that  I  am 
Theology’s answer to Friedrich Nietzsche, to make such a claim would be a lie. In order to be 
able to tell the truth about the matter, I will need good friends to disenchant me and experts to 
give me a proper appreciation of Nietzsche’s genius.
There are a variety of lies, and not all of them require good friends and philosophers. 
An atlas  will  show me that  Sweden is  not  the capital  of Norway (veridiction of political 
cartography), and the presentation of sweet wrappers in my coat pocket will convince me of 
the futility of claiming that it was actually my daughter who had filched the last Quality Street 
(veridiction of guilt and innocence).
There was an array of opinions regarding lying amongst the early Christian ascetics, a 
selection of which are presented above (on page 232). Cassian’s justification of lying quoted 
there was based on the duty a speaker has towards her audience. Others embrace a casuistry 
of prudence, results, and rules (cf. fn.27 above, on page 28). The motivations given for telling 
the  truth  appeal  exclusively  to  either  care  of  others  or  care  for  the  soul.  John Climacus 
contrasts these two principles:
A man may lie on the grounds of prudence, and indeed regards as an act of righteousness the 
actual destruction of his own soul. The inventor of lies declares that he is following the example 
of Rahab and maintains that his own destruction is the cause of salvation for others.55
Lying effects other members of a community in different ways. There are very few 
people that are seriously worried about my illusions regarding the genius of Nietzsche and 
me. Some might be worried about any claim to be the Messiah, although this depends on 
whether it appears on the record cover of a popular rock and roll artist, or on the lips of a 
toga-clad  tap  dancer  quaffing  de-icer.  Lying  about  what  one  had  for  breakfast  does  not 
concern  your  fellows  to  the  same  degree  as  lies  about  whether  you’d  paid  for  it.  The 
obligation not to lie is not universal.
55 Climacus, scal.: Step 12.
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Stoics  and early  Christian  thinkers  were acutely aware of the variety  of  lies.  Fine 
distinctions were made between statements of belief, truth, and justification. On the back of 
this tradition, Augustine wrote two fairly typical treatises, attempting to elucidate the relation 
between the obligation of truth-telling and the logic of belief.56 He distinguishes 8 types of lie, 
in a hierarchy of seriousness (where the first is the worst, and the first five are illicit, whereas 
the last three are wrong but allowable in certain circumstances):
1. concerning religious doctrine
2. unjustly hurtful
3. that profit one at others’ expense
4. lying for lying’s sake
5. that satifies the desire for pretty speech
6. to prevent theft
7. to prevent death (even of the guilty)
8. to prevent bodily impurity.57
Whilst  this  list  makes  the issue appear as a treatment  of teleological  priorities  – a 
choice between the lesser of two evils – Augustine makes use of a sophisticated philosophical 
framework both  to  ground and apply the  list.  He takes  account  of  issues  of  agency and 
consent, of intention and the moral benefit of the truth.
After opening the treatise with an assertion of the uncompromising concern for the 
truth, he immediately introduces the case of jokes to challenge the reader’s assumption that 
we  know what  a  lie  is.  He  then  goes  into  a  variety  of  cases  where  the  definition  of  a 
proposition as a lie can be challenged, before he attempts an interpretation of the various 
Biblical warrants for the admission and prohibition of lying. He considers questions such as 
does the speaker believe the proposition? Does she expect to be believed? Does he believe he 
is  telling  the truth?  Is  knowledge of the proposition beneficial?  We can summarise  these 
issues most conveniently on a table showing relevant information concerning any person A’s 
utterance of any proposition p:
56 Augustinus, mend Augustinus, c. mend. We will be concentrating on the former.
57 Augustinus, mend.: xiv.25, xxi.42.
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Table showing the moral possibilities of A uttering p.
A 
believes 
p
A 
believes 
her belief 
regarding 
p is 
correct
p is 
true
A 
expects 
to be 
believed 
that p
Knowing 
p is 
beneficial 
to the 
hearer
A is lying Moral assessment
Y Y Y Y Y N ideal
Y Y Y Y N N brutal
Y Y Y N Y ? malevolent
Y Y Y N N ? ironic
Y Y N Y Y N rash
Y Y N Y N N leading astray
Y Y N N Y N rash
Y Y N N N N rash
Y N Y Y Y N ideal
Y N Y Y N N brutal
Y N Y N Y N malevolent
Y N Y N N N -
Y N N Y Y N generous
Y N N Y N N malevolent
Y N N N Y N malevolent
Y N N N N N -
N Y Y Y Y Y rash/generous
N Y Y Y N Y rash/malevolent
N Y Y N Y Y rash/brutal
N Y Y N N Y rash/malevolent
N Y N Y Y Y pragmatic
N Y N Y N Y malevolent
N Y N N Y Y cunning/pragmatic
N Y N N N Y cunning
N N Y Y Y ? generous
N N Y Y N ? malevolent
N N Y N Y Y malevolent
N N Y N N ? cunning/pragmatic
N N N Y Y Y pragmatic
N N N Y N Y malevolent
N N N N Y Y brutal
N N N N N ? cunning/pragmatic
So the morality of truth telling is a good deal more complicated for Augustine than the 
simple  determination  of  whether  someone  is  speaking  true  statements  or  not.  He  finally 
considers decisive not the social obligation we have to each other to tell the truth, but the 
desire to tell  the truth to oneself.  Telling the truth is  useful to ourselves because it  is  by 
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nurturing the truth in our soul that we produce right actions and right loves. Only in this way 
can we become good. This consideration far outweighs physical and social benefits or dangers 
that might suggest the expediency of lying.
Augustine’s categories of lies show us the range of social consequences truth-telling 
can have. If an honest citizen is attempting to come up with a practical solution to a social 
challenge, it does not help the community if that person is entirely ignorant of its details and 
background,  or  deceiving  themselves  about  its  possible  solutions.  It  is  important  that 
politicians not be self-deceiving about their tasks and abilities.
This was Socrates’ accusation to the people of Athens. His truth-telling was one of 
uncomfortable  truths  that  were expedient  for  the  state  to  know. The truth-hearing  of  the 
democratic assembly of Athens had an immediate effect on the citizens of that state. They 
were obliged to hear the truth and to tell the truth. It was not simply a matter of taking care of 
their soul: they needed to legislate for their community.
Combining  these  two  aspects,  however  –  the  freedom  of  a  truth-teller  and  the 
obligations towards a community – radically transforms the practice of truth-telling. If the 
truths an agent is obliged to tell to the group are the same kind as those offered by a fearless 
speaker, the individual becomes dependent upon and exposed to truth-tellers (or absolutely 
everyone if the moral hero is the truth-hearer rather than the truth-teller) in order to fulfil that 
obligation. This situation could easily result from a general conviction that people with a lack 
of self-knowledge are dangerous. In order to protect society against them, truth-hearing would 
then  become  obligatory.  Whilst  fearless  speaking  started  off  as  a  contract  between  a 
vulnerable speaker and a powerful hearer, it can develop into the social contract: the governor 
(representing the community) tells the truth to the individual, which s/he is then obliged to 
confess in order to remain a member of the community. Without a taxonomy of different truth 
obligations, it is difficult to see how the general use of truth-telling techniques is to refrain 
from degenerating into this situation.
In the context of a social body, telling lies about the political situation and oneself has 
a public effect. If the phenomenon of lying is indiscriminately defined as utterances of false 
statements, the obligation not to lie becomes an obligation to know the truth as well as being 
honest. It becomes an obligation to hear and acknowledge uncomfortable truths, an obligation 
to hearing fearless speech.  The ideal  of truth-telling then results  in a universal maxim of 
openness and observability.
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3.2.2: Values
If the truth-telling practice itself is committed to particular relations between self and 
society, then it will not promote the transformation of that relation. It is therefore crucial to 
discern any positive content in fearless speech: its values, doctrine, and theory. The character 
of parrhesia is critical. It has a negative force. The truth-teller is remarkable because she says 
everything, regardless of convention or danger. There is no doctrine presented as common to 
all parrhesiasts, unless it be the command aude sapere – dare to know. More often than not, 
what the free-speaker dares to say consists in simple contradiction of their hearers’ assumed 
truths. So Socrates tells people that they are not as wise as they think; Diogenes claims that 
the kingship of Alexander the Great is mere sham; Stoics will point out the impracticability of 
daily life, and Cynics deny the rationality of the categories of public and private life.
Because fearless speech involves an implicit accusation of self-flattery or deception, 
early  Christian  ascetics  were  hesitant  towards  it,  and  sometimes  even  hostile.  Many 
condemned parrhesia along with chattering and gossip as an idle activity that kept the ascetic 
from their proper silence before God. Another reason to reject it, though, was the confidence 
it implied in one’s knowledge of the neighbour.
Abba Peter, who was the disciple of abba Lot, told the story: ‘I was once in abba Agathon’s cell, 
and a certain brother came to him, saying “I want to live with the brothers, but tell me how I 
should live with them.” The old man said to him “Guard foreignness (Greek: ceniteia; Latin: 
peregrinatio)58 you have on the first day you go to them for all the days of your life, and do not 
assume boldness (Greek:  parrhsiasqhj; Latin:  assumas fiduciam).” Abba Macarius says to 
him, “What does boldness do?” The old man says to him “It is as powerful as the summer that, 
during a drought,  drives everything before its  face, because summer  also spoils  the fruit  of 
trees.” Abba Macarius said “Is boldness so bad?” Abba Agathon replied “There is no passion 
worse  than  boldness;  for  it  is  the  mother  of  all  passions.  The  hard  working  monk  should 
therefore not embrace boldness, not even if he is alone in his cell.” ’59
In this case,  parrhesia is not contrasted with silence,  but with foreignness: being a 
stranger.  The virtue is then not the silence of worship,  but that  of hesitancy before other 
people.  Agathon wishes to warn monks against  rushing in to proclaiming truths about the 
brothers without knowing who they are. And the discovery of who one’s neighbour is is an 
58 I prefer the Greek reading here, as it retains the sense of arrival on the first day better than the Latin does.
59 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.8 (my translation) = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Agathon 1 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): X.11. 
Foucault completely ignores the positive virtue of strangeness in his commentary on this passage in Foucault 
2009: 305-307. 
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endless activity. We are a mystery to each other that can not even be fathomed by the practice 
and doctrine of truth-telling.
Fearless speech is not simply about the denial of self-flattery and illusion. It does not 
just take courage to see what everyone is ignoring. It takes discernment. You have to know 
what you are looking for. Whilst the Socratic and Cynic forms of fearless speech are the most 
unadorned, Stoic and Christian traditions developed a sophisticated set of practices that would 
form  the  background  against  which  the  truth-teller  might  speak  courageously  and  truth-
hearers might be able to speak the truth about themselves.
This is not the place for an exhaustive overview of these contexts for parrhesia. They 
vary in detail, from the simple recommendation of St Anthony that hermits write down all 
their thoughts for the scrutiny of their spiritual director, to the proliferation of handbooks for 
spiritual  direction  in  the  wake  of  the  Council  of  Trent  (1545-1563)  which  made  annual 
confession universally obligatory.  The techniques differ enormously,  but all have the same 
objective: to provide a context for the moral agent’s truth-hearing.
The road from the practice of truth-telling to the doctrine of truth about the person is 
short.  It  is a mere practical  task to show people,  as Socrates did,  that they are deceiving 
themselves  in  believing  their  current  way of  life  to  be  a  rational  construction  from first 
principles. It is a natural corollary of this practical task to believe that people are self-deceived 
concerning themselves. This corollary itself may be elaborated into a taxonomy of flattering 
lies  we tell  ourselves  concerning our greatness,  and its  recognition or non-recognition  by 
others.
The transition from shocking home truths to doctrine may be illustrated by the history 
of Evagrius’ doctrine of the passions. Continuing the philosophical tradition that attempted to 
take control of the passions (particularly through Stoic consolation literature), Evagrius wrote 
his taxonomy of passions in order to establish practices that would eradicate them. As we saw 
above (on pages 96-101), this constituted a technology of the self in its relation to truth and 
the world, whereby Evagrius aimed to produce objectivity. The objectivity itself served the 
twin aims of truth and non-manipulative love.
These aims are less clear in Cassian’s account of Evagrius’ taxonomy, which describes 
eight faults,  rather than eight passions.60 It is a short step from these to the description of 
general  sins  that  may  describe  all  Christians,  monastic  or  otherwise  (and  in  this  respect 
60 Cassianus, de institutis: books V-XII, each of which treats one fault Cassianus, Collationes: book V. Climacus 
also has eight vices: Climacus,  scal.: Step 13, although strictly speaking he adheres to Gregory the Great’s 
taxonomy of seven deadly sins – cf. Step 22.
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Pelagius was by no means the loser in his controversy with Augustine: monastic techniques 
are quickly applied to and required of the secular church). With Gregory’s moral comments 
on Job, a number of transformations have occurred to Cassian’s list: the faults are generalised, 
reduced to seven, and connected to the eternal status of the person. They are no longer 8 
practical temptations, but have become the seven deadly sins.
This taxonomy of sins becomes a doctrine concerning the destiny and status of the 
person.  Moreover,  the  list  of  sins  itself  yields  new  techniques  and  interpretations  of 
techniques. They are used by truth-tellers and spiritual directors, and the confession gains the 
significance of a diagnosis of the confessing Christian’s moral substance.61
Whilst  this  is  simply  one  contingent  and  historical  trajectory  for  the  practice  of 
parrhesia,  the  adoption  of  positive  doctrines  concerning  the  person  is  not  a  peculiarity 
exclusive  to  the  religious  appropriation  of  the  technique.  The  truth-teller  does  acquire 
authority  in  the  course  of  the  parrhesiastic  contract.  The  two forms  of  courage  involved 
(courage to speak despite the danger of reprisals, and the courage to hear despite the danger of 
insult) also imply two forms of trust (that the hearer will not become violent and that the 
speaker  will  tell  the  truth).  Trusting  someone  to  tell  the  truth  is  not  grounded  in  first 
principles,  it  is  merely  necessary  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  technique.  The  parrhesiastic 
technique involves belief in the words of the speaker. The transition then from choosing to 
believe a parrhesiast, towards adhering to commonly held beliefs (particularly as parrhesiasts 
learn their trade from handbooks and institutional authorities),  and finally to homogeneous 
community based on shared perceptions of moral dangers is entirely in keeping with the ideal 
of fearless speaking whenever that ideal is held universally.
Fearless speakers regularly acquired a set of disciples, and however resistant they may 
have been to established opinion, they became associated with particular doctrines. It is not a 
necessary result of the practice of parrhesia,  but unless the fearless speaker takes steps to 
avoid it (for example through persistent critique of truth-tellers themselves or a theory of the 
development of doctrine), the values and critiques that it is courageous to tell soon solidify 
into established  and fixed truths  about  the person that  are  no longer  dangerous to  speak. 
Fearless speech may be transformed into uncritical  assumption universally applied.  These 
assumptions  still  call  the  subject  into  question,  produce  flexibility  and  a  critical  stance 
towards  the  self,  but  to  the  extent  that  they  espouse  fixed  standards,  their  objective  is 
61 A good example is the opening chapters of John of the Cross, 1990.
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adaptability towards society rather than the transformation of normality. If the doctrine retains 
its parrhesiastic authority, anyone denying it will be hailed not as a critic, but a coward.
3.2.3: Experts
The practice of parrhesia has always been a two-place activity.  Socrates spoke the 
truth not to himself but to politicians, opponents and disciples. Cynics spoke out brazenly to 
anyone. The Stoics listened to the bold words of their truth-tellers. The desert fathers listened 
to the insults of strangers, and sometimes even of sages. There may not have been a contract 
negotiated in each case, and the relation was not always successful either. Nevertheless, the 
truth game can only be described as parrhesiastic if there is both a truth-teller and someone to 
listen to them. This concrete role can easily be adapted to the market, so that in antiquity, it 
was amenable to the aristocratic tendencies of philosophers. To the extent that the role of the 
truth-teller becomes defined and restricted by specific criteria,  it will also be suited to the 
homogenisation of the self’s relation to society.
Early Christian ascetics did not radically undermine the role of the authoritative man 
in truth-telling, although they were sensitive to the aristocracy of the philosophy of fearless 
speech. They did not, for example, restrict the role of the spiritual master to members of the 
upper  classes  or  intelligentsia.  Abba  Arsenius  –  who  had  been  an  imperial  tutor  –  was 
particularly aware to this problem:
Someone said to blessed Arsenius, ‘How is it that we, with all  our education and our wide 
knowledge  got  no-where,  while  these  Egyptian  peasants  acquire  so  many  virtues?  Abba 
Arsenius said to him, ‘We indeed get nothing from our secular education, but these Egyptian 
peasants acquire the virtues by hard work.’
One day Abba Arsenius consulted an old Egyptian monk about his own thoughts. Someone 
noticed this and said to him, ‘Abba Arsenius, how is it that you with such a good Latin and 
Greek education, ask this peasant about your thoughts?’ He replied, ‘I have indeed been taught 
Latin and Greek, but I do not know even the alphabet of this peasant.’62
As we have seen,  the different forms of the technique of parrhesia concentrate on 
different elements of the negotiation – the truth-teller,  the truth itself,  the truth-hearer, the 
object  of  the  truth,  etc.  The  treatment  of  anyone  and  everyone  as  one’s  truth-teller,  for 
example, is a late development. The transfer of the technique from the political sphere (where 
62 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Arsenius 5 = Apoph. Patr. (Lat): X.5 (where the interlocutor is Evagrius) = Apoph. Patr.  
(Gk. syst.): X.7 and  Apoph. Patr. (alph): Arsenius 6 =  Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XV.7 =  Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): 
XV.7.
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the truth-teller speaks to the entire assembly) to the personal (where the truth-teller speaks to 
the  individual  politician)  appears  in  the  work of  Socrates  and Plato.63 Foucault  identifies 
Galen as the first to listen to a neutral party who would otherwise be a stranger rather than a 
friend who tells you the truth because it is in your interests.64
Common to all these moments of the tradition is the recognition of the speaker as a 
truth-teller. In antiquity, there was not simply a debate concerning how to know the truth, but 
also how to recognise the truth-teller: this is the force of the warnings against flattery. It is not 
simply  that  one  takes  illicit  pleasure  in  hearing  lies,  but  also  that  the  flatterer  apes  the 
parrhesiast: he is ‘a servant of devils, a teacher of pride, the destroyer of contrition, a vandal 
of excellence, a perverse guide’.65 The flatterer does not help one to speak the truth about 
oneself.
How does one recognise the truth teller? There are certain qualifications and hallmarks 
by  which  they  are  known,  and  these  are  noted  and  categorised  at  various  points  in  the 
tradition.66 These qualifications have to do with the person’s honesty with himself, with his 
knowledge of the passions, his discipline, courage, and objectivity.
Recognition is a shared thing. If I have criteria for identifying someone who can tell 
me  the  truth,  then  that  person can  logically  claim those  criteria  to  persuade someone  to 
recognise them as a truth-teller. So qualifications become recommendations, and identifying a 
truth-teller  is  in  keeping  with  their  public  recognition  as  such.  Once again  (as  when we 
studied the doctrines of parrhesiasts), we are faced with the social challenge of authority: no-
one is obliged to accept someone’s authority,  but neither is anyone free from the assumed 
choice of some authorities over others.
The tacit or public recognition of certain authorities adds to the obligation to speak the 
truth one hears from the qualified truth-teller. It is one further way in which the universalism 
of truth-telling and truth-hearing is reinforced. The recognition may be informal (as in the 
case of truth-telling  friends)  or more obviously formal  (as in  the case of the truth-telling 
priest).  Either way,  the parrhesiastic activity entails that a particular group of people with 
specific values and qualifications exert an influence in the determination of the truth about 
individuals.  As  soon  as  the  authority  of  truth-telling  is  divorced  from  its  characteristic 
elements of resistance to political authority, exposure to physical danger, distinction from the 
opinions of the majority, it may be used to recommend any group of people.
63 Cf. Foucault 2009: lecture of 15th February.
64 Foucault, 2005[2001]: 399.
65 Climacus, scal.: Step 22.
66 e.g. in Plutarch, 2006[1878].
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I hold the bet that most of you have met at least one of those guys who nowadays regularly visit 
a kind of master who takes their money from them in order to teach them how to take care of 
themselves. Fortunately enough, I have forgotten, either in French or in English, or in German, 
the name of those modern masters. In antiquity, they were called philosophers.67
The Greek philosophical tradition, both in its Christian and its classical manifestations, 
has been largely responsible for the continuation of the parrhesiastic tradition (particularly in 
middle- and neo-platonism). However, its idealisation of the philosopher king, not least as 
realised in the person of Marcus Aurelius, demonstrates the antiquity of this governor/truth-
teller  combination.  The fact that the technique was not used in governmental technologies 
until early modernism is surely due to its attachment to the role of the advisor to the king, and 
later to marginal ascetic communities rather than to late antiquity’s noble resistance to state 
power. The power of the parrhesiastic expert is difficult to resist, and is a result of reflection 
on the practice of truth-telling.  By characterising and limiting the truth-teller,  the tradition 
defined and grounded the possibilities of truth-hearing in a particular relation to one order of 
society.  Truth-tellers  enabled  citizens  to  fulfil  the  ideal  relation,  leading  philosophically 
ordered  society  onto  the  horns  of  the  ecclesiological  dilemma  outlined  above  (on  page 
163-166).
In its tendencies towards imposing an obligation not to lie, establishing doctrine, and 
fixing a class of experts, the practice of parrhesia is beset with difficulties. None of these are 
necessary results of truth-telling, but all are contingent directions to which it may lead.
The  effect  of  these  difficulties  is  to  rigidify  the  self.  When  the  authority  of  a 
courageous truth-teller is identified with established ideal qualities and a particular class of 
people,  the image of the truth can thereby be confined to that  ideal.  Establishing a fixed 
taxonomy of virtue and vice, together with techniques for avoiding the one, cultivating the 
other, and assessing the result, has the force of defining a model to which all must conform. 
The  obligation  for  everyone  to  speak  the  truth  about  themselves  to  the  community 
(represented by the truth-teller) enforces the necessity of the ideal and the model for the sake 
of the stability of that community.
In short, these are specific ways in which the practice of parrhesia can lead to social 
homogeneity  rather  than  to  critique.  Truth-telling  is  not  the  unambiguous  ethical  ideal 
67 Foucault, 1983.
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embraced by certain naïve Foucauldians.68 It is a practice that lies at the root of disciplinary 
techniques  of  normalisation.  It  plays  into  the  hands  of  aristocratic  philosophy,  marketed 
citizenship, and of homogenising ascetic ideals. For this reason, constructive proposals for 
practical modes of critique (e.g. Bernauer’s mysticism; Butler’s giving an account of oneself; 
Critchley’s Humour)69 must face the implications and possible appropriations allowed by their 
theories. They must find out the cost of telling the truth.
68 This  uncritical  appropriation  is  often  associated  with  theologians,  although  it  can  most  easily  be  found 
amongst the Foucauldian ethical writers: Davidson, 1994 McGushin, 2007 O'Leary, 2002.
69 Bernauer, 2002 Butler, 2005 Critchley, 2002.
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3.3: Humour
I would like to take the example here of humour, which is both the most attractive and 
most  relevant  method  of  truth-telling  to  be  found  as  regards  holy  fools.  It  also  has  the 
advantage  of  having  been  considered  by  a  wide  range  of  philosophers  throughout  the 
centuries. It is a prime example of truth-telling that reconfigures one’s relation to oneself, 
with  both  personal  factors  (affecting  one’s  sense  of  humour)  and  social  factors  (through 
sharing a joke). With its political satire and individual surprise it is a mode of truth-telling 
uniquely able to transform the relation of the self to society. By looking at the implications of 
humour, and attitudes towards it among early Christian ascetics, we will be able to assess the 
significance of the playful comedy and truth-telling insults of the holy fools.
In this section we will look at the technique itself, as it is interpreted by some modern 
authors,70 and argue for the interpretation of humour as a form of asceticism and work on the 
self. Once the foundation of this interpretation is given, we can turn to the ways in which 
humour  – and particularly  the  laughter  of  the  holy fools  –  falls  upon the ecclesiological 
dilemma, and what resources it has for solving it.
Humour  can be interpreted  as  a mode of the fearless  speech we examined above, 
namely as an activity with implications for social life, and effects on the self. Like the practice 
of learning the truth through listening to a truth-teller, humour is primarily a social activity. 
We laugh at what others tell us. If we laugh on our own, it is usually because we have been 
provoked by someone else’s thoughts, either in writing or memory. At the same time, we say 
that people have a good sense of humour, and this is an individual quality, in the sense that we 
would not say that a football team, my relationship with my sister, or all pedestrians have a 
good sense of humour. 
So there is an interaction between the relationship and the attitude: I laugh with others 
to the extent that I have a sense of humour that fits the interaction. Both the laughter and the 
attitude are dynamic: they develop and are transformed. I meet new things to laugh at every 
day; I find things funny today that may have been banal or even insulting yesterday. Just as 
we saw the courage of  truth-telling  and the courage of  truth-hearing,  the comic  situation 
allows for the telling of jokes and the appreciation of jokes. Both may cause the failure of 
comedy.
70 e.g. Critchley, 2002 Bergson, 2005[1901] Berger, 1997.
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Humour has an identifiable relation to truth-telling in addition to its parallel structure. 
There are factors in truth-telling that equally rule out being funny. You cannot, for example, 
use humour to patently communicate dogma. In fact, it is a typical butt for comics. Similarly, 
it is impossible to be a flattering comic. Any joke that appears extravagant in its praise for the 
hearer simply has to be taken tongue-in-cheek. A flattering truth-teller has also renounced her 
task.
A further similarity between fearless speech and humour is the challenge both pose to 
the unspoken assumptions of those who find the joke funny. This may be in terms of simple 
punning,  which brings into  question  the meaning of  words.  More subtle,  however,  is  the 
comic trick of making everyday life seem absurd.71 By adjusting the perception of reality 
somewhat, the logic we enter into when we accept an idiom is revealed and mocked. Two 
examples of mocking advertising demonstrate the technique.
• Wittgenstein closes a letter  to Gilbert Pattisson with the comment ‘Somehow or 
other, one instinctively feels that Two Steeples No. 83 Quality Sock is a real man’s 
sock. It’s a sock of taste – dressy, fashionable, comfortable.’72
• An advertising campaign for a ‘no frills’ chain reads ‘Buy one. Pay for one.’
The comic and truth-telling also have similar relationships to courage. Both dare to 
transgress censorship and taboos in their speech. Both are in their element when they do so. 
Critique and joking – e.g. Greek comedy and Roman satire – have both been forbidden by 
religious  and  political  authorities,  to  the  detriment  of  the  knowledge  of  truth.  Comics 
throughout history have had to pay dearly for their trade.
Truth-telling can be humorous. Braving taboos can be humorous. Humour is critical. 
More specifically, the laugher is often mocked by what s/he laughs at. Humour helps us to 
find ourselves absurd, which can be a long step towards self-transformation.
As  such,  humour  involves  a  very  specific  division  of  the  self.  It  is  a  division 
determined by laughter:  the self  finds itself  funny.  Whilst  this  is  certainly not  true of all 
humour,  or  all  laughter,  it  is  at  least  a  branch  of  humour  that  has  been  normatively 
recommended recently by Critchley, himself taking up the descriptions of the healthy self in 
the later work of Freud.73
71 Bergson, 2005[1901]: 18, 75f.
72 quoted in Monk, 1990: 266f..
73 Critchley, 2002: esp. ch.7.
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When the self has been divided in this way, it becomes possible to tell the truth about 
the self and acknowledge the critique elaborated by the comic without the possibility of insult. 
If one has found the joke funny, then it simply cannot offend. If it does offend, it is no longer 
funny. There is no guarantee here, and the comedian’s task is to get the audience to remain in 
this abjective relation to themselves long enough for her to tell the truth.
In this respect, the sense of humour is a form of apatheia. We noted above (on page 
153) the relation of apatheia to insults: to provoke someone is to test the presence of passion. 
Without  the passion,  an insult  may become funny.  Unless  we are  disconnected  from our 
passions on the other hand, we will be unable to find something funny. If we immediately feel 
concern for a clown slipping on a banana skin, it will not be funny. If we are worried about 
our self image, we will not be able to laugh.
Here I would point out, as a symptom equally worthy of notice, the ABSENCE OF FEELING 
which  usually  accompanies  laughter.  It  seems  as  though  the  comic  could  not  produce  its 
disturbing effect unless it fell, so to say, on the surface of a soul that is thoroughly calm and 
unruffled. Indifference is its natural environment, for laughter has no greater foe than emotion.74
The  candid  view  of  oneself  produced  by  humour  (and  truth-telling)  works  both 
inwards and outwards. We are confronted with our absurd nature, our world, and our bodies 
(which  is  perhaps  why  it  is  so  hard  not  to  laugh  when  someone  farts  in  metaphysical 
surroundings), and forced to recognise the modesty of our lives. At the same time, we are 
introduced to the possibility of another way of configuring reality. The silliness of our way of 
life is not compatible with its logical necessity. Critique of our modes of being-together and 
our representations is made possible. Everyday life may be transformed – or transfigured – by 
the comic vision. The comedian is a social visionary, forcing the possibility into thought that 
things could be otherwise.
But  because  all  this  is  a  pleasurable  experience,  our  absurdity  does  not  awaken 
revulsion in us, or even regret. In our laughter, our faults seem to us like so many endearing 
foolishnesses. Satirist Jeremy Hardy pointed this out concerning the frustration felt by the 
British at the bureaucracy of food regulations in the United Kingdom, that requires packets of 
walnuts to include a note on the back saying ‘may contain nuts’:
That’s the thing that people get most irate about isn’t it? ‘It’s outrageous, packets of nuts which 
may contain nuts in it!’ I know it’s foolish, but it’s quite quaint and charming. It’s like the old 
74 Bergson, 2005[1901]: 4.
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money, it wasn’t doing any harm, pounds shillings and pence. Yes, it was lunatic, but it was 
quite charming. Why can’t we have our quirks? What’s wrong with it?75
It is worth tarrying briefly at this understanding of humour as critique. The tendency 
of modern philosophy to address its critical eye towards the presuppositions of truth as well as 
its content has turned into a mark of academic rigour that is not always justified. We are asked 
to believe a thinker because he ‘challenges established and presupposed tacit truths’. The term 
Foucault used to describe discontinuities in the development of thought – problematisation76 – 
has become a standard academic term more or less synonymous with ‘look at’. People express 
their intention to ‘problematise’ the notion of the family,  the treatment of sexuality or the 
layout of public buildings in antiquity or modern times.
The problem with this particular appropriation of modern philosophy is that it yields 
almost exclusively mendacious descriptions. If a book has genuinely challenged established 
tacit  presuppositions,  then  it  would  be  deeply  shocking  (or  unbelievable  and  thereby 
extremely funny). If it is not perceived as such, then we must be sceptical as to the extent to 
which the truths it has challenged really were deep-seated tacit presuppositions. Similarly, if it 
were genuinely possible for one researcher to ‘problematise’ a particular concept, group of 
people, or practice in which they themselves participate, then that person would be some sort 
of messiah figure in that culture. They would also be entirely incomprehensible to their peers. 
In Foucault’s terminology, at least, shared experiences, perceptions, and eventually concepts 
become problematic as a result of a variety of factors, and the last ones to know about it are 
often the academics who integrate the new terminology – the self, ideology, the homeless – 
into their thought. If professors can sit in their offices and discuss the social significance of 
the family,  this is because it  has already become problematic.  If it  had not become so, it 
would not occur to anyone to discuss it. It is not a mistake to use the word to describe the age-
old  academic  process  of  isolating  and  studying  an  object  of  thought  or  experience  as 
problematisation  (or  at  least,  if  it  is,  it  is  a  trivial  exegetical  one).  But  it  is  not  a  very 
convincing evidence of truth-telling either.
In fact, a number of thinkers have attempted to transform themselves and culture by 
addressing what they consider tacit presuppositions, and the project is not to be denied by so 
much  failure.  It  is  altogether  more  dangerous,  however,  to  identify  a  success  story. 
Revolutionary ideas as well as manipulative falsehoods have been offered to the world as 
75 Anderson, 2008.
76 Foucault, 2000: 117-119.
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unpopular truths.77 We have already noted the social danger inherent in a false proclamation 
of liberation. As a result, Foucault outlines his ideals for such a project in his agreement with 
the school of phenomenology:
Impossible, as one turns these pages, not to think of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s teaching and of 
what  was  for  him  the  essential  philosophical  task:  never  to  consent  to  being  completely 
comfortable with one’s own presuppositions. Never to let them fall peacefully asleep, but also 
never to believe that a new fact will suffice to overturn them; never to imagine that one can 
change  them like  arbitrary  axioms,  remembering  that  in  order  to  give  them the  necessary 
mobility one must have a distant view, but also look at what is nearby and all around oneself.78
The practice of critique is not guaranteed to induce a radical change in language and 
culture.  Although  I  will  be  arguing  here  that  humour  does  have  the  characteristics  of  a 
particularly penetrating critique that allows us to see the world differently, there is no formula 
to produce the kind of cultural transformation dreamt of by recent theorists. To the extent that 
humour is met with surprise and resistance, however, it can be shown to be doing more than 
re-organising language and culture in the surface.
Surprise is thought by some to be the very essence of humour. The punch-line to a 
joke, or the sudden recognition of a mime’s object are not just funny, but unexpected. We had 
not thought this situation in this way before. The surprise is increased the closer it gets to the 
bone. So half the humour of satirists is based in the audience not expecting them to be so 
daring. Note that the surprise explains both the humour here (it’s the resolving punch line) 
and the critique (the new way of looking at the world feels like a resolution/revolution). A 
good example of this is the song ‘The Pursuit of Happiness’ by  The Divine Comedy. The 
theme of the song is laid out as a message of love, full of flattery and noble devotion: “Just as 
long as we are together for ever I’ll never be anything other than happy”. The lover is fulfilled 
and completed by the beloved. The beloved is all that matters. Then the final line delivers a 
crushing blow to its own genre:
Hey, don’t be surprised if millions die in plague and murder,
True happiness lies beyond your fries and happy burger.79
77 Dostoevsky’s  Demons is  (among  other  things)  an  excellent  portrayal  of  the  abuse  of  the  popularity  of 
progressive ideas in nineteenth century Russia: Dostoevsky, 2000[1872].
78 Foucault, 2002[1979]: 448
79 Hannon, 1997.
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The final sentence is a classic punch line. But it also leaves us to reflect on the use of 
the word ‘happy’ in the song and elsewhere. If ‘happy’ can be applied to a hamburger, what 
value can be attributed to the happiness the lover derives from being with his beloved? How 
serious can love songs ever be from now on? The punch line, during the singing of which the 
instruments  fade  away,  allowing  the  truth-telling  conclusion  to  appear  naked in  its  frank 
intensity,  leaves us with an odd feeling of being displaced, like we have been fooled into 
inauthenticity.
The thesis that surprise is at least one element of humour has not, to my knowledge, 
been  contested.  That  humour  regularly  meets  with  resistance  is  also  widely  accepted.  A 
common criticism is that a comic has ‘gone too far’, or that she is saying things just for laughs 
rather than the more serious business of making a point. Jokes can be in poor taste. These are 
signs that the joke is transgressing limits, which is not to say that the transgression is good or 
bad. The fact that the resistance takes the form of non-cognitive criticism – in terms of taste, 
of pre-set limits to speech, of whether it’s funny or not, rather than contesting its patent truth 
claim – demonstrates that the joke is not operating in the realm of logical thought. We don’t 
answer one of Freud’s jokes about Jews by pointing out that it  is founded in a deception 
concerning Jewish hygiene.80 It is not simply false, but revealing of bad character.
One instance of comedy which both meets with resistance and is manifestly meant to 
work  on  its  hearers’  categories  of  thought  is  Eddie  Izzard’s  stand-up  comedy,  and  in 
particular his sequence on being a transvestite. In making the distinction between ‘weirdo 
transvestites’ and ‘executive transvestites’, he makes patent the way in which the category of 
transvestite has become defined in relation to a construction of normality and morality rather 
than having the positive meaning of cross-dressing. He attempts to prise away the concepts of 
sexuality, gender, and violence. Perhaps more subtly, he mocks the bourgeois morality that 
attributes all things that have to do with the ‘executive class’ with an acceptable status.
When I was in New York, there was a guy in the Bronx who was living in a cave – like you do, 
and he was coming out and shooting at geese and – a lot of weird things going on with this guy; 
and the police picked him up and they found a collection of women's shoes, and they thought, 
‘Maybe he's a transvestite.’ And if he is, he’s a fucking weirdo transvestite! I'm much more in 
the executive transvestite area. Travel the world, yes, it's much more executive. Like J. Edgar 
Hoover, what a fuckhead he was! They found out when he died that he was a transvestite, and 
80 These jokes are scattered throughout Freud, 2002[1905].
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they go, ‘Well, that explains his weird behaviour!’ Yeah, fucking weirdo transvestite! (points to  
himself) Executive transvestite. It's a lot wider community, more wide than you'd think.81
Izzard does not fall into the mistake of constructing a new identity for transvestites. He 
does not ask to be taken seriously.  It  is  not that  we should include in our knowledge of 
humanity categories of gender, sexuality, and cross-dressing. Instead, he attempts to produce 
confusion and frustrate the formation of categories. In addition to his self-confession as an 
executive transvestite, for example, he also calls himself a ‘lesbian trapped in a man’s body’ 
or ‘a male tomboy’. His comedy is a brazen challenge – categorise me if you can!
This work on the conditions of thought is of a piece with his activism. Eddie Izzard is 
also a member of Amnesty International and has organised a number of events to support 
them. One particular form his work took was a protest against the death of Vanessa Lorena 
Ledesma,  who died  in  police  custody in  Buenos Aries,  Argentina:  ‘I  stood on Argentine 
territory at the foot of their embassy and said, “I'm a transvestite, I'm on your property, so 
arrest me and beat the shit out of me like you did with your other transvestites!”’82
Humour enables critique both through its own truth-telling practices and through its 
nurture of an attitude of affectionate self-critique that allows scepticism and change in our 
own thought. It is a mode of social transformation in both these respects: we are changed by 
its  truth and we become open to change by the efficacy of its  technique.  In this  respect, 
humour can be described well as a speech act. Its locutionary force (the patent truth claim of 
the joke, e.g. ‘I’m an executive transvestite’) differs from its illocutionary force (its social 
critique, e.g. ‘don’t automatically associate transvestites with dangerous individuals’), and its 
perlocutionary force is then laughter.83
In contrast with its transformative portrayals, the attitude comedy inculcates in us – of 
modesty and flexibility – is an ongoing point of character. We are brought down to earth by 
our sense of humour. If we are in the habit of laughing at the world, then nothing in the world 
is safe from the comic perspective. Everything can change.
This  technique’s  most  attractive  attribute  is  perhaps  that  of  delight.  We  enjoy 
laughing.  Unlike  the  insult,  humour  is  not  a  difficult  pill  to  swallow.  It  is  a  part  of  the 
gracious  ordering  of  creation  that  leads  us  to  the  good and the  true  through our  natural 
appreciation of the beautiful.84 Our bodies need food, and hence the existence of Cornish 
81 Izzard, 1998.
82 Garfield, 2001.
83 For the theory of Speech Acts, see paradigmatically Searle, 1969 and Austin, 1975.
84 For the seminal account of this in Augustine’s work, cf. Harrison, 1992.
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pasties; we need to drink, hence hot chocolate; we need to hear the truth, hence Dostoevsky’s 
novels and Wittgenstein’s philosophy; we need to be humble, hence comedy. The practice is 
good,  true,  and beautiful,  without  the painful  effort  of  repentance  and transformation.  As 
Critchley has put it, ‘your super-ego is your amigo’!85
Humour is not merely an interesting technique of ethics and critique. It is theologically 
grounded,  through its  character  of delight,  its  adherence to the truth,  and its  objective of 
goodness. The comic is the flipside of the priest, where the latter adheres to abiding truths, 
reinterpreting  the  tradition  for  each  new  day,  and  the  former  criticises  the  priest’s 
compromising  attitude  to  contemporary  culture,  and  challenges  the  obvious  truths  that 
condition thought.86
In parallel with the practice of fearless speech, however, this technique is beset with 
dangers. The public recommendation or ethical endorsement of critical humour may license 
its use to force transformation in the entire population. That transformation would be dictated 
by and conformed to the sense of humour of that population, and in particular those intelligent 
and powerful enough to exert an influence on it. However, if critical humour becomes the 
preserve of an elite  few, then all  the resources  of that technique of the self  – flexibility, 
adaptability,  and self-knowledge – are restricted to that aristocratic minority.  Alternatively, 
the technique may become a marketable good like spiritual guidance or therapy. That kind of 
marketing might then cultivate a sense of lack in the population: a sense of humour becomes 
the reserve of the rich. This is the economic effect of the assertion of taste in public comedy.
In what follows, I shall enumerate problems that parallel those mentioned concerning 
truth-telling (cf. over, on pages 166-174) in order to discern whether humour, and particularly 
that of the holy fools, is able to avoid the slippage from critical truth-telling into the forcing of 
the self’s flexibility for the sake of social homogeneity that takes place when truth becomes 
obligatory,  dogmatic,  and  the  preserve  of  a  few experts.  When applied  to humour,  these 
themes become the obligation to laugh; stock comic forms; and the power of the comic.
3.3.1: The obligation to laugh
Humour both assumes and constitutes a community.  Translating jokes is a perilous 
affair, but a feeling of community results if the joke is appreciated. We rarely laugh on our 
own. Something has to  be extremely funny to provoke solitary laughter,  whereas we can 
85 Critchley, 2002: 93-107.
86 This portrayal is given in Kolakowski, 2004[1959].
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laugh at banalities in the right company.87 If we unite this social function of humour with the 
self-critical  effects,  however,  humour becomes a tool of homogeneity and the policing of 
cultural boundaries. This section will attempt a critique of humour in terms of this reading of 
comedy. Laughter at oneself may be pleasurable, but those who cannot laugh with the joker 
are both ostracised thereby,  and kept outside by the truth-force of the joke for those who 
laugh.
We can interpret the perceived dourness of the theologians of the patristic era in this 
context. A brief examination of what motivated the fathers and mothers of the church to resist 
laughter will give the lie to unhelpfully reductionist accounts of these thinkers as grumpy old 
men.88 Certainly the ascetic thinkers were acutely aware of the social dynamics of humour, 
braving ridicule and ostracism by resisting unhelpful humour:
But when the demons observe that we stay clear  of the sallies of some outstanding wit,  as 
though we were avoiding the plague, they try to catch us with two seemingly plausible thoughts, 
namely that we should not be offensive to the person telling the witty story and we should not 
give the appearance of loving God more than he does. Be off! Do not dawdle! Otherwise the 
jokes will start coming back to you when you are at prayer. But do not simply run away. Break 
up the bad company in a devout way by setting before them the thought of death and judgment, 
and if a few drops of vainglory fall on you, what harm? Provided of course, that you become a 
source of profit to many.89
Humour and vainglory are two key modes of preserving fixed values in a group. They 
are inherently social, and hard to resist. The attitude of early Christian ascetics towards them 
is characterised by self-determination.  Humour needs to be open to the critical  eye,  like a 
passion. The ascetic needs to be able to ‘command laughter’90 and reason about the comic.91 
Because comedy is an extremely reasonable thing.
The effects of comedy are socially useful. Bergson refers to the way laughter produces 
social flexibility so that people may adapt themselves to the demands of living in community. 
Laughter homogenises.92 Consider the recent rise of ethnic humour: it is now possible to laugh 
at  one’s  ethnicity  because of  the  national  identity  enforced  by integration  politics,  which 
87 Bergson,  2005[1901]:  4f  et  passim Augustinus,  conf.: II.ix.17  Schopenhauer,  2004[1903]:  Further 
Psychological Observations.
88 e.g. in Screech, 1997: 47f, et passim.
89 Climacus, scal.: Step 12. John Chrysostom is described by John Moschus not as one who never laughed, but as 
one who never ‘listened to witty words.’ Moschus, prat.: 191.
90 Climacus, scal.: Step 7.
91 Basilius, reg. fus.: Question 17.
92 Bergson, 2005[1901]: 73, Symeon the New Theologian 1980: VII.12.
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relativises ethnic culture. Whilst this identity was still fragile and negotiable, one’s relation to 
one’s ethnic origins was still strong and non-negotiable, hence the play on the rigidity of older 
generations prevalent in this brand of humour. The young generation of multicultural British 
citizens laughs at the older generation that was unable and unwilling to adapt and hybridise its 
culture.  Inflexible  ethnic  traditions  are  critiqued  and  laughed  at  in  ways  that  affirm  the 
adaptability of cosmopolitan Europe. And here it is important to note that the comedians are 
laughing  at  themselves:  their  own  identity;  their  own  family,  which  they’ve  managed  to 
bracket in order to fit into secular cosmopolitanism. The discomfort inherent in this analysis 
takes  us  immediately  into  the  ecclesiological  dilemma:  one  is  suspicious  of  the  cultural 
assumptions  that  incline  one to  mock one’s own culture,  whereas forbidding this  kind of 
humour implies denying a set of resources for being happy and criticising public life.
In what is to my knowledge the first modern observation of the social technology of 
government as the organisation and appropriation of self-control – the art of arts93 – Bergson 
notes the social utility of an ascetic technique:
Laughter, then, does not belong to the province of esthetics alone, since unconsciously (and 
even  immorally  in  many  particular  instances)  it  pursues  a  utilitarian  aim  of  general 
improvement. And yet there is something esthetic about it, since the comic comes into being 
just when society and the individual, freed from the worry of self-preservation, begin to regard 
themselves as works of art.94
This particular quality of humour has been identified by business executives all over 
the world, so that ‘executive toys’ and ‘executive games’ have become common practice in 
various corporations and office-based institutions. The effectiveness of the workforce is here 
augmented  by  their  relaxation  in  each  other’s  presence  and  the  trivialising  of  contingent 
differences that confirms the shared assumptions of the work context. Through humour, they 
are able to speak the truth to each other: the working group becomes more cohesive through 
the community-building activity of shared joking, and more effective through the openness 
created around gentle mockery.
It is difficult not to be suspicious of this utilitarian humour. As Critchley has put it:
93 The term used to denote the conduct of conduct essential to spiritual direction and modern government: cf. 
Foucault, 2002[1982] Foucault, 2007[2004]: 148-154 Burchell, 1996: 19, largely quoting  Gregorius, Lib. Reg.  
Past.: I.1.
94 Bergson, 2005[1901]: 10.
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Such enforced fun is a form of compulsory happiness, and it is tempting to see it as one further 
sign of the ways  in which employees’  private lives are being increasingly regulated by the 
interests of their employers.95
The question is: is it possible to resist this form of intrusion? The game of humour is 
difficult  to  decline  without  experiencing  immediate  ostracism.  Refusing to  be  amused  by 
something is both to depart from the shared activity and to invite the community’s derision. 
Expressing offence and solidarity with the butt of the joke is both brave and bad form. The 
critique inherent in comedy can cut both ways. Like the obligation not to lie, the obligation to 
laugh may soon turn into forced self-humiliation.
This  aspect  of  humour  is  particularly  disturbing  because  of  its  combination  of 
techniques of the self with social utility. It is not even the ostracism that is pernicious here: we 
can be happily alone when ostracised. Humour that produces humility does not necessarily 
homogenise,  and social  utility  can  be  a  commendable  virtue.  When all  these  aspects  are 
combined,  however,  the automatic  nature of the technique of humour becomes a form of 
government that subsumes the pursuit of happiness under the objectives of the pursuit of an 
effective  workforce,  a  national  identity,  motivation  for  citizen  participation,  etc.  These 
community aims are pursued within the context of a form of truth-telling that has enormous 
powers of commanding assent. The technique of veridiction is appropriated for the cause of 
social utility.96 In this context, the ostracism is unlikely to happen, because the joking acts as 
an  inclusive  force.  But  including  the  useful  can  be  just  as  sinister  as  ostracising  the 
ineffective.
Comedy  becomes  a  force  of  government  for  precisely  the  reasons  that  it  was 
considered critical above: it is surprising, enables critique, places and comforts the self, and 
challenges presuppositions. Just as the value of truth-telling can be deployed in the program 
of nation-building, so can the critique of humour be a function of national identity and social 
harmony.  The  techniques  of  change  beloved  of  Foucault,  whereby  philosophical  activity 
consists  ‘in the endeavour to know how and to what extent  it  might  be possible to think 
differently,  instead of legitimating what is already known’97 are relayed time after time in 
homogenising and effectivising corporate  workshops concerned with ‘thinking outside the 
box’. Humour is no exception.
95 Critchley, 2002: 13.
96 See Foucault, 1979: 239 for an account of how this kind of combination (of the ‘city-citizen’ game with the 
‘shepherd-flock’ game) is characteristic of government in early modern Europe.
97 Foucault, 1992b[1984]: 9.
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Do the holy fools embrace this governmental force of humour? Is their foolery a way 
of forcing people into the kingdom of God by making them laugh? Symeon the Holy Fool is 
certainly portrayed as an aggressive monk. He accepts the criticism of the anchoritic life as 
unsociable and ultimately self-centred,98 and responds by taking his asceticism to town. As 
such, his aim is to save souls. So we can not expect his life to pose no demands on the people 
he meets. Symeon openly espouses the obligation – indeed the forcing – of humility.
[Symeon] said to John, “What more benefit do we derive, brother, from passing time in this 
desert? But if you hear me, get up, let us depart; let us save others. For as we are, we do not 
benefit anyone except ourselves, and have not brought anyone else to salvation.” And he began 
to quote to him from the Holy Scripture such things as “Let no one seek his own good, but 
rather the good of his neighbor”, and again, “All things to all men, that I might save all”, and 
from the Gospel, “Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works and 
give glory to your Father who is in heaven”, and other such things. … Symeon said to him, 
“Believe (me), I won’t stay, but I will go in the power of Christ; I will mock the world.”99 
In line with this stated intention, he forces certain people to respond to his teaching of 
orthodoxy. Leontius relates a number of occasions when the holy fool miraculously obliges 
the  unorthodox  to  accept  Christianity.  The  specific  methods  vary  –  a  juggler’s  hand  is 
shrivelled until he swears to renounce the theatre; some ‘acephalic heretics’ (monophysites; 
diaphysites in the Syriac text)100 receive a destructive demon in their shop until they confess 
orthodoxy; Symeon breaks all the wares of a Jewish glassblower until he converts – but the 
general form is a threat of violence followed by conversion. The stories are all miraculous, 
even when the secrecy narrative does not require them to be (it is presumably fairly easy to 
destroy the produce of a glassblower, but Symeon does so by simply making the sign of the 
cross).101
It would be a mistake to leave out the aggressive miracle-working characteristics of 
the holy fools. They are warriors for (diaphysite) Orthodoxy in a time and place in which 
Orthodoxy was confronted with its neighbours (the monophysite churches, along with many 
other  movements  defined  as  heretical  and  forced  into  the  East  like  Nestorianism, 
Manicheanism, and Messalianism). This is what constitutes their markers of holiness in the 
98 e.g. in Basilius, renunt Climacus, scal.: Step 4. This theme also underlies Cassian’s treatment of the two forms 
of monasticism in Cassianus, Collationes: XIX.
99 Leontius, v. Sym.: III.142f.
100 Rompay, 1994: 388.
101 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.163.
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hagiographic world.102 It is also pertinent, however, to address the question of their foolish 
practice and use of humour – quite apart from their miraculous works – as regards the element 
of force and obligation.
It is difficult to reconstruct any one culture’s sense of humour. We find it hard enough 
to identify the reasons we find things funny in our own context, without crossing seas and 
centuries in our observation.103 So in the following, I shall have to simply assume that the 
behaviour of the holy fools is meant to seem ridiculous.
Some  people  do  laugh  at  the  foolish  behaviour  of  the  holy  fools,  although  it  is 
remarkable that key witnesses do not respond in terms of laughter or confusion. Those who 
associate with the fools on their own level tend to laugh and play: those on the margins, and 
the prostitutes he dances with.104 But the average citizen of Emesa does not. Neither indeed 
does the exemplary witness, John the deacon, who gravely refuses to be scandalised.
Once his friend, Deacon John, invited him to lunch, and they were hanging salted meats there. 
So Abba Symeon began to knock down the raw meat and eat it. The all-wise John, not wanting 
to say anything to him with a loud voice, drew near his ear and said to him, “You really don’t 
scandalize me, (even) if you eat raw camel. Do whatever you’d like with the rest.” For he knew 
the Fool’s virtue, because he also was a spiritual person.105
We  are  at  least  far  from  the  pernicious  obligation  to  laugh  that  renders  humour 
suspicious. If laughter was meant to be the moral response, then John the Deacon would laugh 
as  well.  Recognition  (cf.  the  discussion  over,  on  page  156)  is  distinct  from  comic 
appreciation. The response to the holy fool is much more biblical. The people of Emesa (apart 
from the ideal observer) are scandalised. When holiness is revealed to them in a way they do 
not expect,  they can not accept it,  and the holy one becomes a fool for them, just as the 
message of Christ was foolishness to the Greeks.106 In this respect, the holy fool’s audience 
combines  the  mistakes  of  Paul’s  Greeks  and  Jews:  to  them,  he  is  both  scandalous  and 
foolish.107
People are not obliged to laugh at or with the holy fools. This much is obvious from 
the deafeningly laughterless silence accompanying most of his actions. Instead, his mockery 
102 Moschus, prat.: 213.
103 John Haldon has braved the difficulties with moderate success: Haldon, 2002.
104 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.163.
105 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.158.
106 1 Corinthians 1.23.
107 For a description of the holy fool tradition as reception history of this passage in 1 Corinthians, cf. Vogt, 
1987.
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functions  as  so many failed  jokes.  Holy fools ostracise  themselves  with their  humour by 
appealing  to  a  community that  is  almost  permanently  absent.  Their  laughter  defines  their 
society, but their society is not that of the city, but of the periphery.
However,  in  keeping  with  his  practical  outworking  of  the  via  dissimilis,  the 
community appealed to by the holy fool’s laughter does include the members of the religious 
periphery. Prostitutes and beggars, Mark the fool’s crowd of lunatics,108 those most patently 
unblessed  by  this  present  order,  can  all  laugh  with  the  holy  fool  (at  least,  in  Leontius’ 
account).109 Their lot renders them unlikely holy men and women. They do not direct thought 
towards God nor claim to be Her representative on earth.
The holy fools’ work of self-ostracism makes their humour fail.  They have so few 
people to laugh with that no-one can be obliged to appreciate it. In denying the holiness of 
their community’s laughter, they ostracise their own. In their humorous solidarity with the 
periphery, everyone in the city becomes the butt of the joke (whether they are dispassionate 
enough to appreciate  it  as a joke or not).  It is not a sufficient tool to prevent subsequent 
recognised  holy fools  representing  God in  such  a  way as  to  religiously  oblige  people  to 
submit  themselves  to  their  crushing  mockery,  but  this  obligation  is  not  owing  to  their 
foolishness,  but  to  the  acknowledgment  of  their  holiness.  And  successful  fools  are  not 
recognised.  Therefore,  to  the  extent  that  people  feel  obliged  to  accept  the  holy  fools’ 
mockery, the original project of ascetic holy fools has failed or been replaced.
The  holy  fools  certainly  oblige  and  force  their  audience  to  take  their  message 
seriously, through miracle and judgement. Their humour and mockery, however, repeatedly 
fall on deaf ears. It causes a scandal and ultimately ostracises itself.110 As such, it offers a 
choice  of  solidarity  rather  than  forcing  community.  People  can  overcome  their  sense  of 
scandal and see the holiness of the outcasts in their community rather than rejecting the holy 
fool as demonic. But any mocking claim to represent that holy periphery will diverge from the 
example of the first holy fools, whose holiness is required to be secret.
3.3.2: Stock comic forms
How does the form of humour contribute to or oppose the transformation of the self’s 
relation to society?  However unique and radical comedians may be, it  is unavoidable that 
their form of humour will be emulated. A brief search of the internet will inform us that Eddie 
108 v. dan. scet.: 2.
109 Leontius is admittedly one of the most socially conscious hagiographers of antiquity: cf. his other extant work 
on John the Almsgiver in Festugière, 1974.
110 Basil takes it as analytic truth that the insane are not to be taken seriously in Basilius, hom. 10.
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Izzard is no longer the only self-proclaimed executive transvestite in the world. Jokes are 
retold, added to, and given new contexts. They take on new roles and gain different social 
dynamics. As the humorous tradition develops, it may still retain the authority (in the case of 
humour,  this  will  include  the  obligation  to  laugh)  of  its  comic  origin.  We  recognise 
derivatives of forms of humour as funny in spite of their transformations. As a comic form 
rigidifies, so will its requisite cultural assumptions, so that it leaves its power of self-critique 
behind and makes the ostracised element it mocks almost irreversibly lost.
One  comic  form that  has  been  noted  as  archetypically  British  is  self-deprecating 
humour that laughs at one’s own (failed or corny) attempts to be funny. Someone makes a 
smart remark, immediately becomes aware that it was unacceptable in some way (a bad pun, a 
tired double-entendre, etc.), and then laughs at their own lack of subtlety by asking ‘Did you 
see what I did there?’
This form of humour is a classic example of the modesty-inducing smile beloved of 
Critchley, the ‘quiet acknowledgement of one’s limitedness.’111 In recent years it has become 
an extremely common form, at least in British society, so that the uninitiated have observed it 
as a British curiosity.112
In becoming conversational bread and butter, the form loses some of its spontaneous 
modesty,  and attains the shape of a confession. It has turned into an idiom that one feels 
obliged to resort to when feeling the disapproval of one’s listeners. The speaker offers a bad 
pun, and instead of covering it over or moving on, s/he now feels obliged to confess to being 
rubbish at telling jokes. And if the confession is not forthcoming, the form can be turned onto 
the speaker, with the stinging ‘I see what you did there.’
The  combination  of  humour’s  power  to  incline  us  to  modestly  find  ourselves 
ridiculous with its appeal to communal appreciation can in other words have a homogenising 
effect. The road from humbling humour to humiliating heckling is short. This stock form of 
comedy (at the time of writing) shows modesty’s homogenising potential.
Humour relates to its community in a number of ways.  We have seen here how it 
provokes a confession of humility.  It  can also cultivate  mediocrity.  Whilst  the powers of 
parody may work well to produce social change when directed towards current situations, it 
may also act as a critique of divergence.
111 Critchley, 2002: 109.
112 In considering this form, I have benefited greatly from conversation with Jeff Biebighauser.
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Parody can be heard as a deterrent.  If directed towards something that we are not 
rather than something that we are, humour simply produces cultural stagnation. By finding 
ourselves absurd, we produce change. In turn, finding development and change absurd stifles 
abnormality and transformation. One kind of comedy that falls into this latter category is the 
‘thin  end of  the  wedge’  variety,  which  often  starts  out  ‘what’ll  they think  of  next,  …?’ 
Someone  objects  to  the  opening  of  borders  to  working  immigrants,  and  expresses  it  as 
‘What’ll they think of next, a no-frills bus service from Poland? Warsaw to London: that’ll be 
five quid and a new bathroom for Mr Picklestop at number 32!’ Such parody actually stifles 
the courage to think innovatively through vilifying divergences from the status quo.
Stock techniques of this kind of comedy include the hyperbole of the unknown. And 
here we shift from the simple writing off of new ideas to the ridiculing of strange thoughts. 
Hyperbole of the unknown may take more forms than mere verbal mockery. Representational 
parodies can be included. The parody of the religious nut on the street corner can be used to 
prevent  us  from  taking  seriously  the  inter-religious  debate  that  takes  place  between 
fundamentalists  that engage in preaching and debating on the street.113 More perniciously, 
portraying political process as impossibly complicated, contrary, and run by bureaucrats will 
restrict political activity to certain kinds of administratively minded citizenship much more 
effectively than party elections do.
A further  technique  of  humour  that  may  stagnate  rather  than  critique  is  the  self-
effacing humour of the powerful. Here the technique involves modesty on the part of agents 
who have access to a great deal of resources and political authority, as they find themselves 
ridiculous. Whilst the effect may be that they thereby listen to critique, it is not a necessary 
result. But those witnessing the humour are put at ease, no longer rightfully suspicious of the 
stubbornness and self-interest  of the powerful.  Being honest  about  innocent  shortcomings 
hides ideological disagreement. In this way, humour may become a technique of discouraging 
the use of parrhesia,  the fearless speech of the governed. It gives authority an element of 
inevitability: I will rule even though I am incompetent, because there must be a master.114
Given our interpretation of holy foolery as resistance to ascetic practice, it is difficult 
to tie down any specific holy foolish techniques of humour. However, we have also branded 
the holy fools as a variety of ascetic, and they are at least recognisable as a group against that 
113 For a sympathetic account of which, cf. Cox, 1995: ch. 10.
114 In  this respect,  intellectuals who arrogantly ridicule American presidents  for  their  stupidity appear  to be 
suffering from amnesia regarding all the ridiculous sovereigns of European history,  from the Shakespearian 
monarchs through mad king George to the diminutive Napoleon Bonaparte. Cf. Critchley, 2007: Appendix. For 
this critique applied to the bungling administrator, cf. Foucault, 2003[1999]: 13.
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background. So we shall examine their practice as transferable technique in terms of their 
refusal of asceticism and embrace of transgression.
The identification of the practice of holy fools as an ascetic critique of asceticism does 
allow a description of their practice in terms of negative forces. The holy fools deny the truth 
of the self offered in their culture’s conceptions of holiness. Holiness is redefined as freedom 
from ascetic determination. So what effects will a general application of this principle have? 
Can this kind of refusal be generalised?
Holy fools demonstrate their freedom from religious, cultural, and ascetic definitions 
of holiness through transgressing them. They work free from ecclesiastic holiness through 
disrupting the  liturgy and mocking ecclesiastical  order  (Symeon dons a stole  of  sausages 
while  parodying a  deacon one Sunday).115 They work free from cultural  holiness  through 
transgressing civil law through stealing, acting aggressively, fornicating, and mocking civil 
authorities (including a ‘village headman’).116 They work free from ascetic holiness through 
ignoring religious markers of time, diet, and place: they do not fast at the right time, they eat 
waste food, they leave the desert. In these ways, they challenge contemporary ways of life and 
godliness.
The praise  of  transgression  works  like  humour,  however,  in  its  social  function  of 
provoking people to ‘think outside the box’. There are at least two problems with valuing 
transgressions. Firstly, it averts us from taking time over the difficult job of evaluating our 
present: is this way of doing things desirable, true, and good? Such questions require at least a 
preliminary analysis of one particular situation. Embracing transgression does not allow the 
stability  required  for  cultural  criticism  and  appreciation,  thus  enabling  a  contented 
cohabitation of surface cultural radicalism on the one hand and irreproachable practical ways 
of life on the other: discuss as much as you like, just as long as you obey; transgress as much 
as you like, as long as you pay.117 The demand to transgress is a call to action whose function 
is to drown out reflection. Reform is a political tool for deferring critique.
Secondly, the praise of transgression focuses attention on particular accepted standards 
to  which  we  object.  Contemporary  European  culture,  for  example,  has  developed  a 
sophisticated expertise in rejecting (perceived) Victorian sexual values, at the expense of any 
honest analysis of the present or nineteenth century sexual mores. Its complete inefficacy in 
this aim of critiquing that period of history’s values and art can easily be witnessed in the 
115 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.160f.
116 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.156.
117 Kant,  2007[1784]:  31.  Contemporary capitalism’s  ‘default  ontology’  determined by the spectral  logic of 
capital is laid out in Goodchild, 2005.
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emotive  power  and  popularity  of  Victorian  romances  evidenced  in  the  success  of  film 
adaptations of the novels of Jane Austen,  Dickens, and the Brontë sisters.
The praise of transgression can function both to transform the present and to conform 
to it. Isolating this particular technique of the holy fool will betray its critical task. It also 
eradicates  the  nature  of  the  holy  fool.  As  soon  as  the  holiness  of  the  transgression  is 
identified, it can no longer be used to combat vainglory. It is precisely when the holy fool is 
revealed  (by divine revelation  in  our literature)  as such that  the holy fool  disappears  (cf. 
above, on page 83). Identifying any technique – even persistent critique – as generally holy 
tears it away from the ascetic  repertoire of the holy fools, whose main task is to become 
unaware of their own holiness.
A related example could be my use of the word ‘mad’ in this thesis. It is an act of 
devotion to Foucault, who brought the term back into circulation with his own doctoral thesis 
on the history of madness.118 He used it originally because it was an unscientific term that 
avoided  the  deployment  of  the  power  of  medical  and  social  knowledge  over  those 
conventionally called mentally ill.  The term was not expected to be taken seriously as an 
academic  denomination.  Since  his  book,  however,  the  coinage  has  regained  academic 
seriousness, and no longer serves this purpose. So that devotion to Foucault in this context 
betrays his own critical practice.119
The  technique  of  the  praise  of  folly  –  which  is  to  say,  the  technique  of  the 
hagiographers – may be generalised into a force for social cohesion and government. The 
discipline of psychiatry, after all, was based upon the notion of the noble innocent madman, in 
Pinel’s claim that the confined madmen of the Bastille were only driven mad by their chains. 
The asylum was defined as an enclosed space of tolerance. However, the technique of acting 
mad (or drunk, or sinful) specifically in order to deprive oneself of apparent virtue can not be 
generalised into a governing technique of producing social cohesion because it simply does 
not  posit  one  form of  behaviour  that  can  be  recommended  (not  even  transgression).  Its 
humble and practical denial of any identifiable holiness refuses to accept or offer knowledge 
of itself and does not recognise the logic or morality of existing ways of life or thought.
Comedy and comic transgression is therefore full of complications as a technique of 
critique and social transformation.  It includes fixed forms filtered into culture that impose 
demands, confession and humiliation, oppose unorthodox thought, and distract criticism from 
118 Foucault, 2006[1961].
119 The  critical  practice  was  never  sufficient  however:  ‘The  word  from  beyond  is  a  dream  that  we  keep 
renewing.’ Foucault, 1996[1976]: 198.
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its most relevant targets by aping critique. For all their satirical and political potential, stock 
forms of humour can result in the muffling of critique and abnormality.  The repetition of 
comedy mirrors the universalisation of asceticism. Not that any of these are its essential role: 
humour is neither solution nor social ill, just dangerous.
3.3.3: The Power of the Comic
Mystics and comedians are praised on all sides. It takes a particular kind of dry and 
humourless scholar to criticise either of them. I am surely not the only researcher to have been 
vilified  for  not  appealing  to  experience  in  every  sentence.  It  takes  the  courage  of 
Dostoevsky120 to point out that there are also evil mystics, that power over truth-telling and 
critique is not identical with goodness. The identification of humourous people, together with 
their use and abuse of this power, are decisive for the implications of humour in relation to the 
transformation of self and society.
If comedy is a practice of the self as well as an attitude to truth, it gives the comic 
enormous  power.  This  kind  of  power  is  a  key  feature  of  Pyle’s  analysis  of  the  fools  in 
Shakespeare, as she portrays them each as holy fools, drawing parallels with the silly theology 
of the Mediaeval mystery plays.121
Pyle’s  Shakespearian  fools  are  far  from those  of  Byzantium that  we are  studying 
however. Instead they are portrayed as doctors that heal the moral ills of the Shakespearian 
world. They manipulate events and truths in order to conform their ‘patients’ to the ideal of a 
Shakespearian moral hero. Rather than employing asceticism to undermine the God-reference 
of the present’s way of living, Pyle claims that Shakespeare’s fools attempt to produce ascetic 
morality in others. Certainly the Shakespearian fool exercises a forceful moral presence in the 
plays.
Without  going  into  the  parallels  between  and  identification  of  Shakespearian  and 
Byzantine fools – which would be an entire study of its own – what I wish to observe in 
Shakespeare’s clowns is the influence and status of the comic. The paradigmatic example is 
perhaps given in Feste the Clown of Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night. In Act IV, Scene III of that 
play,  Feste – at the instigation of the other comic characters in the play – dresses up as a 
curate by the name of Sir Topas (a knighted priest: it is tempting to hear a reference to Sir 
Thomas More), in order to torment the play’s humourless steward, Malvolio, around whose 
downfall the play revolves.
120 Dostoevsky, 1994[1880]: 160, 406.
121 Pyle, 1998.
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The comic subplot of the play functions to save Malvolio from vainglory, but it goes 
much further than that. The main joke that is played on him – sending him a fake love letter – 
provokes  in  him ridiculous  and humiliating  behaviour.  But  in  the  episode  with  Feste/Sir 
Topas, he is forced to bring his own sanity into question.
As a comic situation, we are not asked to be suspicious of the story at all. Here is a 
clear case of the audience and characters laughing at someone who deserves to be taken down 
a peg or too.
Malvolio is confined within a dark cell and visited by tormentors. First Toby Belch, 
then Feste the clown – both as Sir Topas, then again as himself. They attempt to persuade 
Malvolio that he is mad, through the confinement itself (presumably carried out by Belch), 
and by Feste’s deliberately confusing discourse, of which he has a inexhaustible supply, as he 
demonstrates first to Belch:
Bonos dies, Sir Toby: for as the old hermit of Prague, that
never saw pen and ink, very wittily said to a niece of King
Gorboduc, 'That that is, is'; so I, being master parson, am
master parson: for what is that but that? and is but is?
SIR TOBY.
To him, Sir Topas.122
Feste then takes to persuading his ‘patient’ to believe his dark confinement is light, 
that  Pythagoras  was  orthodox,  and  that  he is  talking  complete  nonsense.  ‘Answer  a  fool 
according to his folly, or he will be wise in his own eyes.’123 The reversal is brought out time 
and time again. Here we have a fool who is aware of his foolery, and a worldly man who is 
not.124
Feste’s behaviour is not only sinister because of his abuse of his authority as comic. 
His practice exemplifies the societal use of comedy to produce a particular, acceptable form 
of the self’s relation to the world. Malvolio is obnoxious, but not simply in the eyes of the 
audience:  his  downfall  consists  in  his  being  arrogant  towards  the  comic  mass.  Feste  the 
122 Shakespeare, 1998: IV.III.
123 Proverbs 26.5.
124 Shakespeare, 1998: I.V, III.I, V.I – including Feste’s final spoken line: ‘“By the Lord, fool, I am not mad;”--
But do you remember? “Madam, why laugh you at such a barren rascal? An you smile not, he's gagged”? And 
thus the whirligig of time brings in his revenges.’
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clown, Sir Toby Belch, the maid Maria, and Fabian all constitute the background community 
to the play: they are the chorus. And when they take objection to Malvolio’s attitude, they 
destroy him through humour.
The genius of the play is not simply the humour and moral purpose of its comedy, but 
the way it jars with the audience towards the end. Shakespeare asks us both to laugh at the fall 
of the arrogant, and to be critical to our own laughter. The proud Malvolio is presented in 
humiliated indignation, refusing to laugh at his downfall, and then he is vindicated. ‘He hath 
been most notoriously abused’.125 And it is perhaps only once this has been said at the play’s 
conclusion that the discomfort the audience felt during the prison scene can be expressed. In 
this comedy, Shakespeare is reflecting on the role and task of the comic writer, just as he 
portrays  (and laughs at)  the task of  the  religious  writer  in  his  pious  Midsummer Night’s  
Dream.
This is a particular example of the way in which the comedian’s power can be directed 
towards social cohesion and normality rather than critique and diversity. However, the use of 
theatrical techniques to convince the mad of their medical status in the classical age would 
indicate that it  is not an exceptional instance.126 It  becomes a natural function of the way 
humour expresses and is limited by the community. Jokes require shared assumptions in order 
to work. So laughter at what is unacceptable to those who share those assumptions is not only 
a possible, but a logical use of comedy. Shakespeare’s comedy is so interesting because it 
both uses that comedy to reveal the absurdities of normal life (Feste’s humour works in this 
way throughout the play as well) and it portrays the comic as an arena of moral danger, where 
the truly foolish are manipulated into violence (the foolish but harmless aristocrat Andrew 
Aguecheek is reduced to sabre-rattling) and the truly immodest are forcibly humiliated.
There  is  no  obvious  essential  difference  in  the  form of  the  comic  between  these 
pernicious uses of humour and the more positive, critical use (pace Critchley). In the example 
of  Twelfth Night, it is precisely the benign modesty-inducing humour that is used violently. 
But this is also true of the stock comic forms and the community obligations. We use the 
same forms for self-critique and for mocking the different.  It is precisely because we are 
obliged to laugh that comedy is effective against our own pig-headed arrogance, but it is also 
the obligation that makes it into a sinister tool for office management.
It is not difficult to see how the holy fools’ technique of the insult may be abused. If I 
decide to take all insults seriously as potential revelation, then I make a choice concerning my 
125 Act V, scene I, echoing Malvolio’s complaint in IV.II – ‘Fool, there was never man so notoriously abused;’
126 Foucault, 2006[1961]: 329-334.
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relation to the truth. But if I recommend that others hear my insults as the very word of God, 
then I am imposing an authority onto them. The moral valuing of the insult gives speakers of 
insults greater freedom to exercise their power.
Taking insults seriously (and not ruling them out a priori) may indeed allow us to hear 
a liberating truth that we otherwise would not be exposed to in the presence of polite society. 
Fearless listening is part of the courage of fearless speech. The generalisation of this courage, 
however,  can easily form part  of a technology of  particular  subjectivation  into a specific 
community. It enables the hearer to put aside established truths of the self, but the thrill of 
fearless listening (and radical critique) can then continue to support the rigidity of the new 
values implied in the insulting truth. In this manner, it is both a force for attaining critical 
distance  from one’s  culture,  and  a  way  of  further  entrenching  the  necessity  of  a  newly 
embraced culture. It could be said that the insult can be deeply critical to one reference of the 
word ‘us’ but it is equally able to take for granted another reference of ‘us’.127
It would be misguided to claim that the Christian story saves us from this kind of 
manipulation.  We have already noted the role  homogeneity  plays  in  combating  vainglory 
amongst the desert fathers (above, on page 55). It is also fairly clear that the value of societal 
critique  and  the  courage  of  being  distinctive  supports  a  great  deal  of  modern  Christian 
counter-cultural  movements,  not  least  certain  forms  of  charismatic  Christianity.128 It  is  a 
genuine danger for all religious communities – whether monastic or otherwise – that take 
societal critique seriously. It is further the danger for all models of holy people such as that 
presented by the holy fools.
The holy fool tradition at least attempts to deal with such issues, even if it is not aware 
of them in these terms. We can see them addressed by a range of holy foolish characteristics: 
firstly, the critique of ascetic identities; secondly, the critique from nowhere, thirdly, the value 
of secrecy, and finally the opposition to seduction. All of these are features we have already 
mentioned  in  our  exegesis:  here  I  simply  want  to  apply  them  to  the  problem  of  the 
transference of the techniques and expertise of the holy fools.
Firstly,  we have argued above that the holy fools take ascetic  transcendence to its 
natural conclusion.  Just as early Christian asceticism embraced both a standard moderated 
form of asceticism and a transcending hyperbolic form, the holy fools both reveal monastic 
form to be contingent, and transcend it through their transgression. So when the asceticism of 
127 For the expression of cultural critique as distancing oneself from ‘us’, see Foucault, 2008: 14.
128 For the description of difference as an absolute value in the context of conservative Christianity, see amongst 
many other books, Roberts, 2000. I have analysed the function of certain daringly abnormal ‘manifestations of 
the Spirit’ in charismatic communities in Thomas, 2006b.
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late antiquity had established particular forms of world-denial – particular dress, particular 
calendars,  particular  eating habits  – the holy fools would take into use others.  Instead of 
wearing the humble habit, they would don a scullery maid’s rag, or nothing at all. Instead of 
following  the  church’s  lectionary,  they  would  eat  cakes  in  holy  week  and  sausages  on 
Sundays. Instead of eating only one modest meal a day, they would eat the remains of the 
meal or gorge vast quantities of beans in public.129
The holy fools of late antiquity are therefore acutely attentive to the institution of 
specific  forms  in  the  practice  of  ascetic  abjection.  Their  departure  from desert  life  is  an 
example of the continuous refusal of the located and particular practice of the absolute. They 
leave the life of the secular city for the common life of the monastery,  from there to the 
desert, and from there to the solitude of the city. Each time, the move is the same. Each time, 
they renounce a way of life. They refuse to be satisfied with only one division (world/city), 
and seek God each time in the margins of the community, geography, and reason.
The rhetoric of holy fools will nevertheless have the potential to found a community 
on  one  particular  division  (secular/religious;  normal/foolish).  But  I  am  also  making  an 
historical claim: it is not impossible for asceticism to become, as it does with the holy fools, 
flexible  and  innovative  enough  in  its  critique  to  refuse  the  authority  of  any  ascetically-
founded community. Or a community founded on insult and injury.
Secondly,  the  holy  fools  make  use  of  the  critique  from nowhere.  Their  efforts  to 
combat  vainglory  involve  developing  strategies  to  divert  attributions  of  holiness.  They 
deliberately act in such a way as to be thought unholy. The holy fool thus differs absolutely 
from the prophet, who claims to deliver the words of God; from the religious teacher, who 
claims to know the truth of God; from the mystic, who has been burnt by the encounter with 
God into speaking pregnant mysteries; and from the parrhesiast, whose authority derives from 
their own courage. The critique of the holy fool has no obvious authority.
Those adhering to  the values  that  are  being judged will  consider  holy fools  to  be 
transgressors. However, the fool attempts to deceive even those who are well-disposed. When 
some monastic leaders with a question about Origen are sent to Symeon the holy fool by his 
brother in the desert, they recognise his holiness, but all they get is abuse:
As they approached him, they said to him, “Bless us.” He said to them, “You have come at a 
bad time, and the one who sent you is an idiot.” Thereupon he grabbed the ear of the one who 
had been scandalized and gave him such a blow that (the bruise) could be seen for three days. 
129 Something Basil finds unthinkable even for non-Christians – Basilius, d. bapt.: II.Q8.
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And he said, “Have you found fault  with my beans? They were soaked for forty days,  but 
Origen would not eat them because he plunged into the sea and was not strong enough to get 
out, and he drowned in the deep.” They were amazed that he said all this in advance—and also 
this, “Does the Fool want the ten? He’s as much an idiot as you!—Do you want a kick on the 
shin?” he said. “Yes, yes, go away.” And immediately lifting up a jug of hot wine he burned the 
two of them on their lips, so that they were unable to repeat what he had told them.130
In  these  and other  ways,  the  holy fools  attempted  to  eschew the role  of  religious 
leader.  They  not  only  turned  away  all  admirers,  but  they  devised  a  whole  repertoire  of 
particular techniques (disrupting the liturgy,  pretending to be possessed), of semblances to 
simulate folly, that would prevent people from associating them with divinity.
Thirdly,  holy fools  hedge their  techniques  of ascetic  madness  with the  security of 
secrecy.  Not only do they create  a myth  of unholiness around themselves for the sake of 
humility, but they keep their real identity a secret.
Secrecy is a decisive character amongst the holy fools.131 It is not only Symeon the 
holy fool that has to cover over his virtues and miracles with scandalous acts (as when he 
pretended  to  rape  the  tavern-keeper’s  wife  after  saving  him from a  poisonous  snake)132: 
Isidora is only holy in secret;  Mark the holy fool is one of the many secret saints in the 
narrative of Daniel of Scetis;133 and the few things mentioned about Symeon in the account of 
Evagrius Scholasticus mainly concern his secret piety.134
Acting scandalously was only one part of this. The saints would further keep out of the 
public  eye  (the  Tabennesiotes  convent  was  deep  in  the  desert,  and  Isidora  stayed  in  the 
kitchens),  and  pray  that  no-one  would  find  out  about  them.135 Symeon  similarly  would 
practise his asceticism in secret, keeping a hiding place in the city where he could freely be 
ascetic.
This wise man truly kept nothing in his hut—for he had a hut to sleep in, or rather in which to 
stay  awake  at  night—except  for  one  bundle  of  twigs.  Often  he  passed  the  night  without 
sleeping, praying until morning, drenching the ground with his tears.136
130 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.152f.
131 de Matons, 1970: 293 Dagron, 1990: 933. Cf. also above, on page 70.
132 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.147f.
133 v. dan. scet.: 2. Dahlmann notes the characteristic throughout the work in chapter II of her introduction to the 
text.
134 Evagrius Scholasticus, h.e.: IV.34.
135 Leontius, v. Sym.: III.145.
136 Leontius, v. Sym.: IV.166 – contrast 148, 156.
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Secrecy in itself is not enough however. It is a perfectly natural part of a counter-
cultural  community  to  keep  its  common  life  secret,  whether  from fear  of  violence  or  to 
preserve its authenticity and purity. The secrecy of the holy fool, however, is absolute. It is 
not possible to keep the secret of the holy fool as a community truth, because it can not be 
shared. Those who know the truth about the holy fool do not know about each other. Should a 
community find out about the holy fool, then the fool disappears (cf. above, on page 83). The 
whole point of the fool’s madness is that they cannot tell themselves about their holiness: they 
embrace ‘two solitudes, from the interior me and from the town.’137
In this way, the insults of the holy fools cannot be shared as a common truth that may 
found a community. The truth of the holy fool (that they are not really fools) is an absolute 
secret.  As such,  they do not  draw people into community with them.  There is  no shared 
assumption about the insulter around which a community of the fool may gather. Everyone is 
an outsider to the holy fool.
Fourthly, the holy fools are not seductive.138 There is no community of holy fools into 
which  people  can  be  inducted.  This  is  not  to  deny  that  the  tradition  of  holy  fools  has 
continued in the Eastern Orthodox church to this day, and that this tradition no doubt has at 
times included apprenticeships and learning from the holy fool master. However, in the texts 
from late antiquity and the early Byzantine Middle Ages we are studying, there is no evidence 
of any community of holy fools. The only text that comes close is Mark the holy fool’s chorus 
of genuine lunatic, to whom he distributes the alms he receives.139
Even at the level of hagiography, among those who consider the fools to be holy, the 
identity of believers is not constituted by emulation, but admiration. Leontius, the holy fool’s 
hagiographer  does not aspire to be a holy fool.  He simply recognises Symeon to be one. 
Similarly,  the community around Isidora did not all start to feign madness after the divine 
revelation of the holy fool in their midst, they simply honoured the nun who had done so (and 
who could no more).
They fell at [Piteroum’s] feet, confessing various things, one saying how she had poured the 
leavings of her plate over her; another how she had beaten her with her fists; another how she 
had blistered her nose. So they confessed various and sundry outrages. After praying for them, 
he left. After a few days she was unable to bear the praise and honour of the sisters, and all their 
apologizing was so burdensome to her that she left the monastery.140
137 Dagron, 1990: 930, my translation.
138 Certeau, 1979: 542.
139  v. dan. scet.: 2.
140 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XVIII.19 Palladius, h. Laus.: XXIV.
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This non-seductive character – common to all the holy fools we have discussed – is 
significant  because it  precludes the desire to conform to a model.  We can not envisage a 
group of  Leontius’  friends  going  around  Neapolis  with  ‘What  Would  a  Holy  Fool  Do?’ 
wristbands and paraphernalia. If the holy fools reject the norms of one community, they at the 
same time attempt to prevent the assertion of new norms by their ascetic power. And so they 
continue to push away admirers, rather than initiating them into secrets of conformity that 
have been earned by enduring abuse and insult.
The holy fools do not offer spiritual benefit for enduring ascetic hardship. They do not 
ask others to be conformed to their  example,  and nor do they praise those who recognise 
them. Through their non-seductive, secretive ascetic critique from nowhere, they attempt (and 
do not always succeed) to escape from the power of their  own expertise,  techniques,  and 
dogmatic demands. They are aware of the danger of their enterprise.
There  is  no  easy  solution  to  these  problems  with  humour.  If  we  are  continually 
suspicious  of  comedy,  it  will  become ineffective  in  revealing  to  us  our  presumption  and 
absurdity. If we embrace it as a value in itself, we are deprived of resistance to its constitution 
of a homogeneous community. As a technique of the self, humour is dangerous, whether we 
are aware of the danger or not. And that danger is precisely why it is helpful in the critical 
task.
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3.4: The Unserious Self
Humility has been central to the ways in which humour and fearless speech have had 
an effect on the relation of self to society. Avoiding flatterers, modestly becoming aware of 
one’s relation to one’s body and placing oneself in society are all projects of the humble self. 
They are also sites of moral danger: how to espouse the virtue of humility without legislating 
it for others and thus requiring adaptation to my demands and the demands of my society? In 
this section, then, we turn to the Christian and ascetic understanding of humility.
The  book  on  humility  in  the  Apophthegmata  Patrum is  scattered  with  stories  of 
ascetics who accept accusations against themselves. They do not resist rejection and confess 
sins that are not their own. John Moschus relates a story that had become associated with the 
saying of abba Poemen ‘that each man should always question himself on every matter.’ A 
monk accused another of a particular (unnamed) sin, and ostracised him because of it. After 
protesting his innocence, the accused monk reasoned with himself thus:
“The kindly deacon loves me and, prompted by his love for me, he has confided to me that 
which was in his heart concerning me to put me on my guard. I will make sure that I do not do 
that deed in future. But, oh, wretched soul! While you say you have not done  that deed, are 
there not thousands of misdeeds done by you which you have forgotten? Where are the things 
you did yesterday or the day before that or ten days ago? Can you recall them? Is it not possible 
that you have done this deed as lightly as you did the others, and have forgotten it as readily as 
you forgot them?” And so I [the accused monk] disposed my thoughts to accept the possibility 
that I had in truth committed that deed, but had forgotten it – just as I had forgotten my other 
misdeeds.141
This narrative activates many of the themes we have described above: for example 
guarding oneself, accepting criticism, and placing the self by controlling one’s thoughts. The 
acceptance  of  guilt  resembles  the  distorted  interpretations  with  which  we  opened  our 
interpretation  of  obedience  (cf.  above,  on  page  28).  Having  since  examined  the  ascetic 
practice of truth-hearing, we can identify the monk’s acceptance of guilt as an instance of 
receiving truth from all quarters. I am a mystery to myself, and have no inherent authority to 
describe my own truth.
The monk’s docile openness to the truth of the self can – as we have now established – 
work  in  different  directions.  It  is  based  on  a  severance  of  the  self  from its  established 
141 Moschus, prat.: 219.
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mediations by society and tradition: the humble monk is not allied to previous truths about 
himself. However, the docility is useful both to the monk and to society. The monk is thereby 
free from determinations of the self’s relation to society that he may not have chosen himself. 
He is free to negotiate his own values. However, he is also able to shape his relation to values 
according to the expediency of the state. His docility has utility for the state. A person who 
does not insist on the truths of their own self will not resist the community’s truths about the 
human  either.  The subject  has  become a  problem for  itself.  From this  docile  self  derive 
revolution as well as adaptation to a fixed environment.142
The story of this monk’s confession tells us more than his docility however. It shows 
us how unimportant he considers the truth of the self’s assessment. When the monk discovers 
a difference in opinion with his brother concerning his goodness, he effortlessly changes his 
own view of the matter, as if he were considering the life of a complete stranger. When – in 
the sequel – his brother changes his mind too, there is no agonising over what was true and 
what was false, but pure joy at the reconciliation.
The  truth  about  the  self’s  moral  assessment  is  unknown and  unimportant  for  the 
humble Christian. It is not simply that she is open to others’ opinion, but she does not care to 
dwell on the subject at all. Humility results in unseriousness concerning the self’s morality.
It is fitting that we return to humility and unseriousness at the end of a work on holy 
fools, because a feature common to the majority of holy fool stories is reference to St Paul’s 
claim to be a fool for Christ (1 Cor. 4.10). Paul’s appeal to foolishness is part of a network of 
references to cross, transcendence, justification by faith, and boasting. So the explicit working 
out of his theory of foolishness is not simply in his polemics against Greek thought at the 
beginning  of  the  Corinthian  correspondence  (pace  Breton),143 but  in  his  declaration  of 
weakness at its end.
Paul’s choice to play the fool and do a little boasting in 2 Corinthians (chapters 11 and 
12)  is  shocking.  He  had  already explained  that  the  transcendence  of  the  law  meant  that 
boasting was excluded, leaving no room for confusion: ‘God chose what is weak in the world 
to shame the strong; God chose what is low and despised in the world, things that are not, to 
reduce to nothing things that are, so that no one might boast in the presence of God.’ (1 Cor 
142 For a good illustration of the conception of the problematic self as a prelude to adaptation to state normality, 
see Foucault’s stubborn refusal to analyse himself on TV in Foucault and Chomsky, 1997[1974]: 124: ‘Elders: 
Well,  I’m  wondering  what  are  the  psychological  reasons  for  this… /  Foucault:  [protesting]  Well,  you  can 
wonder about it, but I can’t help that. … I’m not making a problem out of a personal question, I make of a 
personal question an absence of a problem.’
143 Breton, 2002[1981].
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1.27-29, NRSV translation) ‘Then what becomes of boasting? It is excluded. By what law? 
By that of works? No, but by the law of faith.’ (Rom. 3.27, NRSV).
Boasting is excluded because it is based on a fixed set of evaluations. To boast of 
one’s achievements implies that both speaker and hearer share the high value set upon the 
objectives  and  performances  achieved.  No-one  can  boast  to  me  of  their  great 
accomplishments in the game of Warcraft until I have also been initiated into that particular 
mystery.  So  any  boasting  is  vain  on  two  counts:  I  boast  because  I  feel  I’ve  achieved 
something great,  and I consider boasting possible because I think the values according to 
which my greatness is measured are true. I have both perceived and achieved the good.
Against this, Paul excludes boasting not according to an ethical law, but according to 
‘the law of faith’. Boasting is invalid because it is allied to the value of achievements. If we 
do not know what achievements are good, then we can not boast. We must simply have faith.
Boasting is therefore based on a law, and does not allow the transformations we have 
been speaking of in relation to the way of life of early Christian ascetics. Humility, on the 
other hand, refuses the assumption of a fixed law.
Paul’s alternative (in 2 Cor. 11) is to ape others’ boasting according to standards he 
does  not  respect.  This  refuses  the  task  of  defining  a  set  of  values  by which  he  may be 
measured,  because he refuses to stand out  as a model  of any standard he accepts.  Aping 
others’ boasting empties existing standards of their validity. The one who fulfils the law to a 
unique extent does not espouse it as his own measure. This is the flipside of the refusal to 
judge oneself we noted above (on page 89). Instead of resisting judgement according to one 
measure, Paul submits himself to the measure, and demonstrates how little has been achieved 
by that judgement. He does not just write off the law, but exhausts it.
Once again, though, it is striking that Paul does not consider the refusal of law to be an 
ethical commandment. When he succumbs to the temptation to measure himself according to 
old and new standards (as a good Jew and a good Apostle), he is not doing something wrong, 
but something foolish. There is nothing to gain by it. He is free from the economy of honour 
and shame that earns and loses by attention to one’s morality.
Humility  is  therefore  not  a  moral  virtue  as  much as  an attitude  towards  virtue.  It 
identifies and assesses one’s relation to the norms and knowledge of the self, their mediation 
by one’s community and tradition. It allows free transformation of the self in its relation to 
received values through bracketing moral requirements and assessing their validity from a 
distance.
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It is not entirely honest though to claim that humility is not a moral virtue. Humility is 
after all a character trait aspired to both by early Christian ascetics and modern philosophers. 
If humility describes a quality of relation towards morality itself,  how can that quality be 
assessed?
As soon as we claim that one’s relation to values needs to be assessed, we assume that 
there is such a thing as a good relation to morality. Goodness itself, however, is a value. So 
the implication then becomes that our relation to values is assessed by meta-values. In other 
words, there is an ethical demand concerning our relation to ethics. If that ethical demand is 
itself problematic, then we have an infinite regress of ethical demands. This is the alternative 
justification for excluding boasting in Rom. 3.27. Should we be humble because of a law of 
works or out of the law of faith? Humility is not a work. It cannot be legislated, but believed.
So if our ethical demand is posed wrongly, then humility will not help us. If we try to 
be virtuous in order to earn the approval of the citizens of the country we live in, we will very 
likely also try to be critical, transgressive, and humble in order to earn their approval.
Recent  moral  theorists  have  attempted  to  substitute  the  ethical  demand  for  an 
aesthetical one. Ethics is not determined by convention or by truth, but by beauty. However, 
the ethical discourse is so forcefully associated with moral demands rather than aesthetical 
assessment  that  the  aesthetic  revolution  repeatedly  reverts  to  an  ethical  demand  to  be 
beautiful. In other words, the set of values is transformed, but their assertion retains the form 
of an ethical demand.
The transformation and rejection of law is fraught with difficulties deriving from the 
persistence  and  prioritisation  of  the  good  rather  than  beauty  and  truth.  It  is  to  this  last 
transcendental then that I believe humility makes its appeal. Christian humility does not assert 
a rule but a truth. The human is related to the unknown God in a particular way,  with a 
specific  history.  To  this  extent,  humility  competes  with  the  human  sciences’  virtues  of 
modesty.  Where a psychologist might assume that a human lacks something and therefore 
asserts non-judgement in order to allow the person to modestly confess that lack, a Christian 
knows that  the  human  lacks  nothing,  and  so  must  explain  the  obvious  problem with  an 
unalterable  history  of  fall  and  forgiveness.  These  competing  truths  produce  competing 
grammars of confession and relations to morality that can be described and examined.
For the purposes of our account of early Christian asceticism and the way of life of the 
holy fools, we will describe the humble mode of relating to morality. There are at least three 
ways in which Christian humility can be distinguished from its contemporary philosophical 
207
equivalents.  Firstly,  it  is a function of a story rather  than a solution to a practical  ethical 
requirement.  Secondly,  it  is  founded on the grace  of  God rather  than  the  courage of  the 
individual. Thirdly, it produces unserious speech, rather than final truths about the self.
3.4.1: Humility and the Christian Story
The techniques  associated  with  humility  in  ancient  non-Christian  philosophy were 
primarily  practical  moves  aimed  at  producing  modesty,  preventing  disappointment,  and 
cultivating prudence. They combat hubris rather than vainglory, and produce modesty rather 
than humility.
The Christian virtue of humility – although it draws from and has affinities with this 
philosophical tradition – is both motivated and justified by the Christian story. Reference is 
not usually made to the nemesis  brought on by hubris, but rather to Christ’s injunctions ‘Turn 
the other cheek’;  ‘Blessed are the poor in spirit’.144 Similarly,  vainglory is the reversal of 
Messianic  kenosis.  Christ’s  emptying  himself  (kenosis)  of  glory  renders  all  glory  empty 
(kenodoxa=vainglory).
The grammar of Christian theology requires and produces humility. The doctrine of 
Creation and Fall places humanity at the pinnacle of all that is, and tells of its self-inflicted 
corruption of creational bliss. The event of the incarnation and redemption speaks of God’s 
initiative to save humanity independently of the law, so that justification is not the work of the 
self, but gift. Christian humility is given its specific character as a result of this story. It is 
consciousness of one’s own corruption and then salvation through another’s work. It is refusal 
to recognise the efficacy of moral law to transform my worth. It is relief from the obligation 
to be perfect, and the related recognition of need and fallenness. Humility is therefore not as 
much a moral requirement in the Christian tradition, as it is a function of revealed doctrine.
Humility recognises the danger of being in the right – gives it the religious designation 
of ‘self-righteousness’ – and embraces the joy of being alive and wrong. It divides good living 
from  consciousness  of  righteousness  by  withdrawing  the  practice  of  godliness  from  the 
allocation of blame. This is the grammar of righteousness by faith: that it is possible to be 
good without attempting to measure one’s goodness.
In the example examined in depth above (on page 34), the control the monk exercised 
over his thoughts was not a question of sheer mind control – ‘I refuse to think these sinful 
thoughts’  –  but  one  of  calling  to  mind  his  Christian  narrative,  both  doctrinally  and 
144 Matthew 5.39/Luke 3.29. Referred to in  Apoph.  Patr. (Lat): XV.14, 53, XVI.16  Apoph.  Patr. (Gk. syst.): 
XV.15, 71, XVI.25 Apoph. Patr. (alph): Daniel 3 and Apoph. Patr. (anon): 165 and 211.
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biographically.  When brought  high by the elation  of his  successful  attempt  to pursue the 
ascetic life, he remembered his sins, denying the importance of ethics. When brought low by 
the accusations of sinfulness, he recalled the faithfulness of God, denying the importance of 
guilt.
All this is to say that Christian humility works in the same way that a joke does. It is 
not a moral decision, but a reaction to a relationship of truth. You cannot consider whether a 
joke is funny whilst it is being told. You laugh or you do not laugh: afterwards you can tell 
whether it was funny because you know how you reacted. Similarly, you cannot tell whether 
you are thinking humbly at  the moment.  You are or you are not.  But  you can make the 
judgement afterwards, and you can make an attempt at speaking humbly/funnily.
This  is  a  phenomenon  most  people  are  familiar  with.  You can assess  yourself  on 
intelligence, on looks, even on personality. But as soon as you consider your modesty, it is 
impossible to say anything: ‘I am by far the most humble person I know’; ‘In front of others 
[the insensitive man] criticizes himself for being vainglorious, and in making the admission 
he is looking for glory.’145 We are reduced to silence.146 Humility defies language.
Humility is in this way founded on truth rather than convenience. It is not a virtue that 
is valued because it works practically:  that is not the force of the concern of ascetics with 
practice rather than doctrine. Rather, it  is the practice of a truth. And here truth needs the 
resonance it has in other European languages of ‘tro’ – loyal, truthful, in the sense we still 
have of being ‘true to form’, or keeping a ‘troth’.147
In this respect, humility is the archetypal mode of faithfulness to the event of the life 
of Christ.148 It is cultivated through telling the story of creation and redemption. It is the active 
component of the hermeneutical circle. The recollection of this event produces a mode of self-
relation  that  brackets  former  systems  of  ethics  and  social  interaction.  Humility  forms  a 
community incongruous with the world before the event which can only relate to it through 
critique and rejection.
3.4.2: Humility and Grace
Humility  is  further  distinguished  from philosophical  techniques  of  the  self  in  its 
grounding in grace rather than courage. Humour has the power to bracket our ridiculousness 
145 Climacus, scal.: Step 18.
146 which is how abba Alonius responded to praise: Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XV.39 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XV.54 
= Apoph. Patr. (alph): Poemen 55.
147 Critchley, 2007: 43.
148 The reference is of course to Badiou, although I see the culmination of the Christian story in the life of Christ 
rather than purely in the resurrection. cf. Badiou, 2003[1997].
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by having the courage and cheerfulness to see our quirks as funny rather than as signs of our 
doom. Nevertheless it still involves courage, and the ability to laugh when the joke is on you 
is a sign of greatness as well as of a sense of humour. Christian humility is founded on grace, 
however: the conviction that our life is underwritten by God, so that humble critique does not 
simply cause the silliness of everything to emerge: it vilifies social values for the sake of what 
really matters. It constitutes a reconfiguration of values rather than simply making it easier to 
live with those we have.
It was argued above that the ability to see ourselves as ridiculous produces social and 
personal transformation, and not necessarily both at the same time. We become flexible both 
in order to adapt ourselves to the state of normality we are presented with, and for the sake of 
re-thinking our mode of being in society. The contingency of the self may serve stability as 
well as revolution.
Critchley’s reading of humour bears out the double implication. On the one hand, he 
embraces  it  as  a  kind  of  critical  social  anthropology  that  relieves  us  of  shared  cultural 
assumptions.149 On the other, he posits it as a celebration of all the standards by which we 
judge ourselves. He accepts that we are confined by our conditions – that we are wretched 
beings  –  and sees  humour  as  therapy for  the  acceptance  of  these  conditions.  These  two 
functions of humour – of consolation and liberation – are in tension throughout his account, 
and nowhere more strongly than in its conclusion:
For me, it is this smile – deriding the having and the not having, the pleasure and the pain, the 
sublimity and suffering of the human situation – that is the essence of humour. … Yet, this 
smile does not bring unhappiness, but rather elevation and liberation, the lucidity of consolation. 
This is why,  melancholy animals that we are, human beings are also the most  cheerful. We 
smile and find ourselves ridiculous. Our wretchedness is our greatness.150
We should not pass over the non-oppressive function of this conformity to our values 
too  quickly.  Conscious  conformity  to  a  non-remarkable  state  is  also  a  form  of  self-
determination for early Christian ascetics (cf. Motius above, on page 55). It is resistance to the 
community  imperative  to  excel  within  the  limitations  of  social  acceptance,  normality’s 
tempting  offer  to  try  out  your  transgressive freedom so it  can expand its  boundaries  and 
distract you from its contingency.151 Transgression and individuality are not necessarily free 
from social forces. Indeed, quite the opposite is the case in late modernity.
149 Critchley, 2002: 67.
150 Critchley, 2002: 111.
151 A theme also taken up in Žižek’s interpretation of Chesterton, in Žižek, 2005: 52.
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We laugh together at our own foolishness. The joke is on us all. We laugh in order to 
be able to conform to the requirements of our community, but the joke is only funny in the 
company of that community. If we did not laugh, others would laugh at us.
Hence the difficulty and courage inherent in laughing at our entire community. The 
critical function of humour is not guaranteed by the community. Laugh at ourselves, and no-
one minds; laugh at everyone’s shared values, and we may laugh alone. We may end up doing 
everything alone.
It takes courage to see the ridiculousness of one’s own way of being, and even more 
courage to point it out. This kind of joke risks not being laughed at. If I joke about my own 
idiosyncrasy, I may just be thought weird. A bishop joking that he is actually only wearing a 
dress because he’s an executive transvestite  might  not get a lot  of laughs in the Lambeth 
Council. Jokes about bishops installing CCTV (‘epi-scopes’) in their vicars’ bedrooms even 
less so. The one laughs at the self in a way that challenges the shared values expected in 
humour;  the  other  laughs more  directly  at  the common language of the group.  Both risk 
ostracism.
The point I am making about this courage is that it may simply be foolishness. It is 
foolish  rather  than  brave to  rush unarmed into  battle.  Is  the  transgressive  humour  of  the 
radical  critic  brave  or  foolish  if  absolutely  no-one agrees  with  her?  There  is  a  fine  line 
between transgression that is trail-blazing and self-imposed and transgression that is sad and 
lonely.152
The humility lying behind the humour of early Christian ascetics  does not depend 
upon the superhuman courage of the martyr-critic. Instead, it witnesses to a different order. It 
undermines  shared  values  because  it  has  already  experienced  the  neutralisation  of  those 
values. The humour of the holy fools is both a moral critique and a statement of fidelity to the 
Christian story.  It is both exile from the world and a struggle for the Kingdom of God. It 
denies the judgment of the world because it has heard the judgment of God.153 Humility is the 
abandonment of one ethic whilst embracing the grace of another, as abba Alonius put it: ‘that 
you be below the irrational animals, and know that they are not condemned.’154
152 The best portrayal  I know of this is to be found in the character of the founder of the order of wedding 
crashers in the film of that name, who ends up crashing funerals in order to get laid: Dobkin, 2005 (written by 
Steve Faber and Bob Fisher).
153 Barsanuphius and Iohannes,  resp.: 347: ‘Do not seek answers from anyone in regard to yourself, but create 
the answers for yourself.’
154 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XV.36 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XV.53 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Poemen 41.
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It is through this humility that the fools are holy. Freed from the pressure to be good 
and religious, the fools glory in the non-condemnation – indeed the holiness – of the physical, 
the  animal,  and  the  shameful.  So by embracing  the  scum and detritus  of  the community 
(Isidora’s  cleaning  and  Symeon’s  street  shitting),  they  portray  themselves  as  worthless 
members whilst celebrating the holy world of the new order.
[Isidora] never sat down at table or ate a scrap of bread, but she wiped up with a sponge the 
crumbs from the tables and was satisfied with the scouring from the pots.
Often,  indeed,  when  his  belly  sought  to  do  its  private  function,  immediately,  and  without 
blushing,  [Symeon]  squatted  in  the  market  place,  wherever  he  found  himself,  in  front  of 
everyone.155
All this humour is underwritten by God. Not that it is necessarily funny or successful 
(that depends on the hearer),  but it no longer sets their  self into question or puts them in 
danger of being ostracised from the new community.  They share their laughter with those 
who also gain by the redemption of the entire world – prostitutes, beggars, and children – but 
they  are  ostracised  by  those  who  have  invested  in  the  old  order  –  tradesmen,  religious 
authorities, and the learned. They nevertheless have courage for this because, like the martyrs 
of old, their lives are kept with Christ in God. The holy fool never laughs alone.
3.4.3: Humility and unserious speech
In distinction to truth-telling humour, humility – being the telos of Christian humour – 
results in no static truth about the self. In fact, the only truly humble confession is one that 
refuses to be taken seriously. Telling the truth about the self is only a means to an end for 
early Christian asceticism.
We have  portrayed  humour  as  a  mode  of  truth-telling.  It  tells  us  the  truth  about 
ourselves. Comedians portray us in an amusing light so that we may be modest in our claims 
about our place in the world, and ultimately so that we will not be disappointed with our own 
greatness.
But this truth about ourselves is always dependent upon dogma. It is not a pure refusal. 
Eddie Izzard attempts to confuse the relationship of sexuality to gender, because he subscribes 
to the dogma that these are two distinct and separate phenomena that can be configured in 
many  different  ways.  So  he  tells  the  truth  about  himself  in  terms  of  fixed  and  distinct 
155 Apoph. Patr.  (Lat): XVIII.19  Palladius,  h. Laus.: XXIV and Leontius,  v.  Sym.: IV.148.  The scatological 
element of these stories is brought out particularly well in Certeau, 1979: esp. 542f.
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determinative categories in each realm. I am heterosexual. I am a transvestite. I am butch. 
And these are categories he forces us to take seriously. He asserts his right to be a transvestite. 
He is a comedian who is deadly serious about the truth concerning himself.
The truths that Critchley gains from humour are altogether more cosmological. It is 
not simply a case of displacing ourselves in the values of the world. Humour posits our limits. 
It places us in relation to transcendence and bodiliness. It describes ‘the eccentricity of the 
human situation’:
between  beasts  and  angels,  between  being  and  having,  between  the  physical  and  the 
metaphysical. We are thoroughly material beings that are unable to be that materiality. Such is 
the curse of reflection, but such also is the source of our dignity. Humour is the daily bread of 
that dignity.156
There is no one truth central to all humour, and Critchley’s account does not imply 
such a single truth either. However much he generalises here, this kind of insight is only 
applicable  to  one  particular  kind  of  humour,  namely  the  risus  purus of  which  he  is  so 
enamoured. Nevertheless, it would be no exaggeration to claim that each instance of humour 
rests upon a dogma. At the very least, to the extent that humour is a technique of the self in 
the  way described  above,  it  is  also  dogmatic  concerning  the  self.  The  question  is,  does 
Christian humility follow humorous modesty in positing such dogma?
One  key  moment  of  transformation  in  the  European  journey  from  Socratic  self-
government through Christian humility to modern therapy is the book on pastoral care by 
Pope  Gregory  the  Great.157 Here  he  gives  practical  advice  on  how bishops  and  spiritual 
directors should live and speak in order to direct their people well. The work’s third book (out 
of four) is divided up into chapters on human characteristics and addresses how these affect 
the way in which people are to be directed. The characteristics are set out in pairs: men and 
women, poor and rich, joyful and sad, lovers of strife and peacemakers, and so on. In each 
case, the identity of the person (as joyful, female, peacemaker, etc.) is assumed before the 
direction can take place.
If we set to one side the historical development of this passage – its use in European 
Mediaeval government, Episcopal visitatio, and thence to modern juridical procedures158 – the 
technique’s grammar is clear. The truth about people is taken for granted rather than given 
156 Critchley, 2002: 109.
157 Gregorius, Lib. Reg. Past.
158 Foucault, 2002[1973]: 46-52.
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them, and they are governed towards further virtue. Telling the truth about the self is a means 
to a further end rather than an end in itself. In other words: the injunction to ‘know yourself’ 
is neither the final desire (as in modernity) nor the final moral objective (as in antiquity).
More often than not, the advice to be given to people distinguished by a particular 
human truth is that they should not allow themselves to be defined by it. They should live as 
if the truth about them was not determinative for their life and practice. The joyful and the sad 
should not be essentially so, but flexible:
Differently to be admonished are the joyful and the sad.  That is, before the joyful are to be set 
the sad things that follow upon punishment; but before the sad the promised joyful things of the 
kingdom.  Let the joyful learn by the asperity of threatenings what to be afraid of:  let the sad 
bear what joys of reward they may look forward to.159
The wise and the dull are similarly warned to act independently of their knowledge; 
the patient and the impatient are warned to be ignorant of their own endurance of hardship; 
the talkative and silent are warned to hold to the truth rather than to the opportunity to speak. 
The  admonitions  are  more  than  so  many  golden  means.  They  exhort  people  to  refuse 
caricatures of humanity.  They distract people away from silly descriptions and towards the 
mystery of the indescribable divine.
Successful humility will therefore shrug off the truth about the person. It no longer 
takes  confession  seriously.  The  humble  ascetic  does  not  expect  her  words  to  provide  a 
solution to the problem of truth. The unserious self is relieved of the obligation to speak the 
truth about the self. It does not set itself up as a judge of statements about itself. It does not 
feel bound to adhere to a particular view of the self. It has renounced judgement and refuses 
to take itself seriously:
A brother asked Poemen, ‘How ought I to behave in my cell in the place where I live?’ He 
answered, ‘Be as prudent as a stranger; and wherever you are, do not expect your words to be 
taken seriously when you speak, and you will find peace.’160
At this point, the practice of being a fool can be universalised. For all Christians are 
fools to the extent that they do not know the truth – refuse to know – the truth about their 
moral status. The Christian is not subject to moral measurement: not good, but not condemned 
either.  Christian  words  carry  no  burden  of  truth,  as  they  come  from  the  frivolous  and 
159 Gregorius, Lib. Reg. Past.: III.3, admonition 4, translation modified.
160 Apoph. Patr. (Lat): XV.33 = Apoph. Patr. (Gk. syst.): XV.49 = Apoph. Patr. (alph): Poemen 191/S4.
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forgivable source of displaced amorality.161 The Christian is shown kindness but released from 
the demand to be serious.
This is the force of being a stranger in the world. Not only to accept rejection,  to 
renounce attachments and obligations, to adhere to a different set of values. But also to expect 
to be misunderstood, to be indifferent to the judgement and truth games that you inhabit. All 
this because one accepts another order, another truth, rather than simply nihilistically denying 
the validity of the truth about the self offered by governors and insulters. And the other order 
can be witnessed in anyone, so that everyone should be taken seriously.
Has someone insulted you? Bless him. Has he struck you? Suffer it. Has he despised you and set 
you at naught? Reflect that you are made of earth and that you will return to the earth. Whoever 
arms himself beforehand with these considerations will find that every insult falls short of the 
truth.162
It is for this reason holy fools do not simply deal out insults and biting home truths to 
the people they meet.  They also accept  every appellation,  every insult  they are dealt,  not 
seriously, but playfully. They accept the accusations (adulterer, idiot, wretch, madman) and 
fling them back again,  calling  everyone idiots  and madmen.  By offering no resistance  to 
truths  about  themselves,  they mock  the  attempt  to  tie  them down to  particular  roles  and 
categories.
This is the element of play which is added to the apophatic criticism. The holy fools 
mock the institutions of holiness – in liturgy, power, and asceticism – and then embrace all 
kinds of truth about themselves.  But nothing sticks. Their humour aims at a humility that 
dislocates the self from truthful speech (as we argued above on page 75ff). Their speech and 
their lives are unserious, and there is no truth to be told about the holy fools.
161 The fool is defined as infinitely forgivable in Barsanuphius and Iohannes, resp.: 68.
162 Basilius, hom. 10.
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Conclusion
The recurring theme in this study has been that the holy fools make up a critique of 
early Christian asceticism from within the movement. They are to be understood as embracing 
and perfecting the religious vocation. They ascetically undermine asceticism.
But this  much was stated in the introduction:  we need to discover the holy fools’ 
continuity with the ascetic background in order to establish their holiness, and discontinuity to 
locate  their  foolishness. It is a necessity of historical investigation that any description of 
historical phenomena in their context will always point out the continuity and difference of 
the object of its study. Without the former, no frame of description is possible; without the 
latter, no object is discernible to later tradition.
Even the incarnation is to be framed as an understandable contribution to the history of 
the people of Israel, and the annals of the Roman Empire, with similar precedents (Judas the 
Galilean, the kings and prophets of Israel) and similar successors (Paul, Peter, Francis). It is 
part of the scandal of the cross that it  was just one more sign of the power of Rome. An 
historical phenomenon needs to be isolated before it may be described however, and this is 
done by noting its discontinuity.  The most radically transforming events in history like the 
French Revolution and the conversion of Constantine are noticeable because they mark a 
transition from a past in which they take part – feudal society and the Roman Empire – into a 
future which they initiate – the French republic and the Holy Roman Empire.  The events 
themselves, though causing radical transformation, are entirely continuous with the history to 
which they contribute.
So in order to answer our question of the significance of the deployment of madness in 
the Christian experience of madness, we had to ask, in turn, in what particular ways did the 
holy fools and their hagiographers assume the holiness of early Christian ascetics, and how 
did they critique it? What specific features were constants, and what was changed? Hence our 
task of drawing up the shared features  and transformations  fools worked on the tradition 
functioned not simply to define their  holiness and foolishness, but also to carve out their 
historical specificity.
In  examining  the  practices  of  norms,  we discovered  that  the  holy  fools  and their 
predecessors held in common the will  to  transcendence.  The spiritual  techniques  of early 
Christian ascetics were an exercise in gaining control of, and even obliterating, their need for 
food,  clothes,  sex,  and  other  necessities  of  life.  This  included  the  need  to  feel  moral, 
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manifested in the passion of vainglory. There were those who radically rejected these needs, 
and those who moderated them, catering to them in specific forms. Some fasted for weeks, 
some ate only once a day, and others chewed grass. Some took the habit, some wore only bad 
clothes,  and  others  got  naked.  In  time,  however,  monasticism  gained  a  specific  form 
throughout the East, with recognisable attire, and well-defined eating habits.
The holy fools expressed this will to transcendence by controlling their needs in other 
ways.  Whilst monks fasted according to the church year, holy fools paraded sausages and 
cakes on fast days, and ate inhuman quantities of beans. Christian ascetics controlled their 
need  to  feel  moral  by  eschewing  extreme  asceticism;  holy  fools  by  secrecy  and  mental 
dissociation. They did not acknowledge the new religious order.
We  can  summarise  the  holy  fools’  challenge  to  ascetic  norms  in  terms  of  their 
continuing the practice of becoming a stranger. As Anthony became estranged from city life 
and  embraced  the barren  desert,  the  holy fools  become estranged from religious  life  and 
embrace the unreflective life of the distracted fool. They have no time to know if they are 
good or who they really are. Their lives are a secret even to themselves.
The practice of knowledge revealed further continuities and divergences. Many early 
Christian ascetics had espoused a way of generating knowledge through a form of semiotic 
critique around the practice and control of the passions. Through questioning the significance 
and semiotic system of their representations, they force alternative knowledge and construct 
new taxonomies of signification and practices of thought.
The holy fools are presented as already dispassionate, as not part of the systems and 
desires that tempt us to represent the world in terms of acquisition and pleasure. They do not 
recognise distinctions of male and female, economic and moral evaluation, friend and enemy. 
However, neither do they recognise the practices that form new taxonomies of knowledge: 
they disrupt liturgy, mock religious authority, and play around religious language.
Whilst this may appear as a mere practical renunciation, consideration of problems of 
apophaticism make us aware to the practices of reason that allow us to conceptualise both the 
things we describe, and the attributes we predicate of them. The holy fools make a concrete 
contribution to theology by denying the location of holiness, modifying the force of attributes 
such  as  holiness,  dispassion,  and  goodness.  Their  practice  enacts  the  critique  of  the  via 
negativa – by not recognising the authority and God-reference of religious practice – and that 
of the via dissimilis – by playing at being holy amongst those assumed unholy and ungood.
217
Describing the holy fools’ continuity with and transformation of the Christian tradition 
in terms of a practice of negative theology is not meant to imply that their contribution is 
merely practical.  Instead,  their  critique  has  a  double  thrust:  against  those  apophatic 
theologians  that  have  not  considered  the  force  of  their  forms  of  life,  and  against  those 
practical and ascetic theologians that have not been sufficiently critical in their apophaticism.
Much has now been said concerning the way in which early Christian ascetics and 
holy  fools  configure  the  relation  between  self  and  society.  Their  attitude  is  one  of 
renunciation: the abandonment of the norms and knowledge of society.  They refuse to be 
placed. However, the renunciation of any community,  and the recommendation that others 
renounce it, is the first step towards founding a new community,  with specific and human 
forms of life every bit as contingent and placed as the one renounced, although not necessarily 
as secular.
The dilemma of monasticism that we noted concerns the problem of ecclesiological 
universalism: should everyone be a monk? If so, then everyone will be obliged to exert the 
tremendous force of monastic holiness upon themselves for the sake of self-transformation. If 
not, then this force – with all its political and personal consequences – is denied an entire 
group of people. The dangers of leaning in either of these directions can be noted in the way 
critique  slips  into  dogma  that  define  the  self,  spiritual  exercises  slip  into  rigid  forms  of 
control, and free-speaking agents slip into powerful moral experts.
The holy fools may not be able to work themselves free of these dilemma: the later 
holy fools tradition in Russia and the Byzantine empire stemmed largely from the story of St 
Andrew the Holy Fool, who certainly posed as an expert that plied his trade in controlling 
people through his holy foolishness, and his way of life was modelled on the earliest holy 
fools  (especially  Symeon).  However,  the  early  fools’  refusal  to  take  disciples,  their 
unknowledge concerning holiness, and their espousal of continuous critique and renunciation 
are at least attempts to avoid the asceticism of hegemony and aristocracy.
All these considerations lead us to reconceptualise the role of humility in negotiating 
the self’s relation to society. Humility may of course serve either stability or revolution: it 
may bracket the self in order to embrace normality, or it may bracket society’s demands on 
the self for the sake of the individual’s way of life. It may also construct an infinite demand at 
the heart of civil society, as it may constitute the condition of sanity and the touchstone of 
good morals,  but it  is driven by a contradiction.  ‘I am humble’  is  ungrammatical.  So the 
requirement  of  humility  can  never  be consciously  fulfilled.  The practice  and theology of 
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humility that has been developing in this study of holy fools and Christian ascetics has a 
number of features that address this problem. Humility is driven by another order, and so 
requires  no courage;  it  is  practiced  by faithfulness  to  the Christian  story rather  than  any 
specific truth of the self; it is critical of systems of evaluation; it refuses to adhere to the 
seriousness of a substantial self.
The experience and theology of holiness is shared and transformed by early Christian 
ascetics and holy fools. They share the practice of the transformation of norms, knowledge, 
and the self’s relation to society. The holy fools modify this practice by continuing it where it 
had created new forms and given the impression of necessity and exclusive holiness. They 
retain the theology of holiness that denies its centre and circumference, by mocking the holy 
and laughing with the unholy.
The holy fool therefore adheres to a practice of theology that refuses to believe the 
myths and assurances that tell them they have arrived. It is true: they are lies. They wander 
the  cities  and  religious  communities  of  late  antiquity  laughing  at  themselves  and  others, 
rejoicing in the ridiculousness and unseriousness of the search for holiness. The search for a 
way to be unknowingly good.
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